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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines women’s reproductive rights litigation before the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights and determines how the Inter-American System can more 
effectively take account of, and repair, harms specific to women in reproductive rights 
cases. The research conducted in this thesis builds upon a growing body of literature on 
women’s rights in the Inter-American System, and provides an original contribution by 
employing feminist socio-legal methodologies to identify the structural obstacles which 
cause violations of women’s reproductive rights, and to challenge the gap between gender-
based rhetoric and reparation in women’s reproductive rights cases. The thesis centres 
around three specific women’s reproductive rights cases, which are critically examined 
using the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations developed by Ruth Rubio-Marín and 
Clara Sandoval. In applying this Approach to the case studies, it is possible to determine 
how, to what extent and to what effect, each reproductive rights case incorporates gendered 
harm in its reparation design.  
This research utilizes doctrinal and empirical research methods to draw conclusions about 
how the Inter-American System and members of civil society such as women’s rights 
organizations and litigators can expand upon and improve the Inter-American System’s 
approach to repairing and eliminating violations of women’s reproductive rights. Through 
information gathered from interviews with actors familiar with the case studies and the 
Inter-American System, this thesis determines a number of strategies to improve the 
transformative potential of reparations issued by the Inter-American Commission and 
Court. These strategies, when combined with the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations, 
establish the foundation on which to develop a “gender reparations tradition” within 
reproductive rights litigation before the Inter-American System of Human Rights.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
  INTRODUCTION 
 
The project of including a gender perspective within international human rights law is one 
that has been purposefully undertaken by the international human rights community for 
more than three decades.1 While it is undeniable that much progress has been made through 
advocacy and litigation!efforts to protect, promote and fulfil women’s human rights, there 
remain significant shortcomings in the application of international human rights law as it is 
employed to address and challenge structural conditions of gender-based discrimination and 
inequality. This thesis examines women’s reproductive rights within the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights, and is founded on the following question: how can human rights 
law, as it is enshrined within the Inter-American System of Human Rights, be transformed 
to effectively take account of and repair harms specific to women in reproductive rights 
cases?  
 
The Inter-American System of Human Rights has increasingly become a forum for the 
advancement of women’s reproductive rights. As a judicial venue, the Inter-American 
System is limited in its ability to transform the lives of women, but it is also in a unique 
position to apply regional and international human rights law to women’s experiences with 
discrimination, inequality and violence. As Cabal, Roa and Sepúlveda asserted, “despite 
limitations at both the national and international levels, the courts can provide excellent 
venues for bringing about change, especially when a disconnect exists between 
international, constitutional, or legislative norms and the reality of women’s lives”.2 The 
progress made in the realm of women’s reproductive rights is not solely a litigation project, 
it  is also very much connected to national level activism, as well as transnational efforts to 
demand women’s autonomy and reproductive health rights. However, this thesis argues that 
the Inter-American System of Human Rights is presently ineffective in how it interprets, 
addresses and subsequently redresses, gender-based harm. While the Inter-American 
System has made advancements towards developing a body of women’s rights litigation 
that seeks to challenge gender-based violence and discrimination, this thesis focuses 
particularly on women’s reproductive rights in order to develop a coherent and substantive 
link between the violence against women rights framework and violations of women’s 
reproductive health rights. Although there are a number of gender-sensitive procedures and 
                                                
1 The first binding women’s rights treaty was the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) GA Res. 34/180 (1979). 
2 Luisa Cabal, Monica Roa, and Lilian Sepulveda-Oliva, 'What Role Can International Litigation Play in the 
Promotion and Advancement of Reproductive Rights in Latin America?' (2003) 7:1 Health and Human Rights 51. 
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instruments currently existent within the operations of the Inter-American System, this 
thesis seeks to reconceptualise the role and utility of reparations in order to make them 
work better for women; that is, to make them gender-based. The focus in this thesis on 
gender-based reparations directly responds to the Inter-American Court’s determination that 
reparations must be designed to address structural discrimination in cases of women’s rights 
violations.3 
  
This thesis examines reproductive rights case law emerging from the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights, and relies on doctrinal and empirical research to draw 
conclusions around how the Inter-American System can expand upon and improve its 
approach to repairing and eliminating violations of women’s reproductive rights. The 
objectives of this thesis are three-fold: (i) to provide critical analyses of women’s 
reproductive rights cases emerging from the Inter-American System of Human Rights in 
order to highlight the relationship between gender-based harm, reproductive rights 
violations and violence against women; (ii) to examine the role of reparations in 
reproductive rights cases before the Inter-American System, which includes identifying 
how the Inter-American System employs, or fails to employ, its (limited) powers; and (iii) 
to promote the development of an effective and consistent “gender reparations tradition” 
within the Inter-American System of Human Rights. While the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights engage in activities other 
than developing jurisprudence, the research presented here is primarily concerned with 
strengthening litigation processes before the Inter-American Commission and Court. Impact 
and implementation are also discussed through the case study analyses, but the primary 
intent of this thesis is to strengthen the Inter-American System’s approach to reparations in 
women’s reproductive rights cases so that they effectively take into account gendered harm 
and have the potential to transform the lives of women. 
 
This thesis contributes an original approach to the study of women’s rights and reparations 
by advocating the development of a “gender reparations tradition” within the work of the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights. Such a tradition elaborates upon the “Holistic 
Gender Approach to Reparations”,4 developed by Ruth Rubio-Marín and Clara Sandoval by 
suggesting a number of strategies for advancing gender-based reparations in women’s 
                                                
3 González et al. (‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico [2009] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. C) No. 205, 
Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. 
4 Ruth Rubio-Marín and Clara Sandoval, 'Engendering the Reparations Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: The Promise of the ‘Cotton Field’ Judgment' (2011) 33:4 Human Rights Quarterly 1062-1091. 
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reproductive rights cases. While Rubio-Marín and Sandoval also examined women’s rights 
and reparations within the context of the Inter-American System, this thesis takes a different 
approach: (i) it examines women’s reproductive rights cases and does so by incorporating 
information obtained from interviews with actors directly involved in the cases, as well as 
representatives from women’s rights organizations and the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights; (ii) it explores how and why women experience violations of their 
reproductive rights by providing a contextual background for each case analysis; (iii) the 
analysis of case law conducted throughout this research is developed through the lens of 
gender-based harm, which contributes a distinctly feminist approach to critiquing women’s 
reproductive rights protections, and also strengthens feminist arguments about the duty to 
prevent gender-based harm; and (iv) this thesis develops practical strategies for actors to 
employ when developing women’s reproductive rights cases, that when combined with 
Rubio-Marín and Sandoval’s Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations, advance a “gender 
reparations tradition” before the Inter-American System of Human Rights. 
 
The cases selected for this research project are emblematic in nature, and represent 
violations of women’s reproductive rights on a massive scale.5  The first case study 
examines María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru,6 which was a Friendly Settlement 
Agreement. This case remains open before the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, and was selected because it addressed the coercive sterilization of thousands of 
Peruvian women, and because the Agreement included an analysis, albeit limited, of 
sociocultural discrimination as a cause of women’s reproductive rights violations. The 
second case, Paulina del Carmen Jacinto Ramírez v. Mexico, 7  was also a Friendly 
Settlement Agreement, but in this case the State and the victim reached an agreement before 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights formally admitted the case. The case 
was an abortion rights case that highlights the restrictions women and girls face when 
attempting to access their legal rights to abortion services. The Inter-American Commission 
closed this case, despite the fact that the State of Mexico failed to comply with all of the 
measures of the Friendly Settlement Agreement. The analysis conducted of each of these 
Agreements highlights the potential of the Friendly Settlement Agreement mechanism to 
transform the reproductive lives of women through gender-based reparations. The final case 
                                                
5 See, Appendix A for case study selection information. 
6 María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru [2003] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 12.191, No. 
71/03 Friendly Settlement Agreement. 
7 Paulina del Carmen Jacinto Ramírez v. Mexico [2007] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Petition 
161–02, Report 21/07 Friendly Settlement Agreement. 
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study, Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica,8 was selected for analysis because it is, at this 
point, the Inter-American System’s only binding reproductive rights judgment, and as such, 
it is the first glimpse into the Inter-American Court’s approach to repairing gender-based 
harm in a reproductive rights case. This case examined the right to in vitro fertilization for 
heterosexual married couples in Costa Rica, and is especially significant because the Inter-
American Court expanded the definition of reproductive health, and included an analysis of 
the disproportionate impact of gender stereotyping on the lives of women.  
 
Through the analyses conducted of the aforementioned reproductive rights cases, this thesis 
puts forth potential strategies, that when combined with Rubio-Marín and Sandoval’s 
Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations, establish a foundation for the development of a 
“gender reparations tradition” within women’s reproductive rights litigation before the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights. The strategies identified throughout this thesis 
respond to missed opportunities derived from each of the case studies. First, the case study 
analyses reveal the benefit of applying alternative rights concepts, such as the concepts of 
proyecto de vida (life project) and vida digna (dignified life), to women’s reproductive 
rights litigation. These themes are introduced in section 3.2.2, and are discussed in each 
case study conclusion. Second, the analysis conducted of the Paulina del Carmen Jacinto 
Ramírez v. Mexico case highlights the potential for enhancing the role of civil society 
within the design of reparations issued by the Inter-American Commission and Court. The 
current role of civil society is discussed in section 3.2.1. The third suggested strategy is the 
development of a multi-faceted approach to rights in reproductive rights cases, which 
requires a conceptualisation of rights as they are indivisible and complementary. This 
approach is introduced in section 2.1.2, and is a strategy derived from the analysis of the 
María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru case in chapter four. The final strategy builds 
upon the multi-faceted approach to rights to articulate the necessity of developing the 
structural context of women’s reproductive rights violations and gendered harm through the 
violence against women framework; the Convention of Belém do Pará.9 This strategy was 
identified through analysis of the Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica case, and is 
introduced in section 2.1.2, as well as in relation to the principle of due diligence in section 
3.1.1. While acknowledging that there are certainly a number of other strategies available 
for establishing a “gender reparations tradition” within women’s reproductive rights 
                                                
8 Artavia Murillo et al. (‘In vitro fertilization’) v. Costa Rica [2012] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. C) 
No. 257 Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
9 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women 
(‘Convention of Belém do Pará’) OASTS (1994). 
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litigation before the Inter-American System, the strategies identified through this research 
correspond to lessons learned from analysis of the selected women’s reproductive rights 
case studies. In order to provide the foundation on which this research was built, the 
remaining sections of this introductory chapter present the methodology and methods 
employed throughout this thesis. The final section of this chapter introduces the thesis 
structure and outlines the objectives of each of the chapters. 
 
1.1 Methods and Methodology 
The research conducted for this thesis used feminist socio-legal research methods, which 
entail a coupling of social research methods and feminist legal theory. According to Samia 
Bano, feminist social research, “seeks to understand the relationship between the 
experiences of women as complex, multiple and dynamic, and which can only be 
understood in interaction with other identities and social structures”.10 The aims of feminist 
legal theory coincide with those of feminist social research, that is, as Martha Fineman 
suggested, feminist legal theory has “the objective of raising questions about women’s 
relationships to law and legal institutions”.11 Feminist socio-legal research methods were 
employed throughout this research in order to raise questions about the relationship between 
women’s rights and the Inter-American System of Human Rights, with specific regard to 
repairing gendered harm in reproductive rights cases. This section introduces the feminist 
methodology and research methods that inform the research conducted within this thesis. 
The first part on methodology examines feminist socio-legal theory as a lens to explore the 
power of law in women’s lives, and introduces feminist methodologies suggested by Hilary 
Charlesworth which are employed throughout this thesis: searching for silences and world 
travelling. The discussion of methodology also positions the researcher within the greater 
research project. The second part of this section presents the methods used to conduct this 
research. 
 
1.1.1 Methodology: Feminism and the Law 
Feminist social research and feminist legal theory are both concerned with unpacking and 
reconceptualising relationships between women and institutions. The relationship between 
women and the law is contentious because, as Hilary Charlesworth contended, law was 
                                                
10 Samio Bano, “Standpoint’, ‘Difference’ and Feminist Research' in Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Theory 
and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing 2005) 91. 
11 Martha Albertson Fineman, 'Introduction' in Martha Albertson Fineman and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen (eds), At the 
Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory (Routledge 1991) xi. 
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“built on the silence of women”,12 and is therefore deaf to the needs of women. As Fineman 
explained, because the law is an institution that ignores women, it “can and should be the 
object of feminist inquiry, [but] to position law and law reform as the objective of such 
theorizing is to risk having incompletely developed feminist innovations distorted and 
appropriated by the historically institutionalized and inextractable dictates of the ‘Law’”.13 
This means that while there is certainly great benefit and utility in developing a theoretical 
response to the restrictions of law, particularly in regards to women and gender, feminist 
researchers face the risk of assimilating to fit within the confines of the (white male) legal 
institution. As Carol Smart warned, “law is so deaf to core concerns of feminism that 
feminists should be extremely cautious of how and whether they resort to law”.14 Feminist 
methods and methodology work to alleviate the risk associated with entering into the 
quagmire of critiquing the experience of women within the institution of law. 
 
Feminist socio-legal methodology combines the study of women’s lives (socio) with the 
study of women’s lived experience with the law (legal). Martha Fineman provided an 
overview of the benefits of adopting and applying feminist methodology to research on 
women and the law, the following of which are most relevant to this research: (i) feminist 
methodology is informed by women’s experiences and is often critical of paradigms that 
have historically excluded women from legal thought; (ii) feminist work critically evaluates 
the “fundamental concepts, values and assumptions embedded in legal thought”; (iii) 
feminist methodology aims “to present alternatives to an existing order”; and (iv) feminism 
is evolutionary in nature; “at its best (feminism) represents a contribution to a series of 
ongoing debates and discussions which take as a given that ‘truth’ changes over time as 
circumstances change”.15 This thesis applies the above aspects of feminist methodology in a 
number of ways. First, the research conducted for this thesis relies on women’s experiences 
(reproductive rights cases) before a legal institution (the Inter-American Human Rights 
System) to determine how, why and to what extent human rights law excludes women’s 
reproductive rights from legal thought before the Inter-American Commission and Court. 
Second, by analysing the application of human rights law to violations of women’s 
reproductive rights, this thesis critically evaluates and confronts assumptions embedded in 
legal thought that reify rather than challenge gender stereotypes about women and their 
roles in society. Third, this thesis argues for a reconceptualization of how the “existing 
                                                
12 Hilary Charlesworth, 'What are “Women’s International Human Rights?”' in Rebecca J. Cook (ed), Human Rights 
of Women: National and International Perspective (University of Pennsylvania Press 1994) 60. 
13 Fineman, Boundaries of Law (n 11) xv. 
14 Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge 1989) 2. 
15 Fineman (n 11) xiv-xv. 
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order” repairs gendered harm in women’s reproductive rights cases, and calls for the 
development of a “gender reparations tradition” within the work of the Inter-American 
System. Finally, this thesis relies on the evolutionary nature of feminism in order to make 
claims about how to change current practices within women’s reproductive rights law 
litigation. This thesis is itself a contribution to “ongoing debates and discussions” about 
how to insert feminism into human rights law.  
 
Feminist interpretations of the law, and international human rights law more specifically, 
are concerned with the perceived neutrality and power of the law as it impacts women’s 
lives. Feminist legal theorists argue that law is gendered; that is, law is inherently male, and 
contend that the inherent masculinity of law makes it nearly impossible for the application 
of law to be gender-sensitive.16 However, the project of analysing law from a feminist 
perspective has significant benefit in terms of challenging the inherent masculine power of 
law, 17  and perhaps even reforming the way law is made/enforced/understood. While 
feminist legal theorists such as Fineman and Smart were sceptical about the potential of 
feminism to reform law, especially because the law is limited in its potential to be 
transformative, or even to initiate social change,18 the project of questioning and exposing 
law’s claim to objectivity requires that gender become a universal category of legal 
analysis.19 In order to challenge the objectivity of human rights law as it is applied to 
women’s reproductive rights in the Inter-American System of Human Rights, this thesis 
employs two feminist methodologies: searching for silences and world travelling. The 
following section introduces these feminist methodologies. 
 
Methodologies: Searching for Silences & World Travelling 
In her work, Feminist Methods in International Law, Hilary Charlesworth suggested two 
feminist methodologies that allow feminist researchers to question the objectivity of law 
(searching for silences) and respond to the many differences among women (world 
travelling). 20  It is necessary to introduce each of these methodological approaches because 
they are deployed through the analysis this thesis provides of the Inter-American System’s 
interpretation of reproductive rights law, as well as in discussions of why women experience 
                                                
16 Robin West, Caring for Justice (New York University Press 1997) 97, and Catharine A. MacKinnon, Women’s 
Lives, Men’s Laws (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2005) 32. 
17 Smart (n 14) 2. 
18 Fineman (n 11) xv, and Smart (n 14) 2. 
19 Hilary Charlesworth, 'Feminist Methods in International Law' (2004) 36 Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 159. 
20 Ibid 162-168. These concepts first originated in Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of 
International Law: A Feminist Analysis (Manchester University Press 2000) 49-52, but were elaborated upon in 
‘Feminist Methods in International Law.’ 
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violations of their reproductive rights. The first methodological concept, searching for 
silences, begins with the premise that “all systems of knowledge depend on deeming certain 
issues as irrelevant or of little significance”.21 Within the construction of international law it 
is apparent that the absence, or rather the silence of women, permeates all of law’s rules, 
structures and norms. While human rights law has made space for women over time, 
Charlesworth argued, “by and large, when women enter into focus at all in international 
law, they are viewed in a very limited way, often as victims, particularly as mothers, or 
potential mothers, in need of protection”.22 This assertion holds true when applied to 
women’s rights litigation before the Inter-American System because there exists a tendency 
to stereotype women as mothers when determining violations of their reproductive rights. 
As human rights institutions increasingly make space for women’s rights issues, it is 
essential that feminist researchers search for silences hidden within what appears to be 
gender-based reasoning, rhetoric and reparation. Charlesworth explained one of the 
techniques for identifying and decoding the silences of international law is to “pay attention 
to the way that various dichotomies are used within its structure”.23 She claimed that 
international legal discourse is based on a series of distinctions: “objective/subjective, 
legal/political, logic/emotion, order/anarchy, mind/body, culture/nature, action/ passivity, 
public/private, protector/ protected, independence/ dependence”,24 where the first term in 
each of these dualisms reflects “male” characteristics, and the second term is “female”. 
Charlesworth noted that much like most systems of knowledge, international law values the 
first half of each of these dualisms more than its counterpart.  
 
The public/private divide is especially useful for identifying silences in international human 
rights law because it highlights how international law is not neutral or objective in its 
design or application. In dividing the public and private spheres there are inherent 
consequences for women because the law has historically neglected to address issues that 
disproportionately impact women in the private arena, such as gender-based violence and 
discrimination. The law is silent to women’s violations occurring in the private sphere 
because this is an area that is understood to be self-regulated; however, social and cultural 
                                                
21 Ibid 162. 
22 Ibid 163. 
23 Ibid 163. 
24 Ibid 163. The following dichotomies can also be included within the analysis of “male” and “female” 
dualisms/characteristics: state/ civil society, market/family, self/other. See, Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: 
‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy (Methuen Young Books 1984) 56, and Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable 
Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (Hart Publishing 1998) 78. 
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norms are in fact their own form of regulation.25 When the law has been silent to women’s 
rights violations in the private sphere it effectively “blots out the experiences of […] 
women” and ultimately silence their voices within law.26 While the public/private divide 
silences women’s voices and experiences within the law, the argument can also be made 
that there is value in the dualistic distinctions made between men and women and the public 
and private spheres. For example, Karen Engle explained that the private sphere is not 
inherently bad for women, and that perhaps because women’s lives are ignored in the 
private, a space may be created to accommodate private decision-making.27 She asserted, 
“women should [...] (use) the protection and the promise of the public and private, 
depending on their particular perceived needs”.28 Engle’s destabilising of the public/private 
divide requires an interpretation of the “public” as existing in the form of public provisions 
that enable women to exercise their private decisions. This articulation of the public/private 
divide is the foundation for claims made throughout this thesis that suggest the 
public/private distinction should no longer exist in the litigation of women’s reproductive 
rights. This is because states not only have a duty to prevent violations of women’s 
reproductive rights, but there also exists an obligation to provide public services and 
provisions for women to enact their reproductive health rights. This claim is one supported 
by the Inter-American Court’s determination in the Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica 
case, that a violation of the right to private life requires the state to provide reproductive 
health services.29  
 
The searching for silences methodology emphasises the need to conduct feminist research 
that has as its objective the task of challenging and dismantling the (white, Western) male 
foundation on which law is built. However, in order to undertake this enterprise, it is 
necessary to determine how the law, as it is a social construct, operates in societies that are 
both gendered and hierarchical based on the many differences amongst women. In order to 
respond to these differences Charlesworth borrowed Isabelle Gunning’s concept of world 
travelling, which requires that researchers engaged in feminist research include 
“multicultural dialogue and a shared search for areas of overlap, shared concerns, and 
                                                
25 Ciara O’Connell, 'What a “Private Life” Means for Women' in Yves Haeck, Clara Burbano-Herrera, and Oswaldo 
Ruiz-Chiriboga (eds), The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Theory and Practice, Present and Future 
(Intersentia 2015) 635; referencing Nicola Lacey (n 24) 73-78. 
26 Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’ (n 19) 164. 
27 Karen Engle, 'After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction: Strategizing Women’s Rights' (1993) 25 Studies 
in Transnational Legal Policy 148. 
28 Ibid 151.!
29Infra section 6.2.2.1.  
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values”.30 The concept of world travelling responds to critiques made of Western feminist 
theory’s tendency to erase the differences amongst women.31 Postcolonial and critical race 
feminist theorists have raised concerns with feminist analyses that neglect to address the 
various intersecting characteristics that define women, such as race, class, geographic 
location, socioeconomic status, (dis)ability, citizenship and sexuality.32 In her articulation of 
world travelling, Charlesworth referred to the work of Chandra Mohanty to unpack some of 
the challenges that come with applying “universal” western feminism to the complex lives 
of all women. Mohanty asserted, “women are constituted as women through the complex 
interaction between class, culture, religion and other ideological institutions and 
frameworks. They are not ‘women’ - a coherent group - solely on the basis of a particular 
economic system or policy”.33 Mohanty uses the concept of “imagined community” to 
articulate an idea similar to world travelling. 34  In “imagined community”, the term 
“imagined” counters the idea of “boundary”, as “boundary” is based on race, nation, colour, 
sexuality, etc. The term “community” refers to the idea of “horizontal comradeship”, rather 
than self, or individual. The concept of “imagined community” enables critique in chapter 
four about the reasons why certain types of Peruvian women were targeted for sterilization. 
 
Although Charlesworth limited her discussion on world travelling to Gunning and 
Mohanty, there are a number of other concepts that fall within this methodological 
umbrella. This thesis employs Nira Yuval-Davis’ “transversal politics” and Kimberlé 
Crenshaw’s concept of “intersectionality” to determine how and why certain women 
experience violations of their reproductive health rights. 35  Yuval-Davis’ “transversal 
politics” seeks to dismantle social hierarchies and substitute them with “notions of 
difference (that) encompass, rather than replace, notions of equality”. 36  Yuval-Davis 
asserted that notions of difference should not be hierarchical, and they should assume a 
                                                
30 Isabelle Gunning, 'Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female 
Genital Surgeries' (1992) 23 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 191. 
31 For discussion on erasing differences amongst women, see Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders: 
Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity (Duke University Press 2003), and Ratna Kapur, Erotic Justice: Law and 
the New Politics of Postcolonialism (Routledge 2005). 
32 For discussion on intersectionality, see, Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (2nd edn, 
Aunt Lute Books 1999); Norma Alarcón ‘The Theoretical Subject(s) of This Bridge Called My Back and Anglo-
American Feminism’ in Héctor Calderón and José David Saldívar (eds), Criticism in the Borderlands: Studies in 
Chicano Literature, Culture, and Ideology (Duke University Press 1991) 28-42; and Audre Lorde, ‘Age, Race, Class, 
and Sex: Women Redefining Difference’ in Beverly Guy-Sheftal (ed), Words of Fire: An Anthology of African 
American Feminist Thought (The New Press 1995) 284-291.  
33 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, 'Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse', Feminism 
Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity (Duke University Press 2003) 30. 
34 Ibid. See also, Benedict Anderson first elaborated the idea of “imagined community” in Benedict O’G R. 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso 1983). 
35 Nira Yuval-Davis, 'What is ‘Transversal Politics?’' (1999) 12 Soundings 94-98, and Kimberlé Crenshaw, 'Mapping 
the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color' (1991) 43:6 Stanford Law 
Review 1241–1299. 
36 Ibid 95. 
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respect for and acknowledgment of difference based on social, economic and political 
power. “Transversal politics” examines “conceptual and political differences based on 
positioning, identity and values”.37 This means that people who identify themselves as 
belonging to a particular group can be “positioned” differently based on other determinants, 
such as class, gender, ability and sexuality. Yuval-Davis argued that the different 
positioning of women requires that they engage in dialogue across and amongst “positions” 
in order to find a common “truth”.38 The different standpoints of women, if not recognised 
and addressed, results in “unfinished” truth or knowledge.39 The “positioning” of women is 
a theme examined in the discussion of “good” and “bad” abortion in the analysis conducted 
of the Paulina del Carmen Jacinto Ramírez v. Mexico case in section 5.2. Additionally, the 
analysis of the María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru case elucidates how women from 
different “positionings” experienced family planning policies differently based on 
determinants such as economic condition, race and culture. The concept of “transversal 
politics”, implies the need to dismantle problematic hierarchies based on gender, race, class, 
and other different “positionings”, which requires that women’s reproductive rights be 
applied equally to all women, regardless of their “position”. 
 
Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality adds a further dimension to addressing the 
differences among women in that it challenges the value of feminist theory as it applies to 
women of colour, particularly black women, because it “evolves from a white racial 
context” that is often not acknowledged or even identified.40 Crenshaw explained,  
Many of the experiences Black women face are not subsumed within the traditional 
boundaries of race or gender discrimination as these boundaries are currently 
understood, and that the intersection of racism and sexism factors into Black 
women's lives in ways that cannot be captured wholly by looking at the women race 
or gender dimensions of those experiences separately.41  
While Crenshaw applied the concept of intersectionality to Black women, it can be also 
applied to women of colour more broadly. The concept incorporates an analysis of the 
compounded impact of discrimination across multiple variables and dimensions of women’s 
lives, such as class, age, sexuality and gender identity. In her analysis of intersectionality, 
Crenshaw noted that a focus on the most privileged members of a group marginalizes those 
who are burdened on multiple levels, and ultimately obscures discriminatory claims that are 
                                                
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid.!
40 Kimberlé Crenshaw, 'Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’' (1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum 
154. 
41 Crenshaw, 'Mapping the Margins’ (n 35). 
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based on more than one level of discrimination. She warned against the “authoritative 
universal voice”, and advocated for an end to the “top down” approach to addressing 
discrimination.42 Crenshaw contended that, “placing those who currently are marginalized 
in the center (of feminist theorizing and political action) is the most effective way to resist 
efforts to compartmentalize experiences and undermine potential collective action”. 43 
Crenshaw’s concept of “intersectionality” informs the analysis conducted of gendered harm 
in chapters six and seven, and enables critique in chapter four of the compound levels of 
discrimination indigenous and poor women experienced as a result of being coercively 
sterilized. In addition, Crenshaw’s assertion that marginalized women be at the centre of 
any effort to advance women’s rights, drives claims made in sections 2.3.3 and 3.3.1 about 
the need to develop reparations that take into account the needs of the most disenfranchised 
women.  
 
The world travelling methodology requires that feminist researchers engaged in critique of 
the law determine how the law applies to different women differently. Each of the case 
study analyses conducted in this thesis argue for the need to conceptualise violations of 
women’s reproductive rights as they impact women in different ways based on their 
“position” in society. The above world travelling methodology concepts enable critique of 
the social context relevant to each case study by providing a lens through which it is 
possible to determine how and why certain “types” of women are afforded reproductive 
rights protections, while other “types” experience violations of their reproductive rights. In 
order to unearth the different ways in which human rights law silences women’s voices 
(searching for silences) and ignores the differences amongst women (world travelling), this 
thesis applies a variety of feminist theories and concepts. First, the concept of gendered 
harm introduced in chapter two informs critiques of how social and gendered harm effect 
women differently. In addition, gendered harm is the concept central to analyses of harm 
conducted through the “Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations” in each of the case 
studies. Second, chapter two provides a discussion of the public/private divide in order to 
argue that human rights law can no longer silence women through an arbitrary division of 
human rights provisions. Third, in order to reconceptualise the “existing order” of human 
rights law as it applies to women, chapter three introduces an alternative rights strategy 
which includes the concepts of proyecto de vida (life project) and vida digna (dignified 
life). Finally, each of the case study chapters apply feminist theory through a lens specific 
                                                
42 Crenshaw, 'Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex’ (n 40) 138.!
43 Ibid 167. 
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to the reproductive rights violation concerned: intersectionality enables critique of the 
forced sterilization case in chapter four; the concepts of “good” abortion and medical power 
provide a contextual background of the right to abortion in chapter five; and gender 
stereotyping informs analysis of the IVF ban in chapter six. 
 
The last part of this section serves to locate the researcher within this research project. This 
exercise requires that feminist researchers question how they produce and contextualise 
knowledge and power.44  The feminist researcher must ask herself, “who am I as a 
researcher?” “Where did I come from?” And, “how does where I come from, and who I am, 
impact how I conduct research?” These questions are necessary to identify the researcher’s 
worldview and to determine underlying bias in how the researcher shares knowledge.  
 
Locating the Researcher  
When I reflect upon the moments in my life that led to this research topic, I am pulled back 
to my second year of high school, and the day I saw a pregnant student. She was walking 
across a field towards a building specifically designated for the instruction of pregnant 
students. I was stretching during track practice alongside a hundred other students; all of us 
watching her slowly walk toward the “pregnant building”. This building was far removed 
from the high school itself, and was located next to the pigs and chicken corrals, where 
farming students diligently raised and prepared animals for slaughter. I thought to myself, 
“wow, they’re literally putting her out to pasture”. She was soon followed by several other 
heavily pregnant girls, all Latina, some with other children in tow. This experience had an 
immediate impact on me - a white girl, an immigrant, from the poor side of town, but also, 
loaded with an innate privilege that I would only later in life come to understand. 
 
I was raised in a neighbourhood of predominantly Mexican immigrants in a conservative 
Southern Californian city that can best be described as ridiculously divided along lines of 
race, class, and income. Spanglish was a language I picked up at a relatively young age, and 
I referred to my best friend’s mom as “mama”. My childhood friends and I were 
immigrants, but I would later learn there was a difference between a legal and an illegal 
immigrant. I was raised in an Irish Catholic household, and my Mom once called me a slut 
when I confessed to her that I was on birth control. I’ve been on birth control since I was a 
young teenager, I have never had an abortion, and I am not a mother. There are many 
                                                
44 Caroline Ramazanoğlu and Janet Holland, Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices (Sage Publications 
2002) 119. 
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characteristics and experiences that define me, and ultimately inform this research, but the 
ones I mention here have combined to create the desire to conduct this research. 
 
The knowledge I produce as a researcher is directly informed and biased by the information 
I’ve shared above, and in many other ways that I have not yet been able to ascertain or 
understand. In researching women’s reproductive rights in the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights, I am conscious that I am not capable of providing a truth that is applicable 
to, or representative of women living in Latin America. I can familiarize myself with 
literature on gender in Latin America, speak with Latin American women and rights 
activists, and review the facts of women’s rights cases, but I am not a Latin American 
woman, and have no place trying to present a narrative of “the” Latin American woman. 
While religion has played an instrumental role in my life, and is perhaps one of the driving 
forces behind the impetus for this research, there are very few other direct ways in which I 
can claim to have been affected by restrictions placed on reproductive health services. In 
fact, up until this point in my life I am fortunate to have been in “control” of every decision 
ever made about my body. I know nothing about being selected for sterilization based on 
the colour of my skin, where I live, or the size of my bank account. I have never been 
pregnant, so I do not know the pain of miscarriage or abortion, or the potential joy of 
becoming a mother. I grew up playing in the homes of my Mexican friends, but I know 
nothing of the institutionalized racism they experience(d) in our socioeconomically 
stratified city. I have no idea what it would feel like to be pregnant in high school, to be 
judged by my peers as I walk across the field to the pregnant building. 
 
As a researcher working on women’s reproductive rights in the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights, I am an outsider. 45 While being an outsider certainly does have its 
disadvantages, such as challenges in achieving credibility for purposes of networking and 
conducting interviews, it also comes with surprising benefits. For example, when I first 
began conducting interviews with feminists in Peru, Mexico and Costa Rica, I was nervous 
that the women who I saw as fierce feminist warriors would either decline to speak to me, 
or treat me as an outsider – I was so very wrong. Everyone I interviewed welcomed me, and 
took the time to explain their thoughts and ideas in ways that I could understand. Being an 
outsider gave me a significant amount of space to look in and see how people and 
institutions operate. Because I was unfamiliar, I came with no-strings-attached; just a 
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for Feminist Research 189-208. 
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“güerita” (white girl) researcher from the United Kingdom who wanted to understand more 
about women’s reproductive rights in Latin America. Being an outsider to the Inter-
American System and Latin America necessitated the development of research methods that 
would help bring me “inside”.  
 
1.1.2 Method: Incorporating Empirical Research 
Feminist research methods emphasize the uncovering of how institutions work in order to 
determine strategies to deconstruct, and then reconstruct, that institution “in a way that 
(does) not support or reinforce the domination of women by men”.46 In that the goal of this 
research is to reconceptualise how women’s reproductive rights are addressed (and 
redressed) within the Inter-American Human Rights System, it was necessary to first 
determine how the Inter-American System works. While there is certainly much utility in 
examining women’s rights case law and reports emerging from the Inter-American System, 
this activity alone does not provide the in-depth understanding required to argue for a new 
way of doing women’s rights within that institution. In order to develop a nuanced and 
comprehensive understanding of women’s reproductive rights in the Inter-American System 
of Human Rights, this research incorporates qualitative social science research methods in 
the form of semi-structured interviews with actors involved in and around women’s 
(reproductive) rights and the Inter-American System of Human Rights. 
 
Prior to commencing the fieldwork element of this research, I successfully obtained ethical 
approval from the University of Sussex (ER/CO213/1),47 and completed training on social 
research theory and practice at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law48 and 
health rights litigation training at Harvard University’s FXB Centre for Health and Human 
Rights. 49  As part of the ethical approval process I developed interview participant 
information and consent forms, which provided respondents with information about the 
research project as well as outlined their rights as participants.50 These forms were provided 
to potential participants via email in advance of the scheduled interviews, and also in-
person.  
 
                                                
46 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis 
(Manchester University Press 2000) 61. 
47 See, Ethical Approval Form (Appendix B). 
48 International Institute for the Sociology of Law, “Socio-Legal Research Theory and Practice: Qualitative 
Methods,” Oñati, Spain, 25 November - 5 December 2013. 
49 Harvard FXB Center for Health and Human Rights, Global School on Socioeconomics, Health Rights Litigation, 
Boston, MA, USA, 16 - 20 September 2013. 
50 See, Participant Information Form (Appendix C) and Participant Consent Form (Appendix D). 
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In the summer of 2014 I travelled to Lima, Peru; Mexico City, Mexico; and San Jose, Costa 
Rica; each country representing one of the case studies selected for this research.51 I also 
travelled to Washington DC to conduct interviews with representatives from the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. The fieldwork was structured in such a way that 
interviews with representatives from the Inter-American Court and Commission were 
conducted after the interviews with state-level actors. I conducted over 40 interviews in the 
span of ten weeks, most of which were conducted in-person either in the participant’s place 
of employment or at public locations such as restaurants and coffee shops. A small number 
of the interviews were conducted via Skype, especially for participants who were not 
currently located in the case study countries. The individuals selected for this research came 
from a number of sectors related to women’s rights, human rights, and health institutions: 
the participants included sixteen state representatives (some representing the state, some 
representing their own opinions); fifteen representatives from women’s and health rights 
organizations; five representatives from the Inter-American System of Human Rights; three 
lawyers (two of which represented victims in the cases selected for this research); and four 
medical doctors working primarily on women’s reproductive health.52 The objective of 
conducting these interviews was two-fold: first, I sought to understand how each of the 
cases developed and to identify missed opportunities in how the cases engaged with gender 
and reparations; and second, I wanted to learn from the experience of actors involved in 
these cases in order to suggest strategies for improving the utility of the Inter-American 
System as it is one of several avenues for protecting, promoting and fulfilling women’s 
reproductive rights. 
 
Upon completion of the interviews I drafted and distributed a fieldwork findings report 
entitled “Women’s Reproductive Rights in the Inter-American System of Human Rights: 
Conclusions from the Field, June - September 2014”.53 This report served the purpose of 
sharing recurring themes that emerged from the interviews, and was a way to engage in 
knowledge exchange across two levels: (i) between the researcher and the interview 
participant, and (ii) among the interview participants as a collaborative group. In that many 
of these actors do not have the opportunity to participate in open dialogue with other actors 
involved in and around women’s rights litigation, this report provided a glimpse, albeit 
                                                
51 María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru: Lima, Peru, 21 June - 11 July 2014; Paulina del Carmen Jacinto 
Ramírez: Mexico City, Mexico, 12 July - 1 August 2014; Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica and Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights: San Jose, Costa Rica, 2 August - 22 August 2014; and Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Washington DC, USA: 23 - 29 August 2014. 
52 See, List of interview participants and their organization affiliations (Appendix E). 
53 See, Fieldwork Report (Appendix F). Spanish version at https://ilg2.org/2015/05/18/reproductive-rights-the-inter-
american-system-fieldwork-report/. 
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limited, into the work and minds of other actors involved in women’s (reproductive) rights 
and the Inter-American System.  
 
It is important to personally reflect here on some of the benefits and challenges I 
encountered as an “outsider” conducting research in Latin America. First, as noted above, 
being an “outsider” provided me with a certain autonomy and independence that I would 
perhaps not have achieved as easily if I was recognized as an internal actor. However, being 
an “outsider” also made it difficult to secure interviews with high-level actors. In fact, most 
of the interviews I conducted were scheduled through word of mouth and referrals from 
other participants, a practice referred to in social research methods as “snowballing”.54 
Perhaps the greatest challenge I faced during the interview process was communication; 
while I can read and write in Spanish, my speaking ability is not at the level to conduct free 
flowing conversation. To overcome this obstacle, I partnered with local interpreters, all of 
whom were women actively involved in women’s rights issues in their countries.55 These 
women provided an essential link in terms of ensuring effective communication before and 
during the interview process, as well as provided assistance when necessary during 
transcription and translation of interviews. In addition, the benefit of their friendship cannot 
be underestimated; each of these women welcomed me into their lives and shared an insight 
with me for which I cannot adequately express my gratitude. Finally, while I feared that my 
limited Spanish-speaking ability may concern the interview participants, I quickly learned 
that the participants were more than willing to either speak in English (or Spanglish), or 
work with the interpreter to make sure their thoughts and ideas were effectively conveyed. 
While I acknowledge that this process may have been frustrating, and may have limited the 
content of the interviews, it also built a sense of comradery during the interview process 
where we managed to laugh through miscommunications and took the time to check in with 
each other to ensure our thoughts were being expressed correctly.  
 
Perhaps the most significant, and slightly unexpected benefit of conducting interviews was 
the degree to which the information I received through the interviews shifted the objectives 
and analysis of this thesis. Prior to conducting the interviews, the focus of this research had 
been on implementation of women’s reproductive rights decisions emerging from the Inter-
American System. However, following conversations with actors involved in litigation and 
with members of civil society, I realized that the implementation question was a non-starter 
                                                
54 Bruce Tranter, ‘Sampling,’ in Maggie Walters (ed), Social Research Methods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 
(2013) 111. 
55 Interpreters: Viviana Tipiani (Peru); Carolina Corral (Mexico), Muriel Vargas and Tatiana Saprissa (Costa Rica). 
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without first examining how the Inter-American System falls short in its understanding of 
gendered harm and reparation. Thus, the experience of fieldwork revealed the core theme of 
this thesis: the identification of strategies for advancing the Inter-American System’s 
approach to repairing gender-based harm in women’s reproductive rights cases. 
 
1.2 Thesis Structure  
The structure of this thesis is designed to follow the trajectory of women’s reproductive 
rights in the Inter-American System of Human Rights. Case studies form the basis of this 
research because the analysis they allow has the potential to be both tangible and practical; 
that is, through the case studies it is possible to insert feminist critiques of the law with the 
goal of identifying practical strategies for advancing women’s reproductive rights and 
redressing gendered harm. In order to effectively examine reproductive rights cases 
emerging from the Inter-American System it is necessary to first provide a foundation for 
such an analysis. This introductory chapter has served to introduce the methodological 
underpinnings of this research as well as to establish the research question that is at the 
foundation of this thesis. The overall objective of this thesis is to identify new and 
innovative strategies for repairing gender-based harm in women’s reproductive rights cases 
before the Inter-American System of Human Rights. 
 
The second chapter of this thesis, Women’s Reproductive Rights and Reparation, argues for 
the development of a “gender reparations tradition” that acknowledges the utility of human 
rights law as an instrument to repair gender-based harm and address the social nature of 
harm. The themes introduced and examined throughout this chapter are the right to 
reproductive health, gendered harm and reparations. In examining the right to reproductive 
health, section 2.1.1 first defines reproductive health as it is an aspect of the right to health, 
and is subsequently indivisible in nature from civil and political rights. Section 2.1.2 argues 
for the application of a multi-faceted approach to reproductive rights that is based on the 
inherent connections between rights such as the right to life and the right to health and the 
right to humane treatment and the right to access legal abortions. The second part of this 
chapter, section 2.2, examines the concept of harm as it is understood before the law, and 
argues for a reconceptualization of harm as it is both gendered and social. The final part of 
chapter two, section 2.3, defines reparations and argues for the design of reparations that 
take into consideration the different and specific forms of harm women experience, with a 
particular focus on confronting pre-existing conditions that cause harm, such as 
discrimination and violence against women. 
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The third chapter, The Inter-American System of (Women’s) Human Rights, introduces the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights with the objective of identifying strategies for 
injecting a gender-based approach to rights and reparations within the work of the Inter-
American System. The first section, section 3.1, provides an overview of the Inter-
American System. It introduces the regional human rights conventions directly relevant to 
this thesis: the American Convention on Human Rights 56  and the Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, or 
the “Convention of Belém do Pará”,57 with an emphasis on the rights provisions enshrined 
within these treaties and their potential for application to violations of women’s 
(reproductive) rights. This section also introduces the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights’ treaty monitoring bodies: the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Section 3.2 explores the role and evolution of 
(feminist) civil society before the Inter-American System and discusses alternative rights 
concepts for litigating women’s reproductive rights cases. The final part of section 3.2 
reviews women’s rights cases from the Inter-American Court in order to provide a basis on 
which to argue for the development of gender-based reparations in women’s reproductive 
rights cases. The final part of chapter three, section 3.3, entitled “Engendering Reparations 
in Women’s Rights Cases”, introduces Ruth Rubio-Marín and Clara Sandoval’s “Holistic 
Gender Approach to Reparations” as the framework used throughout this research to 
critically analyse case design and reparations issued in the women’s reproductive rights 
cases studies. It is also in this final section that the concept of a “gender reparations 
tradition” is introduced. 
 
Chapters four, five and six critically examine a selection of women’s reproductive rights 
cases emerging from the Inter-American System of Human Rights: María Mamerita 
Mestanza Chávez v. Peru (chapter four); Paulina del Carmen Jacinto Ramírez v. Mexico 
(chapter five); and Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica (chapter 
six). Each of these chapters represents a different aspect of reproductive rights and 
illustrates different litigation approaches before the Inter-American Commission and Inter-
American Court. The objective of examining these cases studies is three-fold: (i) to 
understand how each of these cases developed, including how the actors involved 
approached litigation before the Inter-American System, and to ultimately understand how 
the Inter-American System approaches women’s reproductive rights issues; (ii) to 
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determine strategies for advancing women’s reproductive rights through the Inter-American 
System, specifically focusing on the potential to develop gender-based reparations designed 
to redress  gendered harm; and (iii) to provide practical steps for different actors involved in 
women’s reproductive rights cases before the Inter-American System to reconceptualise 
how the law is formed and applied in the context of women’s reproductive health rights. 
The case study chapters follow a similar analysis rubric which consists of the following: (i) 
an introduction to the women’s reproductive rights case and an analysis of the preconditions 
for developing gender-based reparations as identified in Ruth Rubio-Marín and Clara 
Sandoval’s Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations; (ii) an examination of the context in 
which the reproductive rights violation occurred; (iii) a critical analysis of the case to 
determine its transformative potential using the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations as 
a framework for analysis; and (iv) an exploration of the lessons learned in each case in 
regards to repairing structural gender-based harm and developing strategies for use in future 
women’s reproductive rights cases. The critique conducted of each of these cases is 
grounded in feminist theory and is informed by case documentation and information 
obtained from interviews conducted with actors directly involved with the cases and the 
topic of women’s (reproductive) rights more generally. These cases provide insightful 
lessons, and ultimately form the basis for developing more effective strategies for repairing 
gender-based harm in future women’s reproductive rights cases. 
 
The concluding chapter draws upon the lessons learned through case study analysis and 
reviews thematic findings in order to develop strategies for advancing a “gender reparations 
tradition” within women’s reproductive rights litigation. The proposed strategies are as 
follows: (i) applying alternative rights concepts to reproductive rights litigation; (ii) 
enhancing the role of civil society in the design of reparations; (iii) developing a multi-
faceted approach to rights; and (iv) putting reproductive rights in context. Finally, the 
concluding section of this thesis speculates on the Inter-American Court’s current 
reproductive rights case, IV v. Bolivia.58 This case review applies both the Holistic Gender 
Approach to Reparations and the strategies derived from the case study analyses in order to 
determine the combined utility and benefit of these approaches in developing a “gender 
reparations tradition” that has the objective of advancing the application and efficacy of 
reparations designed to redress gendered harm in women’s reproductive rights cases. 
                                                
58 IV v. Bolivia [2014] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report No. 72/14, Case 12.655 Merits. 
CHAPTER TWO 
WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND REPARATION 
 
In order to conduct an examination of women’s reproductive rights as they are protected, 
promoted and fulfilled within the Inter-American System of Human Rights, it is first 
necessary to lay the groundwork on which to build the context for such an analysis. This 
chapter introduces key themes that provide the foundation for the forthcoming case analyses 
in chapters four, five and six. Section 2.1 defines the right to reproductive health as it is 
indivisible from other human rights and is enshrined within international human rights law. 
This section introduces Ronli Sifris’ multi-faceted approach to alleging women’s 
reproductive rights violations,1 and argues that such an approach is essential in order to 
develop gender-based reparations. Section 2.2 examines gender-based harm to the extent 
that it is acknowledged through law, and explores aspects of gendered harm such as “harms 
of invasion”, “patriarchal harm” and social harm. By examining harm, as it is both gendered 
and social, the objective of this section is to provide the theoretical underpinning for 
analysing harm in the reproductive rights case studies. This discussion is necessary to 
provide the basis for defining and examining the concept of gendered harm as it is an 
element of the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations, which is an analysis framework 
applied in each of the case study chapters. Section 2.3 introduces the concept and practice 
of reparations and more specifically of gender-based reparations within the context of 
international law. This section argues for the development of reparations in women’s 
(reproductive) rights cases that are designed using a multi-faceted approach to rights that 
not only incorporates an analysis of rights provisions enshrined in universal human rights 
conventions, but also articulates women’s reproductive rights violations through 
conventions designed to specifically address women’s rights and violence against women.2  
 
2.1 Reproductive Rights and Human Rights Law 
The right to health, which includes the right to reproductive health, is enshrined in 
numerous international human rights treaties. 3 It is a right that exists through the protection 
of economic, social and cultural rights, however it has also been interpreted through civil 
                                                
1 Ronli Sifris, 'Restrictive Regulation of Abortion and the Right to Health' (2010) 18 Medical Law Review 185-212. 
2 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women 
(‘Convention of Belém do Pará’) OASTS (1994); Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence (‘Istanbul Convention’) Council of Europe (2011); International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), GA Res. 34/180 (1979); and Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (‘Maputo Protocol’) 2003. 
3 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), GA Res. 2200A (XXI) (1966) Article 
12; CEDAW (n 2) Article 14; Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), GA Res. 44/25 (1989) Article 24; 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), GA Res. 61/106 (2006) Article 25. 
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and political rights. As human rights law evolved, the justiciability of the right to health, as 
well as other economic, social, and cultural rights, has become recognized as indivisible in 
nature from the more justiciable civil and political rights. In practice, this means that 
litigators and human rights courts have increasingly recognised the interconnected nature of 
rights, and have begun to use civil and political rights as conduits to enable violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Mónica Feria Tinta illustrated this point clearly when 
she noted, “justiciability is no longer a matter of perfectly dissecting and distinguishing the 
inseparable: ‘here is the right to life and the right to health’ or ‘here is freedom from torture’ 
and here ‘the right not to be starved’”.4 
 
This section examines the indivisible and multifaceted nature of human rights as they are 
interpreted and applied to violations of women’s reproductive health rights. The first part of 
this section provides an overview of the right to reproductive health as it has been advanced 
through international human rights law. This part is intended to locate the right to 
reproductive health within the international human rights law framework. The second part 
of this section examines the indivisible nature of human rights and argues for a multi-
faceted approach to litigating women’s reproductive health rights. This part reflects upon 
Ronli Sifris’ work on the interrelated nature of reproductive health rights.5 However, while 
Sifris argued for reproductive rights to be interpreted through civil and political rights, this 
thesis posits that a multi-faceted approach also requires that reproductive rights be 
examined through the violence against women framework. 
 
2.1.1 The Right to Reproductive Health 
Reproductive health rights exist within the right to health, and have also been interpreted 
through numerous other human rights provisions, such as the right to life and the right to 
privacy. In order to firmly establish the right to reproductive health within the international 
human rights legal framework, this section examines the right to reproductive health as it has 
been defined and interpreted through international human rights law. The analysis of the right 
to reproductive health conducted in this section reveals a disconnect between interpretations 
of reproductive health established by treaty monitoring bodies in recommendations and 
comments, and the application of human rights provisions in reproductive rights litigation. 
The overall intention of this section is to provide a contextual background for the right to 
                                                
4 Mónica Feria Tinta, 'Justicability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of 
Protection of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions' (2007) 29:2 Human Rights Quarterly 435. 
5 Sifris (n 1). 
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reproductive health so that it is then possible to argue for a multifaceted approach to 
reproductive rights litigation in section 2.1.2. 
 
The right to reproductive health is a principle element of the right to health, which is an 
argument supported by former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, 
Paul Hunt: “reproductive health is an integral element of the right to health and will have to 
be incorporated in any strategy reflective of the right to health”.6 An expansive definition of 
the right to reproductive health emerged from the 1994 International Conference on 
Population and Development (ICPD), which defined reproductive health as  
A state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and 
to its functions and processes.  Reproductive health therefore implies that people are 
able to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to 
reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in 
this last condition are the rights of men and women to be informed and to have 
access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of 
their choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which 
are not against the law, and the right of access to appropriate health-care services 
that will enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth and provide 
couples with the best chance of having a healthy infant.7 
This definition emphasised both the negative and positive state obligations required to 
effectively protect, promote and fulfil women’s reproductive health rights. For example, 
this definition of reproductive health not only required that states guarantee access to 
information, a right enshrined within civil and political rights, but also determined that 
states have an obligation to provide provisions and services for women to enact their 
decision-making rights.  
 
The right to reproductive health is also enshrined within the provisions of the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which explicitly 
guarantees women equal rights in deciding “freely and responsibly on the number and 
spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to 
enable them to exercise these rights”.8 This Convention specifies that women’s rights to 
education includes “access to specific educational information to help to ensure the health 
                                                
6 Paul Hunt, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Physical and Mental Health' (UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/58 2003) ¶50. 
7 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), ‘Report of the International Conference on 
Population and Development’ (UN Doc. No. A/CONF.171/13 1994).  
8 CEDAW (n 2) Article 16. 
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and well-being of families, including information and advice on family planning”.9 The 
CEDAW Committee also issued a General Recommendation on the right to health, where it 
asserted that “it is discriminatory for a State party to refuse to legally provide for the 
performance of certain reproductive health services for women”.10 Further to CEDAW’s 
interpretation of reproductive health, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights’ General Comment 14, suggested that a reduction in infant mortality requires, 
“measures to improve child and maternal health, sexual and reproductive health services, 
including access to family planning, pre- and post-natal care, emergency obstetric services 
and access to information, as well as to resources necessary to act on that information”.11 In 
March 2016, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights issued General 
Comment 22 on the right to sexual and reproductive health. In this General Comment, the 
Committee determined,  
The right to sexual and reproductive health entails a set of freedoms and 
entitlements. The freedoms include the right to make free and responsible decisions 
and choices, free of violence, coercion and discrimination, over matters concerning 
one’s body and sexual and reproductive health. The entitlements include unhindered 
access to a whole range of health facilities, goods, services and information, which 
ensure all people full enjoyment of the right to sexual and reproductive health.12  
Reproductive rights violations have also been interpreted as being inherently connected to 
violence and inhuman treatment. For example, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy noted, “forced abortions, forced 
contraception, coerced pregnancy and unsafe abortions each constitute violations of a 
woman’s physical integrity and security of person [...] (and) may amount to torture and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment”.13 
 
Interpretations of the right to reproductive health cross a wide spectrum of human rights, 
but such an approach is not applied to reproductive rights litigation. In reproductive rights 
litigation, the primary focus is on violations of civil and political rights. The reason for 
interpreting reproductive health rights through rights such as information, privacy, life, and 
cruel and inhuman treatment is because these rights have long been considered to be “first 
                                                
9 Ibid Article 10. CEDAW did not originally mention the phrase “reproductive health” within its women and health 
provision (Article 12). However, it did elaborate upon Article 12 with General Recommendation No. 24: Women and 
Health, General Recommendation [1999]. 
10 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24 on the Right to Health (Article 12): Women and Health, General 
Recommendation [1999]. 
11 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 August 2000). 
12 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No. 22: The Right to Sexual and 
Reproductive Health’ (E/C.12/GC/22 4 March 2016) ¶5.!
13 Radhika Coomaraswamy, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and 
Consequences: Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective (E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.4 
1999) ¶45. 
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generation rights”. Before examining the development of reproductive rights through 
jurisprudence emerging from international human rights law treaty monitoring bodies, it is 
necessary to discuss why violations of reproductive health rights have not been interpreted 
in litigation through rights provisions belonging to the “second generation rights”, 
economic, social and cultural rights.  
 
International human rights provisions have historically been divided into “generations of 
rights”,14 where the right to health has been understood as a “second generation right;” a 
right that is to be “progressively realized”,15 rather than immediately implemented. This 
division in human rights provisions is not only an outdated classification of rights, but it 
also creates a problematic hierarchy of rights. This hierarchy/division which can be 
attributed to the splitting of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights into two distinct 
human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)16 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).17 As a 
result of the separations of rights, the application and enforcement of rights belonging to the 
economic, social and cultural arena have been regarded as “more private: social, not 
political, and often not readily enforceable or implementable in the usual form rights 
take”.18 This means that rights enshrined within the “public” arena of civil and political 
rights (“first generation rights”) are regulated and enforced by international law, and 
“private” economic, social and cultural rights are essentially ignored. Feminist legal 
theorists, such as Catharine MacKinnon, argued that the division of human rights into two 
distinct generations corresponds to the public/private divide as it plays out in the application 
and interpretation of human rights law.19 That is, the private sphere is associated with rights 
such as the right to health, housing and freedom from violence, and the public sphere is 
associated with rights such as the rights to life, fair trial, and the right to vote. While the 
right to reproductive health clearly exists amongst and across both the first and second 
generation of rights, it is also a right that requires a disruption of the public/private 
distinction. This means, in terms of reproductive rights protections, that states must refrain 
from interfering in the private decision-making rights of women, and must also provide 
public services and provisions in order to enable women’s decision-making rights. This is 
                                                
14 Hilary Charlesworth, 'What are “Women’s International Human Rights?”' in Rebecca J. Cook (ed), Human Rights 
of Women: National and International Perspective (University of Pennsylvania Press 1994) 58-59. 
15 ICESCR (n 3). 
16 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) GA Res. 2200A (XXI) 1966. 
17 ICESCR (n 3). 
18 Catharine MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues (Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press 2007) 5. 
19 Ibid. 
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an argument provided above in section 1.1.1, which referred to Engle to articulate the 
benefits of the private realm for advancing women’s access to reproductive health 
services.20 While it can be argued that the division in rights no longer exists,21 reproductive 
rights litigation, particularly in the Inter-American System of Human Rights, has failed to 
interpret violations of reproductive rights through human rights provisions enshrined within 
the second generation of rights.  
 
There also exists what can be referred to as a “third generation of rights,” which Vasak 
described as “solidarity rights”. 22 This third generation of rights is concerned with, inter 
alia, minority rights, the right to self-determination and the right to development. Women’s 
rights belong to this generation of rights, where J. Olaka-Onyango and Sylvia Tamale 
argued, “women's human rights, more clearly than any other phenomenon, illustrate the 
interconnectedness of all categories of rights”.23 Women’s rights conventions such as 
CEDAW, the Istanbul Convention and the Convention of Belém do Pará,24 challenge the 
androcentric application of human rights law and the corresponding public/private and 
positive/negative dualistic rights distinctions. These women’s rights conventions 
incorporate first and second generation rights, and effectively disrupt the hierarchy of 
rights. The following overview of women’s reproductive rights jurisprudence focuses on 
cases emerging from the Human Rights Committee, which interprets the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, which interprets the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and elucidates the benefits of examining 
women’s reproductive rights violations through the “third generation of rights”. 
 
Reproductive rights jurisprudence emerging from the Human Rights Committee illustrates 
the tendency in reproductive rights litigation to develop and interpret reproductive rights 
through civil and political rights rather than economic, social and cultural rights. For 
example, in Mellett v. Ireland, 25 the Human Rights Committee recently determined that the 
State’s restrictions on the right to abortion amounted to cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, and violated the rights to privacy and freedom from discrimination. However, 
while the Committee recognised the right to abortion under international human rights 
                                                
20 Engle, supra section 1.1.1 (n 27-28). 
21 Tinta (n 4).!
22 Karel Vasak, ‘A 30 Year Struggle’, UNESCO Courier, November 1977, 29.  
23 J. Oloka-Onyango and Sylvia Tamale, ‘"The Personal is Political," or Why Women's Rights are Indeed Human 
Rights: An African Perspective on International Feminism’ (1995) 17:4 Human Rights Quarterly 711. 
24 Women’s rights conventions (n 2).!
25 Mellett v. Ireland [2016] United Nations Human Rights Committee (UN Doc CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013). 
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law,26 it did not draw any relation between the right to abortion and the right to health. The 
Human Rights Committee reached a similar conclusion in KL v. Peru,27 where it determined 
that restrictions on access to therapeutic abortion constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment and violated the right to privacy and the rights of the child, but did not make 
reference to the interrelated nature between these rights and the right to health. 
 
The CEDAW Committee has also examined violations of women’s reproductive rights in 
cases such as AS v. Hungary,28 LC v. Peru29 and Alyne da Silva Pimentel v. Brazil.30 In that 
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women is a treaty body that 
encompasses rights enshrined within the purview of civil and political and economic, social, 
and cultural rights, the CEDAW Committee has been more successful than the Human 
Rights Committee in interpreting violations of reproductive rights through a multi-
dimensional approach to rights. For example, in AS v. Hungary, a case that examined 
informed consent and sterilization, the CEDAW Committee determined that the state 
discriminated against women in relation to the right to education and the right to healthcare 
by failing to provide advice and information on family planning.31 In LC v. Peru, an 
abortion rights case, the CEDAW Committee determined, inter alia, that the state had a 
responsibility to eliminate discrimination in the field of healthcare and to modify social and 
cultural patterns that discriminate against women.32 The CEDAW Committee’s approach to 
interpreting violations of women’s reproductive rights differs from that of the Human 
Rights Committee because the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women was designed to address rights using a collective perception of human rights.  
 
Without a doubt, the right to reproductive health, and the right to health more generally, 
underpin gender equality, and ultimately impact all aspects of women’s lives. Or, put more 
succinctly, according to Rebecca Cook et al., “a woman is not a womb, but has a womb. 
Health for women is more than reproductive health”.33 The following section builds on the 
legal framework provided above to argue for the development of a multi-faceted rights 
approach to reproductive health. This approach requires that reproductive health rights 
                                                
26 ‘Amanda Jane Mellet v. Ireland – The Key Points,’ Human Rights in Ireland (2016) <http://humanrights.ie/ 
uncategorized/amanda-jane-mellet-v-ireland-the-key-points/>.  
27 KL v. Peru [2005] United Nations Human Rights Committee (UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003) ¶7. 
28 AS v. Hungary [2006] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004). 
29 LC v. Peru [2011] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009). 
30 Alyne da Silva Pimentel v. Brazil [2011] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008). 
31 Ibid ¶11.2 and 11.3. 
32 LC v. Peru [2011] (n 29) ¶9.!
33 Rebecca Cook, Bernard Dickens, and Mahmoud Fathalla, Reproductive Health and Human Rights: Integrating 
Medicine, Ethics, and Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 17. 
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violations be examined through the violence against women framework, while simultaneously 
rejecting the hierarchical division of human rights. 
 
2.1.2 Developing a Multi-Faceted Rights Approach  
The above introduction to reproductive health rights argued the necessity to develop 
reproductive health rights as they include human rights provisions across a varied and wide 
spectrum of civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights. This means, for 
instance, that while the right to access safe and legal abortion services is certainly a health 
right specific to women, it is also indivisible from the rights to life, family, privacy, 
information, freedom from discrimination and possibly even torture. In determining the 
basis for reproductive health rights, it is not beneficial to reinforce a hierarchy of rights, but 
rather it is essential that actors involved in litigation emphasise the indivisibility of rights. 
As Rosalind Petchesky asserted, “when we look at specific reproductive and sexual rights 
and the ways in which they cluster together with other rights in women’s everyday lives 
[…] deciding whether to classify such rights as ‘social,’ ‘economic,’ ‘cultural,’ or also ‘civil 
and political’ is very difficult”. 34  For Petchesky, all rights are indivisible and 
interconnected, and are “grounded in basic needs.” Ronli Sifris maintained a similar 
position, and concluded, “only a multi-faceted approach can adequately take account of the 
numerous ways in which women who are denied access to abortion (or other reproductive 
health rights) may suffer”.35 Using this argument as a foundational premise, this section 
argues that a multi-faceted approach to reproductive rights works to further dismantle the 
“generations of rights”, and also interprets violations of women’s reproductive rights 
through conventions dedicated to the protection of women’s rights and eradication of 
violence against women. 
 
Developing a multi-faceted approach to reproductive health rights requires an 
understanding of rights as they are completely indivisible and reliant upon one another. 
Sifris offered numerous examples of how the right to abortion, as it is both a reproductive 
right and an economic, social, and cultural right, is directly related to the right to life, the 
right to be free from gender-based discrimination, and the right to be free from torture. 
Sifris explained, “the relationship between unsafe abortions and high rates of maternal 
mortality form the basis for the argument that restrictions on abortion violate the right to 
life”.36 Additionally, she argued that a “woman’s right to decide matters relating to her own 
                                                
34 Rosalind Petchesky, Global Prescriptions: Gendering Health and Human Rights (Zed Book 2003) 18. 
35 Sifris (n 1) 190. 
36 Ibid 188. 
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body […] form a part of the right to privacy, autonomy, right to liberty, right to physical 
integrity, and the right to decide the number and spacing of one’s children”. 37  In 
determining the relationship between the right to be free from gender-based discrimination 
and reproductive health, Sifris explained,  
The view that laws restricting access to abortion are frequently informed by 
discriminatory assumptions about women, and that the effect of such laws is to 
further entrench women’s unequal status in society and increase discrimination 
against women, forms the basis for the argument that laws restricting abortion 
violate a women’s right to be free from gender-based discrimination.38 
Sifris connected restrictions on reproductive rights, namely abortion rights, to torture or 
cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment, by explaining that the “suffering experienced by 
a woman who is denied access to abortion services or who accesses unsafe abortion 
services”, is reminiscent of forms of torture (a most extreme manifestation of violence 
against women). Although Sifris unpacked each of these rights as they are indivisibly 
related to abortion (reproductive health) she asserted that in fact, many of the above-
mentioned rights are interrelated. For instance, the rights to life and autonomy are related to 
the right to health in that “restricting a woman’s right to bodily autonomy clearly has the 
potential to damage a woman’s health and wellbeing”.39 For Sifris, it is ineffective to 
approach reproductive health rights through a singular rights perspective. She contended, “it 
is inadequate to only consider restrictions on (reproductive health) through the lens of one 
particular fundamental right as such, a one-dimensional approach invariably results in an 
oversimplification of the ways in which women experience denial of (reproductive health 
services)”.40 By focusing on the advancement of reproductive health rights through a 
singular lens, litigators may miss out on opportunities to expand upon and dissect the 
“deep-lying imbalances of power and social structures and practices of subordination that 
characterize relations between women and men in most societies”.41  
 
Developing a multi-faceted rights approach to reproductive health necessitates a 
reconceptualization of international human rights law as it applies to women. Such a 
process requires more than recognising the interconnected and indivisible nature of rights. It 
requires a complete rejection of the outdated “generations of rights” framework, because 
this characterization of rights is divisive, hierarchical and “built on typically male life 
                                                
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid 189. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Petchesky (n 34) 11. 
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experiences and […] (does) not respond to the most pressing risks women face”.42 In 
dismantling the “generations of rights” it is possible to articulate rights protections as they 
are enshrined across and amongst collective groups, such as women’s rights, indigenous 
rights, disability rights, etc. In terms of reproductive rights specifically, a multi-faceted 
rights approach also requires that violations of reproductive rights be examined in the 
context of violence against women in order to develop an understanding of how and why 
women are denied these rights. 
 
As this thesis elucidates, violations of women’s reproductive health rights have not been 
sufficiently explored nor examined as they are inherently related to the violence against 
women framework. This is problematic because violations of women’s reproductive rights 
are inherently linked to violence against women. The concept of violence, as it is rooted in 
discrimination, violence and poverty relates not only to sexual and domestic violence, but 
also to violence as it is perpetuated by the state through the denial of reproductive health 
rights and services for women. Alaka Basu contended that violence is a problem intrinsic to 
violations of reproductive health, and as such any approach designed to address this form of 
violence “must transmit not merely the treatment of physical outcomes of such violence, but 
the methods of preventing it in the first place”. 43 Structural violence permeates all aspects 
of women’s lives, and is, as Betsy Hartmann asserted, a way of keeping women “in their 
place”.44 Violence is about patriarchal power and for women violence plays a key role in 
maintaining their subordinate status to men, which is reinforced by the state’s refusal to 
allow women control over their own bodies. The disconnect between reproductive health 
rights and violence against women within human rights law and litigation represents one of 
the ways in which the law is silent on women’s rights issues. This silence can be attributed 
to both the contentious nature of reproductive health issues, and also the failure on the part 
of actors engaged in human rights litigation to develop a truly multi-faceted approach to 
understanding how women experience violations of their reproductive rights. Perhaps the 
first step in the project of advancing women’s reproductive rights through the violence 
against women framework is to effectively incorporate the concept of gender-based harm 
into human rights law.  
 
                                                
42 Charlesworth, 'What are “Women’s International Human Rights?”' (n 14) 59. 
43 Alaka Basu, 'Situating Reproductive Health Within the Academy' in Laura Reichenbach and Mindy Jane Roseman 
(eds), Reproductive Health and Human Rights: The Way Forward (University of Pennsylvania Press 2009) 188. 
44 Betsy Hartmann, Reproductive Rights and Wrongs: The Global Politics of Population and Control (South End 
Press 1995) 47. 
!!
36 
2.2 Gendering Harm  
Harm is both social and gendered. It exists in the individual and social realms of our lives, 
and the way we experience harm is largely dependent on gender. This section examines the 
concept of gendered harm and particularly focuses on how harm is gendered and the extent 
to which the law responds to the gendered nature of harm. This section argues that it is 
necessary for the law (in this case, regional human rights law) to consider the gendered 
nature of harm in order to be able to provide gender-based reparation that effectively takes 
into account both the experience of harm, as well as the gender of harm. Section 2.2.1 
explores the law’s ‘gender-blind’ approach to harm, and discusses why the law has thus far 
been reluctant to respond to the gendered nature of harm. Section 2.2.2 examines “gendered 
harm” through Robin West’s analysis of “harms of invasion” and “patriarchal harm,” and 
section 2.2.3 discusses the social aspects of gendered harm. The social and gendered 
characteristics of harm underpin violations of women’s reproductive rights, and as a result, 
they provide a context through which to examine how and why women experience 
violations of their reproductive rights.  
 
2.2.1 Law and Gendered Harm 
The legal response to gender-based harm has been problematic in part because, as 
Conaghan suggested, there is much more effort being put into the “business of deploying 
law as an instrument for the redress of harm than [there is] to more fundamental questions 
of what precisely harm entails and how we know and recognise its occurrence”.45 For 
example, even in situations where judicial venues, that is courts and tribunals, attempt to 
explore the impact of harm as it pertains to violations of women’s reproductive autonomy, 
the analysis is often stereotypically gendered in itself: the woman is viewed as a mother, or 
a victim, rather than as an autonomous rights-holder.46 The law’s androcentric foundation 
makes the challenge of effectively developing the concept of gendered harm (and redress) 
almost insurmountable. Catharine MacKinnon suggested, “law sees and treats women the 
way men see and treat women”.47 Conaghan asserted that because the law is gendered in 
this way “women must challenge that view”.48 Conaghan argued that it is not justifiable to 
refrain from using the law because of its male-centric foundation and approach, but that 
instead the struggle to challenge the male treatment of women within the law must “take 
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place both within law and outside it, both through it and beyond it”.49 For Conaghan, legal 
system reform in respect to reconceptualising how legal systems interpret and redress harms 
specific to women, “is neither the starting point nor the end result of the feminist project 
but, as an inevitable part of that project, [the law] must be addressed”.50 Accordingly, it is 
necessary to work within the institution of international human rights law to reconceptualise 
how judicial venues define and examine harm. The objective of such an exercise is to 
engender the experience of social harm and reparations emerging from judicial venues.  
 
Leslie Bender contended that, “the meaning of responsibility in law would include a 
commitment, in advance of harm, to protecting and caring about the health and safety of 
other people. In the untoward event of harm, it would mean taking care of those harmed - 
that is, personally and interpersonally responding to the needs of harmed people”.51 While 
Bender discussed the notion of harm specifically within the confines of tort law, the 
implications for human rights law are clear: law should respond to the needs of harmed 
people, as well as prevent and protect people from harm. States must respond to harm in 
such a way that the underlying causes of harm are considered in efforts to provide redress to 
both the individual victim and the society that is at risk of experiencing the same causes and 
effects of gendered harm. Bender’s analysis of tort law and harm relates to the international 
law principle of due diligence, or indirect horizontal application. The due diligence standard 
is used to impose on states the responsibility for “violations of human rights emanating 
from non-state actors”,52 which includes "preventing, investigating and imposing penalties 
for violence against women”.53  The due diligence standard is discussed in further detail in 
relation to the Inter-American System of Human Rights in section 3.1.1. 
 
Identifying and redressing gender-based harm requires a “harm-based expansion” of the 
notion of victim, ultimately taking it beyond the individual rights holder to society-at-
large.54 It also requires recognition and prioritization of the interrelated nature of harms and 
the ways in which the widespread impact of harm affects women specifically. Rubio-Marín 
explained that the compound effect of “violence, discrimination, and exploitation that 
women and girls are subject to (the so-called ‘violence continuum’) becomes most vivid 
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when we examine the gendered nature of harms that women endure and the short and long-
term effects on their lives”.55  
2.2.2 Gendered Harm is Patriarchal and Invasive 
Feminists argue that women suffer particular harms as women because they are women. 
That is, as Robin West concluded, “women suffer in ways which men do not, and the 
gender-specific suffering that women endure is routinely ignored or trivialized in the larger 
(male) legal culture”. 56  Joanne Conaghan echoed this sentiment, and explained that 
women’s “experience of pain is distinguishable, to a large extent, from the experience of 
men”.57  In her discussion of the dimensions of gendered harm, Conaghan suggested that 
gendered harm includes “risks which women are more likely to incur than men – the risk of 
rape, incest, sexual harassment, spousal abuse or, more contentiously, the risk of harmful 
medical intervention”.58 This section examines the concept of gendered harm as it is both 
invasive and patriarchal.  
 
Robin West’s concept of “harms of invasion”59 demonstrates how women experience harm 
as it is an invasion on their bodies; whereas “patriarchal harm” is concerned with the harm 
women sustain because they live as “political inferiors, or subordinates, within a patriarchal 
culture”. 60 While West explored harm in other forms, such as “harms of separation” and 
“private altruism”, “harm of invasion” and “patriarchal harm” are representative of the harm 
experienced by the women in the case studies selected for this thesis. The intention of 
discussing “harms of invasion” and “patriarchal harm” is to illustrate the types of harm 
international human rights law has thus far failed to address, especially pertaining to the 
social and gendered dimensions of harm and human rights law’s failure to locate 
reproductive rights violations within these forms of harm/violence.  
 
Robin West defined “harms of invasion” as those harms “occasioned upon women’s 
physical bodies”.61 One of the ways women’s physical bodies are different from men’s is 
that they can become pregnant, and as a consequence, can experience the harm of unwanted 
pregnancy. West suggested that the experience of unwanted pregnancy is not only 
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gendered, but also carries the potential for distinctive gender-based harm. She provided 
several arguments to support this claim, including the physical harm women experience 
when forced to carry an unwanted pregnancy, and the harm to self-identity that women 
experience as a result of unwanted pregnancy.62 In discussing the physical harm related to 
unwanted pregnancy, West argued that this harm is a “physical invasion of the body, 
occasioned by a pregnancy, like the physical invasion of the body by sexual penetration, 
when unwanted, is itself a harm”.63 Here, West provided a correlative between women’s 
experience with rape and unwanted pregnancy that illustrates a natural connection between 
violence against women as it is commonly understood and violence against women as it is 
manifested through restrictions on women’s rights to reproductive health. 
 
Significantly, West also argued that women who experience an unwanted pregnancy find 
themselves in an “involuntary nurturant” position. The physical pain women endure in this 
position is suffered in order to ensure the nurturing of the fetus, and while in the experience 
of voluntary (wanted) pregnancy the woman may want to engage in this act of altruism, the 
experience of unwanted pregnancy is different. West described the experience of nurturing 
as an unwanted experience: “The woman who is pregnant but does not wish to be is doing 
nurturant work which she does not wish to do. […] She becomes a nurturant but unchoosing 
creature”.64 This experience of losing autonomy and the ability to make decisions as an 
individual, threatens and ultimately harms women’s selfhood and their identity. The 
physical invasion of unwanted pregnancy is in many ways subtle and insidious, as West 
articulated: “The self is not simply assaulted, or threatened, or endangered, but more 
exhaustively, is redefined as a self who gives, nurtures, pleases, or acts for others, rather 
than on the basis of one’s physical pleasures, desires, and passions, or one’s freely altruistic 
or moral decisions”.65 In losing so much of her self-identity, the woman who experiences 
the harm of unwanted pregnancy experiences the death of her subjectivity. Ultimately, West 
suggested that the harm of invasion, and in this case, the specific experience and resulting 
harm of unwanted pregnancy, is an invasive terror that causes the “cessation of selfhood”.66  
 
West’s concept of “patriarchal harm” relies on the following definition of patriarchy: “the 
social system in which men’s interests trump women’s whenever they conflict”.67 West 
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argued that patriarchy is enforced through ‘extralegal’ forces; legal and illegal private 
violence and the promulgation of a distinctly patriarchal culture. Patriarchal culture consists 
of “norms that determine the way we behave by influencing the ways we think of ourselves 
and of our fate”.68 For instance, norms that enforce heterosexual families and motherhood 
as essential aspects of a woman’s life are interwoven into the patriarchal culture in which 
women live. West argued that patriarchal control is ultimately manifested in two ways, it 
has a “terrorizing side” and an “ideological and cultural side”. She suggested that the “two 
‘faces’ of patriarchal control harm women in different and distinctive ways. The “violent, 
terrorizing side of patriarchal control” is largely hidden: “It consists of violence in the 
privacy of the home, whispered threats of coercive sexual physicality on the street, and the 
ever-present and unspoken possibility of rape.” The other side, the ideological and cultural 
side of patriarchal control, “is relentlessly public and visible”.69 In fact, it is so omnipotent, 
that it is inseparable from us. West provided examples such as childhood toys, pornography, 
romance novels and heterosexual normalcy as tools used to maintain patriarchal control 
over women throughout their lives. The harm resulting from the terrorizing side of 
patriarchal control is two-fold; not only does the harm consist of physical violence, but also 
“women sustain harm by virtue of the knowledge that these violent […] acts are largely 
unregulated by the state”.70 The harm caused by the cultural side of patriarchal control 
differs from the terrorizing side because it is a “harm done to our sense of our own 
potential, entitlements, and self-worth by virtue of a damaging set of beliefs about the 
necessity and justice of our fate”.71 This means that patriarchal harm manifests itself in the 
ways that women see themselves, and their roles in society. “It is a harm to the richness of 
inner life and the potentialities of public life occasioned by the belief […] that one’s nature 
dictates a life of relative drudgery serving the bodily needs of others”.72  
 
In that “patriarchal harm” exists through a social system, it is inherently a social form of 
harm. While the harm women experience through unwanted sex and/or pregnancy and rape 
are forms of harm done largely to women by men, in the interest of men, the beliefs that 
women are not autonomous sexual subjects and that women should be passive and sexually 
vulnerable are a very different sort of harm. These beliefs attack the very identity, or 
selfhood of women, and the harm they cause makes it impossible to view oneself as a 
victim of a patriarchal and unjust social system. As West suggested, patriarchal harm makes 
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it “difficult or impossible to view oneself as sharing with other similarly situated women a 
common interest in creating a new reality”. 73 
2.2.3 Gendered Harm is Social 
Social harm, or social injury, refers to the “pain caused by ‘hidden injuries’ of all gender-
orientated societies - that lived, internalized experience of lower gender status as personal 
failure”.74 Joanne Conaghan argued that harm is social in a number of ways: 
Harm is social in the sense that social location plays a role in determining the 
incidence and distribution of particular harms: women are more likely than men to 
be raped […] Second, harm is social in the sense that our understanding of harm is a 
product of social relations and the meanings they generate […] The notion of harm 
implies some element of social recognition; as such, it is fluid and contentious, 
shifting and changing over time.75 
The social nature of harm also implies that the harm experienced by an individual has an 
impact on greater society, especially for members of groups who share particular 
characteristics with victims of harm. For example, a woman who is raped experiences that 
harm as both an individual and as part of a larger group of women who are at risk of 
experiencing that same harm simply because they are women. Adrian Howe argued that 
women’s self-identity is inherently injured because of their lower gendered status, and that 
this injury is “not a privatized personal injury, but a social one”.76 Maureen Cain and 
Adrian Howe contended  
Harms to women […] might be better understood if they were conceptualized as 
social injuries – as injuries endured by the virtue of membership of a minority status 
group […] Harms to women as women are not sporadic, experienced by injury-
prone individuals adept in the art of victim-precipitation; they are endemic.77 
Similarly, Catharine MacKinnon, in her work on the harm related to pornography, rejected 
the idea that harm is singular and individually experienced; she claimed that privatizing 
injury fails to consider group-harm and group-effects.78 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin continued this 
line of thinking by explaining that “the concept of harm can only be effectively harnessed to 
women’s experiences when it fully encompasses the social and group effects of certain acts, 
albeit that the effects may, in the particular instance, be directed at specific women”.79 Ní 
Aoláin argued that the law has thus far been ineffective in completely understanding and 
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capturing the group nature and effect of gender-based harm, which would require a 
“dismantling and replacement [of] the legal doctrines that affirm narrow cause, limited 
effect and unsatisfactory remedies to women”.80 
 
In order for the concept of “social injury” to take hold in the legal realm, particularly as it 
applies to violations of women’s rights, the law must be applied in such a way that it 
diffuses the divide between the private and public spheres of women’s lives. Howe 
addressed this point directly:  
We need to demonstrate that the injuries we feel at the private, intimate level are 
socially-created (indeed, social) injuries before we demand that they become public 
issues. [A]nalytically privileging social injury in a feminist legal framework will 
provide a necessary step in the deconstruction of the public/private dichotomy.81  
Critical feminist legal analyses of the harm experienced by women on the individual and 
private level, must also examine structural harm that is public, social and gendered. Or, as 
Ní Aoláin contended, “a narrow focus on bodily violation can obscure the wider social 
context in which abuse occurs”.82  
 
In determining that the law is inherently ill equipped to address the gendered nature of 
harm, it is necessary to identify avenues through which it may be possible to reform the 
law’s “natural” approach; its androcentric approach to interpreting harm. The strategy 
identified in this thesis as a means of advancing the feminist project within human rights 
law is the development of gender-based reparations, as they are defined and implemented 
through international human rights law mechanisms. The gendered harm concepts of harms 
of invasion, patriarchal harm and social harm are central to the case analyses conducted in 
chapters four, five and six. Each case study analysis includes a section on identifying the 
harm within the case, and it is in these sections that the concept of gendered harm is used to 
determine how, and to what extent, gendered harm is interpreted and applied in respect to 
violations of women’s reproductive rights. Chapter four, the forced sterilization case, 
employs harms of invasion and social harm to articulate the experience of harm as it 
effected the physical bodies and individual identities of women who were coercively 
sterilised. Chapter five applies patriarchal harm, social harm and harms of invasion to 
examine the impact of harm on women and girls who were denied their legal right to 
abortion. Finally, the analysis in chapter six examines the Costa Rican IVF ban through the 
concept of social harm. Gendered harm is also referred to throughout the critique of 
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reparations issued in each of the case studies, as well as in the contextual analysis of 
intersectional discrimination in María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru,83 “good/bad” 
abortion and medical power in Paulina del Carmen Jacinto Ramírez v. Mexico84 and gender 
stereotyping in the examination of the Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica.85 The following 
section on gender and reparations in international law introduces the concept of reparation 
and also discusses the concept of gendered harm in relation to reparations in order to 
establish the foundation on which to later argue for the development of a “gender 
reparations tradition” within women’s reproductive rights litigation.   
 
2.3 Engendering Reparations in International Law 
The project of engendering reparations has been one primarily undertaken within the 
context of transitional justice mechanisms, where reparations programs are developed in the 
aftermath of conflict with the objective of repairing collective forms of harm and violence.86 
While reparations are often understood in the context of transitional justice, they are also 
employed within international law through judicial venues, where they have a tendency to 
be more focused on individual, rather than community reparation.87 One of the more recent 
and ever-increasing critiques of reparation programs and reparations, has been the failure on 
the part of transitional justice mechanisms and judicial venues to incorporate a gender-
based approach to designing reparations. Ruth Rubio-Marín, the foremost researcher on 
gender and reparations, urged researchers and advocates working on reparations in judicial 
venues to apply critiques made of reparation programs in transitional justice. She said, “the 
challenge of avoiding gender bias is just as present when reparations are decided in courts 
or compensation tribunals, and the hope is that whatever insight is gained (from her work) 
can contribute to understanding reparations through the lens of gender, broadly speaking”.88 
This section first introduces the concept of reparation as it is understood and applied in 
international law through judicial venues. Reparations are defined and also critiqued in their 
capacity to be “transformative.” The section then examines gender in reparation programs 
in order to determine best practices for designing gender-based reparations in international 
judicial venues.  
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2.3.1 What are Reparations? 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “everyone has the right to an effective 
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted 
him (or her) by the constitution or by law”.89 The concept of remedy includes that of 
reparation, which, according to Theo Van Boven, was first determined in the Chorzow 
Factory90 case before the Permanent Court of International Justice: “the principle in 
international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make a 
reparation in an adequate form”.91 In international law, this fundamental principle underpins 
all reparations: “the violation of a right is a pre-condition for the right to reparation.”92 This 
means that in order for a judicial venue to issue reparation, there must be a corresponding 
violation alleged and proven through the course of litigation.93 The concept of reparation 
has been defined through declarations and guidelines such as the 2007 Nairobi Declaration 
on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and Reparation (Nairobi Declaration) and the 
United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for the Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles).94 The Basic Principles 
outline state obligations in relation to reparations, and include reparatory measures such as 
access to justice and legislative and administrative actions to prevent violations and prompt 
investigation of rights violations. 95  The Basic Principles also delineate a number of 
reparations intended to redress harm, such as rehabilitation, measures of satisfaction, 
restitution, compensation and guarantees of non-repetition.96 The Nairobi Declaration, 
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which builds upon the Basic Principles, 97  establishes a guideline for engendering 
reparations in the context of post-conflict societies, and determines that  
(W)omen and girls have a right to a remedy and reparation under international law. 
They have a right to benefit from reparation programs designed to directly benefit 
the victims, by providing restitution, compensation, reintegration, and other key 
measures and initiatives under transitional justice that, if crafted with gender-aware 
forethought and care, could have reparative effects, namely reinsertion, satisfaction 
and the guarantee of non-recurrence.98 
Of the reparations noted in the Basic Principles and the Nairobi Declaration, guarantees of 
non-repetition (also referred to as “guarantees of non-recurrence”) hold significant 
importance in terms of redressing violations of both civil and political and economic, social 
and cultural rights. That is, this type of reparation is intended to protect against the 
recurrence of violations across a spectrum of rights ranging from the right to life to the right 
to health. For instance, the United Nations Human Rights Committee determined that the 
rights protections enshrined within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
would be defeated without an obligation [...] to take measures to prevent a 
recurrence of a violation of the Covenant. Accordingly, it has been a frequent 
practice of the Committee […] to include […] the need for measures, beyond a 
victim-specific remedy, to be taken to avoid recurrence of the type of violation in 
question.99 
In Pablo De Greiff’s examination of “guarantees of non-recurrence”, he explained that the 
vague nature of this form of reparations allows judicial venues to apply a broad 
interpretation of possible “institutional interventions”.100  For example, De Greiff included 
legal identity and security as necessary “gateway” protections for ensuring non-recurrence 
of human rights violations. Also included within the purview of “guarantees of non-
reparation” are legal, judicial and constitutional reforms, as well social reforms as existing 
such as legal empowerment through community programming and training, promotion of a 
strong civil society by creating “enabling environments” and the facilitation of interventions 
in the educational, psychological and cultural spheres. 101  The legal framework for 
developing “guarantees of non-repetition” in judicial venues has largely been established by 
the Inter-American Commission and Court; however implementation of these reparations 
remains a challenge. In the following chapter, section 3.1.3 provides a more in-depth 
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analysis of how, and to what extent, the different types of reparations are employed through 
the Inter-American System of Human Rights.   
 
Reparations, as they are defined and applied in international law through judicial venues, 
have until recently been both limited and limiting in terms of repairing harm that impacts a 
collective group, rather than the individual rights holder. As Rubio-Marín and Sandoval 
described, human rights judicial venues must “depart from a narrowly conceived role of 
administering justice in individual cases and [...] enter the domain of institutional reform 
and policy-making by requiring states to address structural shortcomings in the protection 
of human rights”. Increasingly, especially in litigation that attempts to redress violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights, reparations have evolved to take into account the 
structural, or emblematic, nature of rights violations that result from, and have an impact 
on, society as a whole. This shift, although admittedly inconsistent in application,102 
challenges preconceived notions about the transformative potential of reparations in 
international law. Pablo de Greiff contended that reparations issued in judicial venues are 
“narrowly conceived” because international law, and human rights treaties themselves, have 
been designed in an individualized fashion.103 However, it can be argued that in certain 
human rights forums, such as the Inter-American System of Human Rights, the notion of 
reparation as it applies to the individual victim has in some situations evolved to include the 
collective notion of the victim. That is, the isolated human rights violation is not isolated at 
all. Rather, it can be representative of systematic and massive rights violations, an 
emblematic case. Manuel Ventura Robles, a judge at the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, described the objective of reparations as being to “provide victims and their next of 
kin with restitutio in integrum for the harm caused”.104 In situations where a human rights 
violation represents a structural problem, or where there is a collective pool of victims, it is 
no longer appropriate to return victims to the status quo ante. Instead, reparations should be 
designed to transform the situation in which the rights violations originally occurred.105 
However, as Thomas Antkowiak asserted, the efficacy and implementation of reparations 
relies on the development of reparation orders 
(that) must be clear enough to be understood and followed by frequently 
unenthusiastic bureaucrats, as well as concrete enough to be verifiable by the Court 
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(in his example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) in the supervisory 
process. […] They should be sufficiently flexible to allow the sovereign state some 
discretion, since an international tribunal cannot anticipate all of the country 
specific complications that might arise in the course of implementation.106 
 
Emblematic human rights cases that come before international judicial venues represent 
massive rights violations that require reparation to redress the structural (social) nature of 
rights violations. The reparations issued in these cases may have a ripple effect at the 
national level. For example, as de Greiff explained,  
Reparations litigation before both national and regional jurisdictions such as the 
Inter-American Court or the European Court can play a tremendously important role 
in massive reparations. First, such litigation can act as a catalyst for the adoption of 
reparation programs […] Second, […] this criterion may be used by victims and 
their representatives to establish reparation programs in the first place, this leverage 
becomes particularly important.107 
Alicia Ely Yamin posited a similar claim when she stated that, “litigation, in conjunction 
with other social action, can play a role in creating new expectations among people who are 
not direct beneficiaries of judgments”.108 In addition, Alexandra Huneeus noted, “even if a 
state fails to comply with the particular demands of a court ruling, there may be ways in 
which that ruling alters its behaviour. Court rulings can also have significant effects on non-
state actors beyond the litigant”.109  
 
In order for reparations to be transformative, that is to affect social change in some way, 
reparations must be developed from a perspective of structural litigation; litigation that 
emphasizes the emblematic, or collective, nature of a singular individual’s rights 
violation.110 In terms of reparation, the aim of structural litigation is to argue for reparations 
that address the public interest or collective nature of rights violations, and ultimately 
transform the status quo.111 The concept of “transformative potential” as it applies to 
reparation is one that originated in the context of transitional justice, which Ruth Rubio-
Marín described as “the extent to which a reparations program has the capacity to subvert 
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107 De Greiff ‘Justice and Reparations’ (n 87) 451. 
108 Alicia Ely Yamin ‘Power, Suffering, and Courts: Reflections on Promoting Health Rights through Judicialization,’ 
in Alicia Ely Yamin and Siri Gloppen (eds), Litigating Health Rights: Can Courts Bring More Justice Health? 
(Harvard University Press 2011) 365. 
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Human Rights' (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 505. 
110 For discussion on structural litigation, see Alexandra Huneeus, ‘Reforming the State from Afar: Structural Reform 
Litigation at the Human Rights Courts’ (2015) 40:1 Yale Journal of International Law 2-40. 
111 Mindy Roseman and Siri Gloppen, ‘Litigating the Right to Health: Are Transnational Actors Backseat Driving?’ 
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instead of reinforce, pre-existing structural inequalities”.112 When applied to reparation 
programs developed in the context of transitional justice, the concept and practice of 
transformative reparation  has received much critique. For instance, Margaret Urban Walker 
argued that a skewed focus on collective repair runs the risk of “bypass(ing) or desplac(ing) 
reparative justice as a distinct and distinctly victim-centered ideal in favor of a different 
kind of justice agenda.”113 Rodrigo Uprimny also raised concern with the emphasis on 
transformative reparation programmes in societies and countries where resources are scarce 
and reparation programmes may in fact detract from rather than enhance the social and 
economic condition of a community or population.114 In the context of international law, the 
critique raised by Walker is not equally applicable because in human rights judicial venues 
the challenge lies in the need to expand the victim-centred approach to reparations so that it 
includes a collective or structural depiction of rights violations and results in structural 
reform. However, Uprimny’s warning about resource distribution rings true when applied to 
reparations issued through transitional justice programmes or judicial venues. For instance, 
the forthcoming case study in chapter seven examines the Costa Rican State’s obligation to 
provide in vitro fertilization through its social healthcare program, where it can be argued 
that the resources necessary to establish such a programme could be better spent on 
maternal healthcare, education, and access to basic health services in rural parts of the 
country.115 
 
Reparations intended to repair and/or address structural inequality must be designed to 
tackle core causes of discrimination manifested by both the state and society itself. While 
the transformative potential of gender-based reparations is indeed limited, failure to 
emphasise the gender-based causes and implications of human rights violations makes it 
near impossible to address the pre-existing conditions that originally allowed for the rights 
violation. While de Greiff raised concerns with the limited transformative potential of 
reparations in judicial venues due to their narrow individualistic approach, Rubio-Marín and 
Sandoval responded by suggesting that judicial venues depart from the individual and 
embrace the structural nature of human rights protections, particularly by focusing on the 
transformative potential of reparation measures designed to guarantee non-repetition of 
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rights violations. Although certainly limited in their transformative potential, reparations, 
especially guarantees of non-repetition, are a resource that has not been fully utilized within 
the context of international human rights law.  
 
2.3.2 Reparations and Gender-Based Harm 
According to Rubio-Marín, the process of engendering harm in reparations requires a 
conceptualization of reparations that comprehends how “the same (rights) violation may 
harm men and women differently”.116 This articulation of gendered harm echoes that 
provided by West and Conaghan, in that both were concerned with the experience of harm 
as it impacts women and men differently based on their gender.117 Margaret Urban Walker 
expanded on this claim by explaining that reparations intended to acknowledge the realities 
of violence inflicted upon women must observe and analyse “how gender creates 
differences between the experiences of men and women as victims, and how differences 
among women and among men mean differences in the impacts as well as the injuries they 
suffer”.118 Walker determined that the differences between the violence experienced by 
women and men can be attributed to several factors.119 First, the domination of women is so 
widely accepted (normative) that it “has been difficult historically for many men and 
women to ‘see’ violence toward women, much less subordination of women”.120 Second, 
the mandate of male control is such that it encourages men to perceive women in terms of 
what they may offer men. Third, violence committed by men against women can function 
as a way to confirm masculinity amongst men. In order to challenge these factors through 
reparation measures, Rubio-Marín explained that the objective of reparations must be to 
subvert the deep-seated and connected nature of gender-based subordination, violence and 
discrimination.121 This requires that reparations, 
First, avoid formal gender discrimination in the design and implementation of […] 
programs; second, look for ways of ensuring that patriarchal norms and sexist 
standards and systems of values do not leak into reparations; and third, explore 
ways to optimize (admittedly modest) transformative potential of reparations 
programs so that they serve to advance toward the ideal of a society altogether free 
of subordination.122 
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Rubio-Marín and de Greiff, in their work on women and reparations, noted that the 
conceptualization of the notion of harm applies “not only (to the) persons whose rights are 
violated but also other individuals affected by the violation, such as their close family 
members and dependents”.123 In the context of international law and women’s reproductive 
rights cases, it can also be argued that the notion of harm applies to all women who are 
impacted by laws, policies and sociocultural norms and values perpetuated by a patriarchal 
culture that violates women’s reproductive health rights. The notion of gendered harm, as 
articulated by Rubio-Marín and de Greiff, figures into a conception of reparations as rights-
based because “what is important in the end for a system of rights is not the protection of 
the integrity of norms but the protection of the integrity of persons”.124 With this reasoning 
in mind, it is possible to determine that reparations intended to do justice for women must 
take into account the notion of harm and the impact of violence as it is social and applies to 
all women, and not only the singular victim.125 Rubio-Marín and Sandoval argued, 
Whenever possible, the specific design of reparations benefits should aim to 
subvert, even if in a modest way, [...] pre-existing conditions [...] (such as) 
discrimination, violence and poverty - which (are) often at the root of the violence 
(against women) and which account for the specific and compounded form of harm 
that women experience.126 
This argument relates to Crenshaw’s assertion that placing the most marginalized women at 
the centre of an action, in this case design of reparations, is the most effective way to “resist 
efforts to compartmentalize (women’s) experiences”.127 When designing reparations with 
the most marginalized, or harmed women as the target beneficiaries of the reparations, all 
other women benefit from the action. This is especially important when referring to 
reparations designed within judicial venues, where the emphasis can sway towards 
individual action, rather than a structural, compound and comprehensive understanding of 
discrimination and violence as it applies to all women. 
 
The challenge of engendering reparations in women’s reproductive rights cases can partly 
be attributed to the difficulties of litigating reproductive rights cases using a “violence 
against women” perspective. In the introduction to her edited collection, What Happened to 
the Women?, Rubio-Marín noted that a number of the authors in the book  
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Regret(ed) that many forms of violence that target or affect women’s reproductive 
function or capacity have not been adequately conceptualized in the reparations 
debates because they have either been left out or lumped together under the 
common banner of sexual violence, even if the offense is not strictly the same and 
the ensuing harms for the victim are not necessarily the same either.128 
Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan expressed a similar sentiment by claiming that the legal 
system has not adequately identified violence against women: “That is, violence can be 
present in legal disputes that do not directly involve violence - the violence is not the reason 
for the litigation – but is an underlying factor in the case. In these circumstances, the 
violence is often ignored, even though it should be central to the resolution of the case”.129 
This thesis argues that the interrelated nature of reproductive health violations and violence 
against women is not only valid and undeniable, but that developing this argument in 
women’s reproductive health rights litigation creates opportunities for judicial venues to 
redress harm as it results from violence. A failure to draw a clear connection between 
violence and reproductive rights violations has the potential to neutralize, or perhaps “de-
gender” reproductive rights violations, which is a critique raised in the case study analyses 
conducted in this research. 
 
The above discussion of women’s (reproductive) rights (section 2.1), gendered harm 
(section 2.2) and reparations (section 2.3) provides the basis for the forthcoming analysis of 
women’s reproductive rights case law emerging from the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights. This chapter presented two central arguments: (i) the right to reproductive health is 
intrinsically connected to a number of human rights, and litigation efforts around the right 
to reproductive health must incorporate a multi-faceted rights approach in order to fully 
encapsulate the many ways in which women experience violations of their reproductive 
rights; and (ii) gender-based harm and violence must be acknowledged and addressed 
through human rights law and reparations emerging from judicial venues; the process of 
engendering reparations requires a thorough examination of the root causes of 
discrimination and violence against women, as well as litigation that distinctly connects 
gendered harm with violations of women’s (reproductive) rights. The next chapter examines 
the Inter-American System of Human Rights in relation to the advancement of women’s 
rights over the past decade, and provides precedent upon which to develop the proposed 
“gender reparations tradition” in women’s reproductive rights litigation before the Inter-
American System. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF (WOMEN’S) HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The Inter-American System of Human Rights has increasingly been recognized as a forum 
for the advancement of women’s human rights. Over the past two decades, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has issued precautionary measures, made 
recommendations in women’s rights cases and published numerous reports on women’s 
rights issues.1 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ordered judgments in cases 
concerning femicide (feminicidio) and reproductive health and has issued provisional 
measures to protect the lives of women. 2  There is a noted increase in women’s rights 
petitions being submitted to the Inter-American Commission over the past ten years, 
however, advancing a gender-perspective in the work of the Inter-American System has 
been slow.3 As more women’s rights cases come before the Inter-American Commission 
and Court, there exists a greater opportunity to develop and expand upon women’s rights 
protections in the Inter-American region. This thesis argues that one such way to strengthen 
women’s rights, including women’s reproductive rights, through the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights is to develop a “gender reparations tradition”. 
 
The process of developing such a “gender reparations tradition” requires a 
reconceptualization of how the Inter-American Systems’ conventions and treaty-monitoring 
bodies are normally used to redress women’s (reproductive) rights violations. In order to 
examine how the Inter-American System of Human Rights currently approaches violations 
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of women’s reproductive rights, this chapter provides an introduction to the Inter-American 
System’s treaties and judicial bodies in section 3.1, and then illustrates how the Inter-
American Court has increasingly adopted a gender-sensitive approach to women’s rights 
cases in section 3.2. The final section of this chapter, section 3.3, provides an overview of 
Rubio-Marín and Sandoval’s Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations,4 as this is the 
framework used throughout the case study chapters to determine the transformative 
potential of reparations in women’s reproductive rights cases. Finally, this chapter 
introduces the concept of a “gender reparations tradition,” which is the primary original 
contribution this thesis provides through the case study analyses. 
 
3.1 The Inter-American System of Human Rights 
Regional human rights systems are treaty-based entities that serve an adjudicatory and 
advisory purpose, and also have the power to receive individual complaints of human rights 
violations. 5  Regional human rights systems share a complex yet complementary 
relationship with universal human rights monitoring bodies.6 Vasak and Alston suggested 
that in its initial perception of regional human rights, the United Nations viewed regional 
arrangements as a “breakaway movement” that sought to undermine the universal 
framework and institutions of the United Nations system.7 However, the UN General 
Assembly later altered its opinion of regional human rights mechanisms by instead 
encouraging States to establish regional arrangements in order to promote and protect 
human rights in their regions.8 Although concerns about how regional systems would 
interpret global human rights law, as well as cooperate with each other and the United 
Nations were not unfounded, regional systems utilize a more heterogeneous approach to 
enforcing human rights, which provides a practical opportunity for universal human rights 
to find their application at regional and domestic levels. Dinah Shelton, former 
Commissioner at the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (2010-2013), argued 
that regional human rights systems have evolved into highly progressive institutions, 
                                                
4 Ruth Rubio-Marín and Clara Sandoval, 'Engendering the Reparations Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: The Promise of the ‘Cotton Field’ Judgment' (2011) 33:4 Human Rights Quarterly 1062-1091.!
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edn, Oxford University Press 2000) 925.  
6 Charter of the United Nations (1945) Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements, Article 52. Provisions for regional 
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7 Karal Vasak and Philip Alston, The International Dimensions of Human Rights (Greenwood Press 1982) 451. For 
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Human Rights in a Nutshell (4th edn, West Publishing 2009). 
8 ‘Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights’, GA Res 32/127 [16 December 1977]. 
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especially in regards to their normative development and institutional reform.9 Additionally, 
James Cavallaro and Stephanie Brewer noted that “a disproportionate focus on (regional) 
institutions’ existence in isolation may lead us to overlook the actual degree of success that 
such tribunals have had in the countries subject to their jurisdiction”.10  Regional systems 
operate by defining their own jurisdiction, within the context of their respective human 
rights conventions, and by amending their Rules of Procedure to reflect the demands and 
requirements of their regions. Not only do the regional systems reference one another’s 
experiences, but they also utilize other regional systems’ jurisprudence to develop and 
reinforce their case law.11 As regional human rights systems progress in their work as 
forums for the advancement of human rights, Cavarallo and Brewer warn that regional 
tribunals “face the challenge of advancing human rights in states that may resist 
supranational decisions and that suffer from large-scale, endemic human rights 
violations”.12  
 
The Inter-American System of Human Rights exists within the Organization of American 
States, and is the regional human rights system dedicated to the purposes of advancing 
democracy, human rights, security and development in the Americas.13 The Inter-American 
System of Human Rights entrusts two treaty-monitoring bodies with protecting, promoting 
and fulfilling human rights in the American hemisphere, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The two bodies share the 
mission of advancing human rights in the region, but their duties, responsibilities, 
jurisdiction and powers of enforcement vary significantly. Each body operates using a 
Rules of Procedure14 that outlines the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American 
Court’s working relationship, precautionary and provisional measure and advisory opinion 
activities, and also the procedures for hearing cases and enforcing the implementation of 
decisions and judgments. The Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court were 
created by the American Convention on Human Rights, which was drafted in 1959, and 
                                                
9 Dinah Shelton, 'The Promise of Regional Human Rights Systems' in Burns H. Weston and Stephen P. Marks 
(eds), The Future of International Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 1999) 356. 
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force January 2010]. 
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became the Inter-American region’s principal human rights treaty in 1969. 15  The 
Organization of American States has adopted a significant number of human rights 
treaties,16 but the most relevant to the critiques raised in this thesis are the American 
Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará).17 
These conventions are examined in this section because they are integral to the development 
of case law that promotes and transforms women’s (reproductive) rights in the Inter-
American System of Human Rights. In addition, this section discusses the roles of the Inter-
American Commission and Court, and examines the function and capacity of reparations 
within the Inter-American System. 
 
3.1.1 The Relevant Conventions 
The American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention) entered into force in 
1978. As of July 2016, 23 OAS Member States are States Parties to the American 
Convention.18 The rights enshrined within the American Convention have been referred to 
as “first generation” rights, such as the right to life (Article 4); the right to humane 
treatment (Article 5); the right to privacy (Article 11); freedom of religion (Article 12); 
rights of the family (Article 17); and the right to fair trial (Article 8) and judicial protection 
(Article 25).  Additionally, the American Convention provides for the rights of the child and 
the right to form a family, as well as freedoms of thought, religion, expression, residence 
and movement.19 The American Convention endows the Inter-American System’s human 
rights treaty monitoring bodies - the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“Inter-
American Commission”) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“Inter-American 
Court”) – with the responsibility of ensuring State compliance with the human rights 
                                                
15 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) OASTS No. 36 (1969) Article 33. 
16 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man OEA/Ser.L./V/II 71, at 71 (1948); Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, OASTS 73 (1990); Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (‘Protocol of San 
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(1994); Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, OASTS 67 (1985); Inter-American Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities, OASTS (1999). 
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the Protocol, in the case of Lluy and Others v. Ecuador [2015] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. C) No. 
298, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
18 Active OAS member states that have not ratified the American Convention: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Belize, Canada, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, United States. Trinidad and 
Tobago denounced the American Convention in 1998, effective May 1999, and Venezuela denounced in 2012, 
effective 2013. <www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B32_American_Convention _on_Human_Rights_sign.htm>. 
19 ACHR (n 15) Part I, Ch. I & II. 
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delineated within American Convention and other related OAS human rights treaties.20 The 
American Convention details the composition, functions and competence of the Inter-
American Commission and Inter-American Court, and also determines the procedures and 
jurisdiction for each organ.21 In addition, the American Convention includes an individual 
petition mechanism for filing complaints,22 as well as mechanisms for monitoring human 
rights situations in the Inter-American region, regardless of whether or not a case was 
brought before the Commission or Court.23 While the American Convention clearly defines 
the functions of the human rights monitoring bodies, it lacks the establishment of a 
permanent implementation-monitoring device that exclusively ensures compliance with the 
judgments, decisions and agreements emerging from the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
 
The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
Against Women (hereinafter “Convention of Belém do Pará”)24 can be understood as an 
elaboration of the American Convention on Human Rights, and is the first regional binding 
human rights instrument to be developed with the objective of eradicating gender based 
violence. The Convention of Belém do Pará entered into force in March 1995, just nine 
months after it opened for signature deposits.25 It is the most ratified treaty in the Inter-
American System, with only the United States, Canada and Cuba withholding their 
ratification deposits. The Convention of Belém do Pará defines violence against women as 
“any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or 
psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or private sphere”.26 
Feminist discourse permeates the Convention of Belém do Pará text; for example, the 
Preamble states, “violence against women is an offense against human dignity and a 
manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between men and women”.27 The 
Convention of Belém do Pará emphasises violence against women in both the private and 
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University Press 2012) 3. 
21 ACHR (n 15). 
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(‘Convention of Belém do Pará’) OASTS (1994). 
25 Ibid. States Parties: <www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-61.html>.  
26 Ibid Chapter I. 
27 Ibid Preamble. 
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public spheres and demands that violations of women’s rights be justiciable before the 
Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court.28 
 
Although the Convention of Belém do Pará represents a positive advancement for women’s 
human rights within the Inter-American System, at this point in its application, only Article 
7 falls under the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court, 
as indicated in the Convention of Belém do Pará Article 12.29 Article 7 of the Convention of 
Belém do Pará 30 requires that  
States Parties condemn all forms of violence against women and agree to pursue, by 
all appropriate means and without delay, policies to prevent, punish and eradicate 
such violence and undertake to: 
(a) refrain from engaging in any act or practice of violence against women and to 
ensure that their authorities, officials, personnel, agents and institutions act in 
conformity with this obligation; 
(b) apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for violence 
against women; 
(c) include in their domestic legislation penal, civil, administrative and any other 
type of provisions that may be needed to prevent, punish and eradicate violence 
against women and to adopt appropriate administrative measures where necessary; 
(d) adopt legal measures to require the perpetrator to refrain from harassing, 
intimidating or threatening the woman or using any method that harms or endangers 
her life or integrity, or damages her property; 
(e) take all appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to amend or repeal 
existing laws and regulations or to modify legal or customary practices which 
sustain the persistence and tolerance of violence against women; 
(f) establish fair and effective legal procedures for women who have been subjected 
to violence which include, among others, protective measures, a timely hearing and 
effective access to such procedures; 
(g) establish the necessary legal and administrative mechanisms to ensure that 
women subjected to violence have effective restitution, reparations or other just and 
effective remedies; and 
(h) adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to 
this Convention. 
Article 7(b) is the most widely used provision under Article 7 of the Convention of Belém 
do Pará, and while it is limited in its application, it also provides an opportunity to develop 
specific measures that address and seek to prevent socio-cultural practices that perpetuate 
                                                
28 Ibid Articles 1 and 3. 
29 Ibid Article 12: ‘Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more 
member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
containing denunciations or complaints of violations of Article 7 of this Convention by a State Party, and the 
Commission shall consider such claims in accordance with the norms and procedures established by the American 
Convention on Human Rights and the Statutes and Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
for lodging and considering petitions.’  
30 Ibid Article 7. 
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violence against women; the principle of due diligence. Elizabeth A.H. Abi-Mershed 
explained the concept of due diligence as it is enshrined in Article 7(b) of the Convention of 
Belém do Para:  
The Convention of Belém do Pará requires that states parties ensure that their agents 
refrain from acts of violence against women, and further requires that these states 
apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish such violence when 
perpetrated by non-state actors in the home, community or wherever it may occur. 
States parties undertake to ensure that these obligations are given practical effect 
and that women at risk for [sic] or subjected to violence have access to effective 
judicial protection and guarantees.31 
Abi-Mershed argued that the due diligence standard serves the Inter-American System as a 
“flexible way of understanding what state obligation and responsibility mean in theory, and 
more importantly, in practice”.32 Further to this, Paulina García-Del Moral and Megan 
Alexandra Dersnah noted that the application of Article 7(b) in violence against women 
cases allows feminists to “strategically challenge the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide underlying the historical depoliticization of violence against women that, until 
recently, had shielded the state and international human rights law”.33 Liz Melendez, the 
Executive Director of Peruvian feminist NGO, Flora Tristan, echoed this analysis by 
claiming that the obligation for states to prevent reproductive rights violations effectively 
requires states to prevent structural violence and discrimination.34 She argued that the most 
practical and effective strategy in women’s rights litigation is to locate women’s 
reproductive health rights within civil and political, or “universal” rights, such as due 
diligence. The power of the due diligence provision should not be underestimated, 
especially because this provision politicizes violence occurring in the private sphere, and 
therefore disrupts traditional notions surrounding negative and positive state responsibility 
in preventing, protecting and fulfilling human rights. 
The Inter-American Commission and Court may only apply Article 7 of the Convention of 
Belém do Pará because of the limitations the Convention imposes on the application of its 
own provisions. Article 12 of the Convention of Belém do Pará states that petitioners “may 
(only) lodge petitions with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights containing 
denunciations or complaints of violations of Article 7 of this Convention by a State 
                                                
31 Elizabeth A. H. Abi-Mershed, 'Due Diligence and the Fight against Gender-Based Violence in the Inter-American 
System' in Carin Benninger-Budel (ed), Due Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence (Nijhoff 
Brill Publishing 2009) 131. 
32 Ibid 127. 
33 Paulina García-Del Moral and Megan Alexandra Dersnah, 'A Feminist Challenge to the Gendered Politics of the 
Public/Private Divide: On Due Diligence, Domestic Violence, and Citizenship' (2014) 18:6-7 Citizenship Studies 
661. 
34 Interview with Liz Meléndez, Director, Flora Tristan, Lima, Peru 14 July 2014 (Ref Code: IP, P, N).  
!!
59 
Party”.35 However, as will be discussed later in this chapter, the Inter-American Court has 
determined that both Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention of Belém do Pará “may be used to 
interpret (Article 7) and other pertinent Inter-American instruments”.36 
For purposes of this research, the Convention of Belém do Pará Article 8 is fundamental to 
the eradication of violence against women and the promotion of women’s human rights. 
Article 8 of the Convention of Belém do Pará states: 
 The States Parties agree to undertake progressively specific measures, including 
programs: 
(a) to promote awareness and observance of the right of women to be free from 
violence, and the right of women to have their human rights respected and 
protected; 
 (b) to modify social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women; including 
the development of formal and informal educational programs appropriate to every 
level of the educational process, to counteract prejudices, customs and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of inferiority or superiority of either of the 
sexes or on the stereotypes roles for men and women which legitimize or exacerbate 
violence against women; 
 (c) to promote the education and training of all those involved in the administration 
of justice, police and other law enforcement officers as well as other personnel 
responsible for implementing policies for the prevention, punishment and 
eradication of violence against women; 
 (d) to provide appropriate specialized services for women who have been subjected 
to violence, through public and private sector agencies, including shelters, 
counselling services for all family members where appropriate, and care and 
custody of the affected children; 
 (e) to promote and support governmental and private sector education designed to 
raise the awareness of the public with respect to the problems of and remedies for 
violence against women; 
 (f) to provide women who are subjected to violence access to effective readjustment 
and training programs to enable them to fully participate in public, private and 
social life; 
(g) to encourage the communications media to develop appropriate media 
guidelines in order to contribute to the eradication of violence against women in all 
its forms, and to enhance respect for the dignity of women; 
 
 (h) to ensure research and the gathering of statistics and other relevant information 
relating to the causes, consequences and frequency of violence against women, in 
order to assess the effectiveness of measures to prevent, punish and eradicate 
violence against women and to formulate and implement the necessary changes; and 
(i) to foster international cooperation for the exchange of ideas and experiences and 
the execution of programs aimed at protecting women who are subjected to 
violence. 37 
                                                
35 Convention of Belém do Pará (n 24) Article 12. 
36 González et al. (‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico [2009] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. C) No. 205, 
Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs ¶79. 
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Although the Inter-American Court has determined it does not have jurisdiction over Article 
8 of the Convention of Belém do Pará, Article 7 cannot be fully understood, nor 
implemented, if not interpreted through the Article 8 provisions. Article 9 of the 
Convention of Belém do Pará provides a fundamental and overarching understanding of the 
situation within which Articles 7 and 8 exist:  
With respect to the adoption of the measures in this Chapter, the States 
Parties shall take special account of the vulnerability of women to violence 
by reason of among others, their race or ethnic background or their status as 
migrants, refugees or displaced persons. Similar consideration shall be given 
to women subjected to violence while pregnant or who are disabled, of 
minor age, elderly, socioeconomically disadvantaged, affected by armed 
conflict or deprived of their freedom.38 
By designating and defining women’s position as vulnerable, Article 9 demands that 
provisions outlined in Article 7 be implemented with a view to protecting women’s rights 
despite the challenges women face in accessing their rights due to their socially and 
culturally defined status as unequal to men. Article 9 also relates back to Crenshaw’s claims 
concerning intersectionality and marginalized women by taking into account the varying 
intersectional determinants of discrimination. 
 
In order to follow up on State implementation of the provisions enshrined within the 
Convention of Belém do Pará, the Organization of American States established “a system of 
consensus-based and independent peer evaluation to assess the progress made by States 
Party in their fulfilment of the objectives of the Belém do Pará Convention”, known as The 
Committee of Experts of the Follow-up Mechanism to the Belém do Pará Convention, or 
MESECVI.39  The role of this body is mostly political, and its objective is to “follow 
through with the commitments undertaken by the States Party to the Convention, to help 
accomplish its stated purposes, and to facilitate technical cooperation among the States 
Party”.40 While MESECVI is an OAS entity designed to work alongside the Inter-American 
Commission and Court, thus far there is no clear collaboration being forged between the 
three bodies.41  
 
The Conventions explored above provide a human rights framework in which women may 
                                                                                                                                          
37 Convention of Belém do Pará (n 24) Article 8. 
38 Ibid Article 9. 
39 Follow-Up Mechanism to the Convention of Belém do Pará (MESECVI) Organization of American States 
<www.oas.org/en/mesecvi/>. 
40 MESECVI Second Hemispheric Report on the Implementation of the Belém do Pará Convention, Organization of 
American States (April 2012) <www.oas.org/en/mesecvi/docs/MESECVI-SegundoInformeHemisferico-EN.pdf>. 
41 Interview with Luz Patricia Mejía, Technical Expert and Coordinator, MESECVI (Follow-up Mechanism to the 
Belém do Pará Convention) and former Commissioner and Rapporteur on Women’s Rights at the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Skype 26 September 2014 (Ref Code: Sk, Cm, S). 
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raise petitions against their governments for failing to protect, promote, and fulfil 
international human rights obligations. The following section explains the roles and 
responsibilities of the Inter-American Commission and Court, with a particular emphasis on 
their activities, working relationship and the design and implementation of reparations. 
 
3.1.2 The Commission and the Court  
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”) was established in a 
Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1959 and was formally established in 1960 when 
the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States approved its Statute.42 The 
Commission has the duty to “promote the observance and protection of human rights and to 
serve as a consultative organ of the Organization in these matters”.43 The Inter-American 
Commission’s work is concerned in part with addressing problems of gross and systematic 
human rights violations, where an individual petition may be emblematic of violations 
occurring on a wider scale.44 The Inter-American Commission is located in Washington 
DC, where it meets to convene regular and special sessions several times a year. The Inter-
American Commission’s work consists of three elements: (i) an individual petition system 
(litigation); (ii) mechanisms by which to monitor human rights situations in Member States; 
and (iii) reporting instruments that give particular attention to priority thematic areas.45 The 
Inter-American Commission receives individual petitions from victims, family members of 
victims and any person, group of persons, or nongovernmental body that is based in an 
OAS Member State.46 This broad standing is of significant importance because it allows for 
representation of victims who belong to vulnerable groups and might otherwise not have the 
available resources to bring a case to the Inter-American Commission. A State can be held 
responsible for human rights violations in three instances: (i) an action on behalf of the 
State where human rights are violated by the State; (ii) State acquiescence or implicit 
consent in the violation of human rights; and (iii) by omission, where the State fails to take 
action to prevent and/or punish human rights violations.47 The Inter-American Commission 
                                                
42 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States (1959) 
<www.oas.org/en/about/commission_human_rights.asp>.!
43 Charter of the Organization of American States, OASTS NOS. 1-C AND 61 (1948) Article 106. 
44 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (n 14) Article 29(2)(d)(i). See also, 
Cecilia Medina, 'The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
Reflections on a Joint Venture' (1990) 12:4 Human Rights Quarterly 439. 
45 ‘What is the IACHR?’ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights <www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp> 
accessed 20 May 2014. 
46 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (n 14) Article 23. See also, Lisa J. 
Reinsberg, ‘Advocacy before the Inter-American System: A Manual for Attorneys and Advocates’ International 
Justice Resource Center 15 <http://ijrcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Manual-Advocacy-before-the-Inter-
American-System-2014.pdf>. 
47 ‘Petition and Case System Informational Brochure’, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2010) 
<www.oas.org/es/cidh/docs/folleto/CIDHFolleto_eng.pdf> accessed 20 May 2014. 
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determines admissibility of a petition,48 and then attempts to promote a Friendly Settlement 
Agreement between the State and the petitioner. In the event that a Friendly Settlement 
Agreement cannot be reached between the parties, the Commission issues a Merits 
Decision. It is when a state fails to uphold the conditions of a Friendly Settlement 
Agreement or Merits Decision, that the Inter-American Commission may refer the case to 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.49 The reparations agreed upon before or issued 
by the Inter-American Commission are not binding on States, which implies that states may 
choose not to fulfil the requirements of a Commission agreement or decision, but should 
then in turn expect a referral to the Inter-American Court.  
 
In that two of the women’s reproductive rights cases selected for analysis in this thesis 
resulted in Friendly Settlement Agreements, it is necessary to discuss the functions and 
benefits of this mechanism. The American Convention indicated, “the Commission shall 
place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to reaching a friendly 
settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for the human rights recognized in this 
Convention”. 50  As Pasqualucci explained, “the friendly settlement process facilitates 
negotiations without judicial intervention”,51 and is beneficial to the petitioner in that it 
“provides an expedited opportunity to obtain a remedy”.52 Pasqualucci argued that the 
Friendly Settlement mechanism also has benefits for “non-parties to the case who have 
suffered similar human rights violations in that the State may agree to adopt legislation and 
procedures that also will assist them”.53 The forthcoming analyses of María Mamerita 
Mestanza Chávez v. Peru54 and Paulina del Carmen Jacinto Ramírez v. Mexico55 highlight 
such a situation, where the States agreed to reform legislation as reparation agreed upon in 
the Friendly Settlement Agreement. The Inter-American Commission’s role in the 
development of Friendly Settlement Agreements is limited in that it does not mediate the 
agreement, but rather reviews the final Agreement to identify any measures which run 
                                                
48 The requirements for admissibility of an individual petition: (1) petitioner must have exhausted domestic remedies 
or be able to show that domestic laws do not provide due process, the victim has not been allowed to access judicial 
remedies or that the State has not provided representation for those petitioners who sought out legal remedies; (2) the 
petition must submitted to the IACHR within six months of the date of final judicial action at the domestic level; and 
(3) only rights protected by the Inter-American treaties can be reviewed by the IACHR. See, Medina (n 44) 445. 
49 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (n 14). 
50 ACHR (n 15) Article 48(1)(f).  
51 Pasqualucci (n 20) 106. 
52 Ibid, referencing Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras [1998] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. C) No. 4, 
Merits ¶60.!
53 Ibid 107, referencing Diego Rodriguez Pinzon, “The Inter-American System and Transitional Processes: in 
Transitional Jurisprudence – The ECHR and Other Regional Human Rights Approaches to Transition (Michael 
Hamilton, and Antoine Buyse eds) Cambridge University Press 2011. 
54 María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru [2003] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 12.191, 
No. 71/03 Friendly Settlement Agreement IV ¶14(11).  
55 Paulina del Carmen Jacinto Ramírez v. Mexico [2007] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Petition 
161–02, Report 21/07 Friendly Settlement Agreement ¶15, ¶11 and ¶12(2). 
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counter to the objectives of the American Convention.56 In the event that a Friendly 
Settlement is reached, the Inter-American Commission adopts a report that includes a 
statement of facts and the solution, including the list of agreed upon reparations. An 
analysis of State compliance with reparations shows that State efforts to implement 
reparation provisions delineated in Friendly Settlement Agreements exceed efforts made 
when the Commission issues a Merits Decision.57 However, as Monica Arango Olaya of the 
Center for Reproductive Rights explained, there are many challenges to working with states 
in order to come to an agreement and subsequently implement reparations:   
Governments are changing and maybe what you sign at some point with somebody 
(won’t apply) when the government changes three years later, and you still have not 
gotten that implementation. Also, there are many strategies governments use… 
some governments prefer to go into Friendly Settlement, and they don’t comply 
with any of what happened, which is of course bad faith.58  
Between 1997 and 2015, the Inter-American Commission released 119 friendly settlement 
reports.59 The Inter-American Commission is tasked with monitoring state compliance with 
the reparation measures agreed upon in each Settlement, and it may continue to request 
follow-up information through reports and public hearings in order to determine 
implementation.60 The most recent Annual Report disseminated by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights revealed that the Commission is currently monitoring 
compliance with 197 friendly settlement agreements, of which the Commission has 
determined total compliance in 45 cases, partial compliance in 127 cases and pending 
compliance in 25 cases. However, as is argued in chapter five, the Inter-American 
Commission’s determination of total state compliance does not necessarily reflect “total” 
compliance with each reparation. 
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established in 1979, and is located in San 
Jose, Costa Rica. The Inter-American Court’s primary functions are adjudicatory and 
advisory, where the Court hears cases referred to it by the Inter-American Commission and 
also issues opinions to member states of the Organization of the American States and the 
                                                
56 ‘Frequently Asked Questions on Friendly Settlements’, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights [2011] 
<www.oas.org/en/ iachr/friendly_settlements/faq.asp#acc4>. 
57 Fernando Basch et al., 'The Effectiveness of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights: 
Quantitative Approach on the System’s Operation and the Compliance with its Decisions' (2010) 7:12 Sur 
International Journal of Human Rights 20. [Referred to as ADC Study (Asociación por los Derechos Civiles]. 
58 Interview with Monica Arango Olaya, Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, Center for 
Reproductive Rights, Skype 11 July 2014 (Ref Code: Sk, N, S).  
59 Annual Report 2015 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 48/15, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 31 December 
2015).  
60 Pasqualucci (n 20) 108. 
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Inter-American System’s human rights organs.61 States parties that have accepted the Inter-
American Court’s contentious jurisdiction are bound by its judgments, but only those states 
that have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction participate in the Court’s proceedings.62 For the 
first seven years, the Court’s work focused primarily on its advisory opinion and 
provisional measure functions.63   
 
As Marie-Bénédict Dembour noted, one of the defining aspects of the Inter-American Court 
is its “resolutely pro-homine orientation”.64 This “pro-human” approach is inherent to the 
activities of the Inter-American Court, and means that the Court implements a bias towards 
the human being through its jurisprudence and advisory mechanisms. According to 
Dembour, the Inter-American Court’s orientation as pro-homine, directly correlates with the 
historical origins of the Court where judges seek to “find every way possible through which 
they [may] manage to offer redress to the victims of human rights violations”.65 This “pro-
human” approach was apparent in the Inter-American Court’s first case, Velásquez-
Rodríguez v. Honduras,66 where the Court determined that the State has a duty to punish 
individuals who violate provisions enshrined within the American Convention, and that the 
Inter-American Court has the legal capacity to place direct horizontal duties on states that 
fail to bring to justice all private actors who violate human rights provisions.67 This case 
introduced and defined the due diligence standard68 as it is understood in the Inter-
American System: 
The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights 
violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of 
violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose 
the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation. 
This duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political, administrative and 
cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights and ensure that any 
violations are considered and treated as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead to the 
punishment of those responsible and the obligation to indemnify the victims for 
damages.69  
                                                
61 ACHR (n 15) Articles 61 and 64. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established by Article 33 of the 
American Convention of Human Rights. 
62 Currently 21 OAS Member States have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
<www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/mapa-interactivo>. 
63 Pasqualucci (n 20) 11. 
64 Marie-Bénédict Dembour, When Humans Become Migrants: Study of the European Court of Human Rights with 
an Inter-American Counterpoint (Oxford University Press 2015) 7.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras [1988] (n 52) ¶172. 
67 On “horizontal” responsibility in human rights law, see John H. Knox, 'Horizontal Human Rights Law' (2008) 
102:1 American Society of International Law 1–47. 
68 Abi-Mershed (n 31) 129. 
69 Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras (n 52) [1988] ¶174-175. [emphasis added] 
!!
65 
The Inter-American Court’s “pro-human” approach has allowed actors and litigants before 
the Inter-American System to build cases that incorporate the structural causes of human 
rights violations. However, the Court’s reputation as being “pro-human,” or “activist,” is 
also a contributing factor to State Parties’ reluctance to engage in the activities of the Court, 
or to respond in full to the reparation measures issued in its cases. In fact, some States have 
renounced the Court’s jurisdiction after judgment.70 In order to combat the state’s disdain 
for the Court’s “pro-human” approach, Alexandra Huneeus contended that the Inter-
American Court must make a greater effort to understand the inner-workings of state 
entities, particularly national justice systems, in order to partner with these systems, rather 
than outright challenge them.71  In addition, Cavallaro and Brewer suggested that the Court 
consider the interests and strategies of civil society engaged in the work of human rights to 
“trigger concrete benefits on the ground when governmental authorities are resistant to 
judgment”.72 
  
The Inter-American Commission and Court function using their own Rules of Procedure 
that they draft and amend in an effort to strengthen and enhance the inner-workings of the 
Inter-American System.73 These Rules of Procedure also serve to outline the relationship 
the two bodies share by clarifying the role of the Commission before the Court and also the 
Commission’s procedures for referring a case to the Court.74 The Commission lacks a 
formal compliance-monitoring instrument, but does receive communications from State 
Parties, local organizations and petitioners in order to follow up on the State’s compliance 
efforts. Communications from participants and interested organizations assist the 
Commission in determining how far the State has come in terms of compliance with its 
recommendations. In the event that the Commission refers a contentious case to the Court, 
its function is to represent and defend the “Inter-American public order of human rights”.75 
As of 2013, the Inter-American Court operates a formal compliance-monitoring 
mechanism, which compartmentalizes implementation assessment by state rather than case 
in order to effectively monitor reparations from different cases within the same national 
context.76  
                                                
70 Pasqualucci (n 20) 143-145. See, <www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/mapa-interactivo>. 
71 Alexandra Huneeus, 'Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce 
Human Rights' (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 531-532. 
72 Cavallaro and Brewer (n 10) 788. 
73 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (n 14).   
74 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (n 14) Article 45. 
75 Ibid Article 35(1)(f) & Article 52(3). 
76 Interview with Alexandra Sandoval, Senior Attorney, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, San Jose, Costa 
Rica 12 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, Ct, S). 
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While the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court operate 
autonomously, their work is fundamentally intertwined in that the Court is reliant upon the 
Commission’s referrals to exercise its adjudicatory authority. 77  The Inter-American 
Commission determines the Inter-American Court’s docket by selecting which cases it will 
refer to the Court.78 This means that the Commission determines what kinds of cases the 
Court receives, and therefore plays a significant role in developing opportunities for the 
Court to make binding judgments on women’s human rights violations. While the Inter-
American Court does rely on the Commission to determine its caseload, once the Court has 
jurisdiction of a case, it is free to interpret the Inter-American Conventions differently than 
the Inter-American Commission requests. For example, the Inter-American Commission 
referred the Xákmok, Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 79  case to the Inter-
American Court with little mention of the rights of women. However, in its judgment the 
Inter-American Court made reference to the necessity of adequate medical care for pregnant 
women and women who have recently given birth.80  
 
The Inter-American System of Human Rights “pro-human” approach to addressing and 
redressing violations of human rights has fostered an emphasis on the development of 
reparations in human rights cases. In that most of the cases that come before the Inter-
American Commission and Court are emblematic, that is they represent structural rights 
violations, the function of reparations has evolved to require that they attempt to transform 
pre-existing problems that inhibit and directly challenge human rights values and 
provisions. The following section introduces the role of reparations before the Inter-
American System, and argues that while the Inter-American Commission and Inter-
American Court have developed a reparations ritual, it is inherently flawed in that 
reparations do not adequately account for structural and gender-based harm. 
 
3.1.3 Reparations in the Inter-American System 
The Inter-American System of Human Rights is entrusted with the power to issue 
reparations by Article 63 of the American Convention on Human Rights: 
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by 
this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment 
of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the 
                                                
77 ACHR (n 15) Article 61. 
78 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (n 14) Article 45. 
79 Xákmok, Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay [2010] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. C), No. 
214 Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. 
80 Ibid ¶233 and 301. 
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consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or 
freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.81 
As Arturo Carillo explained, states that violate human rights obligations enshrined within 
the Inter-American System human rights conventions are “responsible for the wrongful act 
and all its harmful effects, (and the) state is consequently under a duty to repair”.82 Before 
detailing the types of reparations issued by the treaty-monitoring bodies of the Inter-
American System, it is important to recall that reparations ordered by the Inter-American 
Court are binding on those states that have accepted its jurisdiction, whereas reparations 
issued through the Inter-American Commission’s Merits Decisions and Friendly Settlement 
Agreements are non-binding mechanisms. Ultimately, state compliance with reparations 
recommended or ordered by the Inter-American Commission and Court is both sporadic 
and unreliable. Depending on the state, the rights violation, and the type of reparation, state 
implementation of reparations varies widely.  
 
The Open Society Justice Initiative conducted an analysis of reparations issued by the Inter-
American Commission and Court entitled Judgment to Justice: Implementing International 
and Regional Human Rights Decisions.83 The report, which referred to findings developed 
by the Association for Civil Rights (ADC Study) conducted by F. Basch et al., designated 
three categories of reparation: (i) individual reparations that include pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages; (ii) orders to investigate human rights violations and punishment of 
perpetrators; and (iii) reparations which aim to guarantee non-repetition of rights 
violations.84  In reviewing implementation of reparations from the Commission and Court 
between 2001 and 2006, the study found that the greatest levels of State implementation 
were in the form of individual monetary reparations, with a rate of 58% full 
implementation.85 Symbolic reparations, which were those intended to commemorate the 
victims of human rights abuses, were ordered in 21% of Commission and Court reparations, 
and implemented 52% of the time.86  Investigation of abuse and punishment of perpetrators 
at the national level represented 13% of the reparations ordered by the Commission and 
Court, however it was estimated that only 10-14% of these reparations were fully 
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implemented. 87  Legislative reform, which is reparation designed to guarantee non-
repetition, accounted for 9% of the reparations issued by the Commission and Court, where 
states made no effort to implement these reparations in approximately 75% of the cases. 
Other guarantees of non-repetition, such as training and education of public officials 
achieved greater success in implementation, with 42% of reparations being fully 
implemented, yet the Commission and Court only issued these types of reparations in an 
estimated three percent of cases. 88  Finally, reparations that aimed to promote social 
awareness were ordered in only two percent of cases, but were implemented at a rate of 
43%.89 Reparations ordered by the Inter-American Court reached total compliance 29% of 
the time, whereas reparations agreed upon in Friendly Settlement Agreements saw 54% 
compliance, and reparations issued in Merits Decisions only received 11% total 
compliance. These compliance rates illustrate the potential of Friendly Settlement 
Agreements to transform State implementation of human rights provisions. However, it is 
important to note that the above compliance rates reflect the Inter-American Commission 
and Court’s determination of compliance, which, it can be argued, is applied differently 
based on the type of reparation. For instance, a reparation designed to address legislative 
reform would require significant State action, yet a training reparation may be considered 
fulfilled if the State runs one temporary training session. 
 
When a State fails to comply with reparations recommended by the Inter-American 
Commission or ordered by the Inter-American Court, the Commission and Court then face 
the task of defining what kind of implementation is enough for a State to be compliant. The 
most detectable reparations in terms of monitoring compliance are those that call for 
monetary compensation, judicial measures and legislative reform, compliance that is easy to 
see.90 Reparations that call upon States to implement non-repetition measures that address 
less tangible causes of human rights violations, such as discrimination and inequality, often 
escape compliance-monitoring because they are more difficult to assess. For example, 
transformative reparations designed to eradicate social norms that reinforce discrimination 
are far more difficult to measure than monetary payments made to an individual victim.  
 
While the Inter-American Commission and Court certainly have a role to play in the 
development of reparations, that role is limited by the Rules of Procedure that designate the 
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responsibility of developing and requesting reparations to the petitioner (victim’s 
representative).91 According to Alexandra Sandoval, the Inter-American Court very rarely 
expands upon reparations requested by petitioners.92 Instead, the Inter-American Court 
relies on the Commission and the petitioner to identify rights violations and determine 
reparations that address the alleged violations. However, as Karla Quintana-Osuna argued, 
the Inter-American Court may elect to exercise the principle of iura novit curia (the court 
knows the law), which would allow it to apply existing law in order to expand upon the 
violations alleged by the petitioner and Commission.93 In doing so, the Court can then 
invoke its motu propio (on its own initiative or impulse) capacity to develop reparations that 
address the “new” violations. The principle of motu propio entitles the Inter-American 
Court to grant additional reparation measures if it deems the requested reparations as 
insufficient or incomplete. In fact, the Inter-American Court did employ the motu propio 
principle in Rochela Massacre v. Colombia,94 where it found it necessary to include 
additional guarantees of non-repetition. However, as will become evident in the analysis of 
Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, the Court may neglect to invoke motu propio, where it 
can be argued that such an expansion of reparations may have increased the transformative 
potential of the case. 
 
There is undeniably a problem with reparations in the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights. While state compliance is a significant challenge, there are also obvious 
shortcomings in how actors engaged in litigation before the Inter-American System 
approach the task of developing adequate and effective reparations. First, petitioners 
(victim’s representatives) and civil society organizations may fail to develop cases using a 
multi-faceted perspective as to how human rights are interrelated and indivisible. Second, 
according to María Alejandra Cardenas, an attorney formerly with the Inter-American 
Commission who currently works as Regional Legal Director at Women’s Link Worldwide, 
most actors engaged in the work of the Inter-American System do not have a “tradition to 
be thinking about reparations”.95 While the impact of cases emerging from the Inter-
American System is not necessarily tied to implementation of “perfect” reparations, the 
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failure to fully utilize the reparations procedure is a significant disadvantage in how the 
Inter-American System attempts to protect human rights. Finally, the Inter-American Court, 
perhaps in an effort to appear restrained rather than activist, rarely invokes its iura novit 
curia and motu propio powers to expand upon alleged violations and reparations, despite 
having done so in previous cases. If the Court were to actively engage in the design of 
reparations that aim to guarantee non-repetition of rights violations on a more consistent 
basis, perhaps that activity would become more normalized and expected; a “tradition”. The 
objective of reparations in women’s (reproductive) rights cases should be rooted in the need 
to eliminate gender-based discrimination and harm, or as Executive Secretary of the 
Peruvian Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, Roger Rodriguez explained, “we need to 
eliminate the idea that women are an object of power… the idea that women have a natural 
role, the idea that women are not equal in relation with men, institutionally”.96 
 
3.2 Establishing a Women’s Rights Agenda 
The protection of women’s human rights in the Inter-American System faces a myriad of 
obstacles, many of which find their origin in patriarchal, violent and discriminatory 
sociocultural practices, norms and values that are perpetuated and reinforced in both the 
public and private spheres of women’s lives. Women’s human rights, and specifically 
women’s enjoyment of their reproductive rights, are greatly assisted by a regional human 
rights system that works for women. The first part of this section, 3.2.1, introduces the role 
of civil society within the Inter-American System, and particularly discusses how Latin 
American women’s rights organizations adopted an institutional (legal) approach to 
advocating the advancement of women’s rights. This part provides insight as to why the 
Inter-American System has increasingly adopted women’s rights within its agenda, and also 
establishes a basis for claims made in chapter five and the conclusion of this thesis that 
suggest an increase in civil society presence in the development of reparations would be of 
benefit to women’s reproductive rights cases. The second section, 3.2.2, considers the 
challenge of working within human rights law as an institution, and introduces alternative 
strategies for reconceptualising women’s rights. This section discusses the concepts of 
proyecto de vida (life plan) and vida digna (dignified life), with the intention of 
highlighting their potential utility in women’s reproductive rights cases. While there are a 
number of women’s rights cases that have come before the Inter-American System,97 the 
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third and final part of this section introduces developments made specifically in application 
of the Convention of Belém do Pará with particular reference to Inter American Court 
cases: Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru,98 González et al (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico,99 
and Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala.100 The advancements made in these cases in regards 
to the Convention of Belém do Pará set the foundation on which it is possible to argue for a 
reconceptualization of reparations in women’s reproductive rights cases. 
 
3.2.1 Institutionalizing Feminism: The Role of Civil Society 
The 1999 Guidelines for Participation of Civil Society Organizations in Organization of 
American State (OAS) Activities define civil society organizations as “any national or 
international institution, organization, or entity made up of natural or juridical persons of a 
nongovernmental nature”.101 The Guidelines articulate the value of the   
Tradition of OAS cooperation with civil society organizations (that) is based on the 
significant contributions these organizations can make to OAS work, since they can 
contribute knowledge and additional information to decision-making processes, 
raise new issues and concerns that will subsequently be addressed by the OAS, lend 
expert advice in their areas of expertise, and contribute to consensus-building in 
many spheres.102 
The Inter-American System and civil society organizations share a mutually supportive 
relationship. As Cavallaro and Schaffer explained, “civil society may seek enforcement of 
individual rights through recourse to Inter-American human rights protection mechanisms; 
yet the system depends on the support of civil society for its legitimacy”.103 In that the 
standing before the Inter-American Commission and Court allows victims to be represented 
by civil society organizations, 104  it is often beneficial for national and international 
organizations to partner in order to bring a case before the Inter-American System.105  For 
example, the Costa Rican women’s rights organization, La Colectiva, recently partnered 
with the Center for Reproductive Rights, an international non-governmental organization, to 
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submit an abortion rights cases to the Inter-American Commission. 106  Civil society 
contributes to the activities of the Inter-American System by providing information through 
thematic hearings and human rights reporting, as well as in the follow up compliance stages 
of Friendly Settlements, Merits Decisions and Inter-American Court judgments.107 The 
Commission and Court incorporate contextual information given by civil society 
organizations within their work. However, the place for civil society to enter the discussion 
during the reparations stage of a case is limited to compliance monitoring. In situations 
where the petitioner is a women’s rights organization, rather than an individual lawyer, 
there is perhaps a stronger likelihood that the requested reparations will include a gender-
approach. The analysis of women’s reproductive rights cases conducted in this thesis 
supports this hypothesis; the Friendly Settlement Agreements were negotiated by women’s 
rights organizations, and individual lawyers litigated the case before the Inter-American 
Court.108 In order to understand how women’s rights organizations became integral to the 
work of the Inter-American System, it is beneficial to examine the evolution of the Latin 
American women’s rights movement as it shifted from prioritizing citizenship and 
democracy to incorporating a rights-based agenda that includes participation in international 
human rights institutions.  
 
Feminist activism in Latin America has historically focused on the development of 
meaningful citizenship as a part of the struggle for democracy.109 According to Nikki 
Craske, the term “citizenship” is “fundamentally about inviolable rights, which also entail 
responsibilities, across a polity: each citizen has the same rights which are legally 
recognized”.110 When applied to women, citizenship includes rights that have “tended to 
focus on welfare and quality of life issues, such as access to housing, education and 
work”.111 Feminist efforts to expand women’s citizenship were based on the idea that the 
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concept of the citizen is not gender neutral; instead it “rests on a distinctly masculine 
conception of the person as an independent, self-interested, economic being”. 112 
Challenging perceptions of the rights of the citizen as they were designed particularly to 
protect men requires that women claim their citizenship in the public sphere; they must be 
empowered to exit the confines of the private. This process of empowerment is central to 
the development of effective citizenship. Empowerment cannot only be understood in terms 
of formalities such as the right to vote or the right to information, but rather empowerment 
“requires change in the personal perception of the empowered subject”. 113  The 
empowerment of women is necessary in order to challenge patriarchal culture, and the 
resulting impact of patriarchal harm. 
 
Advancing women’s citizenship through empowerment was, and is, one of the primary 
tasks of Latin American women’s rights organizations. However, as these organizations 
have evolved, they have expanded their approach, resulting in the institutionalization of 
feminist organizations throughout the region. Since the 1980s and 1990s, Latin American 
women have become particularly active and influential throughout international human 
rights arenas. Nikki Craske and Maxine Molyneux claimed that this increase in activity was 
evident in at least three ways: (i) activists began to make full use of international networks 
and institutional arenas to give (social) movements additional organizational capacity, to 
coordinate campaign strategies and to harness resources; (ii) feminist and women’s rights 
movements began to use international human rights instruments in education campaigns to 
inform women and men about their rights, as well as to debate how rights may be 
interpreted; and (iii) actors began using international agreements in order to hold 
governments accountable, and to push for national policy and legislative reform.114 In the 
1990s, a human rights agenda came to the fore, where the “focus shifted to questions of 
how rights can be incorporated into general questioning of women’s place in their own 
societies”.115 Virginia Vargas noted that during the 1990s,  
Feminists began to establish a presence in spaces that were opening up at regional 
and global levels. In this way, they aimed to influence an international agenda that 
was addressing a range of situations of exclusion and subordination (affecting girls, 
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women, the poor) and was redefining the great problems of our era: human rights, 
the environment, population, and development […].116  
Significantly, the 1990s saw the beginning of the “institutionalization of feminism” across 
Latin America, a process which is ongoing as more organizations familiarize themselves 
with and utilize international human rights law mechanisms in order to inform women and 
men about their rights, as well as challenge states that fail to prevent, protect and fulfil 
rights.  
 
In certain aspects, this evolution is a welcome one, especially as the knowledge and 
expertise developed by these organizations can benefit women’s rights progress nationally, 
regionally, and internationally. For example, the historical Peruvian women’s rights 
organization, Manuela Ramos, has focused on women’s citizenship, empowerment and 
education for more than thirty years, but recently incorporated a legal department in order to 
contribute to and benefit from women’s rights advancements made through formal legal 
institutions. Rocío Pilar Puente Tolentino explained, “while we do understand our niche 
(economic and political autonomy, as well as political participation of women) our 
behaviour in the future will be around policies, national public policies, international public 
policies […] that’s probably our focus now”.117 However, as women’s rights organizations 
become more focused on institutional agendas, there is a risk that they will move away from 
their own agenda setting which emphasised increased visibility of women’s rights through 
national level activism and collective movements. The institutionalization of feminism 
across Latin America has resulted in tensions among feminist actors who disagree on the 
transformative potential of a rights discourse, especially as it applies to women’s citizenship 
and empowerment. For example, Guilia Tamayo, a renowned Peruvian feminist, warned 
against “the extreme turn being taken by feminist activism in its attempt to influence 
government policies and mechanisms […] which neglects the strengthening of citizenship 
and is especially problematic in the case of governments that are trying to appear 
democratic when in fact they are not”.118 Virginia Vargas echoed this claim by stating that 
“the most problematic effect of the rights-based approach is […] the disappearance of the 
feminist movement’s own agenda”.119 
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The challenges raised above by Tamayo and Vargas reflect the concerns this thesis raised 
earlier in relation to Martha Fineman and Carol Smart’s claims that there is a risk inherent 
to working within the confines of law.120 Perhaps intentionally or as an organic response, 
actors working within the Inter-American System have identified strategies to avoid the 
risks of disappearing within the human rights legal institution. These alternative strategies 
work both inside and outside the confines of human rights law, and the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights, and when applied to women’s rights cases, have the potential to 
challenge the gendered structure of the public/private divide and the polarization of civil 
and political and economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
3.2.2 Developing Alternative Women’s Rights Concepts 
The concepts of proyecto de vida (life plan) and vida digna (dignified life) exist within the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights and have been applied by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in cases that address violations of rights such as forced 
disappearance, children’s rights, and indigenous rights. 121 These concepts are aspects of the 
right to personal integrity, and have been alleged before and applied by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights. The purpose of sharing these principles here is to highlight some 
alternative tools for advancing women’s rights in the Inter-American region. However, it is 
important to note that although these principles have been applied in the past, their 
application is not guaranteed.   
 
According to Fernández Sassergo, who originally developed the concept, proyecto de vida, 
it  is founded on the guarantee of freedom, because freedom is what allows us “to decide, to 
choose from among many different possibilities or life choices, to elaborate a “life project” 
or “life plan”, a “vital plan” or an “existential project”.122  He argued, “the ‘life project’ 
represents what the human being has decided to be and to do in life, or better still what the 
person does in order to be”.123 Dinah Shelton described proyecto de vida as being “linked to 
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the notion of freedom as the right that each person has to choose his or her own destiny”.124 
She explained, “damage to proyecto de vida threatens the goal of and value of life itself, 
harming the core of what it is to be a human being and affecting the spiritual sense of 
life”.125 Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen contended that the Inter-American Court’s inclusion of 
the concept of proyecto de vida provides new possibilities for how the Court issues 
reparations in cases where the principle is applied. She explained that proyecto de vida “is 
without a doubt one of the most original and innovative elements of the Inter-American 
Court’s case law and is a testimony to its creativity”.126 
 
The concept of proyecto de vida has great potential for application in women’s reproductive 
rights cases. This concept requires an analysis of damage inflicted on an individual life, 
which in turn necessitates an examination of the context in which the harm occurred. This 
means that damage to proyecto de vida might require the Inter-American Court to examine 
gendered harm, structural inequality, discrimination and violence as these are underlying 
factors in violations of women’s reproductive health rights. The application of proyecto de 
vida in women’s reproductive rights cases would perhaps create space for the Inter-
American Commission and Court to issue reparation that guarantee non-repetition of 
disruptions to the life projects of women. 
 
The principle of vida digna has been applied in several cases before the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights,127 and was defined by the Court in the case of Villagrán Morales et 
al. v. Guatemala.128 The Court determined,  
The fundamental right to life includes, not only the right of every human being not 
to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the right that he will not be prevented 
from having access to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence.  States 
have the obligation to guarantee the creation of the conditions required in order that 
violations of this basic right do not occur and, in particular, the duty to prevent its 
agents from violating it.129  
In this specific case, which had to do with rights of street children, the Court concluded that 
“every child has the right to harbor a project of life that should be tended and encouraged 
by the public authorities so that it may develop this project for its personal benefit and that 
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of the society to which it belongs”.130 The Inter-American Court articulated the right to a 
dignified life, vida digna, through Articles four and five of the American Convention, and 
has used this right to recognise the rights to health, education, food, access to clean water 
and cultural identity.131 
 
Alexandra Sandoval, a senior attorney at the Inter-American Court, contended that the 
application of the concept of vida digna has enormous potential, especially in relation to 
violations of economic, social, and cultural rights and reproductive rights such as maternal 
health. 132  She interpreted vida digna as a link between negative and positive state 
obligations, and explained “the concept of vida digna appears then, to be a legal framework 
within the Inter-American Court, which is an amplification of the state’s positive 
obligations, because not only must the state guarantee the right to life, in its simplest sense, 
but it also must provide the minimum conditions that allow its citizens access to a decent 
life”.133 The concept of vida digna is similar to the concept of proyecto de vida in that both 
require the Inter American Court take a deeper look at the causes of human rights 
violations. In the specific situation of violations of women’s reproductive rights, vida digna 
can apply to a woman’s right to life, private life, autonomy, personal liberty and integrity. 
Sandoval noted that there is certainly space for the Court to elaborate upon the principle of 
vida digna, especially in cases where the Court determines a violation of life and integrity, 
but that in those cases it is the responsibility of the petitioner to pursue a vida digna 
violation.134 Vida digna is also useful as a concept to bridge economic, social and cultural 
rights and gender-based discrimination. As Adriana Maroto explained, “the discourse of 
gender in the legal arena is very fragile [...] so, when we try to construct the concept of 
health, or of vida digna we’re doing it from the point of view of gender. We have to do it 
from the other side... there is a gender discourse that supports these arguments, but they 
have their foundation in the health aspects”.135 The concept of vida digna can be used to 
stealthily insert gender into the discussion of rights violations such as the right to life and 
                                                
130 Ibid ¶191. 
131 Thomas Antkowiak, ‘The Inter-American Court at a Crossroads,’ in Yves Haeck, Clara Burbano-Herrera, and 
Oswaldo Ruiz-Chiriboga (eds), The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Theory and Practice, Present and 
Future (Intersentia 2015) 272. 
132 Alexandra Sandoval, 'Vida Digna' (Third Latin American Congress on Reproductive Rights, Mexico, October 
2013) 2 <http://tercer.congresoderechosreproductivos.com/materiales/dia1/conferencia%20magistral_vida%20digna 
/Vida%20Digna_Alejandra%20Sandoval.pdf>. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Interview with Alexandra Sandoval, Senior Attorney, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, San Jose, Costa 
Rica 12 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, Ct, S). 
135 Interview with Adriana Maroto Vargas, Academic and Activist, La Colectiva, San Jose, Costa Rica 14 August 
2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S). 
!!
78 
the right to health because in order to examine violations of vida digna it is necessary to 
unpack the reasons why a rights violation occurred. 
 
The above overview of the principles of proyecto de vida and vida digna highlights some of 
the strategies developed by human rights litigators and feminists to build relationships 
between violations of civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. 
Ultimately, these strategies obscure the public/private divide by developing a 
conceptualisation of rights that requires states to provide public services and provisions for 
women to fulfil their life plan and to live a life of dignity. However, in employing these 
alternative rights concepts, there is a risk that litigators and the Inter-American System 
treaty monitoring bodies may resort to a stereotyped notion of women as (potential) 
mothers in order to articulate damage to a woman’s proyecto de vida and vida digna. It is 
imperative that in developing and applying these strategies to women’s reproductive rights 
cases that actors frame violations of these principles through reproductive autonomy, rather 
than reproductive capacity (and destiny). The forthcoming case study analyses conducted in 
chapters four, five and six examine the utility of these strategies as they have potential for 
application in women’s reproductive rights cases, and ultimately determine that the 
principles of proyecto de vida and vida digna provide a strong platform through which it is 
possible to repair gender-based harm in women’s reproductive rights cases. 
 
3.2.3 Laying the Groundwork for a Gender Approach to Reparations 
The general failure by states to respect human rights as they are intended to be “universal” 
has resulted in the need to develop a body of rights specific to women. According to 
Rebecca Cook, the failure to enforce women’s rights varies by country, and includes a “lack 
of understanding of the systemic nature of the subordination of women, failure to recognize 
the need to characterize the subordination of women as a human rights violation, and lack 
of state practice to condemn discrimination against women”. 136  While women’s 
international human rights can be understood as those rights enshrined within women’s 
rights conventions and treaties, Hilary Charlesworth argued that such an understanding runs 
the risk of actually marginalizing women’s rights”.137 In order to effectively employ 
“universal” human rights and women’s rights conventions, the two must be cohesively 
examined and applied in women’s rights cases. Although the Convention of Belém do Pará 
                                                
136 Rebecca Cook, 'Women’s International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward' in Rebecca Cook (ed), Human 
Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press 1994) 3. 
137 Hilary Charlesworth, 'What are “Women’s International Human Rights?”' in Rebecca J. Cook (ed), Human Rights 
of Women: National and International Perspective (University of Pennsylvania Press 1994) 59. 
!!
79 
came into force in 1995, it wasn’t until the year 2000 that the Inter-American Commission 
applied the Convention to a women’s rights case: María da Penha v. Brazil.138 The Inter-
American Court did not apply the Convention of Belém do Pará until 2008, in the case of 
Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, and it wasn’t until 2009, in the Gonzalez et al. 
(“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico case that the Court formally developed its jurisdiction over 
Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará. This section follows the trajectory of the 
Convention of Belém do Pará as it was applied in a number of Inter-American Court cases, 
and does so to establish both the potential and limitations of the Convention of Belém do 
Pará in its application. The cases selected for analysis here directly relate to claims and 
suggestions posited in this thesis that argue for allegations of reproductive rights violations 
to be interpreted through the violence against women framework. 
 
Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru139 
The case of Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru represents the first time the Inter-
American Court applied the Convention of Belém do Pará. However, this was not the first 
case that allowed for the application of the Convention. As Rubio-Marín and Sandoval 
noted, there were certainly previous cases in which the rights of women were violated 
where the Inter-American Court could have determined violations of the Convention of 
Belém do Pará, as well as issued reparations to “acknowledge the relevance of the specific 
harm that women suffer”.140 Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru was a case concerned 
with a State operation that carried out the torture and killing of inmates at a prison who had 
been accused of being members of the terrorist group. In the aftermath of the initial stages 
of the operation, the state agents made men and pregnant women lie face down on the floor 
for days, and forced women inmates in hospitals to remain naked in front of the male 
security guards, and undergo vaginal inspections.141 Both the Commission and the petitioner 
(victims’ representative) emphasized the particular harm women suffered at the hands of the 
state, which resulted in the Inter-American Court addressing gender-based violations 
through the Convention of Belém do Pará for the first time. Although the petitioner alleged 
a violation of Articles 1, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Convention of Belém do Pará,142 the Court 
determined the State had violated only Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará. In its 
reasoning for applying Article 7 the Court did not provide support in relation to its 
jurisdiction over the Convention of Belém do Pará, but Peru did not object to its 
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jurisdiction.143 Additionally the Court found a violation of the right to humane treatment 
under Article 5 of the American Convention, and took the opportunity to explain how 
violence against women relates to inhumane treatment. The Inter-American Court stated 
that “pregnant women who lived through the attack (experienced) an additional 
psychological suffering, since besides having seen their own physical integrity injured, they 
had feelings of anguish, despair, and fear for the lives of their children”.144 The Court also 
noted, “severe solitary confinement had specific effects on the inmates that were mothers 
[…] the impossibility to communicate with their children caused an additional 
psychological suffering in the inmates that were mothers”.145  
 
The reparations issued by the Court in this case included, among others, human rights 
education programs to be addressed to members of the police force146 and monetary 
compensation.147 The women victims in this case were compensated at a higher amount 
than the men. The pregnant women received an additional $5000, the woman who was 
raped received an additional $30,000 and the six women who were forced to be naked in 
front of male guards were awarded an additional $10,000. While the Court did elect to 
compensate the women victims at a higher rate than the male victims, this case missed an 
opportunity to effectively engender reparation measures that had the objective of preventing 
repetition of gender based harm, which thereby severely limited the transformative potential 
of this case. For instance, while the Inter-American Court made an effort to redress the 
invasive harm inflicted on women involved in this case, it neglected to address the nature of 
patriarchal harm as it reinforces norms that essentialize women as mothers. In relation to 
this claim, it is important to note Patricia Palacios Zuloaga’s astute observation that this 
case relied on a stereotyped notion of women in order to find violations of rights specific to 
women. Zuloaga pointed out that the Court’s determination that women victims did not 
have time to become mothers because of their search for truth and justice, as well as its 
reliance on women’s “experience of maternity”148 to defend its reasoning, relied heavily on 
social stereotypes of women as mothers. According to Zuloaga, the Court’s “positive shift 
to gender justice […] fails to extend gendered logic to reparations and (relied) on 
stereotypes of women in order to find violations”.149  
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González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico150  
The “Cotton Field” case is of significant importance in terms of women’s rights and 
reparations before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In this case, the Inter-
American Court ruled that the state of Mexico had violated both the American 
Convention151 and the Convention of Belém do Pará when it failed to prevent and 
investigate the disappearance and murder of three poor migrant women. The Court 
emphasized that these murders were representative of hundreds of other disappearances, 
rapes and murders that were poorly investigated by the State of Mexico. For the first time, 
the Inter-American Court determined that states have a positive obligation to respond to 
violence against women resulting from the action of private actors, and that those violations 
are justiciable under Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará. The “Cotton Field” case 
is of particular relevance to this thesis for a number of reasons: (i) the Court provided legal 
reasoning for its competence over Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará, and 
determined that both Articles 8 and 9 can be used to inform allegations of Article 7 
violations; 152  (ii) the Court established the need to do justice for women through 
reparations, and specified that reparations have a duty to transform pre-existing situations 
which are discriminatory in nature;153 and (iii) this case provided a thorough explanation of 
the obligation of due diligence and took into account the compound effects of violence 
against women.154 
 
The Inter-American Court provided a thorough legal argument to locate its jurisdiction over 
Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará, despite the fact that it had previously applied 
the Convention in Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru.155  Not only did the Court 
determine competence over Article 7, but it also declared that Articles 8 and 9 may be 
applied to inform violations of Article 7.156 The Court’s expansion of the capacity of Article 
7 directly related to Rhonda Copelon’s expert witness testimony before the Inter-American 
Court in this case, where she argued that “Articles 7-9 of Belém do Pará provide a thorough 
and gender sensitive outline of both immediate and progressive initiatives for the effective 
implementation of reparations”.157 While the Court took steps to incorporate Articles 8 and 
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9 of the Convention of Belém do Pará within its purview, it did not explicitly refer to these 
Articles in its analysis of femicide in the “Cotton Field” case. 
 
In regards to reparations, the Inter-American Court stated,  
Bearing in mind the context of structural discrimination in which the facts of this 
case occurred, which was acknowledged by the State […], the reparations must be 
designed to change the situation, so that their effect is not only of restitution, but 
also of rectification. In this regard, reestablishment of the same structural context of 
violence and discrimination is not acceptable.158  
The Court then outlined a set of criteria for reparations, which was succinctly summarized 
by Rubio-Marín and Sandoval: 
1) reparations should have a direct connection with the violations found by the 
Court;  
2) they should repair in a proportional manner pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
damages;  
3) they cannot be a source of enrichment or impoverishment;  
4) reparations must aim at restitution to, ‘restore the victims to their situation prior 
to the violation insofar as possible, [but only] to the extent that this does not 
interfere with the obligation not to discriminate’;  
5) reparations should be ‘designed to identify and eliminate the factors that cause 
discrimination’;  
6) they should take into account a gender perspective, ‘bearing in mind the different 
impact that violence has on men and on women’; and  
7) they should take into account all the measures alleged by the state to have been 
taken to repair the harm. 159 
The reparations ordered by the Court in this case took gender into account as it was a 
determining characteristic of the additional harm inflicted on women. First, the mothers of 
the victims were awarded additional compensation because they were the primary 
complainants in the case and because they had been harassed and threatened in the 
aftermath of their daughters’ deaths.160 In relation to measures of satisfaction, the Court 
ordered the State to provide psychological and psychiatric care to the next of kin, paying 
special regard to the effects of gender-based violence. In terms of guarantees of non-
repetition, both the Commission and the petitioner requested that the Court order the State 
to create a public policy that would guarantee the prevention and investigation of further 
acts of violence against women. However, the State contended that it already had such a 
policy in place, and the Court determined that the Commission and petitioner had not 
provided sufficient evidence to prove the current policy was ineffective. The Court declined 
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to order such reparation. In addition, the Inter-American Court ordered additional 
guarantees of non-repetition which were designed to specifically engender the principle of 
due diligence. The Court articulated the criteria for the implementation of effective 
investigation responses when a woman or girl disappears. For example, the criteria required 
that the State of Mexico “implement searches ex officio and without delay in cases of 
disappearances as a measure to protect the life, personal liberty and personal integrity of the 
disappeared person”. 161  The Court also ordered the State to “continue implementing 
permanent education and training programs and courses for public officials on human rights 
and gender, and on a gender perspective to ensure due diligence in conducting preliminary 
inquiries and judicial proceedings concerning gender-based discrimination, abuse and 
murder of women, and to overcome stereotyping about the role of women in society”.162 
This reparation addressed the social nature of gendered harm that underpins violence 
against women by seeking to confront harmful stereotypes manifested and perpetuated 
throughout society. Finally, the Court ordered the State to establish a national database that 
would contain information about missing women, including their genetic information.163 
 
The “Cotton Field” case marked a significant change in the Inter-American System’s 
approach to women’s rights, especially in regards to application of the principle of due 
diligence and engendering reparations. Alongside these developments, this case influenced 
the State of Mexico in its approach to gender justice on a wider scale.164 In the aftermath of 
a string of women’s rights cases before the Inter-American Court, the Mexican Supreme 
Court adopted the 2013 Protocol for Judging with a Gender Perspective.165 The Protocol 
specifically noted the Inter-American Court cases within its first few pages, and stated that 
the goal of the Protocol was to: 
Address and remedy certain problems identified by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in three recent cases against Mexico […] In those cases, the Inter-
American Court made clear that Mexican courts must apply, as binding law, the 
international human rights treaties to which Mexico is a party. This Protocol 
responds to that exhortation by explaining how to implement international human 
rights treaty law as binding law. It also outlines methods by which adjudicators can 
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improve their awareness of women’s rights under the law and can build their 
capacity to employ a gender perspective when deciding cases.166 
The adoption of this Protocol signified the importance of developing gendered reasoning 
alongside reparations in women’s rights cases before the Inter-American Court. Not only 
did this Protocol indicate the willingness of the State to work on its approach to gender 
justice, but it may also have provided the Inter-American Court with ideas for reparation 
measures in future cases. 
 
Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala167 
The Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala case included an in-depth analysis of the impact of 
gender stereotyping on violence against women, which resulted in expansive and 
transformative reparation measures. This case included a violation of Article 7 of the 
Convention of Belém do Pará, with specific emphasis on the state’s obligation to provide 
due diligence to victims, that is the State’s obligation to address and eradicate patriarchal 
harm. While this case was decided by the Inter-American Court three years after the most 
recent case study included in this thesis, the developments made in this case elucidate how 
the Inter-American System has evolved in its approach to women’s rights violations. 
 
In this case, Claudia Velásquez Paiz, a young law student, was murdered and the 
Guatemalan State failed to adequately investigate the crime. In their petition, the petitioner 
asserted that the murder of women in Guatemala was not random, and was “founded on a 
patriarchal construct of a woman’s sexual body being men’s property”. 168 The petitioner 
determined that “the system of oppression is built through violence against (women’s) 
bodies and sexuality”. 169  The impact of gender stereotyping as it affects violence 
perpetrated against women was explored exhaustively in the Court judgment. For example, 
in examining violations of Articles 1 and 24 of the American Convention, which deal with 
principles of equality and non-discrimination, the Court determined that the subordination 
of women is based on gender stereotypes, and that “their creation and use becomes one of 
the causes and consequences of gender violence against women”. 170 The Court went so far 
as to note that violence against women is aggravated “when reflected, implicitly or 
explicitly, in policy and practice, particularly in the reasoning and language of state 
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authorities”.171 In regards to the Convention of Belém do Pará, the Court examined Articles 
7(b) and 7(c) to determine that the State of Guatemala had failed in its obligation to provide 
due diligence to the victim, and to women in general. 172   
 
Finally, the reparations issued in this case have significant potential in their capacity to 
transform the lives of women and girls in Guatemala. Notably, the Inter-American Court 
included the following guarantee of non-repetition:  
The Court orders the State, within a reasonable time, to incorporate within the 
National Education System curriculum, at all levels, a permanent education program 
on the need to eradicate gender-based discrimination, gender stereotypes and 
violence against women in Guatemala, in light of the international standards on 
these matters and the jurisprudence of this Court.173  
The Court also included training and education programs for the Guatemalan judiciary and 
police force. The reparations issued in this case set a standard for future women’s rights 
cases, where, as noted previously, the goal of reparations should be to subvert pre-existing 
social and cultural conditions that subordinate women.  
 
The cases outlined above encapsulate the development of women’s rights litigation before 
the Inter-American Court and provide a brief introduction to where women’s rights 
currently stand before the Inter-American System. The Inter-American Court’s emphasis on 
the obligation to provide due diligence through Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do 
Pará is an instrumental development in the Inter-American System, as is the progress made 
in developing gender-sensitive reparations designed to address gendered harm and the root 
causes of gender stereotyping and discrimination. The cases analysed in chapters four, five 
and six elucidate further developments and shortcomings in the Inter-American System’s 
approach to women’s rights, but differ in that they are focused on reproductive health 
rights. This distinction between women’s rights and women’s reproductive health rights 
reveals inconsistencies in the extent to which the Inter-American System seeks to protect 
women’s lives. For instance, the link between violence against women and violations of 
women’s reproductive health rights has not been clearly articulated in the jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court. The fourth and final section of this chapter provides an 
introduction to Rubio-Marín and Sandoval’s “Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations”, 
which is employed throughout the analysis of the case study chapters of this thesis. 
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3.3 Engendering Reparations in Women’s Rights Cases 
The process of engendering reparations within the work of the Inter-American Commission 
and the Court is a significant challenge. Not only are many actors engaged with the work of 
the Inter-American System unfamiliar with the varying and intersecting levels of harm 
women experience in their lives, but also as bears repeating, there is no “tradition to be 
thinking about reparations”.174 This means that at an institutional level, the Inter-American 
System is unprepared to initiate an effective and sustainable approach to engendering 
reparations in cases that come before both the Inter-American Commission and Court.  
 
The Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations175 developed by Rubio-Marín and Sandoval 
serves as the foundational framework for the forthcoming analysis of women’s reproductive 
rights cases emerging from the Inter-American System. While Rubio-Marín and Sandoval 
designed the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations in order to examine reparations in 
cases before the Inter-American Court, this research expands their Approach to apply it to 
Friendly Settlement Agreements emerging from the Inter-American Commission.176 This 
Approach specifically responds to the Inter-American Court’s determination in Gonzalez et 
al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico,177 that there is a “need to provide reparations that do justice 
for women”.178 According to Rubio-Marín and Sandoval, it was in the “Cotton Field” 
judgment that the Inter-American Court  
Suggested a significant redefinition of the Court’s concept of adequate reparations 
by highlighting that, when the violations occur in a context of structural 
discrimination, reparations cannot simply return victims to the situation they were in 
before the violation took place (one of discrimination); instead, reparations should 
aim to transform or change the pre-existing situation.179 
 
This thesis employs the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations as a three-step 
framework: (i) fulfilling the preconditions; (ii) applying the test; and (iii) determining 
transformative potential. Each of these steps is applied within the following reproductive 
rights case study chapters in order to provide a consistent analysis of the cases and their 
reparations. The first step, fulfilling the preconditions, contains three elements: (a) 
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establishing the relevant facts; (b) properly identifying the alleged violations and victims; 
and (c) properly identifying the harm and those harmed by the violations. Rubio-Marín and 
Sandoval assert that it is only once these pre-conditions have been met that gender-sensitive 
reparations may be effectively incorporated within a women’s rights case.180  The second 
step, applying the test, pertains to an assessment of reparations specific to a case, where an 
analysis of the reparations is conducted to determine how the failure to fulfil the 
preconditions impacts the development of gender-sensitive reparations that have 
transformative potential (the third step).181 In order to introduce the Holistic Gender 
Approach to Reparations, the remainder of this section provides an overview of step one, 
fulfilling the preconditions, which will then be applied in the case study chapters of this 
thesis. The second and third steps of the Approach are applied within the analysis of 
reparations issued within a case, which is a task undertaken in the forthcoming case study 
chapter sections entitled, “Repairing Harm: Determining Transformative Potential”. 
 
The Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations suggests three preconditions for “redressing 
the differential impact of human rights violations on women”.182 The first of these pre-
conditions is, establishing the relevant facts, which is identified as the starting point in 
determining a case’s potential for developing gender-sensitive reparations. In Friendly 
Settlement Agreements, the facts of the case are determined through the Agreement 
process, where the state and the victims or their representatives (petitioner) reach a 
consensus on the accepted facts. There are disadvantages and advantages to this procedure; 
facts may be omitted in order to ensure the completion of an Agreement, or facts may 
include a depiction of structural harm, which can then be further explored should the 
Agreement be referred to the Inter-American Court. One of the most challenging aspects of 
establishing the relevant facts during a Friendly Settlement Agreement procedure is relating 
the facts to alleged violations, where it may be difficult for the petitioner to convince the 
State to agree to facts which would in turn require substantive and transformative 
reparations. However, the Friendly Settlement Agreement process also allows space for 
facts to be included which don’t at first appear to require much action from the State, but 
that then result in campaigns, advocacy, and compliance-monitoring that emphasizes those 
facts.183 
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In order to establish the relevant facts within Inter-American Court cases, the Court first 
relies on information provided by the Inter-American Commission when it refers a case to 
the Court.184 The Court’s Rules of the Procedure, as enshrined in Article 35, indicate that 
the Commission’s referral report to the Court should contain “all the facts that allegedly 
give rise to a violation and identify the alleged victims”.185 The materials submitted by the 
alleged victims (petitioners), should include:  
a. description of the facts within the factual framework established in the 
presentation of the case by the Commission;  
b. the evidence offered, properly organized, with an indication of the alleged facts 
and arguments that it relates to;  
c. the identities of declarants and the object of their statements. Expert witnesses 
must also submit their curricula vitae and contact information;  
d. all claims, including those relating to reparations and costs.186   
The State is also required to respond with its information (version) about the facts of the 
case.187 Of particular importance is the provision within the Rules of Procedure that 
determines the “Court may consider those facts that have not been expressly denied and 
those claims that have not been expressly controverted as accepted”.188 This means that in 
the circumstance that the State’s response to the allegations raised by the petitioner fails to 
address those allegations, the Inter-American Court accepts those facts to be true. Following 
acceptance of the State and petitioner materials, the Court has the discretion to clarify and 
confirm the facts established by both parties, as well as gather further evidence if it 
determines that such an activity is necessary.189 Determining the facts of a women’s rights 
case requires that the petitioners, the Commission and/or the State, include a gendered 
analysis of the alleged harm. For example, in the “Cotton Field” case the facts of the case 
concluded that there was a pattern of violence and discrimination against women in a 
particular region of Mexico.190 In that the facts of this case established that women were 
being targeted based on their gender, the Inter-American Court was able to determine 
violations of the Convention of Belém do Pará, as well as order reparations designed to 
transform, or dismantle, the patriarchal culture which allowed for extreme levels of violence 
against women in Mexico. 
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prescribe a period within which the state is to take the measures that are incumbent upon it to remedy the situation 
examined.” 
185 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (n 14) Article 35. 
186 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (n 14) Article 40(2). 
187 Ibid Article 41(1). 
188 Ibid Article 41(2). 
189 Ibid Article 58. 
190 Rubio-Marín and Sandoval (n 4) 1080, and Gonzalez et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico [2009] (n 36) ¶121. 
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The second pre-condition for engendering reparations in cases before the Inter-American 
System of Human rights is, properly identifying the alleged violations and victims. Rubio-
Marín and Sandoval asserted that it is necessary to correctly identify the alleged victims and 
violations in a case after the facts have been established. 191  The responsibility for 
determining the alleged violations and victims is initially that of the petitioners, and in the 
situation where a case is referred to the Inter-American Court, the Inter-American 
Commission is also responsible for presenting the alleged violations and victims. However, 
as noted above the Court does have the power to invoke the principle of iura nova curia in 
order to expand upon the violations alleged by the petitioner and/or the Commission. 
 
The Inter-American Court’s Rules of Procedure identifies alleged victims as “person(s) 
whose rights under the Convention or another treaty of the Inter!American System have 
allegedly been violated”, and “victims” as person(s) whose rights have been violated, 
according to a judgment emitted by the Court”.192 However, determining the identification 
of victims in human rights cases before the Inter-American Commission and Court can 
prove to be a challenge, especially in situations where the victims may have suffered social 
rather than direct individual harm. The Commission and Court have determined that a 
victim, for purposes of reparation, can also be a next of kin or a dependent of the direct 
victim in circumstances where the immediate victim was killed as a result of a rights 
violation. While the definition of victim is expansive in that it includes family members of 
victims directly harmed, it is also important to note that individual victims in cases before 
the Inter-American Commission and Court may be representative of rights violations 
experienced by members of a society on a much larger scale than the immediate victim or 
their family. This argument harkens back to the discussion of the social nature of gendered 
harm, which was described by Howe as the “‘pain caused by ‘hidden injuries’ of all gender-
orientated societies - that lived, internalized experience of lower gender status as personal 
failure” in section 2.2. 193 In that many of the Inter-American System cases are emblematic, 
it is necessary for women’s rights cases to reflect upon and redress the structural and 
collective components of rights violations as they have a far-reaching impact. 
 
The challenge of determining alleged violations in a case directly relates to the fulfilment of 
pre-condition one, establishing the relevant facts. The facts serve as “proof” of a violation, 
                                                
191 Ibid 1065. 
192 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (n 14) Article 2. 
193 Adrian Howe, 'The Problem of Privatized Injuries' in Martha Albertson Fineman and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen 
(eds), At the Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory (Routledge 1991) 149 note 1; supra section 2.2.3 (n 
74). 
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where Rubio-Marín and Sandoval referred to Juliane Kokott’s work on determining 
violations of the law, to point out that the Inter-American Court has “made obvious the 
‘intimate relationship between the effective protection of substantive rights and the 
allocation and standard of proof.’”194 In cases concerned with violations of rights based on 
gender, challenges arise when it comes to meeting the standard of proof. Rubio-Marín and 
Sandoval asserted, “cases on gender violence, given the existence of cultural or religious 
factors […] may render proving that a certain violation took place particularly difficult”.195 
Rubio-Marín and Sandoval explained that in order to properly fulfil the second pre-
condition, properly identify the alleged violations and victims, two principles must be 
applied: (i) “the alleged victim should not be required to prove the impossible or else his or 
her rights would become meaningless”; and (ii) “general rules of evidence should include 
mechanisms to balance the rigidity of the burden and standard of proof”.196 In order for a 
Friendly Settlement Agreement or Inter-American Court judgment to include a violation of 
a right, the facts must provide enough evidence to support the claim of an alleged violation. 
With specific regard to cases that respond to gender based harm and violations of women’s 
rights, it is imperative that the victim (petitioner) and/or the Commission interpret the facts 
of the case in such a way that it is possible to allege a violation of Article 7 of the 
Convention of Belém do Pará.197 In that Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará 
essentially protects rights already enshrined within the American Convention of Human 
Rights, the task of conducting a gender-based analysis of rights violations should be 
undertaken in any case related to gender-based harm and/or violence against women. Once 
the petitioners allege an Article 7 violation, it is then possible for the petitioners and the 
Commission to refer to Article 8 and Article 9 as lenses through which the Article 7 
violation may be examined.198   
 
The third and final pre-condition, properly identifying the harm and those harmed by the 
violations, is “crucial to determin(ing) adequate reparations”, according to Rubio-Marín and 
Sandoval.199 Although Friendly Settlement Agreements and Court judgments determine 
reparations through different procedures, the intention of each mechanism is the same: to 
prevent and repair harm. Rubio-Marín and Sandoval explained that the “notion of harm is a 
                                                
194 Juliane Kokott, The Burden of Proof in Comparative and International Human Rights Law: Civil and Common 
Law Approaches with Special Reference to the American and German Legal Systems (Brill Nijhoff 1998) 141. 
Referenced in Rubio Marín and Sandoval (n 4) 1066. 
195 Rubio-Marín and Sandoval (n 4) 1067. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Convention of Belém do Pará (n 24) Articles 7, 8 and 9. 
198 González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico (n 36) ¶79. 
199 Rubio-Marín and Sandoval (n 4) 1067. 
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necessary part of an agenda that seeks to render reparations gender-sensitive in at least two 
important ways”.200 First, “the notion of harm links the violations to the set of affected 
individuals, allowing the proper identification of the circle of beneficiaries”.201 Second, 
“giving adequate relevance to the notion of harm allows for understanding that different 
harms may ensue from the same violations and that one of the determining factors may be 
the gender of the victim”.202 For Rubio-Marín and Sandoval it is crucial that harm 
experienced by women be understood in a context of the “pre-existing structures of 
subordination that account for (the) compounded nature (of gendered harm)”.203 The task of 
incorporating the concept of gendered harm into the facts or alleged violations of a case is a 
challenge, especially because, as Rubio-Marín and Sandoval contended, “poor litigation of 
cases and lack of awareness of the many ways in which women can be affected, even by 
those violations that target men, will translate into the incapacity of the system to 
acknowledge women as victims of violations under the Convention”.204 This challenge is 
especially evident in the forthcoming analysis of gendered harm in the Artavia Murillo et 
al. v. Costa Rica case. In determining fulfilment of the pre-conditions in the forthcoming 
case analyses, the interpretation of harm relates back to the discussion of gendered harm in 
section 2.2. 
 
Finally, in proving harm, the Court may invoke its motu propio capacity in order to connect 
human rights violations with harm, and then subsequently issue reparation to address both 
the violation and the harm that caused the rights violation. This means, with particular 
regard to women’s rights cases, that in the event that the Commission and the petitioner fail 
to link gendered harm to alleged rights violations and subsequent reparations, the Inter-
American Court may take on the duty of linking violation, to harm, to reparation. However, 
as will be discussed in the analysis of the Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. 
Costa Rica case,205 even in a situation where the Court actively attempts to analyse harm as 
it is gendered and results in violations of women’s rights, reparations issued in a 
reproductive rights judgment do not necessarily reflect the Court’s activist approach to 
determining harm. Instead reparations can be heavily reliant on the facts established in the 
case, as well as the violations alleged by the petitioners and the Commission.  
 
                                                
200 Ibid 1068. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid 1069. 
205 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica [2012] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. 
C) No. 257 Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
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Why a “Gender Reparations Tradition”? 
While this thesis employs the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations as a framework to 
consistently analyze reparations issued in each of the forthcoming case study chapters, the 
thesis also advocates the development of a “gender reparations tradition” in the Inter-
American System of Human Rights. Where the Holistic Approach is reflective in design, 
meaning it is intended to look back at litigation processes to determine how and to what 
extent gender was incorporated in women’s rights cases, the concept of a “gender 
reparations tradition” requires that women’s (reproductive) rights cases be designed from 
the outset using a gendered understanding of harm, violence, and discrimination. The 
requirements for advancing a “gender reparations tradition” within the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights are not fixed, but the analysis of reproductive rights case studies 
conducted in this thesis reveals strategies that if consistently employed in women’s rights 
litigation may contribute to a sustainable approach to engendering reparations. 
 
The notion of “tradition” used in this thesis originated in two ways. First, María Alejandra 
Cardenas, a former attorney at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and also 
with the Center for Reproductive Rights, explained in an interview that there is “no current 
“tradition (or practice) to be thinking about reparations” in the process of human rights 
litigation before the Inter-American System of Human Rights.206 Cardenas’ use of the word 
“tradition” appealed to me because it is not a procedural or technical term yet it implies the 
need to “mainstream” or “institutionalize” gender through the Inter-American System. 
Second, as part of the research conducted for this thesis, I was invited to join Hilary 
Charlesworth’s “Strengthening the International Human Rights System: Rights, Regulation 
and Ritualism” project as a visiting scholar with Australian National University.207 At an 
accompanying workshop held in Spain, I was tasked with presenting my research as it 
relates to the practice of “ritual”, which in this context referred to how States engage with or 
reject human rights norms, values and practices through involvement with supranational 
human rights conventions and monitoring bodies.208 For my presentation, I likened the 
                                                
206 Interview with María Alejandra Cardenas, Regional Legal Director, Women’s Link Worldwide, Former Human 
Rights Attorney, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Center for Reproductive Rights, Washington 
DC, USA 27 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, Cm, S). 
207 ‘Strengthening the International Human Rights System: Rights, Regulation and Ritualism’ PI: Professor Hilary 
Charlesworth, Centre for International Governance and Justice, Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian national 
University; Visiting Scholar (23 October - 4 December 2014. Available at: http://regnet.anu.edu.au/research/research-
projects/details/535/strengthening-international-human-rights-system-rights#acton-tabs-link--qt-research_project_ 
odetails_qtab-ui-tabs1. 
208 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Introduction to the Workshop and the concepts of regulation, rituals and ritualism’ Rights, 
Regulation and Ritualism Workshop’ International Institute for the Sociology of Law, Onati, Spain (1-4 September 
2015). !
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concept of “ritual” to that of “tradition” in order to highlight the problematic nature of 
ineffective procedural norms that impede implementation of human rights law. I argued, 
much like I do through this thesis, that a “gender reparations tradition” should be 
understood as a form of ritual; one where states and actors engaged in litigation, as well as 
the Inter-American System itself must advance a recurring practice of engendering 
reparations in order to ensure its ongoing existence, development and improvement.  
 
The “gender reparations tradition” I propose is based on strategies derived from the cases 
studies selected for analysis in this thesis. That being said, there are undoubtedly other 
strategies that may be compiled from different critiques of these same cases, or from other 
reproductive rights cases in the coming months and years. To summarize, the strategies 
developed in this thesis to advance a “gender reparations tradition” are as follows: (i) 
employ alternative rights concepts in reproductive rights litigation; (ii) enhance the role of 
civil society in the design of reparations; (iii) apply a multi-faceted approach to interpreting 
reproductive rights; and (iv) acknowledge and claim violations of reproductive rights 
through the violence against women framework. Each of these strategies corresponds with 
critique of the case study chapters insofar as they accomplish or fail to achieve an 
understanding of gendered harm through the litigation and reparation processes. By 
advocating the development of a “gender reparations tradition” in women’s reproductive 
rights cases, this thesis provides a new way of framing and analysing gender and 
reparations in judicial venues. As is discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter, 
chapter seven, the proposed “gender reparations tradition” requires that reparations be 
brought forward in the process of case design, so that alleged violations be asserted and 
defined in conjunction with reparations, rather than treat reparations as a superfluous 
secondary aspect of women’s rights litigation. The overall objective of introducing these 
preliminary strategies for advancing a “gender reparations tradition” is to lay the 
groundwork for reparation design that lends itself to reparation implementation; that is, the 
“gender reparations tradition” is in itself a first step to ensuring state compliance with 
human rights norms as they are intended to protect, promote and fulfil the rights of women. 
 
Chapter three provided the groundwork for developing a “gender reparations tradition” 
within the work of the Inter-American System of Human Rights. By building on the 
concepts of gendered harm and reparation in chapter two, chapter three identified and 
examined several approaches to integrating gender within women’s rights cases. These 
approaches include application of the Convention of Belém do Pará Article 7 protections, 
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specifically due diligence; promotion of an increased civil society role in the development 
of gender-based reparations; and the creation of alternative litigation strategies that 
challenge the “maleness” of law. The themes addressed within this chapter combined with 
those from chapter two provide the contextual and analytical premise by which to conduct 
critical analyses of reproductive rights cases in chapters four through six. While the above 
chapters highlighted potential pathways for promoting a “gender reparations tradition” in 
the Inter-American System, the following case studies reveal the practical challenges 
inherent to reconceiving and advancing the transformative potential of reparations in 
women’s reproductive rights cases. The following case study chapters, which are 
introduced in chronological order, have the following objectives: (i) to understand how each 
of these cases developed and how the Inter-American System works on women’s 
reproductive rights issues; (ii) to determine strategies for advancing women’s reproductive 
rights through the Inter-American System, specifically the development of gender-based 
reparations designed to redress structural gender-based harm; and (iii) to provide practical 
tools for designing gender-based reparations cases in women’s reproductive rights cases. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
MARÍA MAMERITA MESTANZA CHÁVEZ V. PERU 
 
Of the three cases selected for analysis in this research, María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez 
v. Peru1 is significant in that it was one of the first cases before the Inter-American 
Commission to connect women’s reproductive health rights violations to underlying causes 
of discrimination.2 It was also the first forced sterilization case to be admitted by the Inter-
American Commission where the State accepted responsibility for a violation of the 
Convention of Belém do Pará in a reproductive rights case that resulted in a Friendly 
Settlement Agreement.3 The case was selected for this research not only because it was the 
first of its kind in the Inter-American System, but also because the Agreement reached by 
the parties is over ten years old, allowing time to analyse the case in its aftermath and to 
reflect on lessons learned related to the design of gender-based reparations. The analysis 
conducted here provides a critique of the María Mestanza Chávez Friendly Settlement 
Agreement in order to determine the potential for this case to transform the reproductive 
lives of women through the development of gender-based reparations, and to identify 
strategies for gendering reparations in future women’s reproductive rights cases. 
 
This chapter explains and critiques the context in which Peruvian women experience(d) 
gender-based harm through violations of their reproductive rights, and draws conclusions 
from the María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez case in order to examine the potential of the 
Inter-American System to protect, promote and fulfil women’s reproductive rights. The first 
section of this chapter introduces and examines the María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez case 
through the facts established by the petitioner and the State of Peru in the Friendly 
Settlement Agreement. This section employs the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations 
to determine fulfilment of the gender reparations pre-conditions, establish the relevant 
facts, identify the alleged violations and victims and identify the harm and those harmed by 
the violations. The second section explores the wider context in which this case exists, and 
focuses on the implications of social and gender based harm as it impacts women’s lives 
and reproductive health rights. The third section critically reviews the reparations agreed 
                                                
1 María María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru [2003] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 
12.191, No. 71/03 Friendly Settlement Agreement. 
2 Ibid ¶14(11): “The Peruvian State pledges to change laws and public policies on reproductive health and family 
planning, eliminating any discriminatory approach and respecting women’s autonomy.” The first reproductive rights 
case before the Inter-American Commission was Monica Carabantes Galleguillos v. Chile [2002] Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights Report 33/02, Friendly Settlement Agreement. 
3 Other forced sterilization cases: IV v. Bolivia [2014] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report No. 
72/14, Case 12.655 Merits, and FS v. Chile [2014] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Petition 112–09, 
Report No. 52/14 Admissibility.   
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upon in the María Chávez case, also referred to as applying the test, in order to determine 
their transformative potential for improving the lives of Peruvian women. The concluding 
section of this chapter identifies strategies derived from the María Chávez case to 
strengthen gender-based reparations in the Inter-American Systems. 
 
4.1 The Case: María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru 
Women’s enjoyment of their reproductive rights has a contentious and storied past in Peru. 
In many ways, Peruvian women’s experiences with reproductive rights advancements and 
violations mirror the experiences of women throughout the Latin American region. 
However, in the Peruvian context, an amalgamation of internal armed conflict, duplicitous 
population control policies, an international agenda which promoted women’s reproductive 
autonomy, neoliberal healthcare reform, and institutionalized discrimination based on race, 
gender and class, combined to create an environment of violence for a certain type of 
Peruvian woman; the poor, rural, uneducated, dark-skinned, indigenous woman. This 
chapter explores the case of María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru,4 a woman whose 
identity fits within the above characteristics, and whose case is representative of 
reproductive rights violations for approximately 300,000 Peruvian women.  
 
María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez (hereinafter referred to as María Chávez) was an 
indigenous woman and mother living in poverty in the Encañada District of Peru. She had 
seven children and was approximately 33 years old. In 1996, personnel from the public 
health centre of Encañada pressured María Chávez to commit to a tubal ligation procedure, 
also known as sterilization. She and her husband, Jacinto Suárez, were told that if she were 
to refuse the sterilization procedure, she would be required to pay a fine and may be taken 
to prison for violating a (non-existent) Peruvian law that made it illegal to have more than 
five children.5 As a result of harassment and coercion over a period of almost two years, 
María Chávez underwent a tubal ligation procedure on March 27th 1998. The operation was 
performed without prior medical examination, and María Chávez was not given a medical 
consent form to sign until the day after the procedure. The following day, María Chávez 
was discharged from the Encañada public health centre despite complaints of pain and 
stomach irritation. Her complications intensified over the following days, and in spite of 
Jacinto Suárez’s repeated attempts to request medical assistance for his wife, the health 
                                                
4 María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru [2003] (n 1). Peru ratified the American Convention on Human Rights in 
1978 and the Convention of Belém do Pará in 1996. It accepted the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 
jurisdiction in 1981. 
5 Ibid ¶10. 
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centre denied the family follow-up care. María Chávez died at home on April 5th 1998, 
eight days after her sterilization operation.  The death was ruled to have been a direct result 
of the procedure. Shortly after María Chávez’s death, a physician from the Encañada health 
centre attempted to offer Jacinto Suárez a sum of money to forget the issue.6  On April 15th 
1998, Jacinto Suárez implicated the chief of Encañada health centre in the death of María 
Chávez, and filed formal criminal charges before a Provincial Judge on May 15th 1998. On 
June 4th, the Judge declared “there were no grounds for opening an investigation”, and in 
July of that year the Specialized Chamber for Criminal Matters concurred with the 
Provincial Judge’s decision.7 The María Chávez case was formally closed in Peru on 
December 16th 1998.   
 
On June 15th, 1999, a number of NGOs 8  (hereinafter, “the petitioner” or “victims’ 
representatives”) filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
on behalf of María Chávez and her family.9 They alleged that the State of Peru had violated 
the following human rights: the right to life (Article 4), right to personal integrity (Article 
5), and the rights to equality and non-discrimination (Articles 1 and 24) under the American 
Convention on Human Rights;10 the right to be free from violence in the public and private 
spheres (Article 3), right to respect for freedom and security, including decision-making 
(Article 4), right to due diligence (Article 7), the state obligation to enact programs which 
combat sociocultural patterns that contribute to violence and discrimination (Article 8) and 
the state’s duty to consider the circumstance of vulnerability in which women live (Article 
9) enshrined within the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and 
Eradication of Violence Against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará);11 the right to non-
discrimination (Article 3), right to health (Article 10) in the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (Protocol of San Salvador);12 and the right to health (Article 12) and state duty to 
undertake non-discrimination measures (Article 14(2)) as protected in the United Nations 
                                                
6 Ibid ¶6.  
7 María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru [2000] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Case 12.191, 
Report No 66/00 Admissibility ¶7. 
8 Office for the Defense of Women’s Rights (DEMUS), the Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the 
Defense of Women’s Rights (CLADEM), and the Asociación por Derechos Humanos [Association for Human 
Rights] (APRODEH), the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy (CRLP) and the Center for Justice and 
International Law (CEJIL). 
9 María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru [2000] Admissibility (n 7). 
10 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), OASTS No. 36 (1969). 
11 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women 
(‘Convention of Belém do Pará’) OASTS (1994). It is worth noting that the Convention of Belém do Pará does not 
clearly delineate its rights provisions, which makes it difficult to succinctly and easily refer to provision violations. 
12 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (‘Protocol of San Salvador’), OASTS 69 (1988). 
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Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).13 
This list of human rights violations is multi-faceted and takes into account the relationship 
between reproductive rights violations and violence against women. By claiming violations 
of the right to non-discrimination, the right to be free from violence and the right to health, 
as well as recognising the State’s failure to address sociocultural patterns that cause 
women’s rights violations, the petitioners employed a multi-faceted approach to rights in an 
attempt to connect the structural inequality and discrimination facing rural, poor and 
indigenous women across Peru to the specific case of María Chávez. After hearing from the 
State of Peru in response to the allegations, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights admitted María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru on October 3rd 2000.14 Despite 
the petitioner’s efforts to illustrate an all-encompassing and multi-faceted picture of the 
structural components of Maria Chavez’s forced sterilization, the Inter-American 
Commission admitted the case based only on the following rights violations: Articles 1, 4, 
5, and 24 (obligation to respect rights, right to life, personal integrity, and equality, 
respectively) of the American Convention, and Article 7 (due diligence) of the Convention 
of Belém do Pará.15 Of particular significance here is the Commission’s failure to determine 
an Article 7 violation in collaboration with Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention of Belém do 
Pará. This effectively limited the petitioner’s capacity to demand reparations that reflected 
upon the structural components of the violations. This disconnect is clear in the Friendly 
Settlement Agreement, which does not include an effective analysis of the relationship 
between social and gendered harm and forced sterilization. 
 
Upon concluding the Admissibility proceedings before the Inter-American Commission, the 
State of Peru and the petitioners entered into Friendly Settlement Agreement proceedings. 
The victims’ representative and the State agreed to define the victims in this case as María 
Chávez, her husband, Jacinto Suarez, and their seven children.16 The victims outlined in the 
Agreement were those designated as beneficiaries for restitution. However, the case also 
connected the forced sterilization of María Chávez to a wider systemic problem by 
declaring that María Chávez was “one more among a large number of cases of women 
                                                
13 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), GA Res. 
34/180 (1979). 
14 María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru [2000] (n 7). 
15 The Convention of Belém do Pará does not contain an article granting the Inter-American Commission and Court 
contentious jurisdiction. However, both the Commission and Court have expanded their advisory jurisdiction over 
this Convention by finding violations of due diligence (Article 7). See, Maria da Penha v. Brazil [2001] Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Merits; Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru [2008] Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights (ser. C), No. 160, Merits, Reparations and Costs; and González et al. (‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico 
[2009] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. C) No. 205, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs. 
16 María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru [2003] (n 1) ¶14. 
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affected by a massive, compulsory, and systematic government policy to stress sterilization 
as a means for rapidly altering the reproductive behaviour of the population, especially 
poor, Indian, and rural women”.17 The Agreement did not provide an analysis of why these 
women were targeted. It also neglected to mention the estimated 25,000 men who were also 
sterilized,18 therefore making invisible discrimination on the grounds of class and ethnicity. 
The State and the petitioners reached a final Agreement on August 26th 2003, and then 
submitted the report to the Inter-American Commission, where it was subsequently 
approved and then published. The Agreement did not refer to the term “forced sterilization”, 
but as is examined in section 4.3, the Agreement did attempt to repair gender-based 
discrimination as a central contributing factor to the violation of María Chávez’s 
reproductive health rights. 
 
Fulfilling the Preconditions 
The above introduction to the facts established within the María Chávez Friendly 
Settlement Agreement provides the foundation for determining the extent to which this case 
fulfilled the gender reparations preconditions identified within Rubio-Marín and Sandoval’s 
Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations. The fulfilment of these preconditions is 
considered by Rubio-Marín and Sandoval to be a key component in the project of 
developing gender-based reparations in the Inter-American System of Human Rights. 19 
This section reflects on the María Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement in order to 
determine the extent to which it established the relevant facts, properly identified the 
alleged victims and violations and properly identified the harm and those harmed. 
 
First, the María Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement did not effectively take account of 
the context in which María Chávez was forcibly sterilized. While the Agreement was 
progressive in that it recognised that “poor, Indian, and rural women” were 
disproportionately sterilized, it did not include a thorough examination of intersectional 
discrimination as it allowed for the targeting of a specific “type” of Peruvian women; there 
was no recognition of why women from a particular demographic were sterilized. As a 
result, the first pre-condition, establish the relevant facts, was not entirely fulfilled through 
the Friendly Settlement Agreement. Second, the Agreement did not include violations of 
                                                
17 Ibid ¶9. 
18 'Perú Reopens Criminal Investigation Into Mass Forced Sterilizations' (Center for Reproductive Rights, 13 May 
2015) <www.reproductiverights.org/press-room/peru-reopens-criminal-investigation-into-mass-forced-sterilizations> 
accessed 20 May 2015. 
19 Ruth Rubio-Marín and Clara Sandoval, 'Engendering the Reparations Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: The Promise of the ‘Cotton Field’ Judgment' (2011) 33:4 Human Rights Quarterly 1062-1091, supra 
section 3.3 (n 180).!
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Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention of Belém do Pará, and also neglected to include rights 
provisions enshrined within the Protocol of San Salvador, such as the right to health. The 
Inter-American Commission did not include these rights provisions in its statement of 
admissibility, despite the petitioner’s claim that the forced sterilization of María Chávez 
constituted a violation of these rights. If the Inter-American Commission had admitted the 
María Chávez case on the basis of these additional violations, there may have been the 
opportunity in the Agreement proceedings to develop a more nuanced and comprehensive 
depiction of the structural nature of reproductive rights violations as they are rights that 
exist across a spectrum of human rights. In that the Agreement did not include a 
comprehensive determination of the applicable rights provisions, this analysis determined 
that the Agreement partially fulfilled the identify the violations precondition. Finally, 
despite the petitioner’s efforts to locate forced sterilization as a violation under the 
Convention of Belém do Pará, the Friendly Settlement Agreement did not include a 
thorough analysis of the gendered and social nature of harm. While the facts of the 
Agreement established that the María Chávez case represented the rights violations of a 
number of Peruvian women, there was no examination of the social injury inflicted on a 
large group of people who were specifically targeted for sterilization. The harm experienced 
by women (and men) who were sterilized was gendered, racist and classist; it was a form of 
social harm based on intersectional discrimination. The gendered harm experienced by the 
thousands of women who were coercively sterilized was a form of invasive harm in that the 
State purposefully invaded women’s bodies to strip them of their reproductive capacity, and 
ultimately denied them their reproductive autonomy and identity. In that the Friendly 
Settlement Agreement neglected to examine the gendered and social nature of harm 
inflicted through forced sterilization, the María Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement did 
not fulfil the identify the harm precondition. 
 
By examining the María Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement through the gender 
reparations preconditions determined in Rubio-Marín and Sandoval’s Holistic Gender 
Approach to Reparations, 20 it is clear that the María Chávez Agreement was ineffective in 
developing the emblematic nature of the rights violated in this case. As Oscar Parra Vera, 
former senior attorney at the Inter-American Court asserted, it is important to create a 
“structural picture about a specific problem” in human rights litigation.21 While the María 
Chávez Agreement made reference to the widespread problem of forced sterilization, it 
                                                
20 Ibid. 
21 Interview with Oscar Parra Vera, Senior Attorney, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, San Jose, Costa Rica 7 
August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, Ct, S). 
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failed to recognize and examine the underlying intersectional root causes of forced 
sterilization, which ultimately limited the transformative potential of this case. The 
following section develops the “structural picture” of forced sterilization in Peru, and is 
intended to provide the context missing in the María Chávez Friendly Settlement 
Agreement.  
 
4.2 Context: Setting the Stage for Women’s Reproductive Rights in Peru? 
In Peru, as in many other parts of the world, structural inequality is manifested through a 
myriad of characteristics, including gender, ethnicity, race, language, income, religion, 
citizenship, disability and sexuality. For women in Peru, the intersection of these 
characteristics often indicates how women experience harm, discrimination and violence in 
their lifetimes. Poor Quechua-speaking indigenous Peruvian women experience 
discrimination across at least four characteristics: gender, race/ethnicity, language and 
income combine to contribute to women’s unequal status in society. These women are 
subjected to violence in the public and private spheres, where patriarchal culture permeates 
home and public life.22 The violence women experienced when targeted for sterilization was 
a result of intersectional discrimination, where women’s characteristics became grounds for 
their subordinate position in society. Crenshaw described these multiple indivisible levels of 
discrimination as “structural intersectionality”. 23  She explained that “intersectional 
subordination need not be intentionally produced; in fact, it is frequently the consequence of 
the imposition of one burden that interacts with pre-existing vulnerabilities to create yet 
another dimension of disempowerment”.24 In Peru, women experience discrimination based 
on their gender, which can be understood as a “pre-existing vulnerability”, and rural, poor, 
indigenous woman experience additional “dimensions of disempowerment”. The concept of 
intersectionality is particularly useful to use as a foundation in analysing how and why a 
certain type of Peruvian woman became a tool in Peru’s struggle to control population 
growth, eliminate poverty and modernize in the 1980s and 1990s. Crenshaw’s emphasis on 
pre-existing vulnerabilities applies here, where a culture of racism and sexism permeate 
Peruvian society and in many ways, determine who is an eligible rights holder and who is 
not.  
 
                                                
22 Sylvia Chant and Nikki Craske, Gender in Latin America (Latin American Bureau 2003) 9. 
23 Kimberlé Crenshaw, 'Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of 
Color' (1991) 43:6 Stanford Law Review 1249. 
24 Ibid. 
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According to Jelke Boesten, in Peru the concept of race plays out based on height, skin, hair 
and eye colour combined with other determinants such as socioeconomic position, 
geographical origin, education, dress, and language.25 Women in Peru are perceived to be 
lower on the social ranking than their male counterparts in the same social group.26 Peru’s 
hierarchical social ladder manifests and reinforces itself in both the intimate space of private 
life and in the public sphere. This is especially true in how familial power relations play 
out; in matters related to the formation of families, patriarchal understandings of decision-
making in the household determine how women experience autonomy. For its part, the 
Peruvian State perpetuates rather than challenges gender, race, and class hierarchies. 
According to the Center for Reproductive Rights, this practice was evident in the State’s 
population control program in the 1990s and is still visible today in the State’s ongoing 
failure to prosecute individuals responsible for women’s reproductive rights violations.27 In 
the 1980s and 1990s structural inequality and discrimination against women, especially 
poor women living in the highlands, amplified exponentially. According to Ernesto 
Vasquez del Aguila, it was during this time that an internal armed conflict raged throughout 
the country, and simultaneously, a population control policy went into effect under the 
guise of reproductive autonomy and access to family planning. 28  These two forces 
compounded to add a new level of vulnerability for poor (indigenous, rural) women in Peru; 
they became tools in a war as well as in state efforts to control population growth.  
 
The Peruvian internal conflict, which began in 1980, instilled a deep-seated sense of 
collective terror throughout society, where concepts like truth, justice and rights became 
almost alien, and resulted in a public distaste for impunity.29  During this conflict women 
experienced violence on a widespread scale, yet the violence they experienced was not 
always visible or quantifiable. Human rights violations such as rape, forced disappearance 
and death disproportionately affected women, especially poor, indigenous, Quechua-
                                                
25 Jelke Boesten, 'The State and Violence Against Women in Peru: Intersecting Inequalities and Patriarchal Rule' 
(2012) 19:3 Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 366. 
26 Ibid. 
27 'Perú Ends Criminal Investigation into Mass Forced Sterilizations', (Center for Reproductive Rights, 29 January 
2014) <http://reproductiverights.org/press-room/Peru-Ends-Criminal-Investigation-into-Mass-Forced-Sterilizations> 
accessed 17 February 2015.  
28 Ernesto Vasquez del Aguila, 'Invisible Women: Forced Sterilization, Reproductive Rights, and Structural 
Inequalities in Peru of Fujimori and Toledo' (2002) 6 Estudios e Pesquisas em Psicologia 111. 
29 ‘Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report' (2003) <www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/index. 
php> accessed 4 June 2013. 
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speaking women living in the Peruvian highlands. 30  The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission established in the aftermath of the conflict determined that,  
The women most effected (were) part of the Andean culture and (were) Quechua-
speaking, […] what was happening to them, las campesinas [the peasant women], 
was not part of the national concern. They were ‘those’ who were there in the 
highlands, from the mountains, away from progress and civilization. Peruvian 
society was not interested in these crimes.31  
The “otherness” of the women and men most affected by the conflict is a mind-set that 
continues today in Peru. Cristina Alcalde explained there is a strong awareness of race and 
class in Peru, where the wealthy in Lima use terms like indio and cholo32 to signify 
backwardness or inferiority, and euphemisms such as educados (educated) and gente 
decente (decent people) to refer to white limeños (fair-skinned, often wealthy Peruvians 
living in Lima).33  
 
Ewig noted that women who live in the highland regions of Peru are perceived by those 
living in the urban regions of Peru, to be “backward”, not modern, and a hindrance to the 
process of Peruvian development.34 Women who live in Lima are educated and modern, and 
are quick to disassociate with indigenous, or india, backgrounds.35 This disconnect amongst 
Peruvian women harkens back to West’s assertion that it is difficult for women to view 
themselves as sharing common interests with other women in terms of advancing social 
change.36 Diana Portal, a Peruvian human rights lawyer, echoed this sentiment, “people are 
not conscious that the situation (referring to forced sterilization campaigns in the highlands) 
could have been for them. They cannot see themselves in that farmer, or the Andean and 
Quechua-speaking woman”.37 The violence women experienced during the conflict, and 
during the population control policies of the 1990s, was a result of underlying and 
intersecting discrimination, where the victim’s lives were ultimately invisible to the 
educated and decent members of Peruvian society. While a conflict raged in the highlands 
and eventually seeped into the outskirts of Lima, the situation for women affected by the 
                                                
30 Julie Guillerot, 'Linking Gender and Reparations in Peru: A Failed Opportunity' in Ruth Rubio-Marín (ed), What 
Happened to the Women? Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations (Social Science Research Council 
2006) 141. 
31 'Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report’ (n 29) Chapter 2 - Differential Impact of Violence: 
Gender’ <www.derechos.org/nizkor/peru/libros/cv/viii/21.pdf> accessed 4 June 2013. 
32 M. Cristina Alcalde, The Woman in the Violence: Gender, Poverty, and Resistance in Peru (Vanderbilt University 
Press 2010) 52, 54 and 86. The term cholo is used to refer to someone who is in the process of transition from 
indigenous to mestizo, where mestizo implies a shift to “modernity,” for example wearing urban clothing.  
33 Ibid 51. 
34 Christina Ewig, 'Hijacking Global Feminism: Feminists, the Catholic Church, and the Family Planning Debacle in 
Peru' (2006) 32:3 Feminist Studies 633. 
35 Interview with Cecilia Olea, Women’s Rights Researcher and Advocate, Flora Tristan, Lima, Peru 9 July 2014 
(Ref Code: Ip, P, N).  
36 Robin West, Caring for Justice (New York University Press 1997) 97, supra section 2.2.2 (n 73). 
37 Interview with Diana Portal Farfán, Attorney, Office of the Ombudsman, Women Department, Lima, Peru 2 July 
2014 (Ref Code: Ip, P, G, S). 
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conflict was not a central focus for society in Lima, as highlighted above in the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission final report.38 Structural inequality based on discrimination, 
racism, sexism and classism carried over to impact 300,000 women (and 25,000 men) from 
the rural, poor, indigenous communities of Peru who were forcibly sterilized in an effort to 
“modernize” the country. 
 
4.2.1 Talking Rights Talk: Family Planning in Peru 
In the mid-1990s, women’s human rights came to the fore in the international arena. The 
1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) culminated in a 
Programme of Action that established as goals, among numerous others, universal access to 
family planning and reproductive health rights and services, gender equality and 
empowerment of women, and education for girls.39 The following year, in 1995, the United 
Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing reiterated elements of the ICPD 
call for action, placing emphasis on women’s empowerment and equality.40  It was at this 
conference that former president of Peru (1990-2000), Albert Fujimori, discussed strategies 
for family planning, and declared, 
My government has decided to carry out, as part of a policy of social development 
and the fight against poverty, an integral strategy of family planning that confronts, 
openly - for the first time in the history of our country - the serious lack of 
information and services available on this matter. Thus, women can have at their 
disposal with full autonomy and freedom, the tools necessary to make decisions 
about their own lives.41 
Fujimori placed an emphasis on free choice and information, especially for women living in 
poverty, and forthrightly challenged the Church.42 He continued, 
 We are not going to stop our effort to carry out a vast national campaign to actively 
make public all these family planning methods that modern science has placed at 
our disposal. This is not going to be done to instate some kind of sinister power, but 
to light torches of hope to advance in to a new millennium that must highlight a new 
era of dignity for all human beings.43  
At the time, Fujimori’s speech seemed revolutionary. He demanded the rights of women to 
autonomy and freedom, and related family planning to dignity, and above all, he made this 
statement before an international forum, where the world was listening and watching.  
 
                                                
38 'Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report' (n 29) 72. 
39 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), ‘Report of the International Conference on 
Population and Development’ (UN Doc. No. A/CONF.171/13 1994). 
40 'Platform for Action United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women' (1995) 
<www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/ platform/plat1.htm#concern>. 
41 Alberto Fujimori, 'Speech Given by the President of the Republic of Peru before the IV World Conference on 
Women, Beijing, China' (1995) <www.un.org/esa/gopher-data/conf/fwcw/conf/gov/950915131946.txt>. 
42 Ewig (n 34) 642. 
43 Fujimori (n 41). 
!!
105 
Despite the seeming advances in access to family planning services, the reality of the 
situation on the ground vastly differed to the rhetoric in Fujimori’s speech. Superficially, 
Fujimori’s women’s rights-based discourse and emphasis on family planning appeared to 
benefit women’s enjoyment of their reproductive rights, but upon closer inspection it 
became apparent that national legislation on population control provided the impetus to 
implement a coercive sterilization program, where the goal was not the protection of 
women’s reproductive rights but rather, population control and subsequent poverty 
reduction.44 President Fujimori’s thinking was in-line with the international community’s 
desire to reduce population growth, and modernize/“Westernize” developing countries.45 
The rationale “that poverty was caused by overpopulation (instead of overpopulation being 
a symptom of poverty), and that reducing the population was a condition for 
development” 46  underscored the global community’s perception of family planning. 
Fujimori’s plan to stop poor people from producing more poor people targeted Peruvians 
living in the highlands who were perceived as “backwards” and not modern. Ultimately 
“family planning” in Peru was designed to exploit and curtail the rights of those individuals 
deemed responsible for causing the overpopulation/poverty problem: poor, rural, 
indigenous women. 
 
4.2.2 Family Planning or Something Else? 
Following Fujimori’s speech, the international aid community applauded the work being 
done on women’s reproductive health in Peru, and began funding family planning projects 
in the country.47 In 1995, with the assistance of funds from international aid groups such as 
USAID,48 Fujimori’s government implemented the “Voluntary Surgical Contraception” 
program (Anticoncepción Quirúrgica Voluntaria), which was originally developed in 1990. 
Implementation of the Voluntary Surgical Contraception program resulted in an intensive 
sterilization campaign in the rural regions of Peru. The program embodied a Malthusian 
                                                
44 Giulia Tamayo, 'Nothing Personal: Human Rights Report on the Application of Sterilization in Peru, 1996-1998, 
[Nada Personal. Reporte de Derechos Humanos sobre la Aplicacion de la Anticonception Quirurgica en el Peru 1996-
1998],' (CLADEM (Comité de America Latina y el Caribe para La Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer) 1999) 
<https://1996pnsrpf2000.files.wordpress.com/2011 /07/cladem_nada-personal.pdf>. 
45 Stephanie Rousseau, 'The Politics of Reproductive Health in Peru: Gender and Social Policy in the Global South' 
(2007) 14:1 Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 104.  
46 Jelke Boesten, Intersecting Inequalities: Women and Social Policy in Peru, 1990-2000 (Pennsylvania State 
University Press 2010) 76. 
47 Ibid 81. USAID contributed “a yearly sum of approximately $14 million plus several tons of foodstuffs.” 
48 Note that aid from US government entities, such as USAID, requires that all NGOs receiving US federal funding 
refrain from performing or promoting abortion services as a method of family planning. See, 'USAID’S Family 
Planning Guiding Principles and U.S. Legislative and Policy Requirements', (USAID, 11 June 2014) 
<www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/global-health/family-planning/ usaids-family-planning-guiding-principles-and-us> 
accessed 17 February 2015. 
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approach to population control, 49 where the fear that population was growing at too fast a 
rate to be sustainable led to the institution of “positive and preventive checks” in order to 
quell population growth.50 It is estimated that from 1995-2000, approximately 300,000 
women were forcibly sterilized as part of the Voluntary Surgical Contraception program.51 
Giulia Tamayo, a prominent feminist in Peru, along with women’s rights NGOs Flora 
Tristan and CLADEM, discovered that the health centres had set obligatory quotas, which 
obliged program employees to sterilize a set number of women (and men) in order to 
remain employed and receive promotions and monetary compensation. The evidence 
compiled by Tamayo revealed that only ten percent of the women sterilized under the 
Voluntary Surgical Contraception program underwent the procedure with “real consent”.52 
In many cases, those women who did not give “real consent” for the procedure were 
provided with information forms about the procedure that were written in Spanish, and not 
the Quechua language that most indigenous women spoke, and many women were not 
asked to complete consent forms until after their procedure.53 The program also utilized 
propaganda in health clinics and throughout rural communities to convey the idea of a small 
family as being necessary for happiness and modernity.54  
 
In that the Voluntary Surgical Contraception program targeted a specific type of woman, 
not all Peruvian women were at risk of coercion. The criteria selectively targeted poor 
indigenous women.55 The tactics employed by health personnel responsible for sterilizing 
the women elucidate discriminatory practices and attitudes that contributed to the 
manipulation and sterilization of thousands of women. Jelke Boesten, in her discussion on 
women and the healthcare system in Peru, provided an analysis of underlying forms of 
discrimination that permeate(d) the health sector. She explained, “the relationship between 
women and medical personnel […] is grounded in sociocultural misunderstandings that are 
entrenched in racism and sexism toward rural indigenous women”.56 Boesten argued that 
this racist/sexist relationship allowed for the state to implement an aggressive population 
control program through medical personnel. Underlying racism and sexism in Peruvian 
                                                
49 Betsy Hartmann, Reproductive Rights and Wrongs: The Global Politics of Population and Control (South End 
Press 1995) 14-15. 
50 T. R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (W. Pickering 1986) 
51 'Peru Reopens Criminal Investigation into Mass Forced Sterilizations' (n 18).  
52 Bernard M. Dickens and Rebecca J. Cook, 'Types of Consent in Reproductive Health Care' (2015) 128:2 
International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics 182. For this research, “real consent” is “informed consent” that 
has the purpose of “informing, not to persuade the patient to consent, but to serve the patient’s choice or autonomy, 
allowing choice to decide according to the patient’s own assessment of competing interests and values.”   
53 Giulia Tamayo ‘Nothing Personal’ (n 44). 
54 Ewig (n 34) 644-645.  
55 Ibid 644. 
56 Boesten, Intersecting Equalities (n 46) 83.  
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society combined with the State’s plan to limit population; medical personnel saw their role 
as instrumental in bringing those “backward” people in-line with the modern Peru. Luis 
Távara, a Peruvian medical doctor and expert in sexual and reproductive health confirmed 
Boesten’s claims about the relationship between women and medical personnel in Peru. He 
said,  
People who lack resources […] they don’t have the power to decide with autonomy 
the specific measures about their health. They become the victims of decisions 
made by other people, which in this case are the health personnel who do the 
deciding for them. So these women are discriminated against because they have a 
different language, they speak Quechua or Aymara, […] they are people who may 
have other religious beliefs, ones that differ from those of the staff at the health 
center. Or, they are just poor people, so they are just not respected.57 
 
The above analysis of women’s reproductive rights and family planning in Peru revealed 
that Peruvian women experienced protection of their rights to varying degrees depending on 
their race/ethnicity, income, geographic location, and class. Discrimination based on these 
characteristics is representative of claims made by Walker, where she explained “women of 
oppressed racial or economic groups may be perceived as economically or sexually more 
exploitable, or exploitable in different ways and with greater impunity.”58 The women 
sterilized as part of the Voluntary Surgical Contraception program in the María Chávez case 
were targeted because they belonged to groups already perceived to be “economically or 
sexually exploitable”; their rights meant less because society had normalised their 
discrimination. These social hierarchies exist in part because it is difficult for women who 
belong to poor, racially stigmatized groups to find solidarity with men in their same group, 
or with women who belong to different groups. For example, men in the same social group 
as marginalised women, and women with social privilege cannot afford to “jeopardize their 
status by reporting or condemning gender-based violence” because their own social status is 
precarious.59 The concepts of “transversal politics” and “imagined community,” when 
applied to the context of the María Chávez case, reveal the challenge of confronting social 
hierarchies. By applying Yuval-Davis’ “transversal politics” to the context of the María 
Chávez case it is clear that the different “positionings” of women across Peruvian society 
shaped and distorted “knowledge,” and ultimately established a skewed perception of the 
“truth”.60 The María Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement failed to engage in “truth-
                                                
57 Interview with Dr. Luis Távara, Executive Director of the Latin American Federation of Societies, Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, Lima, Peru 8 July 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, P, S, Rx).  
58 Margaret Urban Walker, ‘Gender and Violence in Focus: A Background for Gender Justice in Reparations,’ in 
Ruth Rubio-Marín (ed), The Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies While Redressing Human Rights 
Violations (Cambridge University Press 2009) 25. For more on social groups and interacting forms of oppression, see 
Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Equality of Difference (Princeton University Press 1990).  
59 Ibid 26. 
60 Yuval-Davis N, 'What is ‘Transversal Politics?’' (1999) 12 Soundings 95, supra section 1.1.1 (n 38). 
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making/telling” in that it did not address the reasons why particular groups of women were 
sterilised. Additionally, Mohanty’s “imagined communities”61 provides the concept of 
“boundaries” to interpret the lines along which Peruvian women experienced protections of 
their rights. India women and limeña woman were separated by a “boundary” built on a 
racist and patriarchal social hierarchy that made it difficult for women to see each other as 
belonging to the same oppressed group. 
 
The harm inflicted upon María Chávez, and hundreds of thousands of other Peruvian 
women, can be understood as both gendered and social harm. These women experienced 
“harms of invasion” in that their bodies were stripped of their childbearing function through 
medical intervention. They were also robbed of their reproductive autonomy and choice to 
become mothers. The social element of the reproductive rights violations involved in María 
Chávez cannot be ignored, especially because certain types of women (and men) were 
targeted for sterilization, and the impact on their communities is specific to a collective of 
people who were poor, indigenous and living in rural areas. In that the context in which 
María Chávez was sterilized is one shared by thousands of other women and men, there was 
a need to repair social and gendered harm at a structural level in order to address not only 
the invasive and physical nature of gendered harm, but also the “hidden injuries” still being 
experienced by those women and men who were sterilized, as well as their families and 
communities.  
 
4.3 Repairing Gendered Harm: Determining Transformative Potential 
The above sections introduced the María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru case, and the 
context in which the case existed. Where section 4.1 determined the partial fulfilment of the 
Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations pre-conditions in the María Chávez Friendly 
Settlement Agreement, section 4.2 provided a comprehensive assessment of how and why 
forced sterilization was imposed on a certain “type” of Peruvian woman. The reparations 
agreed upon within the María Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement reveal a significant 
gap between the individual María Chávez case and the context in which over 300,000 
Peruvians were robbed of their reproductive autonomy. This section examines a selection of 
reparations agreed upon in the Friendly Settlement Agreement, and does so with two 
objectives: (i) to explore the transformative potential of the reparations included in the 
                                                
61 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, 'Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse', Feminism 
Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity (Duke University Press 2003) 30, supra section 1.1.1 (n 
34).!
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Agreement, and (ii) to identify missed opportunities in the development of structural 
gender-based reparations. 
 
The María Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement contains numerous reparation 
measures.62  However, the following reparations have been selected for analysis because of 
their potential to transform the status quo ante in which massive forced sterilization took 
place in Peru, and because of their failure to take account of the gendered and social aspects 
of this case. These reparation measures are: 
1. The Peruvian State promises to conduct a “thorough investigation of the facts and 
apply legal punishments to any person determined to have participated in them, as 
either planner, perpetrator, accessory, or in other capacity, even if they be civilian or 
military officials or employees of the government” (justice reparation);  
2. Monetary compensation in the form of moral damages, corollary damages, 
medical payments, education payments and an additional payment to purchase land 
(compensation reparation); 
3. “The Peruvian State pledges to change laws and public policies on reproductive 
health and family planning, eliminating any discriminatory approach and respecting 
women’s autonomy” (guarantee of non-repetition reparation). 
 
4.3.1 Justice  
Perhaps one of the most significant reparation provisions established in this Agreement was 
the Peruvian State’s pledge “to carry out administrative and criminal investigations […] and 
to punish:  
a. Those responsible for the acts of pressuring the consent of Ms. María 
Mámerita Mestanza Chávez to submit to tubal ligation;  
b. The health personnel who ignored the need for urgent care for Ms. Mestanza 
after her surgery; 
c. The doctors who gave money to the spouse of the deceased woman in an 
attempt to cover up the circumstances of her demise; and  
d. The Investigative Commission… which questionably exonerated the health 
personal from responsibility for Ms. Mestanza’s death”.63  
Because the State agreed to the facts of this case, which included a structural problem of 
discrimination and violence against women, this provision not only aimed to investigate and 
punish those individuals directly and indirectly responsible for María Chávez’s rights 
violations, but also any individual who could be linked to the facts established within the 
                                                
62 Other reparations include a $20,000USD payment to Jacinto Suarez to purchase land/housing and compensation to 
each identified victim in the form of moral damages. 
63 María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru [2003] (n 1). 
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Agreement. This justice-based reparation continues to be of great importance in Peruvian 
society, where impunity is a lasting concern following years of internal armed conflict.64  
 
As discussed in section 3.1.3, reparations that aim to deliver justice in the form of 
individual criminal accountability have not seen significant success in implementation.65 
The situation in Peru is reflective of this gap in compliance, where impunity continues for 
thousands of women (and men) who were sterilized as part of the Voluntary Surgical 
Contraception program. 66  However, the Ombuds Office in Peru continues to receive 
complaints and follow-up enquiries from women affected by the Voluntary Surgical 
Contraception program.67  If one of the challenges for compliance with justice-based 
reparations is lack of public engagement, this is not the case in Peru. Milena Justo, a lawyer 
with Manuela Ramos, one of the first feminist NGOs in Peru, explained, “(this) is probably 
one of the main issues in our country […] there is a (public) perception of impunity”. 68 In 
fact, more than ten years after the María Chávez case, the Peruvian people remain outraged 
at the lack of justice.69  
 
The justice reparation agreed upon in the María Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement did 
not take into account the gendered nature of reproductive rights violations. Diana Portal 
Farfán, an attorney in the Women’s Division of the Peruvian Ombudsman Office, argued 
                                                
64 The first investigation was closed because the Prosecutor determined that the Statute of Limitations had expired, 
and the second investigation was closed because the Prosecutor denied the argument that the sterilizations were a 
crime against humanity. See, Dan Collyns, “Peruvian Women Intent on Bringing State to Book over Forced 
Sterilisations,” The Guardian (12 March 2014). <www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/mar/14/peru-
women-forced-sterilisation-justice>. (accessed 23 February 2015). 
65 David C. Baluarte and Christian De Vos, 'Judgment to Justice: Implementing International and Regional Human 
Rights Decisions' (Open Society Justice Initiative 2010) 68, supra section 3.1.3 (n 83). 
66 ‘Perú Ends Criminal Investigation into Mass Forced Sterilizations’ (n 27), and Carlos Hinostroza, Diario 16, 
“Justice Done! Prosecutor Reopens Forced Sterilization Case during Fujimori” [¡ Se Hizo Justicia! Ministerio Público 
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67 Interview with Carla Villareal Lopez, Women’s Division of the Ombudsman Office, Lima, Peru 2 July 2014 (Ref 
Code: Ip, P, G).  
68 Interview with Milena Justo, Attorney, Manuel Ramos, Lima, Peru 30 June 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, P, N). 
69 Mona Lisa Diéguez, ‘We Demand Justice in the Case of Forced Sterilization in Peru’, Alianza por Solidaridad 
[Solidarity Alliance] Peru ApS (February 2014) <www.alianzaporlasolidaridad.org/en/reflexiones/caso-de-
esterilizaciones-forzadas-en-peru> (accessed 18 November 2014), and ‘Women Victims of Sterilization Ask for 
Reparations,” [Mujeres víctimas de esterilizaciones piden reparación al Estado], El Comercio Perú, (12 December 
2015) <http://elcomercio.pe/peru/pais/mujeres-victimas-esterilizacion es-piden-reparacion-al-estado-noticia-
1863145> (accessed 15 December 2015). In July 2016, the Peruvian prosecutor determined that the sterilization of 
thousands of women was not an intentional violation of human rights, but was just part of a state policy. As a result, 
the Prosecutor decided to punish individual doctors who failed to obtain informed consent, and will not examine the 
structural nature of the human rights violations. See, ‘Denunciation of Forced Sterilizations was Filed by the 
Prosecution’ [‘Denuncia de Esterilizaciones Forzadas fue Archivada por la Fiscalía’] La Republica (27 July 2016) 
<http://larepublica.pe/sociedad/789156-denuncia-de-esterilizaciones-forzadas-fue-archivada-por-la-fiscalia>. On 
August 13th 2016, over 50,000 Peruvian women and men protested gender based violence, with a contingency 
specifically focused on justice for the thousands of women who were forcibly sterilized under Fujimori. See, Aramis 
Castro, ‘Peruvians say “No!” to Violence Against Women’ IPS News 16 August 2016) <www.ipsnews.net/2016/08 
/peruvians-say-no-to-violence-against-women/> accessed 17 August 2016. 
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that the role of gender was not adequately incorporated into an analysis of forced 
sterilization in Peru because  
The violation is not seen as a gender issue in our country, because there is not a 
social gender perspective. We do not have that perspective. I think personally that it 
is because of discrimination. Who were the victims of forced sterilization? Who the 
victim is determines the response from the state, and the consciousness of the other 
[…] So, I think it is important to see how the gender perspective crosses with the 
discrimination context, and then how to include these issues in reparations.70  
The point made here by Farfán Portal is important because it reflects back on one of the 
original causes of María Chavez’s sterilization and death, discrimination across intersecting 
characteristics based on gender, race and class. While it appears that this justice-based 
reparation was composed with the intent of holding perpetrators accountable for committing 
women’s reproductive rights violations, the actual transformative potential is minimal 
because the reparation was designed using a “gender free” understanding of the rights 
violation. For example, in calling for the investigation and prosecution of “those responsible 
for the acts of pressuring the consent”, there is no analysis of the reasons why certain 
women (and men) were coerced into giving consent for sterilization procedures; a point that 
relates back to a failure to fulfil the Gender Reparations Approach preconditions. In 
addition, this reparation ignored underlying racism and sexism in the healthcare sector. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the María Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement did not fulfil the 
identify the violation precondition because of the Inter-American Commission’s failure to 
determine a violation of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention of Belém do Pará. While the 
Friendly Settlement Agreement did include a violation of Article 7 of the Convention of 
Belém do Pará, which requires that the State investigate and prevent violations of women’s 
rights, the State was not required to provide gender justice, per se. The incomplete 
fulfilment of this precondition resulted in the development of a justice reparation that was 
gender free, rather than gender-based; that is, the justice reparation was designed using an 
androcentric vision of human rights.71 In addition, because the Agreement did not establish 
a comprehensive depiction of the impact of intersectional discrimination (establish the 
                                                
70 Interview with Diana Portal Farfán, Attorney, Office of the Ombudsman, Women Department, Lima, Peru 2 July 
2014 (Ref Code: Ip, P, G, S). It can be argued that forced sterilization is increasingly being understood as a gender 
issue in Peruvian society. The recent gender violence march (n 68) and the #niunamenos (#notoneless) campaign are 
evidence of a shift in how Peruvian society approaches gender and violence against women. See, Jacqueline Fowks, 
‘The “Not One Less” Movement Gains Strength in Peru’ [El movimiento ‘Ni una menos’ toma fuerza en Perú] El 
Pais (26 July 2016) <http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/07/26/america/1469488408_366821.html> 
accessed 17 August 2016, and Gabriela Wiener, ‘The Day Peruvian Women Rebelled,’ New York Times (23 August 
2016) accessed 23 August 2016 <www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/opinion/the-day-peruvian-women rebelled.html? 
mabReward=A3&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&region=CColumn&module=Recommendation&src=rechp&WT
.nav=RecEngine&_r=0>. 
71 Catharine MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues (Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press 2007) 5. 
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relevant facts) and did not take into account the social aspect of harm in this case (properly 
identify the harm), it rendered invisible the over 25,000 involuntarily sterilized men, and 
also reinforced the invisible social harm that many women and their families live with to 
this day as a result of involuntary sterilization. As of September 2016, the State of Peru has 
not implemented this justice reparation. Following several attempts to investigate the forced 
sterilization of thousands of Peruvian women, the Peruvian public prosecutor determined in 
July 2016 that the state sterilization policy was not in itself a violation of human rights. The 
prosecutor determined that former President Fujimori and his health ministers are not liable 
for charges, and that only a small number of doctors will be held accountable.72  
 
4.3.2 Compensation 
It is common practice for the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court to 
issue monetary compensation as part of an attempt to repair harm caused by human rights 
violations. For many victims, this form of reparation plays a fundamental role in how a 
victim begins a new life following years of turmoil in their quest for justice. In this case, the 
Inter-American Commission determined that María Chavez’s family had been victimized 
by her sterilization and death, and that they fulfilled the beneficiary criteria for 
compensation.73 The Agreement included the following compensation: $80,000 for moral 
damages, $2,000 for María Chavez’s burial, $7,000 for psychological care as well as health 
insurance for María Chavez’s immediate family, free education through the university level 
for María Chavez’s children, and $20,000 for Jacinto Suárez to purchase land.74 The 
Peruvian State complied with these reparations. However, in failing to also incorporate a 
community-based/collective approach to reparations, the petitioner and the Peruvian State 
missed a significant opportunity to acknowledge the far-reaching effect of social harm in 
this case. 
  
When reflecting on the approach to reparations in the María Chávez case, Jeannette Llaja, 
former Director of DEMUS, a Peruvian legal feminist NGO who represented the victims in 
this case, said,  
I feel that if we negotiated the case today we would do it differently […] We would 
work on the individual remedy, but also for the community, because Jacinto 
belonged to a community and Maria’s death affected him and the whole 
                                                
72 Dan Collyns, ‘Women Vow to Fight on in Peru after Alberto Fujimori Absolved over Forced Sterilisations,’ The 
Guardian (3 August 2016) < https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/aug/03/women-vow-to-fight-
on-in-peru-after-fujimori-absolved-over-forced-sterilisations> accessed 17 August 2016.!
73 María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru [2003] (n 1) ¶14. 
74 Ibid. (Amounts are in US Dollars) 
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community, and that agreement did not have a community approach [...] In rural 
areas life is not seen individually, but as a community.75 
As Llaja pointed out, the model for monetary reparations in this case was flawed in that it 
was not developed to adequately address the collective/social harm experienced by Maria 
Chavez’s immediate community, as well as the hundreds of thousands of surviving victims 
and their families. This case fell into the trap of serving as a sort of lottery for victims.  
 
Rubio-Marín and de Greiff explained that in “situations of deep scarcity, individual 
reparations may be socially divisive”.76 Accordingly, in the aftermath of the María Chavez 
case, Jacinto Suarez returned to his community with a sum of money for himself and his 
family. Although his wife’s sterilization and subsequent death represented the situation for 
thousands of women (and men), the result of the compensation reparation impacted only 
one man and his family. Although it is not realistic to expect the State to monetarily 
compensate all women and men who were directly and indirectly victimised by forced 
sterilization, the development of a reparation designed to repair social harm which would 
benefit entire communities would have held great potential for healing. In addition to the 
compensation awarded to Maria Chavez’s family, the Agreement could have also included 
for example, the building of new schools and healthcare clinics in the highlands regions of 
Peru, especially in areas most affected by the sterilization program. A formal apology could 
have been issued to the communities, with the State accepting responsibility for the 
sterilization of thousands of women and men and also pledging to bring the perpetrators of 
forced sterilization to justice. The shortcomings detected in this reparation directly correlate 
with incomplete fulfilment of the second and third pre-conditions, identify the alleged 
violations and victims and identify the harm and those harmed by the violations. A limited 
picture of who the victims were, and the harm they experienced resulted in compensation 
reparation that failed to address collective harm, or social injury, experienced by a particular 
group of people. This reparation transformed the lives of the immediate victims identified in 
the María Chávez case, but in no way transformed the lives of the thousands of other 
families impacted by the coercive sterilization programme. 
 
                                                
75 Interview with Jeannette Llaja, Former Director of DEMUS (Office for the Defense of Women’s Rights) [Estudio 
para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer], Lima, Peru 3 July 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, P, S). DEMUS collaborated 
with several other NGOs to represent the victims: Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense of 
Women’s Rights (CLADEM); Association for Human Rights [Asociacion Pro Derechos Humanos]; Center for 
Reproductive Law and Policy (CRLP); and Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL).  
76 Rubio-Marín and Sandoval (n 19) 336. 
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4.3.3 Guarantees of Non-Repetition 
The eleventh reparation, “Changes in Laws and Public Policies on Reproductive Health and 
Family Planning”,77 outlines the following provisions:  
The Peruvian State pledges to change laws and public policies on reproductive 
health and family planning, eliminating any discriminatory approach and respecting 
women’s autonomy. The Peruvian State also promises to adopt and implement 
recommendations made by the Ombudsman concerning public policies on 
reproductive health and family planning, among which are the following: 
a.  Penalties for human rights violators and reparation for victims 
  1) Conduct a judicial review of all criminal cases on violations of human rights 
committed in the execution of the National Program of Reproductive Health and 
Family Planning, break out and duly punish the perpetrators, requiring them to pay 
the appropriate civil damages, including the State if it is determined to have some 
responsibility for the acts that gave rise to the criminal cases. 
 2) Review the administrative proceedings initiated by the victims and/or their 
family members, linked to the cases in the previous paragraph, which are pending or 
have concluded concerning denunciations of human rights violations.  
b. Methods for monitoring and guaranteeing respect for human rights of health 
service clients 
      1) Adopt drastic measures against those responsible for the deficient pre-surgery 
evaluation of women who undergo sterilization, including health professionals in 
some of the country’s health centers. Although the rules of the Family Planning 
Program require this evaluation, it is not being done. 
      2) Continuously conduct training courses for health personnel in reproductive 
rights, violence against women, domestic violence, human rights, and gender 
equity, in coordination with civil society organizations that specialize in these 
topics. 
      3) Adopt the necessary administrative measures so that that rules established for 
ensuring respect for the right of informed consent are scrupulously followed by 
health personnel.  
      4) Guarantee that the centers that offer sterilization surgery have proper 
conditions required by standards of the Family Planning Program. 
      5) Take strict measures to ensure that the compulsory reflection period of 72 
hours is faithfully and universally honored. 
      6) Take drastic action against those responsible for forced sterilization without 
consent. 
      7) Implement a mechanism or channels for efficient and expeditious receipt and 
processing of denunciations of violation of human rights in the health 
establishments, in order to prevent or redress injury caused. 
There were several elements of this provision that had the capacity to affect change, that is, 
they had transformative potential: (i) providing a mechanism for processing of human rights 
violations claims; (ii) amending laws and policies on reproductive health and family 
planning; and (iii) implementing training programs for health personnel. The other elements 
                                                
77 María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru [2003] (n 1) ¶14. 
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of this provision mirror the requirements outlined under the justice-based reparation: to 
bring the perpetrators of forced sterilization to justice.  
 
Section b (7) of this reparation provided a mechanism for women and men to denounce 
rights violations occurring within the healthcare sector. The Ombuds office currently serves 
in this capacity; women who were victims of forced sterilization continue to submit and 
follow-up on previous complaints.78 In establishing this mechanism the State signalled to 
society that women have rights when accessing healthcare, and that the Peruvian State 
intended to challenge and rectify violations of those rights. This mechanism has proven to 
be a valuable resource in compiling the names and experiences of victims of forced 
sterilization. However, in terms of reparations designed to guarantee non-repetition of 
gendered based harm, the most encouraging sections of this reparation provision were 
training courses for health personnel and the adoption and amendment of laws and policies. 
The intention of these reparations was to eradicate racism and sexism in the healthcare 
sector and society as a whole. However, implementation of these reparations remains a 
challenge. 
 
The reparation requiring training and education programs for medical personnel in topics 
ranging from reproductive rights to gender equity was essential in order to alter current 
discriminatory practices in the healthcare sector. While the María Chávez Agreement 
included training of health personnel in its reparation provisions, questions remain 
regarding implementation, such as: who will receive the training, who will develop the 
curriculum, and how is the training sustainable? Nevertheless, the training provision 
required that training programs be developed in cooperation with civil society organizations 
that specialize in the themes identified for training. Concerning this aspect of the reparation, 
the petitioners indicated in follow-up reports requested by the Inter-American Commission 
from 2006 through 2013, “that they [did] not have information as to whether the State [was] 
actually carrying out these trainings”, which implies that the State had not in fact engaged 
with civil society in order to fulfil this requirement of the Agreement.79 The State’s follow-
up communication also identified training programs on gender-based violence, training of 
police personnel and the establishment of a diploma program on violence. Despite these 
seemingly positive efforts on behalf of the State to fulfil the requirements of section b(2), 
                                                
78 Interview with Carla Villareal Lopez, Women’s Division of the Ombudsman Office, Lima, Peru 2 July 2014 (Ref 
Code: Ip, P, G). 
79 Annual Report 2011 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 69, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2011) Case 12.191, 
Report No. 71/03. 
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the petitioners remained sceptical of the State’s actual efforts to comply with this 
reparation, particularly because civil society had not been involved in the development or 
delivery of the training programs.  
 
For the Inter-American Commission’s part, in its Annual Report mechanism it did not 
request that the State prove it had implemented these programs. The State was not required 
to share information about the design of the curriculum, how participants were enrolled in 
training, and to what extent the participation was mandatory or voluntary. The enrolment 
numbers shared by the State were extremely low; that only five nurses were trained in 
reproductive health care as a direct result of this Agreement is disheartening in itself. 
Furthermore, the Inter-American Commission made no comment on the seeming lack of 
collaboration between the State and civil society in developing training programs, although 
this activity was clearly part of the provision. It is also important to note the type of training 
agreed upon in the Agreement, training for health personnel. This reparation was intended 
to directly address the racist and sexist nature of the healthcare sector in Peru. This 
reparation fulfilled the criteria of a gender-based reparation, despite the Inter-American 
Commission’s failure to effectively monitor its compliance. 
 
The María Chávez Agreement included within its reparations provisions, the adoption and 
amendment of laws and policies on reproductive health and family planning, with the goal 
of eliminating discrimination and respecting women’s autonomy. While the Agreement 
included this provision, it is challenging to draw direct connections between advancements 
in national legislation and those reparation measures agreed upon before supranational 
human rights bodies; this is especially the situation in Peru. Monica Arango Olaya 
explained “that has really been the fight with Peru […] they won’t do anything under the 
name and implementation of those cases because they don’t acknowledge those decisions as 
binding”.80 Regardless of whether or not Peru’s legislative advancements in terms of 
women’s rights can be specifically attributed to cases such as María Chávez, or cases before 
the CEDAW Committee or the Human Rights Committee, the standards established by 
these cases are undoubtedly entrenched in civil society’s push for legislative reform.81 For 
instance, there is a clear connection between the María Chávez case and the National Health 
Strategy for Sexual and Reproductive Health because the State references the Strategy in its 
                                                
80 Interview with Monica Arango Olaya, Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, Center for 
Reproductive Rights, Skype 11 July 2014 (Ref Code: Sk, N, S). 
81 Interview with Beatriz Ramirez, Advisor, Ministry of Women, Republic of Peru, Lima, Peru 22 June 2014 (Ref 
Code: Ip, P, S). 
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compliance report to the Inter-American Commission. 82 This reparation also fulfilled the 
criteria of a gender-based reparation.  
 
The analysis conducted in this chapter of the reparation measures agreed upon in the María 
Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement reveals the challenges inherent to developing 
reparations that effectively consider the compound effects of social and gender-based harm. 
Not only do these reparations fail to incorporate a community-based approach to repairing 
harm, but they also fall short in addressing the multiple intersecting levels of structural 
discrimination, inequality and violence that women in Peru experience. It is clear that a 
failure to fulfil the pre-conditions for engendering reparations corresponds to the reasons 
why the reparations agreed upon in the Friendly Settlement Agreement fell short in 
encompassing a more nuanced approach to protecting women’s rights and preventing future 
violations. However, while these reparations may be limited(ing), they are some of the most 
progressive reparations issued in a women’s reproductive rights case, as will become 
evident in the analysis of the two other cases selected for this research.  
 
4.4 Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
The María Chávez Agreement serves as a stepping-stone for future reproductive rights 
cases emerging from the Inter-American System of Human Rights. While the Agreement 
could have adopted a more effective approach to examining intersectional discrimination 
and repairing social and gender-based harm, it remains a victory in the fight for women’s 
reproductive rights in Latin America. The sentiment amongst actors engaged with this case 
and involved with women’s rights activism in Peru is that the María Chávez case has 
reached its potential in terms of advancing women’s rights in the country.83 Civil society 
continues to demand that the State comply with justice reparations, but there is no activity 
around the State’s failure to comply with guarantees of non-repetition. This concluding 
section derives from the above analysis of the María Chávez Friendly Settlement 
Agreement two strategies for more effectively repairing gender-based harm in women’s 
reproductive rights cases. First, the concepts of vida digna and proyecto de vida are 
examined below as they can be employed in forced sterilization cases to uncover the 
harmful impact of gender-based discrimination. Second, the analysis of María Chávez 
Friendly Settlement Agreement elucidated the benefits of applying a multi-faceted rights 
                                                
82 National Health Strategy for Sexual and Reproductive Health, Republic of Peru (2011) [Estrategia Nacional de 
Salud Sexual y Reproductiva, Ministerio de Sanidad, Política Social e Igualdad]. 
83 Interview with Beatriz Ramirez, Advisor, Ministry of Women, Republic of Peru, Lima, Peru 22 June 2014 (Ref 
Code: Ip, P, S) and interview with Jeannette Llaja, Former Director of DEMUS (Office for the Defense of Women’s 
Rights) [Estudio para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer], Lima, Peru 3 July 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, P, S). 
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approach in claiming and interpreting women’s reproductive rights violations. These 
strategies contribute to the “gender reparations tradition” framework introduced above in 
section 3.3 and are examined in more detail in section 7.1. 
 
While the María Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement was progressive in its attempts to 
address and redress structural gender-based discrimination and harm, it missed an 
opportunity to examine the intersectional nature of discrimination across determinants such 
as class, race/ethnicity, geographic location and gender. As noted by Alexandra Sandoval, it 
is the duty of the petitioner to assert violations of proyecto de vida and vida digna in cases 
before the Inter-American Commission and Court. If asserted and applied in the María 
Chávez case, these concepts would have provided a foundation on which to develop a 
comprehensive examination of the relationship between intersectional discrimination and 
violations of reproductive rights.  
 
As noted above in section 3.2.2, alternative rights concepts, such as vida digna and proyecto 
de vida, provide space for litigators and the Inter-American System Commission and Court 
to examine the structural context in which a reproductive rights violation occurred. For 
instance, application of the proyecto de vida concept in the María Chávez case would have 
elucidated the direct connection between damage to María Chávez’s life project and the life 
she led. María Chávez was poor, a mother to five children and lived in the rural highlands 
of Peru, and it was because of the life she led that she was targeted for sterilization; she was 
sterilized because of what she “decided to be and to do in life”.84  Not only was María 
Chávez discriminated against based on her gender, but her life project was interrupted 
because she was a member of a group of people who were deemed to be “less than” in 
Peruvian society. If the petitioners had included within the María Chávez Friendly 
Settlement Agreement proceedings an examination of damage to proyecto de vida, there 
would have been the opportunity to unpack the grounds on which María Chávez and 
thousands of other women and men had been targeted for sterilization. Similarly, the 
concept of vida digna, if claimed by the petitioners as a component of the violation of the 
right to life in the Friendly Settlement Agreement, would have required the petitioners and 
the State to engage in discussions about the factors that contributed to violations of María 
Chávez’s right to dignity. As mentioned above, the concept of vida digna is useful as a 
conduit to insert gender into discussions of rights violations because it requires that actors 
                                                
84 Fernández Sassarego, “Deslinde conceptual entre dano a la persona, dano al proyecto de vida y dano moral,” Foro 
Jurídico, Year 1, No. 2, Lima, July 2003.  
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engaged in women’s reproductive rights litigation examine what dignity means in the 
context of reproductive health.  In the situation of forced sterilization, vida digna can be 
interpreted to mean that States have an obligation to respect women’s reproductive 
autonomy, right to be free from discrimination, and also the right to informed consent 
practices in healthcare services. Applying alternative rights concepts in forced sterilization 
cases creates an opportunity to delve deeper into the causes of reproductive rights violations 
and also creates the grounds on which to examine rights violations from various angles; the 
right to lead a dignified life requires states to protect and fulfil rights such as the right to 
life, health and freedom from discrimination, for example. 
 
Second, the María Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement affirmed the benefits of 
employing a multi-faceted approach in women’s reproductive rights litigation. The 
petitioners in this case claimed violations of María Chávez’s reproductive rights across a 
number of human rights conventions, and successfully located forced sterilization within 
the violence against women framework by claiming violations of the Convention of Belém 
do Pará. In that the Inter-American Commission accepted the petitioner’s claim of Article 7 
of the Convention of Belém do Pará, the reparations agreed upon by the petitioners and the 
State of Peru addressed the gendered nature of human rights violations.  
 
Applying a multi-faceted approach to rights in the María Chávez case allowed for the 
development of reparations that addressed and incorporated both the positive/negative and 
public/private characteristics of human rights. The reparations required the State undertake 
positive actions such as development of training programs and legislative reform, as well as 
refrain from interfering in women’s lives, a negative obligation. By examining the forced 
sterilization of María Chávez through the lens of civil and political, economic, social and 
cultural and women’s rights violations, the petitioners involved in this Agreement 
developed an articulation of women’s reproductive rights that recognised the interrelated 
nature of human rights. While there was an opportunity to develop a more comprehensive 
analysis of the intersectional nature of discrimination in this case, the reparations issued in 
this case are the most advanced to date in a women’s reproductive rights case before the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights. I argue that the basis for the inclusion of gender-
based reparations in the María Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement is directly linked to 
the petitioner’s efforts to litigate this case using a multi-faceted approach to rights that 
incorporates the Convention of Belém do Pará.  
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The following chapter builds upon the lessons learned through the analysis of the María 
Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru case by examining the Paulina Jacinto Ramirez v. 
Mexico.85 This is the only abortion rights cases to have been processed through the Inter-
American System. However, because the State and the petitioner entered into Friendly 
Settlement Agreement proceedings before the case was formally admitted by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, this case does not provide insight into the Inter-
American Commission’s perspective on the right to abortion. Rather, the Inter-American 
Commission’s approach to monitoring the reparations in this case reveals some of the 
challenges actors such as civil society organizations face when working within the Inter-
American System to address contentious rights issues.  
                                                
85 Paulina del Carmen Jacinto Ramírez v. Mexico [2007] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Petition 
161–02, Report 21/07 Friendly Settlement Agreement ¶IV (14)2. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
PAULINA DEL CARMEN RAMÍREZ JACINTO V. MEXICO 
 
Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico1 was an abortion rights case that resulted in 
a Friendly Settlement Agreement before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 
This case was selected for analysis because it highlights a number of issues related to the 
right to abortion and also represents the challenges many Latin American women and girls 
face when attempting to access their legal abortion rights. The Paulina Ramírez case 
provided the Inter-American Commission with its first opportunity to monitor compliance 
with reparations agreed upon in an abortion rights case. This case is also significant because 
it provides lessons and strategies for actors involved in abortion rights cases currently 
awaiting admission before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.2  
 
Much like the analysis conducted in the previous chapter, the critique of the Paulina del 
Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico case conducted here has the intention of identifying 
effective strategies for developing gender-based reparations in women’s reproductive rights 
cases. The first section introduces the right to abortion in Mexico and the Paulina Ramírez 
v. Mexico case, as well as determines fulfilment of the Holistic Gender Approach to 
Reparations preconditions.3 The second section of this chapter places the right to abortion in 
context, and begins with a discussion on the concepts of “good” and “bad” abortion to argue 
that a woman’s “positioning” determines her level of access to reproductive health rights. In 
order to develop the context in which the Paulina Ramírez case emerged, the second section 
also provides a general overview of Mexican women’s experiences with violence and 
discrimination and examines the role of medical power and abortion stigma as they harm 
women. The third section examines the reparation measures agreed upon by the petitioner 
and the Mexican State in order to determine their transformative potential, and concludes 
                                                
1 Paulina del Carmen Jacinto Ramírez v. Mexico [2007] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Petition 
161–02, Report 21/07 Friendly Settlement Agreement. Mexico ratified the American Convention on Human Rights in 
1981 and the Convention of Belém do Pará in 1998. It accepted the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 
jurisdiction in 1981. 
2 Interview with Adriana Maroto Vargas, Academic and Activist, La Colectiva, San Jose, Costa Rica 14 August 2014 
(Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S). There are currently two abortion rights cases pending admission before the Inter-American 
Commission: AN v. Costa Rica and Aurora v. Costa Rica. These cases deal with women being denied their legal right 
to abortion due to severe malformation of the fetus, which is one of the criteria under which abortion is legal in Costa 
Rica. See, ‘Unspeakable Cruelty’ Center for Reproductive Rights (2013) <www.reproductiverights.org/feature/unspe 
akable-cruelty-in-costa-rica> accessed 20 July 2014, and ‘A.N. v. Costa Rica: Access to Legal Abortion Services 
[Acceso a servicios de aborto legal]’ Center for Reproductive Rights (2011) <www.reproductiverights.org/document 
/an-v-costa-rica-acceso-a-servicios-de-aborto-legal>. 
3 Ruth Rubio-Marín and Clara Sandoval, 'Engendering the Reparations Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: The Promise of the ‘Cotton Field’ Judgment' (2011) 33:4 Human Rights Quarterly 1062-1091, supra 
section 3.3 (n 180).!
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that a failure to fulfil the gender-based reparation pre-conditions outlined in the Holistic 
Gender Approach to Reparations negatively impacted the design of gender-reparations in 
the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement Agreement. The concluding section examines the 
role of civil society in developing and monitoring reparations, and argues that the task of 
engendering reparations is one in which the role of civil society could be significantly 
expanded. The conclusion also discusses the potential for applying alternative rights 
concepts in this case. 
 
5.1 The Case: Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico 
The reproductive right to abortion is perhaps the most contentious of those rights 
encapsulated within the reproductive health rights framework. While there are an 
undeterminable number of reasons why a woman may elect to seek an abortion, most Latin 
American states place severe restrictions on women’s ability to access their abortion rights.4 
Looking at Mexico specifically, the total number of authorized and unauthorized abortions 
carried out each year ranges from 850,000 to over 1 million.5 A significant number of these 
abortions are carried out under unsafe conditions, and as a result, complications arising 
from unsafe abortions account for an estimated 7% of maternal mortality in Mexico.6 
Before introducing and critiquing the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement Agreement, it is 
necessary to provide a brief overview of the political structure in which the right to abortion 
exists across Mexico.  
 
Mexico is comprised of 31 states and one federal district, Mexico City. The right to 
abortion is regulated at the state-level as an aspect of the “general health” of the country,7 
where depending on geographical location and socio-economic status, a Mexican woman is 
restricted in her right to access abortion at varying degrees. Although abortion is regulated 
by each federal state, the Federal Penal Code defines abortion as a crime.8 However, in 
April 2007, the Mexico City Legislative Assembly amended the Mexico City Penal Code in 
order to legalize first-trimester elective abortion (up to 12 weeks), which allows any 
                                                
4 ‘World Abortion Laws’ Center for Reproductive Rights < http://worldabortionlaws.com/>. 
5 Martha Silva and others, 'Physicians’ Agreement with and Willingness to Provide Abortion Services in the Case of 
Pregnancy from Rape in Mexico' (2009) 79:1 Contraception 56.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Constitution of Mexico (1917) Article 73: “The Congress has the power: To enact laws in regard to nationality, the 
legal status of foreigners, citizenship, naturalization, colonization, emigration and immigration, and the general 
health of the country.”  
8 'Omission and Indifference: Reproductive Rights in Mexico', Information Group on Reproductive Choice – GIRE 
[Grupo de Información en Reproducción Elegida] (2013) 18.  
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woman, regardless of her state of residence, to access abortion services in Mexico City.9 
Although Mexico City successfully decriminalized first-trimester abortion, the 
response/backlash from 18 Mexican states was to amend their constitutions in order to 
protect life from conception.10  These reforms created a further divide in how women 
exercise their reproductive rights to abortion. 
 
Each of the 31 Mexican states’ penal codes contain different restrictions and criteria for 
abortion, all of which are restrictive and/or ineffective in their implementation. Regardless 
of the state, abortion of a pregnancy resulting from rape is legal across the whole of 
Mexico, and has been since 1931.11 However, as revealed by GIRE, “women’s effective 
access to legal indications for abortion in Mexican states is precarious or null, representing 
a major gap between the law and the effective exercise of this right.”12 It is outside the 
parameters of this chapter to examine each Mexican state’s penal code in regards to 
abortion, but in order to fully examine the Paulina Ramírez case it is necessary to discuss 
the Penal (Criminal) Code in Baja California in more detail; Paulina Ramírez lived in Baja 
when she was raped and subsequently became pregnant.  
 
Article 136 of the Baja California Criminal Code states the following: 
Abortion shall not be punishable: I. […], II. […], When the pregnancy is caused by 
rape […], provided that the abortion is carried out within the first ninety days of 
gestation and the incident was duly reported, in which case it may be performed on 
the sole condition that the incident is verified by the Public Prosecution Service.13 
Article 136 requires that women who have been raped follow a strict set of guidelines in 
order to be “eligible” for an abortion. Under these guidelines there is a significant burden 
placed on women victims (survivors) of rape to follow a procedure that is not only time-
restrictive, but that also assumes public officials, such as public prosecutors, police and 
medical personnel, are capable of being unbiased in their approach to determining if (i) a 
woman has been raped, and (ii) that a pregnancy is a result of rape.14 Unfortunately, the 
                                                
9 Mexican Federal District Penal Code (2002) section 5, Article 144: “Abortion in the termination of pregnancy after 
the twelfth week of gestation.” While the inclusion of legal abortion in Mexico City’s Penal Code is cause for 
celebration, in the aftermath of the reform many Mexican States responded by amending their penal codes to 
emphasize the right to life of a fetus from the moment of conception. 
10 Jennifer Paine, Regina Tamés Noriega, and Alma Luz Beltrán y Puga, 'Using Litigation to Defend Women 
Prosecuted for Abortion in Mexico: Challenging State Laws and the Implications of Recent Court Judgments' (2014) 
22:44 Reproductive Health Matters 61, and David Agren, ‘Abortion Banned by Controversial Mexican State 
Governor’ Guardian (28 July 2016) <www.theguardian.com/world/2016 /jul/29/ abortion-banned-controversial-
mexican-state-governor-veracruz?CMP=twt_gu> accesses 29 July 2016. 
11 ‘Omission and Indifference’ (n 8) 17.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico [2007] (n 1) ¶10. 
14 'Mexico: The Second Assault - Obstructing Access to Legal Abortion after Rape in Mexico', (Human Rights Watch 
2006) <www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico0306webwcover.pdf> accessed 3 May 2015. 
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procedure established in the Penal Code does not reflect or take into consideration the 
reasons why a woman may not choose to report her rape to the Public Prosecutor’s office. 
For example, according to Madigan and Gamble, women may fear reprisal from their rapist 
if they report the rape, they may feel a deep sense of shame or that they were at fault for the 
rape, or they may not trust the public officials or the legal process.15 As will be shown in the 
analysis of the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement Agreement, even if a woman or girl 
manages to fulfil all of the criteria outlined above, there is no guarantee that she will then be 
allowed to access her right to abortion. 
 
Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto (hereinafter referred to as Paulina or Paulina Ramírez) 
was a thirteen-year old girl from Mexicali in the State of Baja California, Mexico.16 On July 
31st 1999 an intruder entered Paulina’s family home and raped her; a month later Paulina 
went to see a doctor and discovered she was pregnant.17 The doctor explained that Paulina 
had a right to an abortion, and that she would be willing to perform the abortion once 
Paulina received legal authorization.18 On September 3rd 1999, Paulina’s mother requested 
authorization for an abortion from the State Prosecutor, which was subsequently approved 
with the requirement that the abortion be performed at Mexicali General Hospital.19 On 
October 1st 1999 Paulina Ramírez went to Mexicali General Hospital to undergo an abortion 
procedure but was discharged from the hospital after waiting for the procedure for seven 
days. During that time the hospital staff made a “series of excuses (as to) why the procedure 
could not be performed” and informed Paulina that her case was being submitted to a 
review committee.20 Paulina was readmitted to the hospital on October 13th, and the next 
day two women claiming to be from the government’s Comprehensive Family 
Development Agency (Desarrollo Integral para la Familia, DIF) visited Paulina without her 
mother being present and tried to persuade her not to carry out the abortion. The women 
returned and continued their tactics, such as showing violent videos of abortion procedures, 
in the presence of Paulina’s mother.21 On the evening of October 14th, moments before the 
abortion procedure was to be carried out, Paulina’s mother was told that if the abortion was 
performed her daughter could die or become sterile. Upon hearing this news Paulina’s 
                                                
15 Lee Madigan and Nancy Gamble, The Second Rape: Society’s Continued Betrayal of the Victim (Jossey-Bass Inc. 
1991). 
16 Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico (n 1). Note: The FSA puts Paulina Ramírez’s age at the time of her 
rape at 14, but other documents put her at 13 years of age. 
17 Rocio Taracena, 'Paulina: In the Name of the Law' (GIRE – Information Group on Reproductive Choice [Grupo de 
Información en Reproducción Elegida]) 2000) 9. 
18 Ibid 9.   
19 Ibid. 
20 Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico (n 1) ¶11. 
21 Ibid ¶12. 
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mother refused the procedure. On October 15th, Paulina Ramírez and her mother appeared 
before the State prosecutor to declare they did not want to interrupt the pregnancy. Later, in 
a document drawn up by the State Prosecutor, Paulina’s mother stated,  
They forced me to waive my daughter’s right to abortion. They did not care that 
they gave me manipulative, partial or fatalistic information violating my right and 
my daughter’s right to information, and to her right to choose to reproduce in a free, 
responsible and informed manner. They did not take into consideration the 
consequences that my daughter and her baby will suffer for the rest of their lives.22 
 
On October 25th 1999, representatives from Alaíde Foppa, a Mexican NGO focused on the 
promotion of minority rights, filed a complaint with the State’s Law Office for Human 
Rights and Citizen Protection, where they argued that the group, “Pro-Life,” had violated 
Paulina’s right to confidentiality and the right to respect for her decision.23 Paulina’s mother 
provided a declaration which indicated that the “State Attorney General […] told Paulina 
that she should have her baby, that there were people who would adopt it and insisted that 
she waive her right to an abortion and personally took her to see a priest, who also tried to 
convince her not have an abortion”.24 In March 2000 the Director of the State’s Law Office 
for Human Rights and Citizen Protection issued recommendations in favour of Paulina, 
however when the recommendations were sent for approval to the office of the Governor of 
Baja California they were rejected. On April 13th 2000, Paulina Ramírez gave birth to a 
baby she named Isaac.  In an interview with the Mexicali newspaper, Mayor, Paulina 
asserted,  
Those who say I gave up my right to an abortion lie. We accepted it only when they 
scared us, when they told me I might die of a hemorrhage. Everyone, including the 
bishop, is lying because I never stopped trying. We only accepted it when the 
Director of the Hospital told me that if I suffered a hemorrhage I might die. This is 
why my mother and I agreed not to have the abortion. I didn’t think it up myself, I 
didn’t give up just by myself. It was the fear that they put in us that made me give 
up.25  
 
Almost two years later, on March 8th 2002, Alaide Foppa filed a petition with the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights on behalf of Paulina Ramírez.26 The victim’s 
representatives (Alaide Foppa and GIRE) alleged that the State of Mexico was responsible 
for violating the following human rights: the state obligation to protect rights (Article 1), 
the right to humane treatment (Article 5), the right to personal liberty (Article 7), the right 
                                                
22 Taracena, ‘Paulina: In the Name of the Law' (n 17) 12. 
23 The complaint, number PDH/MXLI/1219/99/2, was registered under “Violation of the Right of Minors to 
Protection of Their Integrity, Torture, Insufficient Protection of Persons, Undue Exercise of Public Responsibilities, 
Violation of the Right to Privacy and Illegal Disclosure of Information.” 
24 Taracena, ‘Paulina: In the Name of the Law' (n 17) 16. 
25 Ibid 19. 
26 Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico (n 1) ¶1. 
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to a fair trial (Article 8), the right to privacy (Article 11), the right to freedom of conscience 
and religion (Article 12), rights of the child (Article 19), and the right to judicial protection 
(Article 25) under the American Convention on Human Rights;27 the right to respect for 
freedom and security, including decision-making (Article 4), the right to due diligence 
(Article 7), and the duty for the state to pay attention to the circumstance of vulnerability in 
which women live (Article 9) enshrined within the Convention of Belém do Pará;28 the right 
to health within both the Protocol of San Salvador29 and the United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW);30 the right to 
liberty and security of person (Article 9), the right to privacy and family life (Article 17) 
and the rights of the child (Article 24) under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights;31 the rights to life, liberty and security (Article 3) and right to privacy and 
family life (Article 12) within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;32 and the right to 
be free from physical or mental violence (Article 19), the right to be free from torture or 
other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 37), and the duty on 
the state to take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery 
and social reintegration of a child victims (Article 39) under the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.33 The human rights violations delineated in the petition submitted to the Inter-
American Commission were not only extensive, but they also highlighted the interrelated 
and multi-faceted nature of human rights, and specifically noted the indivisible relationship 
between violations of the reproductive right to abortion and the violence against women 
framework. However, unlike the María Chávez case proceedings before the Inter-American 
Commission, the Paulina Ramírez case was not formally admitted by the Commission. This 
was because the State of Mexico and the petitioners agreed to begin Friendly Settlement 
proceedings prior to the Commission’s decision to admit the case.34 The State of Mexico 
and the petitioners reached a Friendly Settlement Agreement on March 8th 2006, nearly 
seven years after Paulina Ramírez was raped and six years after she gave birth to her son. 
 
The State’s decision to enter into an Agreement indicated that not only was the Mexican 
                                                
27 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) OASTS 36 (1969). 
28 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women 
(‘Convention of Belém do Pará’) OASTS (1994). The petition also includes Articles 1 and 2, which define violence 
against women in both the public and private spheres. 
29 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (‘Protocol of San Salvador’), OASTS 69 (1988) Article 10. 
30 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), GA Res. 
34/180 (1979) Article 12. 
31 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) GA Res. 2200A (XXI) 1966. 
32 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) GA Res. 217(III)A (1948) 
33 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), GA Res. 44/25 (1989). 
34 Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico (n 1) ¶4-6. 
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government willing to repair the harm caused to Paulina Ramírez, but that the State 
recognized all of the rights violations outlined in the petition submitted by the victim’s 
representatives. When reflecting on this case, María Alejandra Cardenas asserted that when 
the Paulina case was filed the petitioners did not think the Commission would admit the 
case.35 One can speculate that the State’s willingness to engage in the Friendly Settlement 
Agreement proceedings was in part influenced by the impact the Paulina case had 
throughout the nation and the world. The international media followed the case closely, and 
framed the situation as a failure on the part of the State of Mexico to protect the rights of an 
innocent young girl who needed an abortion after suffering a violent infringement of her 
rights.36  
 
Fulfilling the Preconditions 
The above introduction to the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement Agreement establishes a 
foundation to examine the terms of the Agreement through Rubio-Marín and Sandoval’s 
Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations. This section critically examines the Paulina 
Ramírez Agreement in order to determine the extent to which it fulfilled the gender-based 
reparations preconditions delineated within the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations. 
As a reminder, the preconditions established by Rubio-Marín and Sandoval are, establish 
the relevant facts, properly identify the alleged victims and violations and properly identify 
the harm and those harmed. 
 
First, while the facts established in the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement Agreement 
emphasised the discrimination and violence Paulina experienced while attempting to obtain 
an abortion, the Agreement did not adequately explore the relationship dynamics between 
medical “power” and women’s rights. For example, the facts established in the Agreement 
in no way examined the problematic nature of conscientious objection and the effects of 
patriarchal harm (paternalistic control) in the medical sector. In that the Agreement failed to 
include direct recognition of the flaws within the medical system, there was no firm basis 
on which to design a reparation that would effectively address gender-based harm and 
discrimination in the healthcare sector. As a result, the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement 
Agreement only partially fulfilled the first gender-based reparation pre-condition: establish 
the relevant facts. 
                                                
35 Interview with María Alejandra Cardenas, Regional Legal Director, Women’s Link Worldwide, Former Human 
Rights Attorney, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Center for Reproductive Rights, Washington 
DC, USA 27 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, Cm, S). 
36 Rocio Taracena, 'Social Actors and Discourse on Abortion in the Mexican Press: The Paulina Case' (2002) 10:19 
Reproductive Health Matters 104-105. 
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Second, analysis of the Paulina Ramirez Friendly Settlement Agreement reveals that it was 
not successful in fulfilling both elements of the second pre-condition: identify the alleged 
violations and victims. The Agreement correctly identified the victims as both Paulina and 
her son,37 and also noted that Paulina Ramírez’s case was “indicative of those of a countless 
number of girls and women forced into motherhood after being raped and after being 
prevented by state authorities from exercising a legitimate right enshrined in Mexican 
law”.38 By recognizing the emblematic nature of this case, the petitioners successfully 
established grounds on which to articulate the effect of social harm and to potentially design 
collective gender-based reparations that would address structural rights violations. 
However, because the Inter-American Commission did not formally admit this case, and 
subsequently did not determine which conventions and articles had been violated, it is not 
clear which rights provision were violated in this case. In that the petitioner’s complaint 
recognizes violations of all of the above listed conventions,39 and the State agreed to the 
Settlement, it is plausible to conclude that the State accepted responsibility for violating 
provisions of each of the conventions. While there are certainly benefits to interpreting this 
Agreement as encompassing provisions from each of the above conventions, such as 
applying a multi-faceted approach to standard setting on abortion rights, there are also 
disadvantages. In that the violations are ambiguous, it is unclear how the development of 
reparations in this Agreement could be designed to address specific human rights violations. 
Additionally, in terms of legal norm advancement, there is no room for an interpretation of 
how certain rights are applied to the abortion rights debate. This is a significant drawback 
because without a legal framework in which to ground the right to abortion, it is difficult for 
future abortion rights cases to refer to precedent and develop further argumentation. 
  
Finally, in regards to the third precondition, identify the harm and those harmed, the 
Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement Agreement did not address the invasive nature of 
harm as it relates to unwanted pregnancy; “harm of invasion”. It also neglected to examine 
gendered harm as it was perpetuated by the medical community on behalf of the State, 
which is a theme explored in the forthcoming section 5.2.2. Paulina Ramírez experienced 
harm before, during, and well after her attempts to access a legal abortion. As an adolescent 
girl who was raped by an intruder in her home, she was harmed by a society that promotes a 
culture of violence against women and girls, also referred to as social and patriarchal 
                                                
37 Paulina’s son was established as a beneficiary in this case through a determination in the reparations that he should 
receive health and education benefits. Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico (n 1) ¶16. 
38 Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico (n 1) ¶14. 
39 Human rights provisions claimed in the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement Agreement (n 27-33). 
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harm.40 That is, as West suggested, “women sustain harm by virtue of the knowledge that 
these violent […] acts go unregulated by the state”.41 In that the State of Mexico failed to 
prevent patriarchal harm, it violated the obligation to provide due diligence, as protected by 
Article 7(b) of the Convention of Belém do Pará. Not only was Paulina Ramírez raped, but 
she experienced an attack on her self-identity and her proyecto de vida. In that Paulina was 
forced to carry her pregnancy to term and give birth, her future as a poor young woman was 
determined for her by the medical community and the State. In other words, Paulina 
experienced a “cessation of her selfhood” in that she was forced to undergo the experience 
and resulting harm of unwanted pregnancy.42  
 
Upon examination of the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement Agreement in regards to 
fulfilment of the gender-based reparations pre-conditions identified by Rubio-Marin and 
Sandoval, it is evident that the Agreement did not sufficiently establish the relevant facts, 
identify the alleged violations, and identify the harm experienced by Paulina Ramírez. 
Because these pre-conditions were not adequately met, the reparations agreed upon in the 
Settlement are not expansive in their capacity to address and tackle pre-existing patriarchal 
norms that originally caused violations of Paulina’s reproductive rights. The following 
section addresses the missing components of the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations 
preconditions in the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement Agreement by exploring the right 
to abortion in context. The following section focuses particularly on gendered violence and 
discrimination and the influence of medical power and abortion stigma on women’s 
enjoyment of their reproductive health rights.  
 
5.2 Abortion in Context: The “Good” and the “Bad” 
In her book, Decoding Abortion Rhetoric, Celeste Michelle Condit introduced the idea of 
“goodness” when explaining the rhetorical analysis of abortion. While Condit focused 
specifically on the American context, her thoughts about how rhetoric perpetuates and 
reinforces the concept of the “good” woman who is forced to acquire an abortion are 
relevant in the Latin American context as well. She explained that “good” abortions require 
“a broad public to feel sorry for the agent and angry with the forces that bring her suffering, 
the character depicted must be ‘good,’ or at least, unable to control her destiny”.43 The 
                                                
40 Maureen Cain and Adrian Howe, ‘Introduction: Women, Crime and Social Harm, Towards a Criminology for the 
Global Age’ in Maureen Cain and Adrian Howe (eds), Women, Crime and Social Harm, Towards a Criminology for 
the Global Age (Hart Publishing 2008) 3, supra section 2.2.3 (n 77). 
41 Robin West, Caring for Justice (New York University Press 1997) 137, supra section 2.2.2 (n 70). 
42 Ibid 109, supra section 2.2.2 (n 66). 
43 Celeste M. Condit, Decoding Abortion Rhetoric: Communicating Social Change (University of Illinois Press 1994) 
25. 
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rhetoric designed to advocate for “good” abortions depicts images such as the married 
woman or young girl who has been raped and subsequently impregnated. Condit asserted 
that it is possible for the public to support a woman in her attempt to access an abortion if 
she can show that she is “making a choice not against motherhood but against situations 
which themselves violated the idealized image of motherhood”.44  Using this concept of 
“good” abortion reasoning, it is possible to deduce the converse, that there are “bad” 
reasons for women to decide to have an abortion. A woman who is not interested in 
motherhood, who may be more concerned with her career than raising children, or who 
would like to postpone motherhood, and therefore chooses, rather than is forced, to have an 
abortion, would be making that choice based on “bad” reasons. The binary of “good” and 
“bad” abortion also reflects the different “positioning” of women who attempt to access 
their rights to abortion.45 For instance, a woman whose “position” is that of poor and 
uneducated will perhaps face greater challenges in demanding her right to abortion because 
her “position” is “bad”, and so any claim she makes for an abortion, regardless of the 
context, is also “bad”. Conversely, women in good “positions”, such as wealthy and 
“white” women, may experience less challenges when demanding their abortion rights. 
 
Activist and litigation strategies around the right to abortion in Latin America have focused 
primarily on the right to abortion as it exists within three criteria, which are (i) the woman’s 
life or health (physical and/or mental) is at risk; (ii) the fetus is not viable outside of the 
womb; and (iii) the pregnancy is a result of rape and/or incest. When reflecting on Condit’s 
concept of “good” reasons for a woman to have an abortion, each of the legal abortion 
criteria fit within Condit’s perception of “good” characteristics. The woman who is allowed 
an abortion under the above criteria is not overtly challenging her gender role as a mother or 
demanding to exercise her decision-making autonomy. Instead, the perception is that she is 
not in control of her ability to become a mother, and therefore deserves protection because 
of the risk to her potential motherhood. These criteria are designed based on “good” reasons 
to have an abortion, and in turn, activists and litigators focus on passing and implementing 
laws which guarantee at least these conditions under which a woman can obtain an abortion. 
However, in working within these confines, it becomes difficult to focus on the right to 
abortion as it is connected to the rights to integrity, equality, and freedom from 
discrimination. The division between “good” and “bad” plays out in many facets of society, 
and sometimes in spaces where such a rift is not expected, such as in feminist activism and 
                                                
44 Ibid 26. 
45 Yuval-Davis N, 'What is ‘Transversal Politics?’' (1999) 12 Soundings 97, supra section 1.1.1 (n 37). 
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litigation strategy. Ultimately, the separation of the right to abortion into two separate 
factions, good versus bad, creates a space where women and women’s rights activists and 
litigators become perhaps too complacent with operating within the confines of “good” 
abortion reasoning. That is, they use the tools afforded to them, but don’t necessarily push 
hard enough to disrupt the paradigm of good versus bad women.46 The following sections 
provide a general overview of the sociocultural context in which Mexican women live, and 
also examine the role of the medical community in perpetuating abortion stigma and 
reinforcing concepts of “good” and “bad” abortion.  
 
5.2.1 Gender, Violence and Discrimination in Mexico 
For more than a decade the international human rights community, especially the United 
Nations and the Inter-American System of Human Rights, have closely scrutinized violence 
and discrimination against women in Mexico.47 An examination of the sociocultural context 
in which women live in Mexico has been explored within thematic and country reports, 
public hearings with members of civil society and women’s rights cases, which all reveal a 
culture of violence, inequality and discrimination that serves to subordinate women, and 
ultimately deny them their rights. In a report entitled “Integration of the Human Rights of 
Women and a Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women”, former United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Yakin Erturk, explained,  
High levels of violence against women in Mexico are both consequence and 
symptom of widespread gender discrimination and inequality. Additional layers of 
discrimination on the basis of national origin, ethnicity or socio-economic status 
coupled with a lack of equal access to State protection intersect with gender 
discrimination and make some groups of women - namely migrant, poor and 
indigenous women – particularly vulnerable to violence.48 
In this report, Erturk attributed violence and discrimination against women to Mexico’s 
machista culture, which “relegates women to a subordinate role in their family and 
community”. 49  Significantly, Erturk also noted that attempts to empower women to 
overcome structural discrimination, especially economic discrimination, may in fact 
                                                
46 Audre Lorde, 'The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House', Sister Outsider: Essays and 
Speeches (Crossing Press 2007) 110–114. 
47 For example, United Nations: Asma Jahangir, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary 
Executions, Report of her visit to Mexico (U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/3/Add.3 25 November 1999); CEDAW: under 
Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention, and Reply from the Government of Mexico (U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/Mexico 27 January 2005). Organization of American States: Marta Altolaguirre, Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Women, Inter American Commission on Human Rights, The Situation of the Rights of 
Women in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico: The Right to be Free from Violence and Discrimination 
(OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117.Doc.44 7 March 2003). 
48 Yakin Erturk, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Integration of the Human Rights of 
Women and a Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women: Mission to Mexico' (E/CN.4/2006/61/Add.4., 2006) 2. 
49 Ibid 5.!
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challenge the very basis of machismo, which in turn reveals men’s inability to fulfil their 
machista role as the family provider. She explained this can lead to,  
Family abandonment, unstable relationships or alcoholism, which in turn may 
increase the risk of violence. Even cases of rape and murder, may be understood as 
desperate attempts to uphold discriminatory norms that are outpaced by changing 
socio-economic conditions and the advance of human rights.50  
The threat of disruption to the machista social paradigm contributes to the violence women 
experience in their lives; the act of violence becomes an exertion of power, where men can 
regain their macho51 role in society.  
 
In contrast to the male concept of machista, is the gendered equivalent of marianismo. 
According to Jezzini et al., marianismo is a “latina gender role phenomenon based on 
traditional cultural norms, and the values of Catholicism. (It) encompass(es) the concepts of 
self-sacrifice, passivity, caretaking, duty, honor, sexual morality, and the Latina’s role as a 
mother”.52 As a social construct, marianismo is intrinsically related to the martyrdom of the 
Virgin Mary.53 Essentially, the social constructs of machismo and marianismo serve to 
divide gender into two separate classes, placing women in a subordinate position to men.54 
As a result of machismo and marianismo, women in Mexico face a great deal of pressure to 
become mothers. Marta Lamas explained that feminist efforts in Mexico to work within and 
simultaneously against the confines of machismo/marianismo resulted in an articulation of 
reproductive rights through the discourse of “voluntary motherhood”.55 The concept of 
“voluntary motherhood” challenges the social construct of marianismo by prioritising 
women’s choice in regards to reproduction over their reproductive capacity and ascribed 
gender roles. Despite efforts to confront the machismo/marianismo paradigm, the power 
dynamics that place women in a subordinate position to men are perpetuated and reinforced 
through the medical profession. The following section examines the asymmetrical power 
relationship between women and physicians, as they are the “moral watchdogs” or 
gatekeepers in women’s attempts to access their reproductive right to abortion. 
                                                
50 Ibid 6. 
51 It is important to note that the term macho or machismo, has various meanings which are dependent on “contrasting 
urban and rural experiences, generational differences, class stratification, stages within individual’s lives...” 
Additionally, the term mandilon, makes reference to the man who is “dominated by women.” See, Matthew C. 
Guttman, The Meanings of Macho: Being a Man in Mexico City (University of California Press 2006) Chapter 9, 
“Machismo.” 
52 A. T. Jezzini, C. E., Guzmán, & L. Grayshield, ‘Examining the gender role concept of marianismo and its relation 
to acculturation in Mexican-American college women,’ March 2008. 
53 Rosa Maria Gil and Carmen Inoa Vasquez, The Maria Paradox: How Latinas can Merge Old World Traditions 
with New World Self-Esteem (Perigee Books 1997): The Ten Commandments of Marianismo. 
54 Patricia M. Hernandez, 'The Myth of Machismo: An Everyday Reality for Latin American Women' (2003) 15 St. 
Thomas Law Review 860. 
55 Marta Lamas, 'The Feminist Movement and the Development of Political Discourse on Voluntary Motherhood in 
Mexico' (1997) 5:10 Reproductive Health Matters 58. 
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5.2.2 Medical Power and Abortion Stigma 
Medical power and abortion stigma are concepts very much related to the previous 
discussions on “good” and “bad” abortion reasoning and gender-based violence in Mexico. 
The stigma around abortion is related to machista norms that create an environment of 
gender-based discrimination, and the abortion procedure itself challenges men’s identities 
as powerful decision-makers who control the activities of family life. Abortion stigma is 
rooted in society’s concerns about what a woman should be and shouldn’t be. Kumar, et al. 
theorized that abortion stigma is based on three central concepts of femininity and the 
“essential nature” of women: motherhood, female sexuality as having the sole purpose of 
reproduction, and a nurturing instinct.56 Abortion stigma is perpetuated and reinforced in 
various spheres, including the medical community. A medical doctor in Mexico, depending 
on their geographical location, is tasked with deciding if a woman’s life or health (including 
mental health) is enough at risk, if a woman has been raped, or if a fetus is viable, in order 
to determine if she is eligible for an abortion procedure. The responsibility afforded to 
members of the medical community in this undertaking is significant; it is loaded with 
power, and often leaves women in extremely vulnerable positions. 
 
Foucault described medical doctors as “priests of the body”, meaning that the authority of 
the doctor in her/his ability to confront suffering and deny death is akin to the spiritual 
power typically afforded to priests.57 This power intensifies with regard to female patients, 
especially those seeking an abortion, because a woman’s relationship with her doctor is ripe 
with gendered assumptions based on her role as a (potential) mother. Kathy Davis explained 
this power dynamic by using the concept of “paternalistic control”, in which the doctor is 
given the power to decide in the woman’s best interest, and the woman seeking an abortion 
is someone in need of being controlled.58 When describing what paternalistic control might 
look like in application, Sally Sheldon provided the following examples: “Paternalistic 
control may involve influencing a woman to continue (or equally to terminate) a pregnancy. 
Equally, it may be failing to tell her about some of the alternatives open to her”.59  While 
exercising “paternalistic control” is most obviously done by members of the medical 
community, it can be understood as a form of state intervention that “actively imposes the 
control of the woman as the doctor’s responsibility”.60 As Sheldon explained, the state 
                                                
56 Anuradha Kumar, Leila Hessini, and Ellen M. H. Mitchell, 'Conceptualising Abortion Stigma' (2009) 11:6 Culture, 
Health & Sexuality 628. 
57 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (Routledge 2003) 32. 
58 Kathy Davis Power Under the Microscope (Foris 1989). 
59 Sally Sheldon, Beyond Control: Medical Power and Abortion Law (Pluto Press 1997) 66. 
60 Ibid 74. 
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cannot be seen as neutral in matters of reproductive health. However, the state can in effect 
distance itself from any negative connotations related to its attempts to regulate women’s 
reproductive rights by relying on medical doctors to appear neutral while also “support(ing) 
the existing status quo and the power imbalance which characterizes it”.61 Paternalistic 
control can be understood as a form of patriarchal harm, especially when applied to medical 
power and abortion rights, because power exerted by medical doctors to block abortion 
access in effect reinforces patriarchal norms that reify motherhood as an essential aspect of 
women’s lives. In addition, paternalistic control contributes to the impact of “invasive 
harm” by forcing women to relinquish their selfhood in order to become involuntarily 
nurturant. 62 
 
In that medical professionals play the role of gatekeepers in controlling women’s access to 
safe abortion services, it is beneficial to explore doctors’ attitudes and opinions in regards to 
abortion. In a study conducted with medical trainees in Mexico City, which was designed to 
determine trainee opinions on abortion access and restrictions, researchers found that only 
15% of respondents were in agreement with abortion on demand, but that 91% of the 
trainees agreed with providing abortion services in situations of severe fetal malformation, 
where the fetus would die outside of the womb.63 Interestingly, only 64% of the interview 
respondents were aware that abortion is legal in Mexico City.64 Lastly, 15% percent of the 
interviewed trainees responded that there should be no circumstance in which a woman can 
have a legal abortion.65 This last statistic is alarming, and raises the issue of conscientious 
objection. 
 
In the medical community, the practice of conscientious objection is defined as “the refusal 
to participate in an activity that an individual considers incompatible with his/her religious, 
moral, philosophical, or ethical beliefs”.66 The regulation of conscientious objection varies 
in different geographical contexts, but in terms of rights, the debate is one between doctors’ 
rights to freedom of conscience and religion versus women’s rights to liberty, dignity, 
health and freedom from discrimination. Ana Cristina González Veléz, co-founder of 
Global Doctors for Choice and an expert on women’s sexual and reproductive rights, 
                                                
61 Ibid. 
62 West (n 41), supra section 2.2.2 (n 64). 
63 Deyanira González de León Aguirre and Deborah L. Billings, 'Attitudes Towards Abortion among Medical 
Trainees in Mexico City Public Hospitals' (2001) 9:2 Gender & Development 90. 
64 Ibid 91. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Wendy Chavkin, Liddy Leitman, and Kate Polin, 'Conscientious Objection and Refusal to Provide Reproductive 
Healthcare: A White Paper Examining Prevalence, Health Consequences, and Policy Responses' (Global Doctors for 
Choice 2013) <http://globaldoctorsforchoice.org/resources/white-papers/>. 
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explained, “conscientious objection is an individual practice - it cannot be institutional, it 
cannot be an entire hospital who is an objector, it cannot be an entire region”.67 She referred 
to the original intention of conscientious objection, which originated in military terms, and 
explained,  
Conscientious objection is a very precious term when it comes to military service 
[...] and we have transported that debate to the health services without thinking that 
it's not the same thing. Because, when you refuse, when you express conscientious 
objection for the military service, that is an individual action where you are saying 
that you don't want to be part of that. But when you use conscientious objection at 
the health services, your decision is having consequences for the provision of the 
service for others.68   
The power exerted by medical doctors is not explicit, but rather, it is inferred. Both a 
doctor’s medical knowledge and the technology afforded to her/him create a completely 
asymmetrical power dynamic. Women who engage in this dynamic are made to feel that 
they don’t know enough about the technical processes to make informed decisions about 
their bodies. In that doctors create and in many ways, are complicit in perpetuating an 
unsafe and uncomfortable space for women who seek abortions, they play an instrumental 
role in denying women their rights to reproductive autonomy. The result is a situation 
where women’s lives are dictated by doctors’ individual beliefs and prejudices.  
 
It is undeniable that conscientious objection practices, abortion stigma and “paternalistic 
control” are harmful to women. The combination of these harmful practices contributed to 
the context in which the Paulina Ramírez case originated. The objective of this section has 
been to examine the context and factors that contribute to the harm women (and girls) in 
Mexico experience when attempting to access their reproductive rights to abortion. The role 
of religion underpins all of the above discussion - machismo is rooted in religion, as is 
abortion stigma, conscientious objection, and the criminalization of abortion. The following 
section examines the transformative potential of the reparations agreed upon in this case. 
Once again, Rubio-Marín and Sandoval’s Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations is 
employed as the analytical framework in order to determine missed opportunities in how 
the Paulina Ramírez Agreement repaired gender-based harm in a women’s reproductive 
rights case. 
 
                                                
67 Interview Ana Cristina González Velez, Sexual and Reproductive Health Expert, Skype 5 August 2014 (Ref Code: 
Sk, N, S, M). 
68 Ibid. 
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5.3 Repairing Gendered Harm: Determining Transformative Potential 
The Inter-American Commission’s role during the Paulina Ramirez Friendly Settlement 
procedure was limited to approval of the Agreement upon its completion, and compliance 
monitoring of the reparations delineated in the Agreement. The Agreement included 
numerous individual compensatory reparations for Paulina Ramirez and her son,69 as well as 
non-repetition reparation measures in the form of legislative proposals; public 
acknowledgment of the violations; training courses to be conducted by the petitioners; a 
review of literature and materials to detect shortcomings in the way reproductive health 
information is delivered; and dissemination of a circular to the health sector in order to 
strengthen the commitment toward ending violations of the right of women to legal 
termination of pregnancies. The individual monetary reparations issued to Paulina and her 
son recognized the economic harm Paulina experienced by compensating for immediate 
legal costs as well as future living expenses. Design of monetary reparations was successful 
in this case because of the partial fulfilment of the second and third pre-conditions, identify 
the alleged victims and identify those harmed by the violations. It is important to note that 
the State did not comply with all of the monetary reparations. According to Vanessa Coria 
and Rebeca Ramos, who are both human rights attorneys working on women’s reproductive 
rights in Mexico, the payment to Paulina’s son was never fulfilled.70 The Agreement did not 
include monetary compensation intended to address the social and gendered elements of 
Paulina’s human rights violations, which may be attributed to inadequate fulfilment of the 
identify the alleged violations and identify the harm preconditions. 
 
The reparations selected for in-depth analysis in this case are those that have the potential to 
subvert sociocultural norms which caused and contributed to the denial of women’s rights 
to safe and legal abortions in Mexico, also referred to as “guarantees of non-repetition”. 
Unlike the analysis of the María Chávez Friendly Settlement Agreement, which examined 
each of the agreed upon reparations, this analysis reviews only non-repetition measures. 
Such an approach is necessary in order to adequately determine advancements and 
                                                
69 The individual reparations developed to compensate Paulina Ramirez are: (1) monetary compensation for medical 
expenses and legal damages (60,000 pesos); (2) monetary assistance for school supply expenses (114,000 pesos); (3) 
monetary support for housing expenses (220,000 pesos); (4) Paulina and her son to be provided with health services; 
(5) psychological care for Paulina and her son; (6) school supplies and monetary support for Paulina’s son (5,290 
pesos/year) and free attendance at a public university; (7) a computer and a printer; (8) monetary compensation to 
help Paulina set up a business (20,000 pesos); and (9) a one-off payment for moral damages (265,000 pesos). The 
Agreement also contained a symbolic reparation in the form of a public acknowledgment for violations of Paulina’s 
rights in Baja California newspapers. 
70 Interview with Vanessa Coria, Advocacy and Program Manager, Women’s Global Network for Reproductive 
Rights (WGNRR), formerly with Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), Mexico City, Mexico 18 July 
2014 (Ref Code: Ip, M, N, S) and Rebeca Ramos, Legal Researcher, Information Group on Reproductive Choice 
(GIRE) [Grupo de Información en Reproducción Elegida], Mexico City, Mexico 17 July 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, M, N). 
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inadequacies in the design of non-repetition measures, and to determine the transformative 
potential of the reparations agreed upon in this case.  
 
5.3.1 Legislative Reform in Baja California 
The State of Mexico’s agreement to undertake legislative reform as part of the remedies in 
this case signalled to the federal states across Mexico that Agreements made at the federal 
level under the supervision of the Inter-American Commission have direct implications 
throughout all levels of government. The reparation stated, “The Government of Baja 
California shall ‘submit to and promote before the State Congress the legislative proposals 
submitted by the petitioners and agreed on with the state government’”.71 During the 
proceedings of the Friendly Settlement Agreement the state of Baja California amended 
Article 79 of the Regulations of the Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General for 
Justice of the State of Baja California, which included the following statement,  
As a result of the friendly settlement agreement, signed by the Mexican State and 
Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto, and in accordance with the terms of Article 48 
of the American Convention […] the Government of the State of Baja California 
[…] assumed the commitment of enacting an amendment to Article 79, […] 
whereby women who are victims of the crime of rape are to receive information on 
the legal termination of pregnancy, in order to provide such persons as so request 
with mechanisms to enable them to decide freely and on an informed basis 
regarding the possibility of performing that procedure through mechanisms that 
ensure free access to the facilities of the health sector in the shortest delay 
possible.72  
The amendment included a detailed procedural outline for Public Prosecution Service 
agents,73 but did not mention or elaborate upon the role and responsibilities of medical 
professionals in guaranteeing access to legal abortions. The acknowledgment of the Paulina 
Ramírez case in the amendment was significant because it directly recognized the 
legitimacy of the Inter-American Commission and the Friendly Settlement Agreement 
procedure. However, failure to recognize the role of the medical community in enacting 
women’s rights to legal abortions in Mexico effectively rendered the amendment useless.  
 
As was discussed previously, the state entrusts medical doctors with preserving and 
“support(ing) the existing status quo and the power imbalance which characterizes it”.74 
Simply altering Article 79 to include the duties of the Public Prosecution Office in 
enforcing legal abortion did not address the harm inherent to medical control and abortion 
stigma. In fact, in Paulina Ramírez’s case, it was the Public Prosecution Office that had 
                                                
71 Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico [2007] (n 1) Annex 4. 
72 Ibid. The amendment was publicized in The Gazette newspaper on 13 October 2006. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Sheldon (n 59) 74. 
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initially determined Paulina Ramírez’s eligibility to undergo the abortion procedure.75 The 
amendment to Article 79 upholds the relationship between the state and the medical 
community, in turn reinforcing existing norms that place decision-making power in the 
hands of doctors, and out of the hands of women. Additionally, the amendment did not 
examine the medical community’s procedures for exercising conscientious objection. The 
amendment could have provided a guideline to require public hospitals to employ doctors 
who do not have objections to performing legal abortions. This reparation failed to refer to 
the various components of gendered harm experienced by Paulina Ramírez, especially in a 
sociocultural context in which doctors exercise their power over women patients. The 
reparation in no way recognized the patriarchal and invasive harm Paulina suffered as an 
adolescent girl who was manipulated by her doctors, members of religious factions and the 
State Attorney General. The shortcomings detected in this reparation directly correlate with 
incomplete fulfilment of the first and third gender reparation pre-conditions, establishing 
the facts and identifying the harm. Ultimately, legislative reform in Baja California failed as 
a transformative gender reparation because it did not sufficiently address the multiple forms 
of harm that women and girls experience when they are denied abortion services by 
members of the medical community.  
 
5.3.2 Training  
In the Paulina Ramírez Agreement, the State and the petitioner included the following 
training reparation: “The local government agrees to schedule the training courses to be 
conducted by the petitioners, as agreed on at the technical analysis meeting [...]”.76 The 
contents, quality, subject matter and audience were not identified in this reparation. In 
addition, upon review of the Inter-American Commission’s follow-up reports on the Paulina 
Ramírez Settlement Agreement, it is clear that this reparation was agreed upon without a 
comprehensive implementation plan in mind. Again, a failure to examine the role of 
medical doctors as gatekeepers in women’s health services correlated with the development 
of a weak reparation. In the follow-up reports issued by the Inter-American Commission, 
the State of Mexico explained that it was willing to “take initiatives with the appropriate 
offices to hold training courses, after receiving a proposal from the petitioners”.77 In 
response, the petitioners (GIRE) explained that they were not in communication with the 
                                                
75 Taracena, ‘Paulina: In the Name of the Law' (n 17) 9. 
76 Researcher was not able to access notes from the content of the technical meeting held in October 2006. Interview 
respondents explained that the material is confidential and cannot be shared publically. 
77 Annual Report 2008 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.134 Doc. 5, rev. 1, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 25 
February 2009) ¶606); Annual Report 2009 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 5, corr. 1, Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights 30 December 2009) 670, and Annual Report 2010 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 5, rev. 1, Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights 7 March 2011) ¶79. 
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State justice or health authorities because “the environment […] was hardly propitious for 
carrying out trainings by the Executive”.78 Despite initial complications, in 2011 the State 
and petitioners were able to collaborate in order to “develop a cycle of courses for health 
personnel during the first quarter of 2012”.79 Implementation of this reparation is an 
important accomplishment, especially as it illustrates the State’s willingness to fulfil its 
obligations. However, both the petitioner and Commission fell short in their roles to design 
and monitor the training reparation. In the follow-up reports submitted to the Inter-
American Commission there was no mention of the course content or the number of health 
and legal professionals who attended the courses.80  
 
The inclusion of training as a reparation is undeniably a necessary and important element of 
an effective reparations program. However, it is clear in the Paulina Ramírez Friendly 
Settlement Agreement that the content of this reparation was of limited importance to the 
Commission and civil society organizations (petitioners) during the follow-up sessions for 
this case. The shortcomings in this reparation represent each of the missing elements of the 
gender-based reparation pre-conditions: incomplete facts about the role of doctors in 
women’s health services resulted in a training reparation that did not outline the training 
content and the intended audience (establish the facts); ambiguous and unexamined rights 
violations concealed the relationship between denial of abortion services and women’s 
autonomy and health rights (identify the alleged violations); and a failure to 
comprehensively acknowledge and examine social and gendered harm in relation to 
abortion limited the analysis of the massive negative impact abortion restrictions have on 
women and girls (identify the harm). This reparation was ineffective in its transformative 
potential capacity. 
 
5.3.3 National Efforts to Reform Legislation and Disseminate Information 
The final non-repetition reparation agreed upon in the Paulina Ramírez Friendly 
Settlement Agreement contained provisions that had the potential to address the 
sociocultural factors that hindered implementation of women’s reproductive rights. 
Interviews with participants involved in the negotiation process of this Agreement 
identified the following provisions as essential to the transformative potential of the 
Paulina Ramírez case: 
                                                
78 Annual Report 2008 (n 77) ¶609. 
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Twelve: The Mexican State, through the Health Secretariat, agrees to: 
(1) Conduct a national survey, involving state representation, to assess the 
enforcement of Official Mexican Standard NOM 190-SSA1-1999 regarding medical 
assistance in cases of domestic violence, and to measure progress with the 
implementation of the National Program for the Prevention and Attention of 
Domestic, Sexual, and Violence against Women. 
(3) Draw up and deliver a circular from the federal Health Secretariat to the state 
health services and other sector agencies, in order to strengthen their commitment 
toward ending violations of the right of women to the legal termination of a 
pregnancy.81 
This section analyses these reparation provisions with particular focus on the National 
Program for the Prevention and Attention of Domestic, Sexual, and Violence against 
Women (National Program), and the development and distribution of a circular to state 
health agencies and sectors. The second part of reparation 12(1) is of significant importance 
because the operational word “measure” implies that the State must report back to the Inter-
American Commission and petitioner with evidence and information about how elements of 
the National Program have been implemented.  
 
The National Program for the Prevention and Attention of Domestic, Sexual, and Violence 
against Women included the implementation of Official Mexican Standard NOM-046-
SSA2-2005, “Criteria for the Protection and Care of Domestic and Sexual Violence Against 
Women for the National Health System”.82 Of the numerous provisions delineated within 
this legislation, section 6.8.1 affirmed a duty “to investigate conduct in public institutions, 
specifically in regards to domestic or sexual violence, to better enable the quantification and 
identification of its causes and underlying social, cultural and economic, associated factors, 
as well as their impact on individual and collective health”.83 This reparation did indeed 
address the gendered aspects of healthcare services, and had as its objective the goal of 
identifying the underlying causes of violence against women in public institutions. 
However, information gathered from interviews revealed that this reparation was not 
necessarily designed with the Paulina Ramírez case in mind. Rather, the National Program 
was added to the Agreement in order to draw attention to the Program, which was an action 
                                                
81 Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico [2007] (n 1) [emphasis added]. The other elements of this 
reparation are: (2) Update the aforesaid Official Standard, to expand its goals and scope and to expressly include 
sexual violence occurring outside the family context. To this end, the petitioners shall be given the preliminary draft 
of the amendments to the Standard, so they can present whatever comments they deem relevant […] (4) Through the 
National Center for Gender Equity and Reproductive Health conduct a review of books, indexed scientific articles, 
postgraduate theses, and documented governmental and civil society reports dealing with abortion in Mexico in order 
to prepare an analysis of the information that exists and detect shortcomings in that information. 
82 Mexican Official Standard NOM-046-SSA2-2005, Sexual and Domestic Violence Against Women, Criteria for 
Prevention and Attention, Federal Government, Secretary of Health [Norma Oficial Mexicana NOM 046-SSA2-
2005, Violencia Familiar, Sexual y Contra Las Mujeres. Criterios para La Prevención y Atención, Gobierno Federal, 
Secretaría de Salud] 16 April 2009.  
83 Ibid. 
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suggested by Patricia Uribe Zuniga, former General Director of the National Centre for 
Gender and Reproductive Health. 
 
Patricia Uribe Zuniga explained, “they (the Agreement and the National Program) both 
helped each other […] it was the moment where both things came together and they helped 
each other along”. 84  This is interesting because although the gender reparation pre-
conditions were not fulfilled in their entirety in this case, individual actors within the State 
played a significant role behind-the-scenes to include a provision within the Friendly 
Settlement Agreement that focused on the impact of violence against women in public 
institutions.85 While this is a welcome advancement, it is in no way indicative of the State’s 
overall intention in regards to implementing this reparation. In fact, inclusion of this 
provision in the Agreement was highly disputed by conservative members of the Mexican 
government. Uribe Zuniga explained, “the authorities tried to discredit the Agreement 
because I was the one who participated, and supposedly I didn’t have the faculty to take part 
in these agreements […] But, I had a signed document from the Secretary authorizing me to 
do it. Initially the conservatives didn’t know that and they tried discrediting the 
Agreement”.86  
 
Section 5.3 of the National Program stated that health institutions must “foster coordination 
with other institutions, agencies and organizations in the public, social and private sectors in 
order to incorporate individuals involved with domestic or sexual violence, so that a 
collaboration of their respective powers provides women with the best possible care”.87 
Unfortunately, civil society organizations did not actively monitor implementation of this 
reparation, and ultimately allowed for it to be ignored in subsequent follow-up meetings. In 
fact, petitioner comments on the National Program are only mentioned in follow-up reports 
on two occasions.88 While this reparation was gender-based in design, its transformative 
potential was limited by the political climate in Mexico, and also by the petitioner and 
Commission’s decision to prioritize monetary compensation reparations over those 
reparations designed to address structural rights violations. The petitioner’s inactivity in 
monitoring implementation of this reparation, particularly the “measuring” component of 
                                                
84 Interview with Patricia Uribe Zuniga, Former General Director of the National Center for Gender and 
Reproductive Health, CENSIDA (Mexico City, Mexico 31 July 2014). 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Mexican Official Standard NOM-046-SSA2-2005 (n 82) part 5.3. 
88 Annual Report 2009 ¶681 and Annual Report 2010 ¶92 (n 77). 
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the reparation, influenced the Inter-American Commission’s decision to determine that the 
State had reached compliance with this reparation.  
 
The final reparation, which was the development and distribution of a circular to the “state 
health services and other sector agencies, in order to strengthen their commitment toward 
ending violations of the right of women to the legal termination of a pregnancy”,89 directly 
addressed the need to inform and educate medical professionals, and essentially spoke to 
the heart of what this case was about. For its part, the State claimed that the circular had 
been “published in the entry halls of each of the areas, hospitals, and health centers of the 
Secretariat of Health in the state of Baja California”,90 but it did not intend to publish the 
circular in the newspaper or on its website. María Alejandra Cardenas, who represented 
Paulina in the follow-up meetings before the Inter-American Commission, explained the 
significance of the State’s failure to fully comply with this reparation: 
The State had to publish it (the circular). They didn't make any effort to actually 
make sure that health care practitioners were going to know that it (the law that 
permits abortions when a woman has been raped) exists, and they actually have to 
follow it. So, we go back to the same thing, because what's the root of the problem 
there? That the healthcare practitioners didn't even know that the law existed, and 
that therefore there was an obligation to provide abortion in those cases. So, if you 
remain in the same legal vacuum, where they don't even know, and they don't know 
that there are rules that they have to follow in those cases when a woman has been 
raped and asks for an abortion [...] you go back to the same situation. […] And then, 
what happens so many years later, there's still the same inseguridad juridical (legal 
uncertainty) because they didn't clarify what the law was, and they didn't make sure 
that the practitioners knew what the law was. So, what's the point? I think that was 
the only concrete point that would have made a change in the lives of many 
women.91 
The distribution of the circular was the only reparation included in the Friendly Settlement 
Agreement that had the capacity to realistically transform the medical community’s 
approach to providing abortion services. Despite the incomplete account of the facts in this 
case, this reparation was designed to educate doctors, to provide them with the knowledge 
that abortion procedures were legal in certain situations, and to impart on them a duty as 
medical professionals to provide women with abortion services. In that this reparation did 
indeed address women’s rights violations within the health sector, it fulfilled the 
requirements of a gender-based reparation. However, there is a connection that can be made 
between the Mexican State’s refusal to comprehensively implement this reparation and the 
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partial fulfilment of the establish the facts precondition; the Friendly Settlement Agreement 
did not recognize the role of the medical community within the facts of the case. 
The analysis of reparations agreed upon in the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement 
Agreement reveals challenges inherent to repairing harm in women’s reproductive rights 
cases. Not only was the transformative potential of these reparations limited by the highly 
contentious nature of the right to abortion, but a failure to fulfil the Holistic Gender 
Approach to Reparations preconditions resulted in reparations that in no way subverted 
structural inequality or gender-based discrimination. However, the transformative potential 
of a case may not always be found within the case itself, rather it may be in how the 
existence of the case triggers a response from society. Rosario Taracena explained, 
“Paulina’s case attracted a great deal of public attention and generated many articles in the 
media in 2000, giving abortion a “human face” in Mexico”.92 The widespread outcry over 
Paulina’s case was directly related to the way the media portrayed Paulina and her 
experience; she was a “‘raped child’ (who) was not allowed to abort”.93 In that the media 
framed Paulina’s abortion within the confines of “good” abortion reasoning, Paulina’s name 
became representative of all women at risk of not being allowed an abortion when pregnant 
as a result of rape. Taracena claimed that one of the greatest breakthroughs of the Paulina 
Ramírez case was that it modified the traditional view of abortion. Abortion was no longer 
morally reprehensible; it had shifted in discourse to be a necessary health service in extreme 
conditions. According to Taracena, “For the first time, a young girl’s experience, instead of 
abortion in general, was the subject of discussion, and it has had a great influence on 
abortion laws and policy in Mexico”.94  Rebecca Ramos, a legal researcher with GIRE, 
echoed this sentiment:  
The Friendly Settlement Agreement between Mexico and the victim has been an 
instrument for accessing abortion resulting from rape. This Agreement helped to 
create an official norm that guarantees women survivors of rape access to health 
services, including emergency contraception and legal interruption of pregnancy. 
This is now mandatory in all States […] the Friendly Settlement Agreement helped 
to build pressure in creating this norm.95 
The Inter-American Commission closed the Paulina Ramírez case in 2012 after concluding 
that the State had complied with all of the reparations agreed upon in the Settlement. 
However, because the reparations agreed upon in the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement 
Agreement did not address the underlying patriarchal culture prevalent within the medical 
                                                
92 Taracena, ‘Social Actors’ (n 36) 104. 
93 Ibid 105. 
94 Ibid 104. 
95 Interview with Rebeca Ramos, Legal Researcher, Information Group on Reproductive Choice (GIRE) [Grupo de 
Información en Reproducción Elegida], Mexico City, Mexico 17 July 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, M, N). 
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community in relation to abortion access, it failed to challenge the patriarchal and 
paternalistic harm women and girls face when attempting to enjoy their reproductive health 
rights. The final section reflects on the analysis of the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement 
Agreement in order to suggest strategies for improving and strengthening gender-based 
reparation design in Friendly Settlement Agreements. 
 
5.4 Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
The Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement Agreement was both a highlight and setback in 
the fulfilment of women’s reproductive rights in the Inter-American region. The Agreement 
itself was extensive in its attempt to repair harm through monetary compensation and it was 
ground-breaking as a standard for State-compliance in regards to fulfilling the terms of a 
Friendly Settlement Agreement. It was also the first and only abortion rights case to be 
monitored by the Inter-American Commission, and the publicity surrounding the 
Agreement provided great impetus for sociocultural and legal shifts in discourse around 
abortion reasoning. However, the Agreement’s reparations fell short in their potential to be 
transformative. This section reflects on the above critical analysis of the Paulina Ramírez 
Friendly Settlement Agreement in order to determine how application of alternative rights 
concepts may benefit litigation on abortion rights. This section also suggests that the role of 
civil society be expanded in the design of reparations, and relies on information obtained 
from interviews to argue that the Inter-American System needs to provide more support to 
civil society in order to strengthen the relationship between women’s rights organizations 
and the Inter-American Commission and Court. Once again, the strategies derived from 
analysis of this case study contribute to the “gender reparations tradition” suggested in this 
thesis. 
 
Alternative rights concepts such as proyecto de vida and vida digna have great value when 
applied to abortion rights cases. As suggested in the María Chávez case study analysis, 
alternative rights concepts, when employed in reproductive rights litigation, have the 
potential to uncover gender-based discrimination and violations of the rights to autonomy 
and integrity. When applied to the right to access legal abortion services, these concepts are 
also beneficial in that they provide a lens to connect gendered harm to restrictions on 
abortion. For example, the concept of vida digna requires that individuals not be prevented 
from accessing “the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence”.96 In that Paulina was 
denied access to her legal right to abortion in the situation that she was raped, the State 
                                                
96 Alexandra Sandoval, 'Vida Digna' (Third Latin American Congress on Reproductive Rights, Mexico, October 
2013) 2, supra section 3.2.2 (n 132-133). 
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effectively prevented Paulina from accessing the conditions necessary to live a life of 
dignity. She was forced to become a mother, which was a violation of her reproductive 
autonomy, and as a result she became, as West described, an “involuntary nurturant”.97  
 
In addition, Paulina experienced a violation of her proyecto de vida in that her life path was 
changed without her consent. In order to apply the proyecto de vida concept in the Paulina 
Ramírez Friendly Settlement proceedings, the petitioners would have had to simultaneously 
rely on and reject essentialist and stereotypical portrayals of women as mothers. This means 
that, in the context of abortion, violations of proyecto de vida must be interpreted in such a 
way that disruption to a woman’s life plan is a result of the state’s refusal to respect 
women’s reproductive autonomy and choice, and not just because women are forced to 
become mothers when their reproductive rights are violated. The concepts of proyecto de 
vida and vida digna have great potential for application in abortion rights litigation because 
they force discussions about the gendered nature of harm when women are forced to forego 
their own rights in order to conform to sociocultural norms that subordinate and marginalize 
women.  
 
Second, the above examination of the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement Agreement 
uncovered the limited role of civil society in the design and development of reparations 
before the Inter-American System of Human Rights. In order to advance a “gender 
reparations tradition” within the Inter-American System, the relationship between the Inter-
American Commission and civil society should be expanded in order to allow for the design 
of reparations that effectively take into account the gendered nature of harm in reproductive 
rights cases. The role of civil society before the Inter-American System is multi-
dimensional: civil society organizations litigate human rights cases and monitor compliance 
with reparations. They can also be the driving force behind implementation of a case at the 
national level. As Tara Melish argued, “the challenge of implementation is always the 
same: to go beyond rhetorical or cosmetic changes in state policy to change the political 
culture that allows human rights abuses to recur […] requires coordinated, intersecting 
(civil society) campaigns at domestic, regional, and international levels”.98 While the Inter-
Commission relies on civil society to develop cases and monitor reparations, the potential 
for civil society to engage in the design of reparations is non-existent.  
 
                                                
97 West, Caring for Justice (n 41) 105, supra section 2.2.2 (n 64). 
98 Tara Melish 'Rethinking the less as More Thesis: Supranational Litigation of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
in the Americas' (2006) 39 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 342. 
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Vanessa Coria, a human rights lawyer who represented the petitioners in the follow-up 
stages of the Paulina Ramírez Agreement, raised two primary concerns with how the Inter-
American Commission and civil society organizations engage with strategic litigation 
before the Inter-American System. First, she explained that civil society organizations are 
sometimes “too focused on organization objectives. [A petitioner’s] goal is to have a 
decision and not necessarily to build and strengthen civil society and a movement to follow 
up the decision”.99 Second, Coria suggested the reason why petitioners fall short in 
monitoring implementation is in part due to limited resources, but can also be attributed to 
limited support coming from the Inter-American Commission. When discussing the Paulina 
Ramírez follow-up meetings Coria explained that the Commissioners were not supportive 
of her request for the State to complete the final payment to Paulina’s son. She said it 
seemed like “they were almost saying ‘why are you asking for more? Come on, this is the 
most complete agreement we have ever seen […] Come on girls’”.100 Coria’s criticisms of 
both the petitioners and the Inter-American Commission ring true when applied to the 
Paulina Ramírez Agreement’s reparation design and implementation. The petitioners in this 
case were civil society organizations that had their own objectives in the development of the 
Agreement, where it is obvious that reparation design and subsequent implementation and 
monitoring were not significant priorities in terms of resource allocation. The Inter-
American Commission’s seemingly annoyed response to the petitioner’s request for 
complete fulfilment of monetary reparations highlighted the difficulties petitioners face in 
pushing the Inter-American Commission to demand State compliance. Coria concluded, 
“sometimes we lose the battle because we just don’t have the support from the Commission 
to do the follow-up. That’s the situation of the Paulina case”.101  
 
The examination of the Paulina Ramírez case conducted in this chapter reveals a number of 
avenues through which civil society could be engaged in the process of reparation design in 
a more substantive and effective way. First, in order to strengthen the role of civil society in 
the design of reparations, the Friendly Settlement Agreement procedures should be 
amended to include a call for reparation suggestions from national and local level women’s 
organizations. Such an activity would have great utility in terms of compliance-monitoring 
because the primary supervisors of compliance and implementation are civil society 
organizations. Therefore, civil society organizations tasked with monitoring state 
                                                
99 Interview with Vanessa Coria, Advocacy and Program Manager, Women’s Global Network for Reproductive 
Rights (WGNRR), formerly with Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), Mexico City, Mexico 18 July 
2014 (Ref Code: Ip, M, N, S). 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
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compliance with reparations should also have a role in designing reparations. This exercise 
would likely allow for an increase in reparations that take into account the gendered and 
social aspects of harm because feminist civil society organizations have a level of expertise 
on women’s rights issues that cannot be matched by the Inter-American Commission. 
Second, the Inter-American Commission must provide greater levels of support to civil 
society and petitioners in monitoring compliance with reparations. In doing so, the 
Commission must treat all reparations equally, and should consider civil society’s expertise 
in determining the extent to which reparations has been implemented. This is especially 
important in regards to guarantees of non-repetition, where, as this case analysis revealed, 
the Inter-American Commission has not focused on effective and sustainable 
implementation of training and education programmes. 
 
In that the past two cases reviewed reparations and women’s rights violations that emerged 
from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the analyses have been limited to 
critiques of reparations as they were developed by states and petitioners; the Inter-American 
Commission’s role has been limited to that of administrator and compliance monitor. This 
means that in the above cases, the best way to determine the Inter-American Commission’s 
approach to reproductive rights has been to examine its efforts to monitor compliance with 
the reparations agreed upon in the Friendly Settlements. In using the Holistic Gender 
Approach to Reparations to analyse and critique the reparations in María Mamerita 
Mestanza Chávez v. Peru and Paulina del Carmen Ramírez v. Mexico, it is apparent that the 
Inter-American Commission does not have a “gender reparations tradition”.102 This is 
especially obvious in the Paulina Ramírez case, where the Inter-American Commission 
closed the case despite the State’s failure to fully implement all of the reparation measures. 
The following case, Artavia Murillo et al. (In Vitro Fertilization) v. Costa Rica, provides 
the only real insight thus far into the Inter-American Court of Human Right’s approach to 
women’s reproductive rights violations. This case reveals advancements and 
misunderstandings in the Inter-American Court’s analysis of gendered harm and gender 
stereotyping as applied to women’s reproductive rights.  
                                                
102 Interview with María Alejandra Cardenas, Regional Legal Director, Women’s Link Worldwide, Former Human 
Rights Attorney, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Center for Reproductive Rights, Washington 
DC, USA 27 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, Cm, S). 
CHAPTER SIX 
ARTAVIA MURILLO ET AL. V. COSTA RICA 
 
At the crux of women’s reproductive rights is the fundamental understanding that 
reproductive rights empower women to make choices about if and when they would like to 
form a family. As the previous cases have illustrated, these rights include the right not to be 
coercively sterilized and the right to access safe and legal abortion services. In this chapter, 
the Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica case, 1 which deals with the reproductive right to 
access in vitro fertilization, adds a further dimension to the examination of gender-based 
harm and reproductive rights in the Inter-American System of Human Rights. In this case, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights determined that the Costa Rican Constitutional 
Court’s ban on in vitro fertilization (IVF) violated the reproductive rights of women and 
men. While the reproductive right to access medically assisted reproduction techniques 
(ARTs) such as IVF2 may seem removed from the more pressing reproductive rights issues 
of our time, the problem of infertility is directly related to norms and social values which 
dictate that women and couples should aim to create smaller families later in life. Family 
planning and population control programs emphasise voluntary motherhood, which is 
supported by technologies such as birth control, emergency contraception, and sterilization. 
As women and couples choose to postpone parenthood, they are faced with potential 
fertility problems, where, according to Rebecca Cook et al., it becomes “imperative that 
they should be helped to achieve a pregnancy when they so decide, in the more limited time 
they have available”.3 
 
The fulfilment of women’s reproductive rights requires that states refrain from interfering 
with women’s decision-making regarding their reproductive lives; negative state 
obligations. However, alongside the negative obligation to refrain from interfering in the 
lives of women, there exists an implication that states must only interfere in the lives of 
women in order to provide public provisions that allow women to enact those decisions they 
make about their bodies and lives; these are positive duties.4 The reproductive right to in 
                                                
1 Artavia Murillo et al. (‘In vitro fertilization’) v. Costa Rica [2012] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. C) 
No. 257 Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
2 For discussion on in vitro fertilization procedure, see Fernando Zegers-Hochschild, Bernard M. Dickens and Sandra 
Dughman-Manzur, ‘Human Rights to In Vitro Fertilization’ (2013) 123:1 International Journal of Gynecology and 
Obstetrics 86-89. 
3 Rebecca Cook, Bernard Dickens, and Mahmoud Fathalla, Reproductive Health and Human Rights: Integrating 
Medicine, Ethics, and Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 306. 
4 Karen Engle, 'After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction: Strategizing Women’s Rights' (1993) 25 Studies 
in Transnational Legal Policy 148, supra section 1.1.1 (n 27-28). 
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vitro fertilization tests this negative/positive relationship: a woman or couple wants to form 
a family (a private decision that requires no interference), but requires assistance from the 
state in the form of both legislative reform and public provisions, in this case, state-funded 
in vitro fertilization (IVF). This chapter critically analyses the Artavia Murillo et al v. Costa 
Rica case, and works toward three objectives: (i) to identify how actors engaged in this case 
incorporated, or failed to incorporate gender within the case, and to determine the impact on 
reparations; (ii) to explore missed opportunities and advancements in case design; and (iii) 
to determine the usefulness of this case in future women’s reproductive rights cases. The 
case study analysis of Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica is extensive because it is 
currently the most substantive insight into how the Inter-American Court interprets and 
applies women’s reproductive health rights. The structure of the case analysis conducted 
here differs somewhat from the previous case studies because Artavia Murillo et al. v. 
Costa Rica was examined by both the Inter-American Commission and the Court. In order 
to effectively follow the trajectory of this case, and locate the case within its context, this 
first section steps back to examine the sociocultural environment in which Costa Rican 
women live their reproductive lives. A discussion of gender stereotyping and the role of 
religion in section 6.1 enables the analyses conducted of the Artavia Murillo et al. case 
before the Inter-American Commission and Court in section 6.2. The case study analysis 
follows the development of Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica from its inception in 2001 
through to the release of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ judgment in 
November 2012. The purpose of examining this case as it evolved through the Inter-
American Commission and Inter-American Court is to determine missed opportunities in 
the design of the case, particularly in relation to the development of gender-based 
reparations. The third section focuses on the reparations issued in this case by the Inter-
American Court, and again utilizes Rubio-Marín and Sandoval’s Holistic Gender Approach 
to Reparations5 to identify the transformative potential of reparations. The fourth and final 
section reflects on lessons learned in this case in order articulate strategies for litigating 
women’s reproductive health rights in future cases. This final section looks specifically at 
the beneficial utility of applying the Convention of Belém do Pará in women’s reproductive 
rights cases and also discusses the capacity of the Inter-American Court to expand its 
activist approach to repairing gender-based harm through reparations.  
 
                                                
5 Ruth Rubio-Marín and Clara Sandoval, 'Engendering the Reparations Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: The Promise of the ‘Cotton Field’ Judgment' (2011) 33:4 Human Rights Quarterly 1062-1091. 
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6.1 Context: Women as Mothers in the Non-Secular State 
Although Costa Rica is one of the most modern, democratic and “developed” countries in 
the Latin American region,6 the State is inconsistent and ineffective in its protection of 
women’s rights. Compared to other countries in the Inter-American region, women’s 
reproductive rights violations in Costa Rica have received little attention before 
international treaty-monitoring bodies.7 There are a few reasons why women’s reproductive 
rights violations have not received much scrutiny. Costa Rica is perceived as a human rights 
leader in the region. It is home to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and 
consistently ranks high on the United Nations Human Development Index when compared 
to other countries with similar income levels.8 In addition, Costa Rica has the lowest 
maternal mortality rate in Central America, and the second lowest in the whole of Latin 
America.9 Another reason women’s reproductive rights violations aren’t so visible in Costa 
Rica is because advocacy efforts have decreased due to massive defunding over the past 
decade. 10  According to Ivania Solano, a representative from the Women’s Rights 
Department of the Costa Rican Ombuds Office, this has led to a feminist movement that is 
compartmentalized rather than unified.11 As a result, advocacy campaigns concerning issues 
such as same-sex marriage and in vitro fertilization are individualized rather than 
interwoven aspects of the sexual and reproductive rights movement.  
 
Despite Costa Rica’s status a human rights leader, Costa Rican women experience 
violations of their reproductive rights. Not only is IVF banned in Costa Rica, but emergency 
contraception is also illegal and unavailable,12 and the right to abortion is heavily restricted 
and difficult to access.13 Costa Rican women also experience additional challenges in 
accessing their reproductive rights because of Costa Rica’s status as a non-secular state. 
                                                
6 Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, 'Cross-Currents in Latin America' (2015) 26:1 Journal of Democracy 
114; UN Human Development Report 2011: Costa Rica ranked 68th in per capita GDP rates in the world, available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gdp-per-capita-2011-ppp; and Human Development Index 2015: Costa Rica ranked 
69th, fourth highest HDI score in Latin America (Chile = 42nd; 1st in Latin America; Honduras = 131st; lowest in Latin 
America). 
7 Interview with Adriana Maroto Vargas, Academic and Activist, La Colectiva, San Jose, Costa Rica 14 August 2014 
(Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S) and Interview with Ivania Solano Jiménez, Attorney, Women’s Department, Office of the 
Ombudsman [Defensoría de los Habitantes], San Jose, Costa Rica 20 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S). 
8 Human Development Report 2010, ‘The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development,’ UNDP. 
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete.pdf> 49. 
9 ‘Trends in Maternal Mortality: 1990 to 2015’ WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, The World Bank, and the United Nations 
Population Division (World Health Organization 2015). 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT/countries/ XJ?display=default> (accessed 21 March 2016). 
10 Interview with Adriana Maroto Vargas, Academic and Activist, La Colectiva, San Jose, Costa Rica 14 August 
2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S) and interview with Hilda Picado, Executive Director, Asociación Demográfica 
Costarricense (ADC) San Jose, Costa Rica 14 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, N). 
11 Interview with Ivania Solano Jiménez, Attorney, Women’s Department, Office of the Ombudsman [Defensoría de 
los Habitantes], San Jose, Costa Rica 20 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S). 
12 Anibal Faundes and others, 'Emergency Contraception under Attack in Latin America: Response of the Medical 
Establishment and Civil Society' (2007) 15:29 Reproductive Health Matters 132. 
13 AN v. Costa Rica and Aurora v. Costa Rica, supra chapter 5 (n 2). 
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Catholic Church principles permeate all aspects of Costa Rican life, where not only does the 
State refer to Catholic teachings to inform law, but longstanding sociocultural norms and 
beliefs create a stereotyped ideal of women as mothers.14 This section establishes the 
context in which the Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica originated, and focuses on two 
relevant obstacles to Costa Rican women’s enjoyment of their reproductive rights: (i) 
religious attitudes, norms and beliefs that discriminate against women, and (ii) gender 
stereotyping of women.  
 
6.1.1 The Role of Religion  
Costa Rica is not a secular state,15 and the Catholic religion permeates not only the social 
and cultural lives of all Costa Ricans, but also the political arena.16 Adriana Maroto, a Costa 
Rican academic and activist, explained,  
With the topic of sexual and reproductive rights, we cannot talk about autonomy, 
because cultural and social mandates, and sins, always come into the picture […] 
We don't have freedom of conscience, or religious freedom to make decisions. So, 
morals and religion are very important in this country, which makes reproductive 
rights a very hard topic to speak about in Costa Rica. 17  
Women’s reproductive rights are at the forefront of conservative religious efforts to restrict 
women’s autonomy. For example, Adriana Maroto provided the following anecdote about 
Costa Rica’s National Institute for Women, which highlights the role of religion within 
State institutions: 
INAMU (Instituto Nacional de la Mujeres, National Institute for Women) has a long 
history, there have been many feminists working there with a gender perspective, 
but in 2004 there was a scandal, and the president at that time was related to Opus 
Dei, even though she said she was not. In that moment they prohibited talking about 
sexual and reproductive rights. They asked people within INAMU to eliminate the 
word 'abortion' from any text in the building […] any book or text that had the word 
'abortion,' or 'sexual rights,' it couldn't be in the building. And then, they (the 
employees) found ash crosses on the doors of their offices. INAMU has very well 
trained employees who know about human rights, but the problem is that these are 
people that have been prosecuted and they have been threatened, and they are 
                                                
14 Interview with Adriana Maroto Vargas, Academic and Activist, La Colectiva, San Jose, Costa Rica 14 August 
2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S) and interview with Hilda Picado, Executive Director, Asociación Demográfica 
Costarricense (ADC) San Jose, Costa Rica 14 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, N). 
15 Article 75 of the Costa Rican Constitution indicates that the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church is the religion of 
the State (Article 1, Law No. 5703, 6 June 1975). 
16 Approximately 76% of Costa Ricans identify as Catholic and 13% identify as Evangelical. See, Susy Villegas, 
‘Adolescent Pregnancy in Costa Rica,’ in A. Cherry and M. Dillon (eds) International Handbook of Adolescent 
Pregnancy, Medical, Psychosocial, and Public Health Responses (Springer 2014) 258. 
17 Interview with Adriana Maroto Vargas, Academic and Activist, La Colectiva, San Jose, Costa Rica 14 August 
2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S). 
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afraid. So, the people have the knowledge, and the problem is the political 
environment.18 
This anecdote illustrates the challenges activists and feminists face when attempting to 
cooperate with the Costa Rican State, or when working within the State to effect change. 
Hilda Picado, Director of the Costa Rican Demographic Association (ADC - Asociación 
Demográfica Costarricense) explained there have been significant challenges in 
implementing sexual and reproductive health education in Costa Rican high schools 
because of deep religious influence:  
This is a moral and ethical matter. Because they (conservative religious groups) are 
stating that young people shouldn't be having intercourse […] This is a 
constitutionally Catholic country - so, religion here is very very important. And, 
what the Catholic Church says is that if you're not married, then you cannot have 
intercourse. Even though (now) everyone understands that that is not the way it 
works.19 
Costa Ricans do in fact engage in activities that are counter to religious teachings. For 
example, wealthy women living in Costa Rica face less difficulty accessing safe yet illegal 
abortions or illegal emergency contraception, than those poor women living in rural areas 
who do not experience the same level of reproductive freedom and autonomy.20  
 
In regards to the ban on IVF in Costa Rica, it has been argued that the Catholic Church 
heavily influenced the Costa Rican Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the right to life 
as it applies to the embryo. The Center for Reproductive Rights claimed that the 
“Constitutional Court of Costa Rica (was) under pressure (to ban IVF) from powerful 
elements within the Catholic Church”.21 Lynn Morgan and Elizabeth Roberts asserted that 
the Costa Rican Constitutional Court banned IVF “in an effort to appease the Catholic 
Church”.22 However, Jorge Oviedo, a Costa Rican attorney who represented the State in 
Artavia Murillo et al. insisted that the Catholic Church was not “present” in the Artavia 
Murillo et al. case proceedings before the Inter-American Court. He said,  
I have worked for the government ever since 2004, and never, never in my whole 
experience, neither in the solicitor general office, even with the IVF case, did I 
receive a call from the bishop […] We would not answer the call. We never 
received a call from the bishop, never received an email from him [...] I want to 
                                                
18 Ibid. In 2014, INAMU underwent a shift in leadership and is now run by Alejandra Mora Mora, a prominent Costa 
Rican feminist. This shift in leadership is promising for feminists in the region who would like to see INAMU 
become an effective women’s rights state entity. 
19 Interview with Hilda Picado, Executive Director, Asociación Demográfica Costarricense (ADC) San Jose, Costa 
Rica 14 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, N). 
20 Ibid. 
21 'Costa Rica’s IVF Ban and the Future of Reproductive Rights in Latin America', (Center for Reproductive Rights 
2012) <hwww.reproductiverights.org/feature/costa-rica-ivf-ban-personhood> accessed 18 October 2014. 
22 Lynn M. Morgan and Elizabeth F. S. Roberts, 'Reproductive Governance in Latin America' (2012) 19:2 
Anthropology & Medicine 242. 
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underline this, it's the foreign department that is in charge to represent the country 
before the Inter-American System, but in this case, they took a political decision to 
delegate that task on us. And, we are the solicitor general office, we are not 
politicians, we are technical, we are like a bunker.23 
While religion is a fundamental part of culture, and the right to manifest one’s religion is 
enshrined in numerous human rights treaties, including the American Convention, Costa 
Rica’s religious government creates a hostile environment in which to advocate for the 
promotion of women’s reproductive rights. Any argument to protect and fulfil reproductive 
rights raised on the grounds of the right to health or life, privacy, non-discrimination or 
equality, may be countered with religious rhetoric emphasising the rights of the unborn over 
the rights of women. In short, as explained by Solano, “they own our bodies, and they don’t 
let us have any choices”.24 
 
6.1.2 Gender Stereotyping  
Gender stereotyping can be defined as the process of applying stereotypes to an individual 
or group based on the “social and cultural construction of men and women, due to their 
different physical, biological, sexual and social functions”.25 According to Cook and 
Cusack, gender stereotyping “becomes problematic when it operates to ignore individuals’ 
characteristics, abilities, needs, wishes, and circumstances in ways that deny individuals 
their human rights and fundamental freedoms, and when it creates gender hierarchies”.26 
The law embodies and contributes to women’s gendered experiences of inequality. Of 
course, stereotypes affect both women and men, yet they often have a disproportionate 
impact on women. As Sandra Fredman explained,  
A useful way of examining the continued disadvantage of women is to identify the 
assumptions and stereotypes which have been central to the perpetuation and 
legitimation of women’s legal and social subordination. Such assumptions have 
roots which stretch deep into the history of ideas, yet continue to influence the legal 
and social structure of modern society.27  
Cook and Cusack noted that “individual men and women may embrace gender stereotypes, 
and they may take steps to structure their lives, attitudes, and relationships accordingly”.28 
However, the State must adhere to principles of equality and non-discrimination by 
refraining from relying on gender stereotypes in the adoption of laws and practices. 
                                                
23 Interview with Jorge Oviedo, Deputy Attorney, General Prosecutor of the Republic of Costa Rica/State 
Representative in Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, San Jose, Costa Rica 20 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, G).  
24 Interview with Ivania Solano Jiménez, Attorney, Women’s Department, Office of the Ombudsman [Defensoría de 
los Habitantes], San Jose, Costa Rica 20 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S). 
25 Rebecca J. Cook and Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2009) 20. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Sandra Fredman, Women and the Law (Clarendon Press 1997) 3. 
28 Cook and Cusack (n 25) 111. 
!!
154 
Gender stereotyping of women often places emphasis on two intersecting ideas: (i) that 
women are not as intelligent as men, and can therefore not be relied upon to make 
decisions; and (ii) that women are particularly attune to the roles of mother, homemaker and 
caregiver. While gender stereotypes exist, and are certainly reinforced through culture and 
society, the State plays a key role in upholding and perpetuating gender stereotypes. For 
example, Adriana Maroto shared an anecdote about the Costa Rican National Institute for 
Women’s (INAMU) activities on International Women’s Day.  
In those four years, for the 8th of March, International Women’s Day, they had 
workshops to teach women how to put makeup on. They had free massages for 
women. They never talked about women’s rights. They celebrated women in a 
traditional manner. Last year, they had an alliance with local shops, so on women’s 
day they had a discount if they wanted to buy something at the shops. They never 
talked about the international day against women’s violence.29  
In this example, a State agency relied on stereotypes of women that portray them as 
beautiful feminine consumers, and did not take any measures to disrupt the traditional 
understanding of women’s roles in society.  
 
Of particular relevance to the examination of the Artavia Murillo et al. case, is the role of 
motherhood as an element of womanhood, or femininity. Gender stereotypes that reinforce 
women’s roles as primarily mothers or caretakers, can be perceived as either hostile or 
benevolent, where use of benevolent stereotypes may be perceived as “thoughtful” or 
“considerate”, and hostile stereotypes may seem more forthrightly demeaning.30  However, 
Williams and Segal asserted that “regardless of whether stereotyping is hostile or 
benevolent, it strips the decision-making power about how to interpret responsibilities of 
motherhood away from the mother herself, in favour of an assumption that she will (or 
should) follow traditionalist patterns”.31 It is indeed possible for the State or society to rely 
on the illusion of benevolence while acting in a discriminatory and hostile manner. For 
example, a woman may be encouraged/forced to stay home after the birth of her child rather 
than returning to work. Frances Raday, a former member of the Committee on the 
Convention of the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women, provided an 
example of how the pervasive and persistent stereotype that women should be mothers, 
housewives and caretakers is in fact harmful to women. She explained,  
The most globally pervasive of the harmful cultural practices […] is the 
stereotyping of women exclusively as mothers and housewives in a way that limits 
                                                
29 Interview with Adriana Maroto Vargas, Academic and Activist, La Colectiva, San Jose, Costa Rica 14 August 
2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S). 
30 Cook and Cusack (n 25) 18 and 23. 
31 Joan Williams and Nancy Segal, 'Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who are Discriminated 
Against on the Job' (2003) 26 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 95. 
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their opportunities to participate in public life, […] Stereotypical assignment of sole 
or major responsibility for childcare to women disadvantages women across 
cultures. The stereotypes that women should be mothers and homemakers, and 
therefore be ‘the center of home and family life’ have had a long history of use to 
justify women’s exclusion from public life.32 
The pervasive and persistent nature of stereotypes that relegate women to the role of 
caretakers serve to remove women from the public sphere in both a figurative and literal 
sense. That is, the stereotyping of women ultimately works to silence women before the 
law; women’s issues are to be understood as private, and quiet.33 Raday’s concern that 
hostile stereotypes limit women’s access to public life reflects feminist challenges to the 
public/private divide, where women’s lives are regulated by the State most often in the 
public sphere, and largely ignored in the private. I explained further,  
Motherhood, as it relates to the development of family life, is an experience specific 
to women that exists in the private sphere, that is both regulated and protected by 
law, but is done so by reinforcing stereotypes that assume motherhood is a 
fundamental element of a woman’s development. In the example of motherhood, 
the law has been comfortable with promoting in the public sphere the concept of 
women as mothers, […] essentially remind(ing) women that their role is limited to 
the private, but is susceptible to arbitrary interference when it comes to issues 
surrounding motherhood, such as abortion, access to contraception and decision-
making in terms of reproductive rights.34 
Not only is gender stereotyping harmful in that it reinforces a status quo that places women 
in positions of less power and inequality, but it is also provides a foundation on which to 
base discriminatory ideas and practices. In fact, according to Cook and Cusack, in 
attempting to eliminate gender stereotypes, one must “presuppose that an individual, a 
community, or state is conscious of that stereotype, and how it operates to the detriment of a 
woman or subgroup of women”.35  
 
Lastly, gender stereotyping is a form of gendered harm in that it perpetuates and reinforces 
a social system based on patriarchal hierarchies. The patriarchal culture that underlines 
gendered harm and stereotyping is based on norms and values that influence the way 
women see themselves, their roles in society and their destinies.36 With specific reference to 
gendered harm and ARTs, in this case IVF, gender stereotyping creates a paradox in the 
ways in which human rights advocates advance and litigate women’s reproductive rights. 
                                                
32 Frances Raday, “Culture, Religion and CEDAW’s Article 5(a),” in The Circle of Empowerment: Twenty-Five 
Years of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling & 
Cees Flinterman, eds., Feminist Press at CUNY, 2007), 71. 
33 See, feminist methodologies, Searching for Silences, supra section 1.1.1.!
34 Ciara O’Connell, 'What a “Private Life” Means for Women' in Yves Haeck, Clara Burbano-Herrera, and Oswaldo 
Ruiz-Chiriboga (eds), The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Theory and Practice, Present and Future 
(Intersentia 2015) 638. 
35 Cook and Cusack (n 25) 37. 
36 Robin West, Caring for Justice (New York University Press 1997) 132-133, supra section 2.2.2 (n 73). 
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On the one hand, restrictions on ARTs impede women’s reproductive rights by denying 
them their right to make choices about when and if to form a family. However, in arguing 
for the right to access ARTs, there is a tendency to reify, or essentialize women, rather than 
to recognize and challenge the gender stereotyping of women in their potential to become 
mothers. In that women experience patriarchal harm that has at its core the objective of 
shaping the social and gendered lives of women as they are to be subordinate and 
subservient, gender stereotyping, as an aspect of patriarchal harm, cannot be compatible 
with claims made to advance women’s reproductive health rights. This means that any 
attempt to find a violation of women’s rights based on their reproductive capacity and their 
potential to become mothers reinforces rather than dismantles the patriarchal hierarchy. In 
every instance where “motherhood” has been the foundation on which to build demands for 
women’s reproductive rights, there exists the option to instead develop those rights through 
the lens of reproductive autonomy, individuality and the right to choose.  
 
The socio-political context in which the IVF ban emerged and subsequently gave rise to the 
Artavia Murillo et al v. Costa Rica case, was one that valued norms established by the 
Catholic Church over the reproductive rights of women and men in Costa Rica. For women 
in particular, gender stereotyping coupled with religious norms created a hostile 
environment in which to exercise reproductive autonomy and the right to make decisions 
about if and when to form a family. The following analysis of the Artavia Murillo et al v. 
Costa Rica case reveals the challenges of advancing women’s reproductive rights through 
the Inter-American Court, particularly in regards to repairing gendered harm in women’s 
reproductive rights cases. 
 
6.2 The Case: Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica 
The origins of Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica can be traced 
back to the year 2000, when the Costa Rican Constitutional Court overturned the 1995 
Health Ministry Executive Decree on in vitro fertilization. 37 The Decree had authorised the 
in vitro fertilization (IVF)38 procedure within the private healthcare system for married 
heterosexual couples in Costa Rica. When the IVF ban took effect in 2000, Costa Rica 
became the first country to actively deny its citizens the reproductive right to in vitro 
fertilization.39 In the months following the Constitutional Court’s ban on IVF in Costa Rica, 
                                                
37 Costa Rican Health Ministry Executive Decree No. 24029-S (February 3, 1995); authorized the technique of in 
vitro fertilization for married couples and regulated its practice.  
38 For more on in vitro fertilization procedure, see Zegers-Hochschild and others, ‘Human Rights to In Vitro 
Fertilization’ (n 2). 
39 Ibid.  
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a group of IVF patients and doctors brought a case before the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights in order to challenge the IVF ban and demand compensation for the nine 
couples (victims) immediately involved with the case. 40 The nine couples (petitioners) filed 
a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on January 19th 2001.41  
 
6.2.1 Designing the IVF Case: The Initial Stages 
In their submission to the Inter-American Commission, the petitioners claimed that the 
Costa Rican Constitutional Court judgment violated rights enshrined within the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the Additional Protocol to the American Commission on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("Protocol of San 
Salvador") and the Convention of Belém do Pará. The alleged rights violations were as 
follows: the obligation to respect rights (Article 1); the right to domestic legal effects 
(Article 2); the right to life (Article 4); the right to humane treatment (Article 5); the right to 
a fair trial (Article 8); the right to private life (Article 11.2); the rights of the family (Article 
17); the right to equal protection (Article 24); the right to judicial protection (Article 25); 
the right to progressive development of economic, social and cultural rights (Article 26); 
and the duty to respect the rights of each person as they are limited by the rights of others 
(Article 32) under the American Convention on Human Rights;42 the obligation of non-
discrimination (Article 3); the right to health (Article 10); and the right to the formation and 
protection of families (Article 15) enshrined within the Protocol of San Salvador;43 and 
“violence against women shall be understood as any act, conduct, based on gender, which 
causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in 
the public or the private sphere” (Article 1); and “States Parties […] undertake to (f) 
establish fair and effective legal procedures for women who have been subjected to violence 
which include, among others, protective measures, a timely hearing and effective access to 
such procedures” (Article 7(h)) under the Convention of Belém do Pará.44  
 
The petitioners’ broad interpretation of rights violations in this case was illustrative of a 
multi-faceted approach to rights in that not only did the petitioners locate the right to IVF 
within the context of the right to private life and health, but they also attempted to connect 
                                                
40 Interview with Dr. Delia Maria Ribas Valdés, IVF Doctor, San Jose, Costa Rica 14 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, 
CR, S, Rx). 
41 This petition was filed under Ana Victoria Villalobos et al. v. Costa Rica [2004] Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Petition No. 12.361, No. 71/03 Admissibility. 
42American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), OASTS No. 36 (1969). 
43 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (‘Protocol of San Salvador’), OASTS 69 (1988). 
44 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women 
(‘Convention of Belém do Pará’) OASTS (1994). 
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reproductive rights to the violence against women framework through the Convention of 
Belém do Pará. In their submission to the Inter-American Commission, the petitioners 
argued that the IVF ban implied a violation of the right to health, the right to private life and 
the right to form a family because it denied men and women who suffer from infertility or 
sterility the possibility of constituting a family.45 With specific regard to the allegations 
lodged under the Convention of Belém do Pará, the petitioners argued that “the prohibition 
of in vitro fertilization in Costa Rica […] caused severe pain and suffering to the presumed 
victims, and in particular to the women, [… because] there is a very strong pressure, 
especially on women, to have children, and that the lack of treatment prolongs and 
exacerbates the emotional suffering caused by that pressure”.46 The State responded to this 
allegation by declaring that the petitioners’ argument was “an extended interpretation of the 
letter of the Convention of Belém do Pará, and that is strays far from the spirit of that 
instrument. [The State maintained] that the petition in question does not refer to any act of 
violence against women, or any lack of due diligence that might provoke such violence”.47 
 
Despite the petitioners’ attempts to frame the IVF ban through a plethora of rights, 
including those enshrined within the Convention of Belém do Pará, the Inter-American 
Commission admitted the Artavia Murillo et al. case in respect to violations of Articles 1, 2, 
11, 17 and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights. In admitting the case, the 
Inter-American Commission elected not to include a violation of the Convention of Belém 
do Para because it claimed the petitioners had failed to “provide a sufficient foundation to 
characterize violations of […] Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará”.48  In refusing 
to include a violation of Article 7(h) of the Convention of Belém do Pará, the Inter-
American Commission signalled to the petitioners that they had not sufficiently examined 
the gendered nature of the IVF ban. There are a number of reasons why the petitioners in 
this case failed to effectively examine gender-based harm and gender stereotyping before 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. First, the initial argument and intention 
of this case was not designed to provide reproductive health services and rights protections 
for all Costa Rican men and women. Rather, the argument developed in the initial stages of 
the Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica case focused on infertility as a disease and 
reproductive disability, and sought specifically to repeal the IVF ban and compensate the 
victims involved in the case. There was very little focus on IVF as it is an aspect of 
                                                
45 Ana Victoria Sanchez Villalobos et al. v. Costa Rica [2004] (n 41) ¶22-24. 
46 Ibid ¶25. 
47 Ibid ¶40. 
48 Ibid ¶70. 
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women’s reproductive health and autonomy. Huberth May, a lawyer who joined the case in 
its later stages, explained, 
I think that if we had to begin again we would include the reproductive rights and 
use the trial as an opportunity to help Costa Rican society progress […] I believe the 
trial was not planned to go in that direction […] issues like abortion, contraception, 
and topics related to women’s autonomy and the right to decide about procreation, 
sex, etc. […] I believe we could have taken more advantage of this case.49   
It is clear from the argument provided by the petitioners to claim a violation of Article 7(h) 
of the Convention of Belém do Pará that this case was not designed to take into account and 
repair the gendered harm inherent to violations of women’s reproductive rights on a broad 
scale. Rather, the petitioners argued that gender discrimination relevant to this case was 
related to the societal pressure women feel to become mothers.  
 
Second, the lawyers50 involved in the Artavia Murillo et al. case did not have a background 
in human rights litigation before the Inter-American System of Human Rights, and they had 
no expertise in women’s rights or reproductive health.51 From the outset, Gerardo Trejos, 
the first lawyer involved in the case, resisted assistance from civil society organizations that 
had expertise in the area of reproductive health. Huberth May explained that this was 
because there were concerns about overcomplicating the case.52 However, María Alejandra 
Cardenas asserted, “people who litigate these cases are not necessarily the people who 
actually have this as a cause, and understand it”.53 Cardenas suggested that the lawyers 
involved with the Artavia Murillo et al. case were not interested in partnering with 
women’s rights civil society organizations for a number of reasons: “it was two things, one 
is they didn't want to be associated with abortion at all, and two, it happens constantly, 
lawyers that take on cases don't want any help, because they want the fame and the glory”.54 
For Adriana Maroto, an academic and activist with La Colectiva in Costa Rica, the lawyers’ 
reluctance to collaborate was especially frustrating: 
                                                
49 Interview with Huberth May, Attorney, Victim’s Representative in Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, Legislative 
Assembly, San Jose, Costa Rica 18 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, S). 
50 Before the case reached the Inter-American Court, the victims divided into two groups: one was represented by 
Huberth May, who replaced Gerardo Trejos after he passed away, and the other group was represented by Boris 
Molina.  
51Interview with Adriana Maroto Vargas, Academic and Activist, La Colectiva, San Jose, Costa Rica 14 August 2014 
(Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S); interview with Ivania Solano Jiménez, Attorney, Women’s Department, Office of the 
Ombudsman [Defensoría de los Habitantes], San Jose, Costa Rica 20 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S); and 
interview with Alexandra Sandoval, Senior Attorney, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, San Jose, Costa Rica 
12 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, Ct, S). 
52 Interview with Huberth May, Attorney, Victim’s Representative in Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, Legislative 
Assembly, San Jose, Costa Rica 18 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, S). 
53 Interview with María Alejandra Cardenas, Regional Legal Director, Women’s Link Worldwide, Former Human 
Rights Attorney, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Center for Reproductive Rights, Washington 
DC, USA 27 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, Cm, S). 
54 Ibid. 
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The IVF case was done from the beginning to end by male lawyers that didn’t have 
any knowledge about gender, human rights, nothing. Right? They had a huge 
opportunity to talk about human rights and reproductive rights here in San Jose, but 
the lawyers talked about the right to life from conception, but only to defend the in 
vitro case. Feminist organizations like La Colectiva offered help, but they didn’t 
accept it, because they were worried about their professional image.55  
Cooperation with expert civil society organizations in this case did not take place until the 
late stages before the Inter-American Court, when Boris Molina, another lawyer who 
represented victims in this case, requested assistance from the Center for Reproductive 
Rights to develop arguments about the role of discrimination in the denial of reproductive 
rights. Cardenas explained, “So he basically asked for help - I helped him, and trained him 
for the hearing, and I drafted the last arguments that he submitted. So, I would say […] 
that's how at the last minute, the argument about how this is a discrimination case came 
out”.56  
 
Third, perhaps because the petitioners were not familiar with the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights, they failed to develop a strong argument to include reproductive rights 
violations within the violence against women framework; the Convention of Belém do Pará. 
Rather than claiming violations of Articles 1 and 7(h) of the Convention of Belém do Pará, 
it can be argued that the petitioners should have relied on the Inter-American Court’s 
previous determination in the “Cotton Field” case that women’s rights violations may be 
interpreted through Articles 8 and 9 when Article 7 is violated.57 If the petitioners had 
provided a sufficient argument to connect gender discrimination and stereotyping through 
Article 8 to Article 7(b), they could have alleged that the IVF ban is discriminatory because 
it places women in a position where they are unable to exercise their reproductive 
autonomy. Subsequently, women denied their right to reproductive autonomy through the 
IVF ban are considered “incomplete” owing to a patriarchal culture that the Costa Rican 
State not only fails to prevent, but is complicit in perpetuating through the IVF ban. Such an 
analysis would have required that the petitioner unpack the interrelated nature of 
reproductive rights restrictions and violence against women, as both are premised on norms 
that subjugate women and serve to remove their individuality and autonomy. 
 
                                                
55 Interview with Adriana Maroto Vargas, Academic and Activist, La Colectiva, San Jose, Costa Rica 14 August 
2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S). 
56 Interview with María Alejandra Cardenas, Regional Legal Director, Women’s Link Worldwide, Former Human 
Rights Attorney, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Center for Reproductive Rights, Washington 
DC, USA 27 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, Cm, S). 
57 González et al. (‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico [2009] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. C) No. 205, 
Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, supra section 3.2.3 (n 151). 
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The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights referred the Artavia Murillo et al. v. 
Costa Rica case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on July 29th 2011.58 In its 
letter of referral, the Inter-American Commission requested that the Inter-American Court 
find violations of Articles 11, 17 and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in 
conjunction with Articles 1(1) and 2. It also requested that the Inter-American Court 
examine the disproportionate impact of the IVF ban on women, and suggested that the 
Inter-American Court issue reparations to require the Costa Rican State to lift the IVF ban 
and provide monetary compensation and satisfaction to the immediate victims. As is 
examined in the next section, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights conducted a 
thorough analysis of reproductive rights as they are enshrined within the American 
Convention on Human Rights. The Inter-American Court also unpacked the relationship 
between gender-based stereotyping and the IVF ban. However, in that the petitioner and the 
Inter-American Commission failed to develop a strong connection between gendered harm, 
stereotyping and reproductive rights in the initial stages of this case, the reparations ordered 
by the Inter-American Court missed an opportunity to confront gender stereotyping and its 
harmful impact on women. 
 
6.2.2 Reproductive Rights and the Inter-American Court  
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued its judgment in the Artavia Murillo et al. 
case in November 2012, more than a decade after IVF was banned in Costa Rica. In its 
judgment, the Inter-American Court ruled that the Costa Rican Constitutional Court’s 
decision to overturn the Ministry of Health Executive Decree authorising IVF59 violated the 
rights of couples in Costa Rica who wished to form a family.60 This judgment was ground-
breaking for a number of reasons. The Inter-American Court provided an in-depth 
discussion of the right to life as it applies to the unborn,61 and determined that such a right is 
not absolute.62 The Court asserted that the right to life as enshrined in Article 4(1) of the 
American Convention should not be considered absolute when its protections “justify the 
                                                
58 Gretel Artavia Murillo et al. (‘In Vitro Fertilization’) v. Costa Rica [2011] Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, Case No. 12.361, Letter of Submission.!
59 Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Costa Rica No. 2000-02306, Case No. 95-001734-007-
CO (15 March 2000).   
59 Costa Rican Health Ministry Executive Decree (n 37). See, Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica [2012] (n 1) ¶142. 
60 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica [2012] (n 1) ¶71-76.  
61 Ibid ¶163-246. For discussion of this case in relation to the right to life, see Ligia DeJesus, 'Artavia Murillo v. 
Costa Rica: The Inter-American Court on Human Rights’ Promotion of Non-Existent Human Rights Obligations to 
Authorize Artificial Reproductive Technologies' (2013) 18 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 
275–302; Ligia DeJesus,, 'A Pro-Choice Reading of a Pro-Life Treaty: The Inter-American Court on Human Rights’ 
Distorted Interpretation of the American Convention on Human Rights in Artavia v. Costa Rica' (2014) 32(2) 
Wisconsin International Law Journal 223–266; and Martin Hevia and Carlos Herrera Vacaflor, 'From Recognition to 
Regulation: Access to In Vitro Fertilization and the American Convention on Human Rights,' (2013) 25:3 Florida 
Journal of International Law 453–482. 
62 Ibid ¶246.  
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total negation of other rights”.63 The “other rights” referred to by the Inter-American Court 
in this instance were the rights to private life in relation to family life, personal integrity, 
personal autonomy, sexual and reproductive health, the right to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific and technological progress, and the principle of non-discrimination. Accordingly, 
the first part of this section discusses the rights to private life in relation to reproductive 
health as interpreted by the Inter-American Court, and has the objective of highlighting 
advancements and shortcomings in how the Inter-American Court established its definition 
of reproductive health rights in the Artavia Murillo et al. case. The second part of this 
section examines the Inter-American Court’s interpretation of the rights to equality and 
non-discrimination, with a particular emphasis on gender-based discrimination and 
stereotyping. 
 
 6.2.2.1 Defining Reproductive Health 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights went much further than the petitioners and the 
Inter-American Commission in its efforts to articulate and define the right to reproductive 
health. First, the Inter-American Court expanded the right to private life, as enshrined in 
Article 11 of the American Convention, by relating it to “(i) reproductive autonomy, and (ii) 
access to reproductive health services, which includes the right to have access to the 
medical technology necessary to exercise this right”.64 The Inter-American Court also 
linked the right to privacy to the right to personal integrity and determined that the two 
rights are “directly and immediately linked to health care”.65 It then explained that a “lack 
of legal safeguards that take reproductive health into consideration can result in a serious 
impairment of the right to reproductive autonomy and freedom [...] (and that) there is a 
connection between personal autonomy, reproductive freedom, and physical and mental 
integrity”.66 By connecting the right to private life to the rights to reproductive health and 
access to medical technology, the Inter-American Court drew a connection between the 
negative obligation for states to refrain from intrusion in the lives of women, and the 
positive duty to ensure women have access to services to enact their rights; the Court 
crossed the public/private divide. The Inter-American Court’s conceptualisation of the right 
to private life as it implies a positive duty speaks to the previously discussed argument 
developed by Engle, where she contended that the right to private life is not inherently bad 
                                                
63 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica [2012] (n 1) ¶258. 
64 Ibid ¶146. 
65 Ibid ¶147. 
66 Ibid. 
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for women if it is used as a space to accommodate private decision-making that then 
requires the State to provide services.67  
 
In interpreting the scope of the protection of the right to private life, the Inter-American 
Court determined that private life encompasses “a series of factors associated with the 
dignity of the individual, including [...] the ability to develop his or her own personality and 
aspirations, to determine his or her own identity and to define his or her own personal 
relationships”.68 In addition, the Inter-American Court determined that private life “includes 
the way an individual views himself and how he decides to project this view towards others, 
and is an essential condition for the free development of the personality”.69 While the Inter-
American Court made great strides in its expansion of the right to private life as it relates to 
reproductive health and personal identity, it then determined, “motherhood is an essential 
part of the free development of a woman’s personality”.70 By relying on motherhood to 
develop its argument for establishing a violation of the right to private life, the Inter-
American Court effectively reinforced and perpetuated stereotypes that women should be 
mothers in order to be complete, or to achieve their full development. That the Inter-
American Court included this argumentation is perplexing and disheartening because not 
only does it raise concerns about the Court’s interpretation of women’s reproductive rights, 
but as is discussed in the next section, this reasoning was disconnected from the Inter-
American Court’s analysis of gendered harm and discrimination and the impact of gender 
stereotyping. In addition to the analysis the Inter-American Court provided of the right to 
private life, it also examined the concept of proportionality in order to determine the 
severity of the state’s interference with the victims’ rights.71 The Inter-American Court’s 
analysis of proportionality applied its interpretation of the right to reproductive health to the 
individual victims’ lives and situations to determine that the IVF ban discriminated against 
the victims based on their financial condition, (dis)ability and gender.   
 
 6.2.2.2 Examining (Gender) Discrimination 
Unlike the Inter-American Commission, which examined State interference with the right to 
private and family life alongside the right to equal protection (Article 24), the Inter-
American Court determined that a more appropriate analysis of violations of the rights to 
                                                
67 Engle (n 4). 
68 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica (n 1) ¶143. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. The Inter-American Court first developed this concept in Gelman v. Uruguay [2011] Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (ser. C) No. 221 Merits and Reparations ¶97. 
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equality and non-discrimination would be through Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American 
Convention. The Inter-American Court shifted its analysis as a result of its determination 
that the State had a duty to “abstain from producing discriminatory regulations or those with 
discriminatory effects on the different groups of the population when exercising their 
rights”. 72  In its analysis, the Inter-American Court considered that the “concept of 
disproportionate impact is related to that of indirect discrimination”, and therefore analysed 
the disproportionate impact (indirect discrimination) of the IVF ban in relation to disability, 
financial condition and gender. 
 
As mentioned previously, the original design of this case focused on the concept of 
infertility as a form of disease and reproductive disability. The Inter-American Court relied 
on the social model of disability as provided by the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities,73 as well as interpretations from expert witnesses, to conclude 
“that disability is not defined exclusively by the presence of a physical, mental, intellectual 
or sensorial impairment, but that it is interrelated to the barriers or limitations that exist in 
society for the individual to be able to exercise his rights effectively”.74 In determining the 
disproportionate impact of the IVF ban on those persons suffering from infertility, as it is a 
form of reproductive disability, the Inter-American Court recalled that it is “not sufficient 
that States abstain from violating rights; rather it is essential that they adopt positive 
measures, to be determined based on […] her personal condition or […] the specific 
condition in which he finds himself, such as […] disability”.75 The Inter-American Court 
concluded that, “persons with infertility in Costa Rica, faced with the barriers created by the 
Constitutional Chamber’s decision, should consider that they are protected by the rights of 
persons with disabilities, which include the right to have access to the necessary techniques 
to resolve reproductive health problems”.76 In determining that the State of Costa Rica’s 
ban on IVF had a disproportionate impact on those individuals suffering from infertility, the 
Inter-American Court concluded that the State has a duty to not only reverse the IVF ban, 
but that there also exists a positive obligation to provide the IVF service. 
 
The Inter-American Court’s analysis of the disproportionate impact of the IVF ban on 
individuals with less financial means was brief, and relied on the testimony of individual 
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victims to illustrate that the ban had a greater impact on people with less money. For 
example, Mr. Vargas, who was one of the victims involved in the case, stated, 
 The only alternative (for receiving IVF services) was to consider traveling to Spain 
or Colombia to undergo IVF; however, the corresponding costs had tripled for 
[them], and [they] simply felt defeated, discriminated against and punished by a 
court that had curtailed the possibility of having access to a medical treatment that 
was permitted in every other country in the world.77 
The Court determined that the ban on IVF had a disproportionate impact on those infertile 
couples who could not afford to undergo IVF abroad. While some of the victims involved in 
the case were in a financial position to be able to travel abroad in order to receive IVF 
treatment, approximately half of the victims did not have the financial resources.78  
 
The Inter-American Court’s analysis of the disproportionate impact of the IVF ban as it 
relates to gender revealed the Inter-American Court’s analysis of gender as it is a 
determinate of discrimination and inequality. The Court stated that the ban on IVF affected 
men and women, and that the impact of the ban had a disproportionate impact upon women 
“owing to the existence of stereotypes and prejudices in society”.79 Expert witness Paul 
Hunt discussed the role of women as the “creator” in their families, and explained, “in 
many societies infertility is attributed mainly and disproportionately to women owing to the 
persisting gender stereotype that defines a woman as the basic creator of the family”.80 The 
Inter-American Court then relied on observations from the World Health Organization to 
conclude, “while the role and status of women in society should not be defined solely by 
their reproductive capacity, femininity is often defined by motherhood”.81 Additionally the 
Inter-American Court referred to the CEDAW Committee, and indicated, “when a decision 
to postpone ‘surgery due to pregnancy is influenced by the stereotype that protection of the 
fetus should prevail over the health of the mother,’ this is discriminatory”.82 Perhaps the 
most relevant and insightful aspect of the Artavia Murillo et al. judgment in regards to 
gender-based reasoning came in the form of expert testimony provided by Alicia 
Neuberger. She explained,  
The gender identity model is socially defined and molded by the culture; its 
subsequent naturalization responds to socioeconomic, political, cultural and historic 
determinants. According to these determinants, women are raised and socialized to 
be wives and mothers, to take care of and attend to the intimate world of affections. 
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81 Ibid ¶296. 
82 LC V Peru [2011] CEDAW Committee Communication No. 22/2009 ¶8. 
!!
166 
The ideal for women, even nowadays, is embodied in sacrifice and dedication, and 
the culmination of these values is represented by motherhood and the ability to give 
birth […] A woman’s fertility is still considered by much of society to be something 
natural that admits no doubts. When a woman has fertility problems or is unable to 
become pregnant, the reaction of society tends to be scepticism, disgrace, and at 
times, even ill-treatment […] The impact of infertility in women is usually greater 
than in men because […] motherhood has been assigned to women as an essential 
part of their gender identity, transformed into their destiny.83 
The Court relied on the above testimony to conclude, “even though the ban on IVF is not 
expressly addressed at women, […] it has a disproportionately negative impact on 
women”.84 The Court also explored the impact of the IVF ban on men, where one victim, 
Mr. Vargas, stated that “for years (he) felt diminished, (he) did not feel like a man, and 
thought that (his) inability to conceive a child was unmanly. Thus (he) punished himself in 
the silence of (his) own thoughts, in the pain of swallowing thousands of tears so nobody 
could see (him) cry”.85 Again, expert witness Alicia Neuburger provided insight, she 
explained, “fertile disability causes men to feel a strong sense of impotence and, 
consequently, a questioning of their gender identity. Concealing their fertile dysfunction 
socially is the usual defensive strategy because they fear being laughed at or questioned by 
other men”.86 The Inter-American Court concluded its discussion of indirect discrimination 
on the basis of gender as a result of the IVF ban by stating,  
The Court emphasizes that gender stereotypes are incompatible with international 
human rights law and measures must be taken to eliminate them. The Court is not 
validating these stereotypes and only recognizes them and defines them in order to 
describe the disproportionate impact of the interference caused by the Constitutional 
Chamber’s judgment.87  
Despite the Inter-American Court’s assertion that gender stereotypes are incompatible with 
human rights law, it failed to apply its own perspectives on gender stereotyping to its 
examination of the right to private life. By using “motherhood” as the foundation on which 
to argue for women’s reproductive rights within the right to private life, the Inter-American 
Court missed an opportunity to develop those rights through the lens of reproductive 
autonomy. As discussed above in section 6.1.2, gender stereotyping is an aspect of 
patriarchal harm, and is therefore incompatible with claims made to advance women’s 
reproductive health rights. While the Inter-American Court sought to denounce essentialist 
portrayals of women (women should not be stereotyped based on their gender), it 
simultaneously adopted an essentialist perspective of women in order to determine 
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violations of women’s reproductive rights based on their gender role as mothers. This 
paradox is one that the Inter-American Court has struggled with in the past in relation to 
women’s rights cases, and is seemingly one of the challenges the entire Inter-American 
System faces in its attempts to articulate and determine violations of women’s rights.88  
 
6.2.3 Fulfilling the Preconditions 
The above discussion of the Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica case examined the 
sociocultural context in which women attempt to access their reproductive rights in Costa 
Rica and also provided an analysis of the case is it evolved through the Inter-American 
Commission and Inter-American Court. This section once again employs Rubio-Marín and 
Sandoval’s Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations preconditions89 in order to determine 
the extent to which this case was designed to effectively repair gender-based harm; once 
again, the preconditions are establish the relevant facts, properly identify the alleged victims 
and violations and properly identify the harm and those harmed. In an effort to streamline 
analysis of the fulfilment of the preconditions in the Artavia Murillo et al. case, this section 
focuses specifically on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights judgment, and only 
incorporates critique of the case before the Inter-American Commission in order to 
supplement determinations made about the fulfilment of the preconditions in the Court 
judgment. 
The facts established in the Inter-American Court’s judgment in Artavia Murillo et al. v. 
Costa Rica not only provided an extensive analysis of the right to life as it applies to the 
unborn, but also delivered an extensive and comprehensive articulation of reproductive 
health rights as they exist and are to be interpreted in the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights. The Inter-American Court expanded on the Inter-American Commission’s 
articulation of gender-based discrimination in this case in order to determine that gender 
stereotyping is incompatible with international human rights law, which was a significant 
achievement for the women’s (reproductive) rights movement on a global scale. However, 
the Inter-American Court was not entirely successful in linking the IVF ban to the larger 
sexual and reproductive rights and women’s rights frameworks, which resulted in a failure 
to fully acknowledge the gendered aspects of harm in this case. The Court’s negligence in 
this area can be attributed to the initial design of this case before the Inter-American 
Commission; this case was not designed as a women’s reproductive rights case. While the 
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Inter-American Court made great strides in examining Artavia Murillo et al. through a 
gendered lens, the analysis of the case reveals that it did not fully establish the relevant 
facts. 
 
The Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica judgment was successful in identifying the alleged 
victims. The Inter-American Court adequately determined the victims in this immediate 
case to be nine heterosexual married couples. Despite fulfilment of this element of the 
precondition, it is important to note that the Court made no effort to include in its 
determination of victims the larger population of individuals and couples who require 
access to IVF services in order to form a family, particularly single women and homosexual 
couples. The Artavia Murillo et al. judgment was not successful in fulfilling the second 
element of this precondition, properly identify the alleged violations; it did not identify and 
examine reproductive rights violations within the purview of the violence against women 
framework, the Convention of Belém do Pará. Both the petitioners and the Inter-American 
Court had an opportunity to incorporate Article 7(b) of the Convention of Belém do Pará, 
yet both neglected to do so. First, the petitioners were ineffective in their attempt to claim 
violations of the Convention of Belém do Pará because they failed to develop an Article 
7(b) violation through the lens of due diligence and the duty to prevent gendered harm, 
which resulted in the Inter-American Commission’s determination that the IVF ban did not 
trigger a violation of the Convention of Belém do Pará. The Inter-American Court also had 
the opportunity to apply the Convention of Belém do Pará in its determination of the rights 
violated in the Artavia Murillo et al. case. As mentioned above in section 3.1.3, the Inter-
American Court has the power to determine violations of the Inter-American System’s 
human rights conventions that were not identified in the Inter-American Commission’s 
referral to the Court.90 However, in this case, the Inter-American Court neglected to 
exercise the principle of iura novit curia in order to establish a violation of the Convention 
of Belém do Pará.  
 
Determining fulfilment of the third precondition, identify the harm and those harmed, 
differs from the analysis in the previous two case study analyses because harm women 
experienced as a result of the IVF ban is less obvious than the harm resulting from 
restrictions on abortion and coercive sterilization; these reproductive rights violations are 
clearly identifiable as forms of social, patriarchal and invasive gendered harm. The ban on 
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IVF however, harms women in a more discrete way. In its judgment, the Inter-American 
Court examined and denounced gender stereotypes that reify women’s role as mothers in 
order to confront the harmful impact of the IVF ban. The objective of the Court’s analysis 
was to argue that the IVF ban alone was not distinctly discriminatory and harmful as it 
effects women, but rather the impact of the ban disproportionately harms women because of 
the prevalence of gender stereotyping throughout society. In developing this argument, the 
Inter-American Court successfully echoed Robin West’s concept of “patriarchal harm”.91 
Patriarchal harm manifests itself in the way women see themselves and their roles in 
society, which means that the pressure women feel to become mothers is founded on 
existing stereotypes that do in fact cause harm to women. While the Inter-American Court 
successfully examined patriarchal harm through its analysis of gender stereotyping, it 
simultaneously engaged in patriarchal harm to articulate a violation of the right to private 
life. The Court relied on a stereotype of women as mothers when it asserted that 
motherhood is an aspect of women’s development. 
 
Despite its efforts to address gendered harm, the Inter-American Court neglected to analyse 
social harm as manifested through intersectional discrimination.92 The Court examined 
discrimination based on gender, (dis)ability and financial condition, but the analysis was 
compartmentalised and provided no interpretation of how women face greater 
discrimination when they are poor and (dis)abled. In addition, the Court did not provide an 
examination of the IVF ban as it harms single and/or gay men and women who may want to 
form a family. By failing to at least mention the various groups of people who are impacted 
by the IVF ban the Court missed an opportunity to link the ban on IVF to the larger sexual 
and reproductive rights framework/movement. While the Inter-American Court provided in 
its judgment an expansive analysis of the harm women experience as a result of harmful 
gender stereotypes, it failed to examine the intersectional determinants of discrimination 
through a lens of social harm. As a result, the Inter-American Court did not completely 
fulfil the identify the harm and those harmed precondition.  
 
The above introduction to the Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica case and its fulfilment of 
the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations preconditions reveals a number of 
shortcomings in the design and development of the Inter-American Court’s first 
reproductive rights case. From its initial stages this case was limited in its ability to connect 
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the ban on IVF to the greater women’s reproductive rights and violence against women 
frameworks. Although the Inter-American Court made significant advancements in its 
attempt to dissect the gendered aspects of discrimination as they apply to women’s 
reproductive lives, it was inconsistent in that it simultaneously condemned and reified 
stereotypes of women as (potential) mothers. As is substantiated in the following section, 
incomplete fulfilment of the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations preconditions caused 
a gap between gender-based reasoning and reparations in the Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa 
Rica case. Section 6.3 examines the reparations ordered in the Artavia Murillo et al. case in 
order to determine their capacity to repair gendered harm relevant to the ban on IVF. 
 
6.3 Repairing Gendered Harm: Determining Transformative Potential 
Despite the breadth of the Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica judgment, the reparations 
issued in this case are limited(ing), and ultimately reflect the petitioner’s original 
objectives: compensation and reversal of the IVF ban. In determining the required 
reparations, the Inter-American Court “considered the need to award different measures of 
reparation in order to redress the damage comprehensively, so that, in addition to pecuniary 
compensation, measures of restitution and satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition 
have special relevance for the damage caused”.93 The Inter-American Court stated that the 
reparations issued in the Artavia Murillo et al. case “must have a causal nexus to the facts 
of the case, the violations declared, the damage proved, and the measures requested to 
repair the respective damage”.94 This means, that the Inter-American Court intended to 
issue reparations based on the selection of reparation measures suggested by the petitioners 
and the Inter-American Commission, and that in doing so, it would rely on the facts 
determined in the case as well as the violations established by the Inter-American Court to 
determine the need for repair. The previous section on fulfilling the Holistic Gender 
Approach to Reparations indicated that the facts, violations and harm relevant to this case 
were not been properly established and identified in the Inter-American Court’s judgment. 
Accordingly, the reparations ordered by the Inter-American Court in this case do not 
address and redress the gendered components of the reproductive rights violations in the 
Artavia Murillo et al. case. This section determines the gendered nature of the reparations 
issued by the Inter-American Court in the Artavia Murillo et al. case, and identifies missed 
opportunities in how the case developed before the Inter-American Commission in order to 
examine why the Inter-American Court failed to issue effective gender-based reparations in 
this case. 
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In the Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica judgment, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights ordered reparations designed to provide compensation, satisfaction and rehabilitation 
to the victims, and also issued guarantees of non-repetition in order to overturn the IVF ban. 
The reparations are summarized below: 
2. The State must adopt, as soon as possible, appropriate measures to annul the 
prohibition to practice IVF; (legislative reparation) 
3. The State must regulate and establish systems of inspection and control to ensure 
implementation of IVF; (legislative reparation) 
4. The State must include the availability of IVF within the infertility treatments and 
programs offered by its national health care services; (legislative reparation) 
5. The State must provide the victims with free psychological treatment; 
(rehabilitation) 
6. The State must publish a summary of the judgment in national periodicals and 
post the full judgment on the website of the judiciary; (satisfaction) 
7. The State must implement permanent education and training programs and 
courses on human rights, reproductive rights and non-discrimination for judicial 
officials in all areas and at all echelons of the Judiciary; (training and education) 
8. The State must pay the amounts established in [...] this Judgment, as 
compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, and for reimbursement of 
costs and expenses;95 (compensation) 
 
Despite the petitioners’ request, the Inter-American Court decided not to include reparations 
to establish an “international norm on the embryo” and to instruct “the Constitutional 
Chamber of the Supreme Court of justice [to carry out] a public act in order to apologize to 
the victims for the violation of their human rights and for the pain and suffering caused to 
them”.96 Additionally, the Inter-American Court did not require that the State “declare the 
Costa Rican Social Security Institute […] establish a specialized IVF clinic named after 
Gerardo Trejos Salas”.97 The Court denied these reparations after determining that “the 
other measures of reparation requested […] (were) sufficient and adequate to remedy the 
violations suffered by the victims”.98 From the list of reparations accepted and ordered by 
the Inter-American Court, only those focused on legislative reform, compensation and 
training had the potential, albeit extremely limited, to take account of gendered harm. 
However, as will be confirmed through the examination of each of these reparations, the 
Inter-American Court failed to extend its gendered analysis of reproductive rights and 
stereotyping to the reparations issued in this case. 
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6.3.1 Compensation 
In requesting the compensation reparations in this case, one of the victims’ lawyers, Boris 
Molina, requested that compensation for non-pecuniary damage take into account the 
gendered aspects of the rights violations in this case, especially as the ban on IVF damaged 
the victims’ proyecto de vida. He explained that such reparation was necessary because the 
State “created a situation of lack of protection for those persons to the point of affecting 
them in their most intimate personal sphere, and re-victimizing them by not responding to 
their reproductive disability”.99 He argued, “it is essential to consider the damage to their 
life project (proyecto de vida) as part of the non-pecuniary damage because […] these 
couples were seeking to found a family with biological children, and this road map they had 
prepared for their life was curtailed by the State’s arbitrariness and inactivity”.100 Molina 
requested non-pecuniary damage based on several criteria, including loss of monthly 
temporary income, and in his calculation, made a determination of difference based on 
gender. He requested that the Inter-American Court compensate the women victims a sum 
of $654,435 each, and $466,651 for the male victims. However, the Inter-American Court 
judgment did not provide an explanation for this distinction. The Inter-American Court 
ultimately determined that each of the victims receive $20,000 in order to compensate for 
non-pecuniary damages related to the victims’ life projects. 101  In determining the 
compensation amounts to be distributed to the victims, the Inter-American Court made no 
mention of the gender differentiations indicated by Molina. In fact, it is important to note 
that despite the Inter-American Court’s insistence that the IVF ban had a disproportionate 
impact on women, the only mention of compensation designed to address the different 
situations of men and women originated with Molina. If there was an appropriate place to 
recognize and further compensate the disproportionate impact and discrimination women 
victims faced in this case, this was the Inter-American Court’s opportunity. Although the 
Court awarded compensation to redress disruption of the victims’ life project,102 it failed to 
reflect on its own determination that the women victims had suffered greater harm. This 
reparation was not a transformative gender-based reparation, which is attributable to 
incomplete fulfilment of precondition two, identify the violations. In that the Convention of 
Belém do Pará was not included in the Inter-American Court’s examination of the rights 
violations in the Artavia Murillo et al. case, the Inter-American Court had no foundation to 
                                                
99 Ibid ¶357. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid ¶363. (Amounts are in US Dollars) 
102 Ibid.!
!!
173 
develop a compensation reparation designed to redress the gendered harm and the 
restrictions placed on women’s reproductive autonomy. 
 
6.3.2 Legislative Reform 
The legislative reform reparations ordered by the Inter-American Court required that the 
Costa Rican State annul the IVF ban and include IVF services within Costa Rica’s social 
security system (La Caja). The legislative reform reparations in no way addressed the other 
reproductive rights restrictions currently in place in Costa Rica, such as the ban on 
emergency contraception and limited access to legal abortion services, which are arguably 
more pressing reproductive rights issues than the instatement of state-funded IVF 
services.103 In that the petitioners failed to connect the IVF ban to the reproductive rights 
framework, the Inter-American Court subsequently neglected to apply its interpretations of 
the right to reproductive health to the legislative reform reparations. In addition, although 
the Inter-American Court required that “the State must include the availability of IVF 
within the infertility treatments and programs offered by its health care services, in keeping 
with the obligation of guarantee in relation to the principle of non-discrimination”, the 
Court, perhaps intentionally, did not address the wider question of who is entitled to receive 
IVF services through the public system. In failing to explore this question, the Inter-
American Court created an ambiguous space in which it has proven difficult to argue for 
and subsequently overturn the IVF ban. While certainly the Artavia Murillo et al. case was 
never concerned with expanding, let alone identifying IVF rights for individuals who exist 
outside the heteronormative traditional understanding of family, the rights of these 
individuals is a point of contention. Dr. Ribas shared her thoughts on the current challenges 
facing the annulment of the IVF ban: 
The problem I have, is the way that I feel in this country is that you must pick your 
battles. And, you can’t fight ten of them at the same time. So, the (IVF) movement 
has been hindered by mixing things with same-sex couples. I am not homophobic, 
and I totally respect whatever sexual inclination or way of life that someone would 
choose to be, to live. But, if that is going to cloud people’s judgments, then I can’t 
stand by you, because I fought for patients. This is a disease. Infertility is a disease; 
it’s a disabling disease. Homosexuality is not a disability; it is not a disease. We 
should not have chosen that route first – later those rights, but things have been 
clouded by mixing. So, then they walked right into the trap! Because then it’s the 
abortion movement, it’s the homosexual movement, it’s the gays, it’s everything - 
no! This was never the way it should have been brought about… we should have 
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stuck to the patient issues – get the technique into the country, and then ‘come on, - 
everybody else in the door!’ But, everybody tried to get in the door at once!104 
While some of Dr. Ribas’ concerns are valid, especially in that she expressed frustration 
with the IVF technique still not being available in Costa Rica, her argument, while 
pragmatic, essentially ignores the interrelated and multidimensional nature of sexual and 
reproductive rights. Her statement reveals the problems inherent to this case: as much as 
this Artavia Murillo et al. was not designed to be about the reproductive rights of women, it 
was also not designed to promote reproductive rights for anyone other than those 
individuals engaged in heterosexual marriages. The legislative reform reparations issued in 
this case had great potential to transform the lives of married heterosexual Costa Ricans. 
However, because the Inter-American Court did not reference the interconnected nature of 
reproductive rights (establish the facts), and also neglected to recognise the impact of the 
IVF ban on groups other than married heterosexual Costa Ricans (identify the harm and 
those harmed), the transformative potential of the legislative reform reparations ordered by 
the Inter-American Court was extremely limited.  
 
6.3.3 Judicial Training 
The training and education reparation included in the Artavia Murillo et al. judgment 
required that “the State implement permanent education and training programs and courses 
on human rights, reproductive rights and non-discrimination for judicial officials in all areas 
and at all echelons of the Judiciary”.105 The Inter-American Court’s decision to include the 
training reparation for members of the judiciary was especially important in this case, 
because it was the singular reparation with the potential to disrupt or challenge stereotypical 
and discriminatory thinking in the Costa Rican judiciary. Despite this advancement, there 
are several clear missed opportunities in the development of this training reparation, 
namely, the content, duration and the audience of the training and education programs were 
not identified in the judgment. This was also the only reparation that did not set a period of 
time in which the State must report back about the status of compliance. While the Inter-
American Court noted that the training and education programs must be permanent in 
nature, it did not require the State to submit ongoing compliance reports that would prove 
the sustainable nature of the training programs. Additionally, the Inter-American Court 
noted that the training and education programs should cover topics such as human rights, 
reproductive rights and non-discrimination, but in doing so it did not require the State to 
                                                
104 Interview with Dr. Delia Maria Ribas Valdés, IVF Doctor, San Jose, Costa Rica 14 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, 
CR, S, Rx). 
105 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica [2012] (n 1) ¶IX (7). 
!!
175 
collaborate with civil society organizations or gender experts in the country or region who 
were best-suited to conduct this training.  
 
While the Costa Rican State asserted that the Inter-American Court cannot “(determine)… 
the contents of campaigns on reproductive health”, 106  the Court could have taken 
significant steps, such as requiring the State to report back to the Court within set time 
periods in order to ensure the training programs implemented by the State addressed gender 
stereotyping and discrimination in Costa Rica. Lastly, this reparation was limited in that it 
applied only to the judiciary, and failed to address social and cultural norms that serve to 
stereotype and discriminate against women in other private and public arenas, such as 
healthcare and public education systems. Ultimately, this reparation fulfils the criteria of a 
gender-based reparation in that its objective was to educate members of the judiciary in 
human rights and reproductive health, but the design of the reparation limits its 
transformative potential. 
 
The reparation measures ordered by the Inter-American Court have been partially fulfilled 
by the Costa Rican state. The ban on IVF remains, despite efforts made by the Costa Rican 
president to issue an Executive Decree that would supersede the Constitutional Court’s 
restriction on the procedure; the decree was appealed and declared unconstitutional by the 
Constitutional Court.107 The compensation reparations were distributed to the victims within 
three months of the judgment.108 In regards to judiciary training, the Inter-American Court 
deemed the State to be compliant as a result of its efforts to include gender and reproductive 
health training within the Costa Rican legal training institutions, as well as through 
voluntary workshops intended for public defenders and ministers.109 However, in terms of 
challenging gender stereotypes and discrimination in Costa Rica, the transformative 
potential of the reparations issued in the Artavia Murillo et al. judgment is minimal. It is 
unfortunate that the reparations issued by the Inter-American Court in this case did not 
reflect the gender-based reasoning developed within the facts and merits of the case. The 
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Inter-American Court determined that the stereotyping of women is incompatible with 
international human rights law, but then failed to issue reparation that at least calls attention 
to the patriarchal harm that underpins women’s limited enjoyment of their reproductive 
rights. Ultimately, the disconnect between reasoning and reparation in the Artavia Murillo 
et al. case can be attributed to a failure to develop the case from within a violence against 
women framework, which would have required actors involved in the case to interpret 
women’s reproductive rights violations as they result from harm inflicted upon women 
because they are women, and not necessarily because of their gendered roles as mothers. 
 
6.4 Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica is an historic and ground-breaking case. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights made great advancements in its reasoning on gender 
throughout the judgment, which is undoubtedly beneficial for future litigation concerned 
with women’s reproductive rights. However, the above analysis of Artavia Murillo et al. v. 
Costa Rica reveals a number of lessons to be applied in upcoming cases before the Inter-
American System of Human Rights; namely, reproductive rights litigation must incorporate 
a gendered analysis of harm in order to effectively repair gendered harm. The concluding 
section of this chapter reflects on the analysis of Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica to 
highlight the benefit of employing alternative rights concepts in women’s reproductive 
rights cases, and suggests that these concepts be employed in the earliest stages of litigation 
in order to strengthen gender-based reparations. In addition, this section argues that in order 
to develop emblematic reproductive rights cases and ensure a “gender reparations tradition” 
within the Inter-American System of Human Rights, petitioners involved in reproductive 
rights litigation must make concerted efforts to connect women’s reproductive rights to 
gendered harm and the violence against women framework. 
 
The alternative rights concepts identified in this thesis, proyecto de vida and vida digna, 
provide a conduit through which it is possible to uncover the gendered nature of women’s 
reproductive rights violations in litigation before the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights. Proyecto de vida and vida digna, when employed in women’s reproductive rights 
litigation, can be used to examine structural intersectional discrimination, and can also be 
used to analyse and interpret gendered harm. The Artavia Murillo et al. case analysis 
provides further lessons for employing alternative rights concepts in women’s reproductive 
rights litigation. First, in determining a connection between the rights to life and private life 
and the right to dignity, the Inter-American Court established grounds to apply the concept 
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of vida digna in future women’s reproductive rights cases. Second, the Artavia Murillo et 
al. case analysis revealed the importance of incorporating alternative rights concepts from 
the earliest stages of case design in order to strengthen the gendered analysis of reparations 
issued by the Inter-American Court. 
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights determined in its analysis of the right to life 
that States have a responsibility to adopt the “necessary measures to create an adequate 
regulatory framework that deters any threat to the right to life and safeguards the right to 
have access to conditions that ensure a decent life (vida digna)”.110 In addition, the Court 
examined the right to private life in connection with the right to dignity, and determined 
that “the protection of private life encompasses a series of factors associated with the 
dignity of the individual”.111 The Court described these factors as they include, “the ability 
to develop his or her own personality and aspirations, to determine his or her own identity 
and to define his or her own personal relationships”.112 Alexandra Sandoval noted, in her 
analysis of the Artavia Murillo et al. case and the concept of vida digna, that states have an 
obligation to “provide the minimum conditions that allow (their) citizens access to a decent 
life”. 113  According to the Inter-American Court, these conditions include access to 
reproductive health services and medical technologies.114 This means that the concept of 
vida digna, when applied to reproductive rights, requires that states refrain from 
interference in women’s lives (a negative obligation), and in turn, provide women with the 
services they need to enact their rights (a positive obligation). By connecting the rights to 
life and private life to vida digna in the Artavia Murillo et al. case, the Inter-American 
Court established a foundation to apply vida digna in future reproductive health rights 
cases. For example, in cases involving abortion or emergency contraception, the Inter-
American Court can rely on the precedent it established in Artavia Murillo et al. to conclude 
that states must provide technologies and services to enact these reproductive rights.  
 
The Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica case also included proyecto de vida, although this 
concept was introduced in the final stages of the case before the Inter-American Court. One 
of the petitioners raised a claim of damage to proyecto de vida as grounds for 
compensation, and in doing so determined that women should be compensated at a higher 
                                                
110 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica [2012] (n 1) ¶ 172. The English version of the judgment uses the phrase 
“decent life,” whereas the Spanish version uses “vida digna.” 
111 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica [2012] (n 1) ¶143. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica [2012] (n 1) ¶146.!
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rate than men. However, the Inter-American Court did not consider gender as a determinant 
of discrimination in its interpretation of proyecto de vida. The above analysis of the Artavia 
Murillo et al. case revealed that the petitioner’s failure to effectively identify gendered harm 
in the initial stages of this case resulted in gender neutral reparations. Had the petitioners 
introduced proyecto de vida in their claim of a right to private life violation in the initial 
stages of this case, there may have been an opportunity to more effectively incorporate 
gender-based discrimination in the development of reparations. In order to advance the 
likelihood that reparations address, and redress, gender-based discrimination, alternative 
rights concepts must be incorporated in the early stages of reproductive rights litigation. 
 
The analysis of the Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica case conducted in this chapter 
exposed a disconnect between gender-based reasoning and reparation in the judgment 
issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Critical examination of this case 
revealed that the petitioner’s initial objectives were not focused on improving women’s 
reproductive rights in a general sense, but rather, the case was designed to benefit certain 
individuals. Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica was not designed to address structural 
gender-based discrimination and inequality. Despite the Inter-American Court’s efforts to 
examine gender stereotyping and the impact of gendered harm in this case, the original 
intentions of the petitioners involved in this case limited the transformative potential of the 
reparations. The final part of this chapter reflects on the Artavia Murillo et al. case analysis 
to argue that reproductive rights violations must be put in context during litigation in order 
to ensure that reparations address the gendered nature of discrimination and harm. 
 
 Human rights cases that come before the Inter-American System are emblematic in nature, 
they represent structural conditions of inequality, discrimination and violence. The Inter-
American Court has recognized that in situations where the status quo perpetuates norms 
and values that reinforce discrimination and inequality, those conditions must be altered in 
order to protect, promote and fulfil human rights. This means, with regards to human rights 
litigation before the Inter-American Court, that petitioners who litigate women’s 
reproductive rights cases must critique the structural context in which the rights violations 
exist so that the Inter-American Court can consider these pre-existing conditions in its 
determination of the facts and reparations. Oscar Parra Vera, a former senior attorney at the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, explained,  
Considering that the Inter-American Court is dealing with specific cases, it is 
important to develop specific narratives for specific cases. This is one obstacle for a 
structural approach, because sometimes if you don’t have a structural picture about 
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a specific problem, it’s difficult to issue orders that are open or general. Litigation 
(must) put in context every case […] in the context of women’s rights; the better 
case will provide better contextual proof.115 
In order to develop a strategic women’s reproductive rights case, especially one that 
incorporates structural reparations that guarantee non-repetition, litigators must design their 
cases as individual rights violations that represent and originate from harm that is social and 
gendered. It is only then that the petitioner can request reparations that have the objective of 
repairing the social and gendered aspects of structural harm. The above examination of 
Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica highlighted the importance of effectively examining the 
impact of gendered harm in women’s reproductive rights cases. In that the petitioners were 
ineffective in claiming a violation of the Convention of Belém do Pará, the Inter-American 
Commission did not admit the case based on a violation of women’s rights. Without a 
women’s rights violation, there were no grounds for the Inter-American Court to issue a 
gender-based reparation. Alexandra Sandoval noted, in regards to the Artavia Murillo et al. 
case, “they (the petitioners) didn’t ask for much. So, I think that was one of the problems. 
For example, when you look at ‘Cotton Field’ you can see the relationship between 
reparations and what the representatives said about gender, but that wasn’t the case in 
Artavia”.116  
 
While the petitioners failed to properly identify gendered harm in the Artavia Murillo et al. 
case, the Inter-American Court made great progress in defining the right to reproductive 
health and examining gender stereotyping as it applies to restrictions on reproductive rights. 
However, the Inter-American Court missed an opportunity to envelop violations of 
reproductive health within the context of the violence against women framework. The Inter-
American Court has the power to exercise the principles of iura novit curia and motu 
propio in situations where the violations and reparations determined by the Inter-American 
Commission do not adequately address and/or redress certain aspects of a case. In Artavia 
Murillo et al. the Inter-American Court clearly identified structural problems that serve to 
discriminate against women in Costa Rica, but it neglected to exercise its power to find a 
human rights violation under the Convention of Belém do Pará. If the Court had elected to 
exercise iura novit curia to determine a violation of Article 7(b) of the Convention of 
Belém do Pará, it would have provided itself the grounds on which to exercise its motu 
propio capacity and subsequently issue reparation that would address structural gender-
                                                
115 Interview with Oscar Parra Vera, Senior Attorney, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, San Jose, Costa Rica 7 
August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, Ct, S). 
116 Interview with Alexandra Sandoval, Senior Attorney, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, San Jose, Costa 
Rica 12 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, Ct, S). 
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based harm. Rubio-Marín and Sandoval asserted that the Inter-American Court “should not 
shy away from the opportunity to trigger broader structural reform”,117 yet the above 
analysis of Artavia Murillo et al. revealed that the Court did indeed “shy away”, instead of 
electing to exercise its iura novit curia and motu propio powers.118  
 
The Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica case is the culmination of over a decade of 
litigation, and represents advancements made within the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights in regards to women’s reproductive rights, while also providing a foundation on 
which to build future women’s reproductive rights cases. While Artavia Murillo et al. is 
championed as a women’s rights case, the preceding analysis revealed that such a 
categorization is problematic. This chapter raised questions about the original intentions and 
design of this case, and determined that a failure to effectively include a gender approach 
from the initial stages of this case resulted in a disconnect between gender-based reasoning 
and reparation.  
 
In chapters four, five and six, I employed the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations to 
identify how each of the cases failed to fulfil the preconditions. Through the case study 
analyses, I determined that additional strategies beyond the Holistic Gender Approach to 
Reparations are required in order to ensure that gendered reparations are secured in 
women’s reproductive rights cases. The final chapter of this thesis identifies and explains 
these strategies and brings them together with the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations 
to suggest a “gender reparations tradition” within reproductive rights litigation before the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights.  
                                                
117 Rubio-Marín and Sandoval (n 3) 1090. 
118 Quintana-Osuna (n 91), supra section 3.1.3 (n 93). 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
The relationship between women and the Inter-American System of Human Rights has long 
been contentious because the Inter-American System, as a legal and social institution, was 
“built on the silence of women”.1 Feminist legal theorists, such as Carol Smart and Martha 
Fineman, have raised concerns about whether or not feminist researchers should delve into 
the legal realm because it has proven to be an historically inhospitable arena in which to 
challenge gender inequality and advance women’s rights.2 While feminist researchers 
should indeed be wary of the inherent androcentric nature of human rights law, this is not 
an excuse to forego a feminist reconceptualization of how human rights institutions can be 
made to work for women. Human rights institutions, such as the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights, have increasingly acknowledged and responded to women’s rights activists 
and litigators who demand that the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court 
evolve to better address and redress women’s rights violations through the application of 
human rights law. Women’s rights advocates have sought out and applied numerous 
strategies for advancing women’s rights through the Inter-American System, including 
feminist appropriation of the principle of due diligence,3 disruption of the hierarchical 
generations of human rights4 and the development of concepts such as proyecto de vida and 
vida digna.5 Despite advancements made in examining and repairing violations of women’s 
rights,6 the Inter-American System of Human Rights has been largely ineffective in how it 
articulates and repairs violations of women’s reproductive rights. As the above case study 
analyses revealed, the Inter-American System, and actors involved in litigation, have either 
ignored or been unsuccessful in attempts to examine gendered harm as it underpins 
violations of women’s reproductive rights.  
 
In this concluding chapter I suggest a reconceptualization of how gendered harm is 
identified and repaired in women’s reproductive rights cases before the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights. This chapter builds upon key themes emerging from the case 
                                                
1 Hilary Charlesworth, 'What are “Women’s International Human Rights?”' in Rebecca J. Cook (ed), Human Rights 
of Women: National and International Perspective (University of Pennsylvania Press 1994) 60, supra section 1.1.1 (n 
12). 
2 Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge 1989) 2 and Martha Fineman, Martha Fineman, 
'Introduction' in Martha Albertson Fineman and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen (eds), At the Boundaries of Law: Feminism 
and Legal Theory (Routledge 1991) xv, supra section 1.1.1 (n 13, 14). 
3 Supra section 2.2.1 (n 52-53), and section 3.1.1 (n 31-33). 
4 Supra section 2.1, and section 2.1.2 (n 42). 
5 Supra section 3.2.2. 
6 Supra section 3.2.3. 
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study analyses to propose a new way of developing reparations in women’s reproductive 
rights cases. In the first part of this chapter I reflect on the feminist theories and 
methodologies employed throughout this thesis to draw together and reinforce lessons 
learned from the case studies. The second part of this conclusion derives from these lessons 
a number of strategies, that I argue should be combined with Rubio-Marín and Sandoval’s 
Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations7 in order to provide a foundational premise on 
which to develop a “gender reparations tradition” within reproductive rights litigation 
before the Inter-American System of Human Rights. In the final section of this conclusion I 
speculate on the Inter-American Court’s current women’s reproductive rights case, IV v. 
Bolivia.8 In analysing this case, my objective is to test the benefit and utility of the 
strategies I suggest when they are applied in conjunction with the Holistic Gender 
Approach to Reparations, and to determine the potential for the Inter-American Court to 
advance a “gender reparations tradition” through the IV v. Bolivia case. 
 
Feminist methodologies and theories were applied in this thesis to raise questions about 
women’s relationships to law,9 and to explore feminist assertions that gender must become 
a universal category of analysis in order to expose and question law’s claim to objectivity.10 
Throughout this thesis, I employed the searching for silences and world travelling 
methodologies as a theoretical framework to examine the structural context in which 
women experience(d) violations of their reproductive rights. World travelling concepts such 
as intersectionality and “positioning”, when applied to examination of the case studies, 
enabled critique of how and why women experience(d) violations of their reproductive 
rights. These concepts were also used to determine how inadequate examination of the 
multidimensional experience of discrimination in women’s reproductive rights cases results 
in reparations that are individualised and singular in dimension. This was the situation in 
the María Chávez and Artavia Murillo et al. cases, where a failure to examine the 
intersectional determinants of discrimination resulted in reparations that neglected to 
address, and redress, the causes and effects of social harm. 11  Crenshaw’s 
“intersectionality”, 12  Yuval-Davis’ “transversal politics” 13  and Mohanty’s “imagined 
                                                
7 Ruth Rubio-Marín and Clara Sandoval, 'Engendering the Reparations Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: The Promise of the ‘Cotton Field’ Judgment' (2011) 33:4 Human Rights Quarterly 1091. 
8 IV v. Bolivia [2014] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report No. 72/14, Case 12.655 Merits. 
9 Martha Albertson Fineman, 'Introduction' in Martha Albertson Fineman and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen (eds), At the 
Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory (Routledge 1991) xi. 
10 Hilary Charlesworth, 'Feminist Methods in International Law' (2004) 36 Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 159. 
11 Supra section 4.3 and section 6.3. 
12 Kimberlé Crenshaw, 'Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of 
Color' (1991) 43:6 Stanford Law Review 1241–1299, supra section 1.1.1 (n 35, 41). 
13 Nira Yuval-Davis, 'What is ‘Transversal Politics?’' (1999) 12 Soundings 94-98, supra section 1.1.1 (n 37). 
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communities”14 contributed to the analysis of why women are denied their reproductive 
rights in the case study analyses. In the examination of the María Chávez case in chapter 
four I applied each of the world travelling components in order to determine why a certain 
“type” of Peruvian woman was targeted for sterilization.15 In chapter five, the Paulina 
Ramírez case study, I applied the concept of “positioning”, as articulated by Yuval-Davis, 
in order to determine that a woman’s “position” is a contributing factor to perceptions made 
about her right to access legal abortion.16 Finally, in the analysis of the Artavia Murillo et 
al. case I incorporated Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality to inform my critique of the 
Inter-American Court’s inadequate interpretation of discrimination across determinants 
such as class, race, (dis)ability and sexuality.17 
 
The searching for silences methodology was applied throughout this thesis in order to 
examine efforts made by litigators and the Inter-American System to challenge the “existing 
order” of law. This methodology underpinned the analysis of gendered harm in each case, 
and also helped to determine how the public/private divide has been manipulated and 
obscured through women’s reproductive rights litigation. In employing the searching for 
silences methodology, I examined the extent to which the Inter-American Commission and 
Court understand and apply gender in their analysis of women’s reproductive health rights. 
For example, the searching for silences methodology contributed to my assessment of the 
Inter-American Court’s tendency to rely on gender stereotyped notions of women when 
interpreting violations of their reproductive health rights.18 In addition, I determined the 
Inter-American Commission and Court are inconsistent in their efforts to apply the 
Convention of Belém do Pará to violations of women’s reproductive health rights. It was 
also through applying the searching for silences methodology that I uncovered a disconnect 
between the Inter-American System’s interpretation of reproductive health rights as being 
simultaneously “positive” and “negative” rights, and its failure to issue reparation that 
corresponds to such an interpretation. While the searching for silences methodology was a 
useful framework for identifying areas where the Inter-American System has been 
ineffective in recognising and protecting women’s reproductive rights, this methodology 
was also beneficial as a framework for detecting advancements in the Inter-American 
                                                
14 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, 'Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse', Feminism 
Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity (Duke University Press 2003), supra section 1.1.1 (n 
34).!
15 Supra section 4.2 (n 22-38). 
16 Supra section 5.2 (n 45). 
17 Supra section 6.2.3 (n 92). 
18 Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru [2008] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. C), No. 160, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, and Artavia Murillo et al. (‘In vitro fertilization’) v. Costa Rica [2012] Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights (ser. C) No. 257 Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
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System’s approach to enforcing these rights. For example, in Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa 
Rica, the Inter-American Court successfully traversed the public/private divide by defining 
reproductive health through the right to privacy.19  
 
While the searching for silences and world travelling methodologies were employed 
throughout this thesis to uncover the structural context in which women experienced 
violations of their reproductive rights, I also referred to additional feminist theories and 
concepts to analyse each particular reproductive rights violation. In chapter four, I 
employed feminist critiques of family planning and population control to develop the 
context in which certain “types” of Peruvian women were forcibly sterilized. 20 In chapter 
five, I examined “good/bad” abortion21 and paternalistic control22 in the context of the 
Paulina Ramírez case. Lastly, in chapter six, I discussed the impact of gender stereotyping 
on women’s lives in order to provide greater context for analysis of the Artavia Murillo et 
al. case. 23 In addition, through each of the case study chapters I applied the concept of 
gendered harm24 to inform the contextual analysis of the reproductive rights violation, and 
to examine fulfilment of the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations’ identify the harm 
precondition.25 The analysis conducted in chapter four revealed that inadequate recognition 
of social and invasive gendered harm within the María Chávez Friendly Settlement 
Agreement resulted in reparations that were individual rather than social, and also limited in 
their potential to transform the lives of women (and men) targeted for sterilization. In the 
examination of the Paulina Ramírez Friendly Settlement Agreement (chapter five), I 
determined that the reparations agreed upon in this case had no benefit for women 
attempting to exercise their legal right to abortion because the Agreement did not include an 
analysis of the impact of gendered harm perpetuated through the medical community. 26 My 
analysis of gendered harm in the Artavia Murillo et al. judgment (chapter six) exposed the 
Court’s limited assessment of the intersectional and compound nature of social harm. While 
the Inter-American Court was successful in its examination of gender stereotyping, a form 
of patriarchal harm, my analysis of the case revealed a disconnect between the Court’s 
                                                
19 Artavia Murillo et al. (‘In vitro fertilization’) v. Costa Rica [2012] (n 18), supra section 6.2.2.1 (n 64-66). 
20 S. Chante and N. Craske, supra section 4.2 (n 22); C. Ewig, supra section 4.2 (n 34); J. Guillerot, supra section 4.2 
(n 30); J. Boesten, supra section 4.2 (n 25, 46); M. Alcalde, supra section 4.2 (n 32); E. Vasquez del Aguila, supra 
section 4.2 (n 28); B. Hartmann, supra section 4.2.2 (n 49); S. Rousseau, supra section 4.2.2 (n 45); and G. Tamayo, 
supra section 4.2.2 (n 44). 
21 Celeste Condit, supra section 5.2 (n 43). 
22 Kathy Davis, supra section 5.2.2 (n 58) and Sally Sheldon supra section 5.2.2 (n 59-61). 
23 Supra section 6.1.2: Rebecca Cook and Simone Cusack (n 25); Joan Williams and Nancy Segal (n 31); Ciara 
O’Connell (n 34); and Frances Raday (n 32). 
24 Supra section 2.2. 
25 Supra section 4.1, 5.1 and section 6.2.3. 
26 Supra section 5.1, 5.2.2 and section 5.4. 
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interpretation of patriarchal harm and the largely gender-free reparations issued in this 
case.27  
 
By examining gendered harm through the above case studies, I determined that reproductive 
rights cases that neglect to include an analysis of gendered harm in the earliest stages of 
litigation will not successfully fulfil the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations. As a 
result, it is unlikely that they will incorporate gender-based reparations. Or, put another 
way, in the event that gendered harm is not sufficiently examined in the context of women’s 
reproductive rights violations (properly identify the harm), there is little likelihood that a 
women’s reproductive rights case will include a violation of the Convention of Belém do 
Para (properly identify the alleged violations). It is for this reason that the Holistic Gender 
Approach to Reparations is a necessary and valuable instrument in developing a “gender 
reparations tradition”; it requires that women’s reproductive rights violations be interpreted 
through the concept of gendered harm. 
 
The case study analyses conducted in this thesis incorporated feminist methodologies, 
theories and concepts, and information obtained from interviews, to determine the context 
in which women experience violations of their reproductive rights, and to critique the Inter-
American System in its efforts to repair gendered harm in women’s reproductive rights 
cases. Through critical examination of the María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru, 
Paulina del Carmen Jacinto Ramírez v. Mexico and Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica 
cases, I derived four strategies for repairing gender-based harm in women’s reproductive 
rights cases. These strategies provide practical steps for more effectively incorporating a 
gendered analysis of harm in litigation that deals with violations of women’s reproductive 
rights. The intention and design of these strategies is that they should be coupled with 
Rubio-Marín and Sandoval’s Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations 28  in order to 
advance the feminist project of building a “gender reparations tradition” within women’s 
reproductive rights litigation before the Inter-American System of Human Rights.  
 
7.1 Building a Gender Reparations Tradition: Strategies for the Future 
The primary objective of analysing women’s reproductive rights case studies through the 
Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations in this thesis was to derive from the analysis a set 
of strategies, that when combined with the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations, would 
enable the establishment of a “gender reparations tradition” in women’s reproductive rights 
                                                
27 Supra section 6.3 and 6.4. 
28 Rubio-Marín and Sandoval (n 7), supra section 3.3. 
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litigation before the Inter-American System of Human Rights. While I acknowledge that 
there are a number of approaches available for addressing gender-based harm in women’s 
reproductive rights litigation, I maintain that engendering reparations is a necessary step for 
confronting the patriarchal culture that perpetuates violence and discrimination imposed 
upon women. The strategies I suggest here were identified through critique of the María 
Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru, Paulina del Carmen Jacinto Ramírez v. Mexico and 
Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica cases. The strategies are as follows: (i) employ 
alternative rights concepts in reproductive rights litigation; (ii) enhance the role of civil 
society in the design of reparations; (iii) apply a multi-faceted approach to interpreting 
reproductive rights; and (iv) acknowledge and claim violations of reproductive rights 
through the violence against women framework. These strategies are to be employed by the 
Inter-American System and/or actors engaged in women’s reproductive rights litigation. 
While acknowledging that these steps are simultaneously simple and difficult to implement, 
I argue that without these first strategic steps it will be near impossible to advance the 
project of protecting, promoting and fulfilling women’s reproductive rights through the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights. This section introduces each of the strategies, as 
well as explains their benefit and utility when applied to reproductive rights cases. 
 
Employ Alternative Rights Concepts in Reproductive Rights Litigation 
In the concluding sections of each of the above case study analyses I examined the utility of 
applying alternative rights concepts to violations of women’s reproductive rights. In section 
3.2.2, I introduced the alternative rights concepts, vida digna and proyecto de vida, and then 
through critically examining the María Chávez, Paulina Ramírez and Artavia Murillo et al. 
cases, I determined the benefit of employing alternative rights concepts in women’s 
reproductive rights litigation. First, alternative rights concepts provide a foundation to 
examine the structural (gendered) context in which women experience rights violations, and 
second, application of these concepts in reproductive rights cases challenges the “existing 
order” of human rights law by confronting and challenging the hierarchical division of 
rights and the public/private divide.  
 
In order to effectively deploy this strategy, petitioners engaged in women’s reproductive 
rights litigation must include an analysis of proyecto de vida and/or vida digna in initial 
claims brought before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. While the Inter-
American Commission and Court are free to examine violations of vida digna and proyecto 
de vida on their own accord, the Artavia Murillo et al. case analysis revealed that this 
!!
187 
exercise does not necessarily result in gender-based reparations. To increase the likelihood 
that women’s reproductive rights cases include an analysis of gendered harm, and 
subsequently repair gendered harm, it is imperative that litigators establish the foundation 
for a gendered analysis of reproductive rights from the outset of a case. By including 
alternative rights concepts from the earliest stages of litigation, petitioners provide the Inter-
American Commission and Court with a conduit through which it is possible to examine 
how and why women experience violations of vida digna and proyecto de vida. These 
concepts provide an indirect way of inserting a gendered analysis of harm into women’s 
reproductive rights cases because in order to examine vida digna and/or proyecto de vida, 
petitioners and the Inter-American System of Human Rights must determine underlying 
factors that reinforce and perpetuate discrimination against women. In the event that a 
reproductive rights case does not include a violation of the women’s rights convention 
(Convention of Belém do Pará), it is especially important that petitioners employ alternative 
rights concepts as a way of ensuring that gender is a category of analysis in reproductive 
rights cases.  
 
Application of alternative rights concepts in reproductive rights cases also creates space for 
the Inter-American Commission and Court to interpret reproductive rights across the 
public/private divide and the “so-called” generations of rights. The Inter-American Court 
engaged in this exercise in Artavia Murillo et al. by recognising the inherent connection 
between the right to private life, the right to dignity and the right to reproductive health. In 
doing so, the Court engaged in the project of weakening and diffusing the public/private 
hierarchy of rights. In order for alternative rights concepts to be effectively employed in 
women’s reproductive rights cases before the Inter-American System, litigators must make 
concerted efforts to engender the right to dignity (vida digna) and protection of the life 
project (proyecto de vida). However, in doing so, litigators must also take care to avoid 
gender stereotypes that reify women as mothers when applying alternative rights concepts 
to women’s reproductive rights cases.   
 
Enhance the Role of Civil Society in the Design of Reparations 
In order to develop a “gender reparations tradition” in women’s reproductive rights 
litigation, I argue that the role of civil society before the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights should be enhanced to include involvement in the design of reparation measures. 
This strategy is derived from interviews with representatives from civil society and national 
Ombud’s Offices, as well as from the analysis conducted of the Paulina Ramírez case 
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proceedings and the reparations agreed upon in the María Chávez case. Vanessa Coria 
explained in the context of the Paulina Ramírez case that civil society organizations 
representing petitioners do not always receive support from the Inter-American System,29 
and in the analysis of the María Chávez case I determined that even in the situation where 
civil society organizations are invited to contribute to reparation design, the Inter-American 
Commission has not prioritized state compliance with those reparations.30 As discussed in 
section 3.2.1, feminist civil society organizations have increasingly become involved in 
women’s rights litigation, and as a result the Inter-American System relies on civil society 
to share its knowledge and technical expertise. While certain civil society organizations are 
involved in women’s rights litigation before the Inter-American System, there are 
organizations that focus specifically on local and national level advocacy, legislative and 
policy reform, and sexual and reproductive health education. I argue that it is these 
‘peripheral’ non-legal organizations, because of their expertise in issues directly relevant to 
structural gendered harm and discrimination, that should be able to contribute to the design 
of reparations in women’s rights cases. This strategy, if implemented by the Inter-American 
Commission, would not only strengthen reparation design and compliance-monitoring in 
cases where civil society organizations represent petitioners, but it would also help 
safeguard against ineffective weak reparation design in cases where the petitioner is not 
aware of, or neglects to address, structural causes of rights violations.  
 
In order to advance the project of establishing a “gender reparations tradition” in women’s 
reproductive rights litigation, civil society organizations must be invited to participate in the 
design of reparations agreed upon in Friendly Settlements and issued by the Inter-American 
Commission in Merits Decisions. While the task of designing reparations is time-
consuming and requires financial support, I argue that allowing civil society to engage in 
the design of reparations will streamline compliance monitoring and increase the 
transformative potential of gender-based reparations. This strategy involves civil society in 
two ways: first, civil society organizations, other than those directly involved in litigation, 
should be invited to submit reparation suggestions to their national Ombuds Offices, which 
would then present reparation recommendations to petitioners and states in cases before the 
Inter-American Commission. Interview respondents from the women’s rights divisions of 
both the Peruvian and Costa Rican Ombuds’ Offices stated that they would be interested in 
                                                
29 Interview with Vanessa Coria, Advocacy and Program Manager, Women’s Global Network for Reproductive 
Rights (WGNRR), formerly with Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), Mexico City, Mexico 18 July 
2014 (Ref Code: Ip, M, N, S), supra section 5.4 (n 99). 
30 Supra section 4.3.3. 
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participating in the development of reparations in women’s rights cases, but only if they 
were invited by the Inter-American Commission or the State to do so.31 By including civil 
society participation through an “open call” for reparations, the Inter-American 
Commission would gain insight from women’s right organizations about the structural 
context in which reproductive rights cases exist, and would also benefit from establishing 
partnerships with organizations more familiar with national level rights issues than the 
Inter-American System. Second, reparations should be designed so as to require that states 
collaborate with and receive input from civil society organizations in drafting and reforming 
legislative proposals, and in developing the content for training and education reparations. 
Indeed, this is an action that the Inter-American Court has recently adopted. According to 
Douglass Cassel, the Court has  
begun to direct States to include non-governmental organizations and civil society 
in the implementation of reparations. [...] (For example,) When it (the Court) 
ordered Ecuador to develop a training program for prison, judicial and law 
enforcement personnel on the human rights of prisoners, it ordered that civil society 
should participate in the design and implementation of the program.32  
The inclusion of civil society in the design and implementation of reparations increases the 
likelihood that reparations will take account of the gendered nature of harm, and that 
compliance monitoring will be conducted in a more equitable and substantive way. In order 
to begin the process of creating a “gender reparations tradition” it is imperative that civil 
society organizations be given a greater role in the design of gender-based reparations.  
 
Apply a Multi-Faceted Approach to Interpreting Reproductive Rights 
This strategy is derived from analysis of the above reproductive rights cases, and is an 
elaboration of the multi-faceted approach to reproductive rights proposed by Ronli Sifris, 
which was discussed in section 2.1.2.33 In Sifris’ articulation of the multi-faceted approach 
to rights, she claimed that “only a multi-faceted approach can adequately take account of 
the numerous ways in which women who are denied access to abortion (or other 
reproductive health rights) may suffer”.34 When applying this approach as a strategy to 
advance a “gender reparations tradition” before the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights, the utility is two-fold; not only does a multi-faceted approach to reproductive rights 
                                                
31 Interview with Ivania Solano Jiménez, Attorney, Women’s Department, Office of the Ombudsman [Defensoría de 
los Habitantes], San Jose, Costa Rica 20 August 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, CR, G, S) and Carolina Garcés Peralta Rights of 
Women, Office of the Ombudsman, Republic of Peru, Lima, Peru July 2014 (Ref Code: Ip, P, G). 
32 Douglass Cassel, ‘The Expanding Scope and Impact of Reparations Awarded by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights’ in M. Bossuyt, P. Lemmens, K. De Feyter, and S. Parmentier (eds), Out of the Ashes: Reparations for 
Gross Violations of Human Rights (Intersentia 2006). Available at www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r28153.pdf (accessed 20 
February 2017). 
33 Ronli Sifris, 'Restrictive Regulation of Abortion and the Right to Health' (2010) 18 Medical Law Review 185-212, 
supra section 2.1.2 (n 35-40). 
34 Ibid 190. 
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enable a gendered interpretation of reproductive health rights violations, but also, such an 
approach is a necessary component for developing gender-based reparations. In each of the 
cases selected for analysis in this thesis, the petitioners employed a multi-faceted approach 
to rights in order to determine violations of reproductive rights across the generations of 
rights. 35 As a result, the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court interpreted 
women’s reproductive rights as requiring positive and negative state action in order to be 
adequately protected and fulfilled. The María Chávez and Artavia Murillo et al. cases 
clearly exemplified application of this strategy in that the petitioners argued that states must 
implement reproductive health services (positive duty) through rights such as the right to 
private life36 and the right to personal integrity37 (negative rights), as enshrined in the 
American Convention on Human Rights.38 
 
In order to effectively apply a multi-faceted approach to rights before the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights, petitioners must identify and apply the indivisible nature of 
human rights to the rights claims they make before the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights. Then, in order to guarantee that gender is an integral analytical component 
of reparation design, petitioners must ensure that their analysis of rights provisions 
incorporates a thorough and effective gender perspective. 
 
Reproductive Rights and Violence Against Women  
This final strategy builds on the multi-faceted approach to rights to suggest that not only 
should reproductive health rights violations be established through civil and political rights, 
but they must also be interpreted through women’s rights conventions in order to put 
reproductive rights violations in context. In litigation before the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights, this means that petitioners must not only claim violations of reproductive 
rights through the American Convention on Human Rights, but they must also incorporate 
rights enshrined within the Convention of Belém do Pará. As I determined above in section 
3.1.1, Article 7(b), when interpreted through Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention of Belém 
do Pará, can be applied by the Inter-American Commission and Court to require that states 
prevent gender-based harm; the principle of due diligence.39 In the context of reproductive 
rights, this means that states not only have a duty to protect women from arbitrary 
                                                
35 Supra sections 4.1, 5.1 and 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. 
36 Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica [2012] (n 18), supra section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. 
37 María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru, supra section 4.1.!
38 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) OASTS No. 36 (1969). 
39 Supra section 3.1.1 (n 31-34).!
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interference in their private lives, but that states must also take steps to eradicate pre-
existing conditions of gender inequality, discrimination and violence.  
 
The responsibility of locating violations of reproductive rights within the violence against 
women framework in the Inter-American System of Human Rights is that of petitioners and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Based on the above analysis of the Artavia 
Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica case, I contend that it is not enough for petitioners to simply 
claim a violation of the Convention of Belém do Pará in reproductive rights cases, but 
rather, in order to ensure that the Inter-American Commission admits a case based on 
violations of this treaty, petitioners must conduct a thorough and comprehensive 
examination of the role and impact of gendered harm on women’s reproductive lives. In the 
event that the petitioners fail to locate reproductive rights violations within the women’s 
rights framework, as was the situation in the Artavia Murillo et al. case, it is then the 
responsibility of the Inter-American Court to invoke its iura novit curia and motu propio 
powers in order to determine a violation of the Convention of Belém do Pará and 
subsequently issue reparation to address this violation. By examining gender-based harm 
through the Convention of Belém do Pará it is possible for the petitioners, and subsequently 
the Inter-American Commission and Court, to envelop reproductive health within the 
violence against women framework.40 Such an exercise is necessary in order to trigger 
reparation that has as its objective the eradication of pre-existing social and cultural 
structures that reinforce and perpetuate violations of women’s reproductive health rights. 
 
The strategies I suggest here, when combined with the Holistic Gender Approach to 
Reparations, establish the foundation for developing a “gender reparations tradition” in the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights. In order to test the utility of these strategies, the 
final section of this thesis reviews and speculates upon the Inter-American Court’s current 
and ongoing women’s reproductive rights case, IV v. Bolivia.41 In this next section, I pull 
together themes explored throughout the case study analyses, such as intersectionality and 
the public/private divide, and combine them with the identified strategies and the Holistic 
Gender Approach to Reparations to determine the potential for the Inter-American Court to 
initiate the “gender reparations tradition” through its second reproductive rights case. 
Section 7.2 introduces IV v. Bolivia as it developed through the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. In this section I apply the Holistic Gender Approach to 
                                                
40 Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law (2nd edn, The Federation Press 2002) 314-315, 
supra section 2.3.2 (n 126).!
41 IV v. Bolivia [2014] (n 8). 
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Reparations to determine the gendered nature and transformative potential of reparations 
issued in the Merits Decision. Finally, the overall objective of analysing the development of 
this ‘live’ case before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is to determine if and how 
the initial design of this case enables the development of gender based reparations in the 
forthcoming final judgment. 
 
7.2 What’s Next for Women’s Reproductive Rights: Speculating on IV v. Bolivia 
IV v Bolivia is a reproductive rights case concerned with the forced sterilization of a migrant 
immigrant woman. On July 1st 2000, IV underwent a caesarean section procedure to give 
birth to her third child. While IV was under anaesthesia, the doctor who performed the 
caesarean section also performed a tubal ligation, which had the effect of ending IV’s 
reproductive capacity.42 The following day, a medical intern informed IV that she had been 
sterilised during the procedure. When IV learned this information, she asked if her or the 
baby’s life had been at risk, and if that was the reason she had been sterilised. The intern 
responded that her life hadn’t been at risk but that future pregnancies would have been 
risky.43 IV contended that she had not given her consent for such a procedure, despite 
claims made by the doctor who performed the sterilization that she consented verbally 
during her caesarean section. In the months following her sterilization, three audits were 
conducted in order to determine the facts of the situation. The first and second audits were 
inconclusive, but the third audit reached the conclusion: “(i) that no justification had existed 
for carrying out the bilateral tubal ligation [...], and (ii) that there had been no written 
consent signed by the patient prior to the operation”.44 Following the audit, IV sought 
justice through the Bolivian legal system, and while the doctor was charged and sentenced 
on two occasions, he was released each time on appeal. 
 
On March 7th 2007, IV and her representatives lodged a petition before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights.45 The IV v. Bolivia case is unique because IV is being 
represented by the State Ombuds office, which means that a Bolivian State entity brought a 
case against its own country. The violations alleged by the Ombuds office (petitioner) 
before the Inter-American Commission were as follows: American Convention on Human 
Rights: the right to humane treatment (Article 5), the right to fair trial (Article 8), the right 
to privacy (Article 11), freedom of thought and expression (Article 13), the rights of the 
                                                
42 Ibid ¶29.!
43 Ibid ¶26. 
44 Ibid ¶37. 
45  IV v. Bolivia [2008] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report No. 40/08, Petition 270-07 
Admissibility. 
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family (Article 17) and judicial protection (Article 25), and the Convention of Belém do 
Pará Article 7, all of which were accepted by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights.46 In order to establish its claim for a violation of the Convention of Belém do Pará, 
the petitioner claimed, 
These violations of IV’s human rights arise from gender-based discrimination. (The 
petitioner) maintain(ed) that the doctors decided to submit I.V. to a fallopian tube 
ligature without her consent because they had a discriminatory, paternalistic, and 
patriarchal attitude to exploiting a woman’s vulnerability. (The petitioner) also 
maintained that IV’s case is part of a widespread attitude of discrimination by 
Bolivian hospitals and health centers against women with regard to surgical 
contraception.47 
In the above claim, the petitioners successfully connected gendered (patriarchal) harm as it 
was manifested through widespread discrimination in the medical sector to the violence 
against women framework enshrined within the Convention of Belém do Pará. In doing so, 
the petitioners effectively contextualised reproductive rights within the violence against 
women framework.  
 
The Inter-American Commission admitted the IV v. Bolivia case on July 23rd 2008. The 
petitioner decided not to participate in Friendly Settlement proceedings,48 and the Inter-
American Commission issued its Merits decision on August 15th 2014. In its Merits 
Decision, the Inter-American Commission examined the Bolivian State’s obligation to 
respect and guarantee the human right to be free from discrimination,49 and through its 
analysis of the right to personal integrity, the Commission determined that “guaranteeing 
the right to personal integrity has implications for women’s equality, autonomy, privacy, 
and dignity”. 50  In addition, the Inter-American Commission accepted the petitioner’s 
alleged violation of the Convention of Belém do Pará, and explained,  
The right to personal integrity and the non-discrimination principle are closely 
linked to the right of woman to be free from all forms of violence. Accordingly, 
[…] violence against women and the social discrimination promoting and validating 
it are serious human rights problems with negative repercussions for women and 
society at large. They constitute an obstacle to the recognition and enjoyment of all 
their human rights and threaten their physical, psychological and moral integrity.51 
The Inter-American Commission also examined the role of gender stereotyping within its 
analysis of the right to information, and in doing so incorporated the concept of 
intersectionality to articulate how women experience discrimination across a number of 
                                                
46 IV v. Bolivia [2014] (n 8) ¶2 and ¶5. 
47 IV v. Bolivia [2008] (n 45) ¶28. 
48 IV v. Bolivia [2014] (n 8) ¶22. 
49 Ibid ¶96. 
50 Ibid ¶97.!
51 Ibid ¶101, referencing ‘Violence and Discrimination against Women in the Armed Conflict in Colombia (Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser/L/V/II. 124/Doc.67 October 18 2006) ¶11. 
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determining characteristics, such as income level, ethnicity, citizenship status and 
geographical location. 52 This development was a significant departure from the one-
dimensional characterization of María Chávez in the Maria Mamerita Mestanza Chavez v. 
Peru Friendly Settlement Agreement, which failed to establish the intersecting dimensions 
in which women were targeted for sterilization.  
 
The Merits Decision issued by the Inter-American Commission followed in the footsteps of 
Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica by including an analysis of gender stereotyping. The 
Decision also examined paternalistic control in the medical sector: 
There are signs that the medical team that performed the surgery on IV was 
influenced by gender stereotypes on the inability of women to make autonomous 
decisions with respect to their own reproduction. […] (This) reflects the notion that 
medical personnel are empowered to take better decisions than the woman 
concerned regarding control over reproduction.53 
In addition, the Inter-American Commission referred to Artavia Murillo et al. to determine 
violations of the right to privacy (Article 11.2) and family (Article 17.2). The Commission 
not only repeated the argument developed in Artavia Murillo et al. that reproductive 
autonomy is an aspect of the right to private life,54 but went further to stress the “dual 
aspects of the right to family […] which entails for the State both a positive obligation to 
protect and a ‘negative’ obligation to refrain from arbitrary or abusive interference in this 
sphere”.55  
 
Within its examination of the rights to privacy and family, the Inter-American Commission 
expressly stated, “non-consensual sterilization constitutes a form of violence against women 
in which […] a series of human rights are infringed. The Convention of Belém do Pará […] 
recognizes that all women’s rights to a life free from violence includes the right to be free 
from discrimination”.56 Through its analysis of the Convention of Belém do Pará, the Inter-
American Commission delved into the principle of due diligence as enshrined in Article 
7(b) to recognise that the “problem of violence against women […] links to the 
discrimination that women have historically suffered from, (and requires the State) to adopt 
comprehensive strategies to prevent, punish, and eliminate it”. 57  The Inter-American 
Commission also asserted, “performing a non-consensual sterilization causes the affected 
woman pain and suffering and constitutes a form of violence with ongoing physical and 
                                                
52 Ibid ¶132, 160 and 161; Crenshaw, 'Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex’ supra section 1.1.1 (n 40). 
53 Ibid ¶162. 
54 IV v. Bolivia [2014] (n 8) ¶149. 
55 Ibid ¶150.!
56 Ibid ¶156. 
57 Ibid ¶175. 
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psychological consequences for those women’s reproductive health”. 58  Although the 
Commission did not explicitly note Articles 8 and 9 in its interpretation of the principle of 
due diligence, it is clear that these rights provisions empowered the analysis of Article 7. 
 
On April 23rd 2015, after the Bolivian State failed to comply with the recommendations 
issued by the Inter-American Commission in the IV v. Bolivia Merits Decision, the Inter-
American Commission referred the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In 
doing so, the Inter-American Commission requested that the Inter-American Court consider 
violations of both the American Convention of Human Rights (Articles 5.1, 8.1, 11.2 13.1 
17.2 and 25.1) and the Convention of Belém do Pará Article 7 provisions (a) (b) (c) (f) and 
(g). The Inter-American Court accepted the case, and on May 2nd 2016 it held a public 
hearing.59 The Inter-American Court will release the final judgment in IV v. Bolivia late in 
the year 2016.  
 
The above introduction to IV v. Bolivia provides an analysis of this case as it developed 
from its earliest stages through to the Merits Decision issued by Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. This case, despite its pending status before the Inter-
American Court, exemplifies the most prolific and comprehensive understanding of gender 
based harm in a women’s reproductive rights case before the Inter-American System. 
However, the reparations recommended by the Inter-American Commission reflect many of 
the shortcomings determined in the above case study analyses. In this section I analyse the 
IV v. Bolivia Merits Decision to determine fulfilment of the Holistic Gender Approach to 
Reparations preconditions60 and the gender-based nature of the reparations. In addition, I 
review the Merits Decision to establish if, how and to what extent, the petitioners and Inter-
American Commission employed the strategies suggested in section 7.1. Through this case 
analysis I argue that complete fulfilment of the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations 
preconditions does not necessarily ensure the design of gender-based reparations, but rather, 
reproductive rights cases must also incorporate the strategies determined in this thesis in 
order to foster a “gender reparations tradition”. 
 
The IV v. Bolivia case, as it was processed before the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, fulfilled each of the Holistic Gender Approach to Reparations pre-
                                                
58 Ibid ¶180.!
59 IV v. Bolivia, Public Hearing, Inter-American Court of Human Rights. <http://livestream.com/corteidh/events/524 
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60 ‘Fulfill the Preconditions,’ supra section 3.3 (n 179).!
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conditions: establish the facts, properly identify the victims and violations and properly 
identify the harm and those harmed. First, the facts established by the Inter-American 
Commission indicated that the sterilization of IV was a result of intersectional 
discrimination based on gender, citizenship status and ethnicity. In addition, the 
Commission established that all women have the right to be free from violence, and, in 
doing so, effectively connected the IV case to the larger structural problem of violence 
against women. Second, because the facts took into consideration the intersectional 
discrimination and the social impact of violence against women, the petitioners and the 
Inter-American Commission successfully articulated a connection between reproductive 
rights and gender based discrimination, and therefore established that the forced 
sterilization of IV warranted a violation of both the American Convention on Human Rights 
and the Convention of Belém do Pará. This was the first time the Inter-American 
Commission applied the Convention of Belém do Pará to a women’s reproductive rights 
case in the form of a Merits Decision. Finally, the Inter-American Commission was 
exemplary in its efforts to unpack the nature of patriarchal, invasive and social components 
of gendered harm. Not only did the Inter-American Commission acknowledge the power of 
medical personnel (paternalistic control), but it also reinforced the Inter-American Court’s 
prior assertion that states have positive and negative obligations in enforcing the right to 
reproductive health.  
 
While Rubio-Marín and Sandoval asserted that fulfilment of the Holistic Gender Approach 
to Reparations preconditions is necessary in order to ensure development of gender-based 
reparations,61 I contend that fulfilment of the preconditions does not necessarily guarantee 
that gender reparations will accompany a gendered analysis of a reproductive rights 
violation. This is because there is currently no reparations tradition in women’s 
reproductive rights litigation before the Inter-American System of Human Rights.62 The IV 
v. Bolivia Merits Decision exemplifies the disconnect between gender reasoning and 
reparation; despite fulfilling the preconditions, the reparations issued in the Merits Decision 
did not adequately address gendered harm. 
 
The reparations issued by the Inter-American Commission in the IV v. Bolivia case Merits 
Decision were as follows:   
                                                
61 Rubio-Marín and Sandoval, supra section 3.3 (n 179). 
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1. Compensation for the material harm and personal/emotional distress suffered by 
IV;  
2. High quality medical care for IV; 
3. Investigate the facts surrounding the sterilization of IV without her consent, and 
establish liabilities and punishments; 
4. Take necessary steps to ensure similar acts are not committed again; review 
policies and practices applied in all hospitals with respect to obtaining informed 
consent of patients; 
5. Adopt legislation, public policies, programs and directives to ensure the respect 
for the right of all individuals to be informed and counseled on health matters and 
not to be subjected to procedures or treatments without their informed consent. 
These measures should take special consideration of the particular needs of persons 
who are in a vulnerable situation due to the intersection of factors such as their sex, 
race, economic position, or condition as migrant, among others; and 
6. Investigate the shortcomings in the practices of the Judiciary and its auxiliary 
organs that permit excessive delays in judicial procedures and adopt such measures 
as are needed to guarantee effective access to justice.63 
A review of these reparations reveals that the Inter-American Commission’s emphasis on 
gender and violence against women in its Merits Decision did not result in clearly 
articulated and transformative gender-based reparations. Of the above reparations, only the 
fourth and fifth can be interpreted as encompassing an aspect, albeit limited, of the 
gendered notion of harm as it applied to the IV v. Bolivia case. Reparations four and five are 
guarantees of non-repetition, and although they are vague in their design, they can be 
interpreted to require that the Bolivian State take steps to eradicate patriarchal harm within 
the medical sector (reparation four), and adopt legislation and policies on informed consent 
based on an intersectional understanding of discrimination (reparation five). Despite the 
Inter-American Commission’s determination that gender-based discrimination and violence 
underpin violations of women’s reproductive rights, the reparations issued in the Merits 
Decision were lacking in their potential to repair gendered harm as it is manifested through 
violations of women’s reproductive rights. 
 
The above review of IV v. Bolivia, as it has progressed through the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, revealed that despite complete fulfilment of the Holistic 
Gender Approach to Reparations preconditions, the reparations issued by the Commission 
did not effectively take account of and repair harm specific to women. As mentioned 
previously, this disconnect can be attributed to the lack of a gender reparations tradition 
within women’s reproductive rights litigation before the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights. The strategies suggested in section 7.1 are intended to confront and connect the gap 
                                                
63 IV v. Bolivia [2014] (n 8) ¶187. 
!!
198 
between gender reasoning and reparation in women’s reproductive rights cases. This final 
section of the IV v. Bolivia case analysis determines the extent to which the Merits Decision 
incorporated these strategies, and identifies instances where the petitioner and Inter-
American Commission missed an opportunity to employ certain components of the 
strategies. In examining the application and utility of the strategies, my objective is to 
speculate on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ potential to initiate a “gender 
reparations tradition” within reproductive rights litigation. 
 
The IV v. Bolivia Merits Decision incorporated two of the four strategies for advancing a 
“gender reparations tradition” in women’s reproductive rights litigation. I conclude from the 
above examination of the Merits Decision that the petitioners and the Inter-American 
Commission successfully incorporated the third and fourth strategies: employ a multi-
faceted approach to rights, and locate violations of women’s reproductive rights within the 
violence against women framework. However, they did not implement the first and second 
strategies: apply alternative rights concepts, and enhance the role of civil society. In terms 
of applying a multi-faceted approach, the petitioners raised rights claims across a number of 
provisions enshrined within the American Convention.64 In addition, the Inter-American 
Commission successfully connected women’s autonomy and equality to the right to 
integrity, as it is an aspect of humane treatment,65 and also interpreted the rights to private 
and family life in such a way that it directly emphasised the positive and negative 
obligations of these rights. 66 In regards to the fourth strategy, the petitioner claimed 
violations of women’s reproductive rights through the violence against women framework, 
and in turn provided the Inter-American Commission with an effective gender-based 
argument to support a violation of the Convention of Belém do Pará. As a result, the Inter-
American Commission provided an in-depth analysis of the principle of due diligence as it 
relates to reproductive rights violations,67 and determined states have a duty to prevent 
violence and discrimination against women.  
  
For all intents and purposes, the IV v. Bolivia Merits Decision was the most progressive 
reproductive rights case to emerge from the Inter-American System of Human Rights. 
However, I argue that because the Inter-American Commission underutilized civil society 
in the design of reparations, and the petitioners failed to employ alternative rights concepts 
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in the early stages of litigation, this case missed an opportunity to develop a strong 
foundation necessary for the Inter-American Court to order transformative gender-based 
reparations. First, the petitioners had an opportunity to incorporate alternative rights 
concepts in the IV v. Bolivia case through the claim that forced sterilization violated the 
right to personal integrity. Had they included vida digna or proyecto de vida in their 
interpretation of the rights violated in this case, the petitioners could have developed an 
additional layer of gender-based analysis to determine how dignity and integrity are integral 
aspects of reproductive health. In turn, an examination of these concepts may have 
contributed to the development of reparations designed to address factors that damage the 
life project of women and inhibit the right to a dignified life. Additionally, the Inter-
American Court may elect to include alternative rights concepts in its articulation of the 
rights violated and reparations in its forthcoming judgment. However, as the above analysis 
of Artavia Murillo et al. determined, the potential impact of alternative rights concepts is 
greater when they are introduced in the initial stages of a reproductive rights case in order to 
ensure that their analysis is woven throughout the evolution of the case. 
 
Second, there was a clear opportunity in the development of the IV v. Bolivia reparations to 
collaborate with civil society organizations. The enhance the role of civil society strategy is 
especially interesting when applied to IV v. Bolivia because the Ombud’s Office represented 
the victim in this case. The role of the state Ombud’s Office is to provide a link between 
civil society and the state, so there was a great opportunity in this case to consult with civil 
society in designing reparations. The Merits Decision made no mention of civil society in 
the design or implementation of reparations, despite the potential for collaboration with 
women’s and human rights organizations in this case. While the petitioners and the Inter-
American Commission neglected to develop reparations that acknowledge the importance 
and benefit of collaborating with civil society, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
has the opportunity to apply this strategy in the reparations it orders in the IV v. Bolivia 
judgment. In fact, an amicus curiae brief recently submitted to the Inter-American Court in 
the IV v. Bolivia case specifically recommended that the Court apply this strategy in the 
design of reparations in its upcoming judgment.68 Given that the IV v. Bolivia case before 
the Inter-American Commission successfully fulfilled the preconditions of the Holistic 
Gender Approach to Reparation, and applied two of the four gender reparation strategies, 
the Inter-American Court has the opportunity to significantly expand upon the reparations 
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issued by the Inter-American Commission. Not only can the Inter-American Court enhance 
the role of civil society in the design of reparations, but it can also elect to exercise its motu 
propio power in order to more adequately repair violations of women’s reproductive rights 
as they are protected through the Convention of Belém do Pará. 
 
The IV v. Bolivia case review and analysis provides reason to be optimistic that the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, and petitioners engaged in women’s reproductive 
rights litigation, may be prepared, and perhaps willing, to participate in the project of 
repairing gender-based harm in women’s reproductive rights cases. The forthcoming IV v. 
Bolivia judgment may be the first time the Inter-American Court of Human Rights applies 
its own declaration that in the “context of structural discrimination […] reparations must be 
designed to change the situation [...] reestablishment of the same structural context of 
violence and discrimination is not acceptable”. 69 If the Inter-American Court applies this 
reasoning to the IV v. Bolivia case, it will lay the groundwork on which to establish a 
“gender reparations tradition” within women’s reproductive rights litigation before the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights.  
 
Despite the potential for establishing a “gender reparations tradition” in reproductive rights 
litigation before the Inter-American System of Human Rights, the success of such an 
exercise is contingent on the practical capacity of the Inter-American System to engage in 
the work of engendering reproductive rights. This year the Inter-American Commission 
faced severe funding challenges, which not only threatened the Inter-American 
Commission’s existence, but also affirmed states parties’ disinterest when it comes to 
engaging with human rights issues before the Inter-American System.70 This setback is 
especially worrying in terms of advancing women’s reproductive rights through the Inter-
American System because, as María Alejandra Cardenas asserted, “millions of women 
across the continent will lose the only means available to them to obtain justice and demand 
an end to discrimination and violence”.71 While these challenges are cause for concern, they 
                                                
69 González et al. (‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico [2009] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. C) No. 205, 
Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs ¶450. 
70 Nelson Camilo Sánchez León, 'The Silent Checkmate against the IACHR' (Dejusticia’s Global Rights Blog, 23 
May 2016) <https://dejusticiablog.com/2016/05/23/the-silent-checkmate-against-the-iachr/> accessed 23 May 2016. 
As of July 28th 2016, the Inter-American Commission has received enough funding to continue operations through 
the Fall of 2016, but the situation remains precarious, see www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/crisis-iachr.asp/.!
71 María Alejandra Cardenas, 'Crisis de la CIDH: ¿por qué no podemos perder un espacio clave para los derechos de 
las mujeres? [Crisis in the IACHR: Why We Can’t Lose a Key Space for Women’s Rights?' El Espectador (7 June 
2016) <www.elespectador.com/opinion /crisis-de-cidh-no-podemos-perder-un-espacio-clave-los-d> accessed 7 June 
2016. 
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also provide an opportunity for the Inter-American System of Human Rights to reflect on its 
purpose and objectives, and to determine its approach for the future.  
 
In order to advance a “gender reparations tradition” in women’s reproductive rights 
litigation actors involved in reproductive rights litigation must make every effort possible to 
engage in the work of challenging the deep-seated and connected nature of gendered harm 
and violations of women’s reproductive health rights. To assist with, and perhaps expedite 
this task, I suggest through this thesis a set of strategies that if effectively employed in 
conjunction with Ruth Rubio-Marín and Clara Sandoval’s Holistic Gender Approach to 
Reparations, have the potential to engender and expand the transformative potential of 
reparations in women’s reproductive rights litigation. While I acknowledge the inherently 
limited potential for reparations to stimulate significant social change at the national level, I 
contend that failure to engender reparations in reproductive rights cases not only limits the 
utility of reproductive rights litigation, but also undermines efforts made within Friendly 
Settlement Agreements, Merits Decisions and Inter-American Court judgments to examine 
the impact of gender-based harm in women’s lives. The “gender reparations tradition” I 
propose in this thesis requires that the “existing order” of international human rights law, as 
it applies to women’s reproductive rights litigation before the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights, be reconceptualised in order to effectively take account of the gendered 
nature of harm; only then can the Inter-American System of Human Rights provide 
reparations that do justice for women. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Case Study Selection  
This chart provides a summary of the reproductive rights cases processed through the Inter-
American System. It also notes cases pending admission before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. The chart illustrates criteria that contributed to selection of 
the case studies for analysis in this thesis, which were: (i) type of violation; (ii) geographic 
location; (iii) forum/litigation process; and (iv) period of time since Friendly Settlement 
Agreement reached/judgment released greater than one year before Summer 2014. The 
cases highlighted in BOLD fulfilled the criteria and were therefore selected for analysis. 
 
Reproductive 
Rights Case 
Date Forum /  Lit. Process Reproductive Rights Issue 
Notes on 
IASHR Action Decision to Examine 
 
 
María Mamerita 
Mestanza Chávez 
v. Peru 
Petition: 15/6/1999 
Admitted: 3/10/2000  
FSA: 22/10/2003 
 
IACHR / Friendly 
Settlement 
Agreement 
 
 
Forced 
sterilization 
(discrimination: 
indigenous)  
IACHR 
admitted case; 
case remains 
open 
YES - first case of 
its kind (forced 
sterilization); South 
America; admitted 
by IACHR; gender 
analysis 
Paulina del 
Carmen Jacinto 
Ramírez v. 
Mexico 
Petition: 8/3/2002 
FSA: 9/3/2007 
IACHR / Friendly 
Settlement 
Agreement 
Denied legal 
abortion rights 
(discrimination: 
young girl) 
IACHR did not 
formally admit 
case; case closed 
YES - first abortion 
rights case; Mexico; 
not formally 
admitted; case 
closed 
 
 
FS v. Chile 
 
Petition: 3/2/2009; 
Admitted: 21/7/2014 
 
IACHR / 
Admissibility 
Forced 
sterilization 
(discrimination: 
HIV) 
 
IACHR 
admitted case 
NO - too early in 
litigation process, 
admitted by IACHR 
too late for analysis 
 
 
 
 
IV v. Bolivia 
Petition: 7/3/2007 
Admitted:  
23/7/2008 
Merits: 15/8/2014 
Sent to IACtHR: 
23/4/2015 Judgment: 
30/11/2016 
 
 
IACHR / Merits; 
IACtHR Judgment 
 
 
Forced 
sterilization 
(discrimination: 
migrant) 
 
 
IACtHR public 
hearing May 
2016 
NO - Merits Report 
issued by IACHR 
after field research 
commenced; will 
use for analysis in 
concluding chapter; 
IACtHR judgment 
issued after viva 
 
 
Artavia Murillo 
et al. v. Costa 
Rica 
 
Petition: 19/1/2001 
Merits: 14/7/2010  
Sent to IACtHR: 
29/7/2011 Judgment: 
28/11/2012 
 
IACHR / Merits; 
IACtHR judgment 
 
Ban on In Vitro 
Fertilization 
(gender 
stereotyping) 
 
IACHR issued 
Merits and sent 
case to IACtHR; 
IACtHR issues 
judgment; State 
not comply 
YES - first 
reproductive rights 
case before 
IACtHR; Central 
America; gender 
stereotyping 
analysis 
“B” Provisional 
Measure 
(Case also 
submitted to 
IACHR 4/2015) 
 
 
Issued: 29/5/2013 
 
IACtHR 
provisional 
measure 
 
Denial of 
therapeutic 
abortion 
 
IACtHR issues 
measure to 
protect life of 
“B.” 
NO - provisional 
measure, not a case. 
Doesn’t address 
structural issues. 
 
Ana v. Costa Rica 
 
Petition submitted: 
2008 
Pending admission 
before IACHR 
 
Denied legal 
abortion rights 
  
NO - pending 
admission 
Aurora v. Costa 
Rica 
Petition submitted: 
2012 
Pending admission 
before IACHR 
Denied legal 
abortion rights 
 NO - pending 
admission 
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Appendix B: Ethical Approval Certificate 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Sciences & Arts Cross-School Research Ethics Committee 
                              
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL 
 
Reference Number: 
 
ER/CO213/1 
 
School: LPS 
Title of Project 
 
The Effective Implementation of Reproductive Rights 
Law in the Inter-American Human Rights System 
 
 
Principal Investigator: 
 
 
Ciara O’Connell  (Skeet) 
Expected Start Date:* 1/05/2014 
 
*NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this 
Certificate of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account of 
changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures 
 
 
This project has been given ethical approval by the Social Sciences/Arts 
Research Ethics Committee (C-REC). Please note the following requirements 
for approved submissions: 
 
Amendments to research proposal - Any changes or amendments to the approved 
proposal, which have ethical implications, must be submitted to the committee for 
authorisation prior to implementation. 
 
Feedback regarding any adverse and unexpected events - Any adverse (undesirable and 
unintended) and unexpected events that occur during the implementation of the project must 
be reported to the Chair of the Social Sciences C-REC. In the event of a serious adverse 
event, research must be stopped immediately and the Chair alerted within 24 hours of the 
occurrence.       
 
Authorised Signature 
      
  
 
Name of Authorised Signatory  
(C-REC Chair or nominated deputy) 
 
 
Professor Stephen Shute    12/11/13 
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Effective Implementation of Reproductive Rights Law in the Inter-American Human Rights System 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Study Title: The Effective Implementation of Reproductive Rights Law in the Inter-  
          American Human Rights System 
 
Researcher:            Faculty Supervisors: 
Ciara O’Connell           Professor Jo Bridgeman (Healthcare Law and Feminist Ethics) 
             Dr. Charlotte Skeet (Women’s Human Rights) 
 
Your participation is requested in an interview for a research project that analyzes how women’s 
reproductive rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System can be effectively implemented at the 
domestic level within the Inter-American region. The Inter-American System of Human Rights has 
increasingly incorporated a gender-perspective in its work, and as a result the underlying causes of 
women’s human rights violations have become a fundamental part of the assessment of reproductive 
rights law implementation. The experiences of NGOs, local initiatives and social institutions that work 
to implement reproductive rights law domestically have the potential to play a significant role in how 
the Inter-American System of Human Rights develops reproductive rights law. This research will 
identify opportunities for further collaboration between the Inter-American Human Rights System and 
domestic women’s reproductive rights organizations and initiatives in an effort to identify how the Inter-
American System can further reproductive rights law implementation. 
 
Interviews are particularly relevant to this research in order to understand the Inter-American System’s 
potential for developing remedies that address gender inequality, and also to identify the role of 
domestic initiatives and social institutions, and local challenges in terms of reproductive rights law 
implementation. In addition to the researcher’s dissertation, the findings from the interviews will be 
used to produce a short briefing paper, with the intention of providing the participants with the results 
of this research. Before you decide whether or not you would like to participate in this research, it is 
important for you to understand what this research encompasses and what your role will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
The purpose of this research is to assess the implementation efforts of the Inter-American Human 
Rights System’s reproductive rights case law at the domestic level, with a view to identifying obstacles 
to implementation while also offering recommendations for greater implementation success. In this 
study, representatives from the Inter-American Human Rights System, members of women’s rights 
!!
219 
 
 
Effective Implementation of Reproductive Rights Law in the Inter-American Human Rights System 
Participant Information 
 
2 
NGOs, judges and legislators at the domestic level as well as healthcare workers and members of 
local initiatives such as training and education programs, will be interviewed to gain an insight as to 
how reproductive rights law is perceived in the Inter-American regional human rights system and then 
on the ground in its implementation. The overall objective of this research is to determine how the 
work of the Inter-American System can be better informed by local activists’ knowledge and 
experience of implementing reproductive rights in order to overcome boundaries that impede the full 
implementation of reproductive rights law domestically. 
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
The researcher requests your time to participate in a discussion of a selection of the following topics: 
reproductive rights law, women’s human rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System, domestic 
initiatives for the promotion of women’s human rights and reproductive rights, practical implementation 
of reproductive rights law as a healthcare practitioner at the domestic level, as well as local 
reproductive rights legislation. You have been selected to participate in this research based on your 
background, experience and knowledge in these areas. The information gathered from these 
interviews will assist the researcher in developing a complete understanding of the gap that exists in 
the failure to fully implement reproductive rights law at the domestic level. Additionally, your 
participation will aide in determining the potential role for local initiatives in the work of the Inter-
American System, in particular, reproductive rights. 
 
What will my involvement entail? 
If you agree to participate in an interview, the researcher will meet you at a time (within the provided 
timetable) and place that is convenient for you. The interview will take place for approximately one 
hour, during which time, with your consent, the interview will be recorded. In some instances, a 
translator may accompany the researcher in order to ensure effective communication during the 
interview. 
 
Exercise your right to withdraw 
Participation in an interview for this research is entirely voluntary. The researcher respects your right 
to withdraw at any time. If you do decide to withdraw, you’ll be given the option to have any gathered 
data involving your participation in the project destroyed.  
 
Will my information in this research be confidential? 
Your identity as well as the information you provide in this research will not automatically be made 
confidential. However, please do let the interviewer know if you would like your identity, workplace or 
any other information to be kept confidential. You may change your mind at any point before, during or 
after the interview. Please note any confidentiality requirements on the attached Consent Form. 
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What will happen to the results of this research? 
The results of this research will be used in a doctoral degree thesis. Additionally, this research may be 
used in publications in peer-reviewed journals and research reports, as well as in conference 
presentations. Any material that makes use of research acquired from these interviews will be made 
available to the interviewees. 
 
Who is organizing and funding the research? 
This research has been organized and funded by Ciara O’Connell, a PhD Candidate in Law Studies at 
the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom. Additionally, the United Kingdom Society for Latin 
American Studies has awarded a travel grant to the researcher. For more information about the 
researcher, see http://www.sussex.ac.uk/profiles/303008. 
 
How to proceed if I want to participate 
If you are willing to participate in this research, please email the researcher at 
c.oconnell@sussex.ac.uk, and attach the signed consent form. The researcher will contact you shortly 
thereafter to discuss a suitable time to conduct an in-person interview for the summer of 2014. 
 
Who has approved this study? 
This research has been approved under the University of Sussex research governance process 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/staff/research/spg/researchgovernance.  
 
Contact for further information 
For further information please contact the Researcher: 
Ciara O’Connell 
Department of Law 
Friston Building, Falmer Campus 
University of Sussex, Brighton 
BN1 9RH, United Kingdom 
c.o-connell@sussex.ac.uk 
+44 (0) 78572 54888 
 
Or, if you have any concerns about the study, please contact the researcher’s project supervisors at 
the University of Sussex. 
 
Prof. Jo Bridgeman    Dr. Charlotte Skeet 
Department of Law    Department of Law 
Friston 239, Falmer Campus   Friston 236, Falmer Campus 
University of Sussex, Brighton   University of Sussex, Brighton 
BN1 9RH, United Kingdom   BN1 9RH, United Kingdom 
J.C.Bridgeman@sussex.ac.uk   C.H.Skeet@sussex.ac.uk 
+44 (0) 1273 678133    +44 (0) 1273 872919 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. 
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Implementación Efectiva de los Derechos Reproductivos en El Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 
 
Información para Participantes 
 
 
Título del Estudio: Implementación Efectiva de la Ley de los Derechos Reproductivos en         
                                El Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 
 
Investigador:            Supervisores de la Facultad: 
Ciara O’Connell           Profesora Jo Bridgeman (Ley de Salud y ´Etica Feminista) 
             Dr. Charlotte Skeet (Derechos Humanos de Mujeres) 
 
Se solicita su participación en una entrevista para un proyecto de investigación que analiza cómo los 
derechos reproductivos de mujeres en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos se pueden 
implementar con eficacia a nivel nacional dentro de la región interamericana. El Sistema 
Interamericano de Derechos Humanos ha incorporado cada vez más una perspectiva de género en 
su trabajo, y como resultado las causas subyacentes de violaciónes de derechos humanos de las 
mujeres se han convertido en una parte fundamental de la evaluación de la aplicación de ley de los 
derechos reproductivos. Las experiencias de las organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG), las 
iniciativas locales y las instituciones sociales que trabajan para aplicar la ley de los derechos 
reproductivos en el país tienen el potencial de desempeñar un papel significativo en la forma en que 
el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos desarrolla la legislación sobre derechos 
reproductivos. Esta investigación permitirá identificar oportunidades para una mayor colaboración 
entre el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos y de las organizaciones de mujeres 
nacionales de los derechos reproductivos y las iniciativas en un esfuerzo por identificar cómo el 
Sistema Interamericano puede avanzar en la aplicación de la ley de derechos reproductivos. 
 
Las entrevistas son particularmente relevantes para esta investigación a fin de comprender el 
potencial del sistema interamericano para el desarrollo de soluciones que aborden la desigualdad de 
género, y también para identificar el papel de las iniciativas nacionales y las instituciones sociales, y 
los retos locales en cuanto a la aplicación de ley de los derechos reproductivos. Además de la tesis 
del investigador, los resultados de las entrevistas se utilizarán para producir un breve documento 
informativo, con la intención de proporcionar a los participantes los resultados de esta investigación. 
Antes de decidir si desea participar en esta investigación, es importante que usted entienda lo que 
esta investigación abarca y cuál será su papel. Por favor tome su tiempo para leer cuidadosamente la 
siguiente información. 
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Cuál es el propósito de esta investigación? 
El propósito de esta investigación es evaluar los esfuerzos de implementación de la jurisprudencia los 
derechos reproductivos del Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos en el plano nacional, con 
miras a identificar los obstáculos a la aplicación, como asi también ofrecer recomendaciones para un 
mayor éxito de la implementación. En este estudio, representantes del Sistema Interamericano de 
Derechos Humanos, miembros de ONG derechos de las mujeres ONG, jueces y legisladores a nivel 
nacional, así como los trabajadores de salud y miembros de las iniciativas locales, como programas 
de formación y educación, serán entrevistados para obtener una clarificación en cuanto a cómo se 
percibe el derecho de los derechos reproductivos en el sistema regional de derechos humanos 
interamericano y luego en el campo de su aplicación. El objetivo general de esta investigación es 
determinar cómo el trabajo del Sistema Interamericano puede ser mejor informado por el 
conocimiento y la experiencia de los activistas locales en la aplicación de los derechos reproductivos 
con el fin de superar los limitaciones que impiden la plena aplicación del derecho de los derechos 
reproductivos en el país. 
 
¿Por qué he sido invitado a participar? 
La investigadora solicita su tiempo para participar en una discusión de los siguientes temas: derecho 
de los derechos reproductivos, los derechos humanos de las mujeres en el Sistema Interamericano 
de Derechos Humanos, las iniciativas nacionales para la promoción de los derechos humanos de la 
mujer y los derechos reproductivos, la aplicación práctica de derecho de los derechos reproductivos 
por un profesional de la salud en el ámbito nacional, así como la legislación local de los derechos 
reproductivos. Usted ha sido seleccionado para participar en está investigación sobre la base de sus 
antecedentes, experiencia y conocimiento en estas áreas. La información obtenida de estas 
entrevistas ayudará a la investigadora en el desarrollo de una comprensión completa de la brecha 
que existe en la falla de no aplicar plenamente la legislación sobre derechos reproductivos a nivel 
nacional. Además, su participación ayudará a determinar el papel potencial de las iniciativas locales 
en la labor del Sistema Interamericano, en particular, los derechos reproductivos. 
 
¿Qué supondrá mi participación? 
Si usted acepta participar en una entrevista, la investigadora se reunirá con usted en un momento 
(dentro de los plazos previstos) y lugar que sea conveniente para usted. La entrevista se llevará a 
cabo durante aproximadamente una hora, tiempo durante el cual, con su consentimiento, se grabará 
la entrevista. En algunos casos, un traductor puede acompañar a la investigadora con el fin de 
garantizar una comunicación eficaz durante la entrevista. 
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Ejercite su derecho a retirarse 
La participación en una entrevista para esta investigación es completamente voluntaria. La 
investigadora respeta su derecho a retirarse en cualquier momento. Si decide retirarse, se le dará la 
opción de que los datos recogidos relacionados con su participación en el proyecto sean destruidos. 
 
¿Mi información en esta investigación será confidencial? 
Su identidad, así como la información que proporcione en esta investigación, no serán 
automáticamente confidenciales. Sin embargo, por favor, haga saber a la entrevistadora si desea que 
su identidad, lugar de trabajo o cualquier otra información sean de carácter confidencial. Usted puede 
cambiar de opinión en cualquier momento, antes, durante o después de la entrevista. Por favor tenga 
en cuenta los requisitos de confidencialidad en el Formulario de Consentimiento adjunto. 
 
¿Qué pasará con los resultados de esta investigación? 
Los resultados de esta investigación serán utilizados en una tesis de doctorado. Además, esta 
investigación podrá ser utilizada en publicaciones en revistas e informes de investigación, así como 
en presentaciones de conferencia. Todo el material de investigación adquirido de estas entrevistas se 
pondrá a disposición de los entrevistados. 
 
¿Quién está organizando y financiando la investigación? 
Esta investigación se ha organizado y financiado por Ciara O'Connell, candidata a doctorado en 
Estudios Jurídicos en la Universidad de Sussex en el Reino Unido. Adicionalmente, la Sociedad de 
Estudios Latinoamericanos en el Reino Unido ha otorgado la investigación junto con una bolsa de 
viaje para este proyecto. Para obtener más información sobre el investigador, consulte en 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/profiles/303008. 
 
Cómo proceder si quiero participar 
Si usted está dispuesto a participar en esta investigación, por favor escriba la investigadora 
c.oconnell@sussex.ac.uk, y adjunte el formulario de consentimiento firmado. La investigadora se 
comunicará con usted poco después discutir un momento adecuado para llevar a cabo una entrevista 
en persona para el verano de 2014. 
 
¿Quién ha aprobado este estudio? 
Esta investigación ha sido aprobada en el marco del proceso de gobierno de la Universidad de 
Sussex en investigación, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/staff/research/spg/researchgovernance.  
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Contacto para más información 
Para más información, póngase en contacto con la investigadora: 
Ciara O’Connell 
Department of Law 
Friston Building, Falmer Campus 
University of Sussex, Brighton 
BN1 9RH, United Kingdom 
c.o-connell@sussex.ac.uk 
+44 (0) 78572 54888 
 
O, si usted tiene alguna preocupación sobre el estudio, por favor póngase en contacto con los 
directores del investigador en la Universidad de Sussex. 
 
Prof. Jo Bridgeman    Dr. Charlotte Skeet 
Department of Law    Department of Law 
Friston 239, Falmer Campus   Friston 236, Falmer Campus 
University of Sussex, Brighton   University of Sussex, Brighton 
BN1 9RH, United Kingdom    BN1 9RH, United Kingdom  
J.C.Bridgeman@sussex.ac.uk   C.H.Skeet@sussex.ac.uk 
+44 (0) 1273 678133    +44 (0) 1273 872919 
 
 
Gracias por tomarse el tiempo de leer esta hoja de información. 
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CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
 
      Title: The Effective Implementation of 
       Reproductive Rights Law in the 
     Inter-American Human Rights System 
 
                     Approval 
          Reference:  ER/CO213/1                     
 
 
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the project 
explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet, which I may keep for my 
records. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to: 
Be interviewed by the researcher:       
 1) I understand that my identity, as well as any information I provide in an interview, can      
     be anonymized upon my request. If I do request that my identity be made confidential, 
     the information I provide will be coded to prevent my identity from being made public. 
 
 2) I understand that I will be given a transcript of the interview for my approval before it is  
          included in the research findings, and I agree that the information may be published in a  
          doctoral thesis and other subsequent publications. 
 
 3) I understand a translator may accompany the researcher. In that case, if I am electing 
     to anonymize my identity, the translator will sign a confidentiality agreement between  
     the researcher, myself and the translator. 
 
Allow the interview to be audio taped: 
  1) I consent to the audio recording of the interview, but should I request that my   
             identity be kept confidential, the recording shall be done in such a way as to preserve  
      my anonymity.

Please select one: (special conditions may be explained on the following page)
  I give approval for my identity, name and workplace to be used in this research and       
      publications arising from it. 
      
  I would like my identity made confidential, and any information I provide in an interview to be  
      anonymized. 
 
Special Requirements: 
____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Initial 
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I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all of 
the research project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being penalized 
or disadvantaged in any way. 
 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I 
understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance 
with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
Name:       _________________________________________ 
 
Signature: _________________________________________ 
 
Date:         _________________________________________ 
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FORMULARIO DE CONSENTIMIENTO  
PARA PARTICIPANTES DE ENTREVISTA 
 
          Título: Implementación Efectiva de la Ley de los  
            Derechos Reproductivos en El Sistema  
                   Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 
 
                     Referencia de 
          Aprobación:  ER/CO213/1                     
 
 
Estoy de acuerdo en participar en el proyecto investigación de la Universidad de Sussex. El 
proyecto me ha sido explicado y he leído y comprendido la hoja de información, que guardaré 
para mis archivos. Entiendo que aceptar participar significa que estoy dispuesto a: 
Sostener una entrevista con la investigadora:  
 
 1) Entiendo que mi identidad, así como cualquier información que proporcione en una  
     entrevista, pueden ser anónimos a mi pedido. Si yo solicito que mi identidad sea    
     confidencial, la información que proporcione será codificada para evitar que mi    
     identidad sea hecha pública. 
 
   2) Entiendo que se me dará una transcripción de la entrevista para mi aprobación antes  
      de que sea incluida en los resultados de la investigación, y estoy de acuerdo en que la 
      información puede ser publicada en una tesis doctoral y otras publicaciones        
      posteriores. 
 
  3) Entiendo que un traductor puede acompañar al investigador. En ese caso, si decido  
        anonimizar mi identidad, el traductor va a firmar un acuerdo de confidencialidad  
       entre la investigadora, yo y el traductor. 
 
Permitir que la entrevista sea grabada:   
   1) Doy mi consentimiento para grabar el audio de la entrevista, pero debo pedir que mi  
      identidad se mantenga confidencial para hacer el registro de tal manera de preservar    
                mi anonimato. 
 
Por favor selecciona uno: (condiciones especiales pueden ser explicadas abajo)
  Doy la aprobación de mi identidad, nombre y puesto de trabajo para ser utilizados en esta  
      investigación y publicaciones derivadas de ella.      
  Me gustaría que mi identidad sea confidencial, y toda la información que proporcione en una     
       entrevista sea anónima. 
 
Requisitos Especiales: 
____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Iniciales 
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Entiendo que mi participación es voluntaria, que puedo elegir no participar en todo o parte del 
proyecto de investigación, y que puedo retirar en cualquier fase del proyecto sin ser penalizado o 
desfavorecido de ninguna manera. 
 
Doy mi consentimiento para el tratamiento de mis datos personales para los fines de este estudio 
de investigación. Entiendo que esta información será tratada de forma estrictamente confidencial 
y de conformidad con la Ley de Protección de Datos de 1998. 
 
Nombre:       _________________________________________ 
 
Firma:          _________________________________________ 
 
Fecha:         _________________________________________ 
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Appendix E: Interview Information 
This research incorporates information obtained from a field research trip conducted in the 
summer of 2014. The research trip took place in Lima, Peru (June 21st to July 11th); Mexico 
City, Mexico (July 12th to August 1st); San Jose, Costa Rica (August 2nd to August 22nd); 
and Washington DC, USA (August 23rd to August 29th). The aim of this field research trip 
was to conduct interviews with actors involved directly with the case studies, and with 
women’s rights and the Inter-American System of Human Rights more broadly. The overall 
objective of the interviews was to develop a comprehensive understanding of how the Inter-
American System of Human Rights can advance as a forum to effectively take account of, 
and repair, gendered harm in women’s (reproductive) rights cases. 
 
This Appendix provides information about the research design and interview process and 
includes the following sections: (1) Interview Participants, and (2) Interview Design and 
Questions. 
 
1. Interview Participants 
The interview participants were selected based on their affiliation or background with one 
or more of four groups: 
   (i) Participants working in the Inter-American System of Human Rights 
   (ii) Participants working with the selected women’s reproductive rights cases and  
         representatives from women’s rights NGOs more generally 
   (iii) Government representatives in each of the case study countries 
   (iv) Medical doctors involved in women’s reproductive health services 
These groups were selected in order to develop a bottom-up/top-down articulation of how 
women experience their reproductive rights, as well as violations of these rights. Medical 
doctors provided insight into how different women access reproductive healthcare 
differently based on geographic, racial, and economic barriers. Representatives from 
women’s rights NGOs and actors who participated in the selected case studies were crucial 
to understanding how reproductive rights cases develop before the Inter-American System, 
and also for determining practical strategies for advancing a “gender reparations tradition” 
in the Inter-American System of Human Rights. Interviews with government officials 
highlighted the challenges supranational human rights organs face when attempting to 
implement international human rights standards at the national level. Finally, 
representatives from the Inter-American System provided information about the internal 
challenges the System faces when dealing with issues of gender and reproductive rights.  
 
The interview participants were selected based on their group affiliation, and also based on 
their willingness to donate their time for an interview. The participants either responded to 
my interview-request email and committed to an interview time, or they were recommended 
by another participant, a process called “snowballing.” I was unable to speak with a number 
of actors that I planned to interview for several reasons; some did not respond to my 
requests, others were unable to find time to schedule an interview, and one request was 
declined. The accompanying charts detail the names and affiliations of the interview 
participants, and also include a list of individuals who were contacted but did not participate 
in the research.  
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Interview Participants 
Interviewee Name/ 
Affiliation 
Date / 
Location 
In- 
Person 
(IP) 
Skype 
(Sk) 
Peru 
(P) 
Mexico 
(M) 
Costa 
Rica 
 (CR) 
IACHR 
(Cm) 
IACtHR 
(Ct) 
Gov’t 
(G) 
NGO  
(N) 
*Self  
(S) 
Med 
(Rx) 
Ysabel Marin 
Sandoval (Attorney, 
PROMSEX - Center 
for the Promotion and 
Defense of Sexual and 
Reproductive Rights) 
Lima              
(9/7/2014) 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
      
 
X 
  
 
 
Daniel Aspicuelta  
(Director, Peruvian 
Institute of 
Responsible 
Parenthood) 
 
Lima              
(9/7/2014) 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
      
 
X 
  
 
X 
Cecilia Olea Mauleón  
(Researcher,  
Flora Tristán) 
 
Lima              
(9/7/2014) 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
      
 
X 
  
Liz Meléndez  
(Executive Director, 
Flora Tristán) 
 
Lima              
(9/7/2014) 
 
X 
  
X 
      
X 
  
Rocío Pilar Puente 
Tolentino (Sexual & 
Reproductive Rights 
Program Coordinator 
Manuela Ramos)   
 
 
Lima              
(30/6/2014) 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
      
 
X 
  
Milena Justo Nieto  
(Attorney, Manuela 
Ramos) 
 
Lima              
(30/6/2014) 
 
X 
  
X 
      
X 
  
Gladys Vía Huerta 
(Program Coordinator, 
Catholics for the Right 
to Decide) 
 
 
Lima              
(1/7/2014) 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
      
 
X 
  
Carolina Garcés 
Peralta (Women’s 
Rights Director, 
Ombuds Office) 
 
Lima              
(2/7/2014) 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
     
 
X 
   
Diana Portal Farfán  
(Attorney, Women’s 
Rights, Ombuds   
 
Lima              
(2/7/2014) 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
     
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
Shelia Jacay  
(Attorney, Women’s 
Rights, Ombuds 
Office) 
 
Lima              
(2/7/2014) 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
     
 
X 
   
Carla Villareal López 
(Attorney, Women’s 
Rights, Ombuds 
Office) 
 
Lima              
(2/7/2014) 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
     
 
X 
   
Marcela Huaita 
Alegre (Vice Minister 
of Women, Ministry of 
Women and 
Vulnerable 
Populations) 
 
 
Lima              
(10/7/2014) 
 
 
 
X 
  
 
 
X 
     
 
 
X 
   
Gloria Marisela 
Mallqui Osorio  
(Executive Deputy, 
Vice Minister’s Office, 
Ministry of Health) 
 
 
Lima              
(8/7/2014) 
 
 
 
X 
  
 
 
X 
     
 
 
X 
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Interviewee Name/ 
Affiliation 
Date / 
Location 
In- 
Person 
(IP) 
Skype 
(Sk) 
Peru 
(P) 
Mexico 
(M) 
Costa 
Rica 
 (CR) 
IACHR 
(Cm) 
IACtHR 
(Ct) 
Gov’t 
(G) 
NGO  
(N) 
*Self  
(S) 
Med 
(Rx) 
Roger Rafael 
Rodriguez Santander 
(Director, Executive 
Secretary of the 
National Council of 
Human Rights, 
Ministry of Justice and 
Human Rights) 
 
 
 
Lima              
(10/7/2014) 
 
 
 
 
X 
  
 
 
 
X 
     
 
 
 
X 
   
Jeannette Llaja  
(Former Director of 
DEMUS - Study for 
the Defense of 
Women’s Rights) 
 
 
Lima              
(3/7/2014) 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
      
 
 
 
 
X 
 
Beatriz Ramírez 
Huaroto (Advisor, 
Ministry of Women 
and Vulnerable 
Populations - formerly 
with PROMSEX) 
 
 
 
Lima              
(22/6/2014) 
 
 
 
X 
  
 
 
X 
       
 
 
X 
 
Luis Távara, MD  
(Sexual and 
Reproductive Health 
Consultant) 
 
Lima              
(8/7/2014) 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
       
 
X 
 
 
X 
Rebeca Ramos  
(Legal Investigator, 
GIRE - Information 
Group on 
Reproductive Choice) 
 
 
Mexico City 
(17/7/2014) 
 
 
 
X 
   
 
 
X 
     
 
 
X 
  
Doroteo Mendoza  
(Manager of 
Evaluation, 
Investigation & 
Information Systems, 
Mexican Foundation 
for Family Planning, 
AC - MEXFAM) 
 
 
 
Mexico City 
(24/7/2014) 
 
 
 
 
X 
   
 
 
 
X 
     
 
 
 
X 
  
Maria Eugenia 
Romero Contreras 
(Director, Equidad de 
Género) 
 
Mexico City 
(22/7/2014) 
 
 
X 
   
 
X 
     
 
X 
  
Lucía Lagunes 
Huerta  
(General Director, 
Communication and 
Information for 
Women - CIMAC) 
 
 
Mexico City 
(31/7/2014) 
 
 
 
X 
   
 
 
X 
     
 
 
X 
  
Rufino Luna Gordillo  
(General Director, 
National Center for 
Gender Equality and 
Reproductive Health 
Center) 
 
 
Mexico City 
(29/7/2014) 
 
 
 
X 
   
 
 
X 
    
 
 
X 
   
Luís Jardon  
(Director of Human 
Rights Litigation, 
Department of Cases, 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs) 
 
 
Mexico City 
(29/7/2014) 
 
 
 
X  
   
 
 
X 
    
 
 
X 
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Interviewee Name/ 
Affiliation 
Date / 
Location 
In- 
Person 
(IP) 
Skype 
(Sk) 
Peru 
(P) 
Mexico 
(M) 
Costa 
Rica 
 (CR) 
IACHR 
(Cm) 
IACtHR 
(Ct) 
Gov’t 
(G) 
NGO  
(N) 
*Self  
(S) 
Med 
(Rx) 
José Guevara 
(Executive Director, 
Mexican Commission 
of Defense and 
Promotion of Human 
Rights) 
 
 
 
Mexico City 
(25/7/2014) 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
   
 
 
X 
     
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
Marisol Aguilar  
(Impact Coordinator, 
EQUIS - Justice for 
Women) 
 
Mexico City 
(28/7/2014) 
 
 
X 
   
 
X 
     
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
Patricia Uribe 
Zúñiga   
(Former Director of 
the National Center for 
Gender Equity and 
Reproductive Health, 
Under-Secretariat of 
Health Promotion and 
Prevention, Secretariat 
of Health) 
 
 
 
 
 
Mexico City 
(31/7/2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
   
 
 
 
 
X 
    
 
 
 
 
X 
  
 
 
 
 
X 
 
Vanessa Coria  
(Advocacy/Program 
Manager, WGNRR 
(Women’s Global 
Network for 
Reproductive Rights), 
and formerly with 
CEJIL (Center for 
Justice and 
International Law) 
 
 
 
 
Mexico City 
(18/7/2014) 
 
 
 
 
X 
   
 
 
 
X 
     
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
Anonymous  
(Expert in Gender and 
Women’s Rights) 
 
Mexico City 
(30/7/2014) 
 
X 
   
X 
    
X 
  
X 
 
Hilda Picado 
Granados  (Executive 
Director, Asociación 
Demográfica 
Costarricense - ADC) 
 
 
 
San Jose 
(14/8/2014) 
 
 
 
X 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
X 
    
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
Ivania Solano 
Jiménez  (Attorney, 
Department of the 
Protection of Women 
in the Office of the 
Ombudsman) 
 
San Jose 
(20/8/2014) 
 
X 
    
X 
   
X 
  
X 
 
Adriana Maroto 
Vargas  (Academic, 
La Colectiva, 
‘Collective for the 
Right to Decide) 
 
San Jose 
(14/8/2014) 
 
X 
    
X 
    
X 
 
X 
 
Delia Maria Ribas 
Valdés, MD   
(IVF Doctor) 
San Jose 
(14/8/2014) 
X    X     X X 
Jorge Oviedo w/ 
Amanda Grosser  
(Deputy Attorney, 
General Prosecutor, 
State Rep. in Artavia 
Murillo et al. v. Costa 
Rica) 
 
 
San Jose 
(20/8/2014) 
 
 
 
X 
    
 
 
X 
   
 
 
X 
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Interviewee Name/ 
Affiliation 
Date / 
Location 
In- 
Person 
(IP) 
Skype 
(Sk) 
Peru 
(P) 
Mexico 
(M) 
Costa 
Rica 
 (CR) 
IACHR 
(Cm) 
IACtHR 
(Ct) 
Gov’t 
(G) 
NGO  
(N) 
*Self  
(S) 
Med 
(Rx) 
Huberth May 
Cantillano   
(Attorney, Victims’ 
Representative in 
Artavia Murillo et al. 
v. Costa Rica) 
 
San Jose 
(18/8/2014) 
 
 
 
X 
    
 
 
X 
     
 
 
X 
 
Mónica Arango 
Olaya (Former 
Regional Director for 
Latin America and 
Caribbean, Center for 
Reproductive Rights) 
 
Skype 
(11/7/2014) 
  
 
 
X 
       
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
Ana Cristina 
González Veléz, MD  
(Reproductive Health 
Expert, Global Doctors 
for Choice) 
 
Skype 
(4/8/2014) 
  
 
 
X 
       
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
María Daniela Rivero  
(Attorney, formerly 
Center for 
Reproductive Rights 
and IACtHR) 
 
San Jose 
(6/8/2014) 
 
 
X 
     
 
X 
   
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
Oscar Parra Vera  
(Former Senior 
Attorney, IACtHR) 
San Jose 
(7/8/2014) 
 
X 
      
X 
   
X 
 
Alexandra Sandoval  
(Former Senior 
Attorney, IACtHR) 
 
San Jose 
(12/8/2016) 
 
 
X 
      
 
X 
   
 
X 
 
Rosa Celorio** 
(Attorney and 
Women’s Rights Desk 
Specialist, IACHR) 
 
Washington 
DC 
(28/8/2014) 
 
 
X 
     
 
X 
    
 
X 
 
María Alejandra 
Cardenas  (Regional 
Director, Women’s 
Link Worldwide, 
former attorney at 
IACHR & Center for 
Reproductive Rights) 
 
Washington 
DC 
(27/8/2014) 
 
 
 
X 
     
 
 
X 
   
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
Luz Patricia Mejía   
(Coordinator, Follow-
up Mechanism to the 
Belém do Pará 
Convention MESECVI 
and Commissioner and 
Rapporteur on 
Women’s Rights) 
 
 
Skype 
(26/9/2014) 
  
 
 
 
X 
    
 
 
 
X 
    
 
 
 
X 
 
 
* Self: These participants did not represent their organization or institution during the interview. 
** This participant declined to have their interview audio recorded. 
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Potential Participants Contacted, No Reply (NR) / Unable to Schedule (US) / Declined (D) 
 
2. Interview Design and Questions 
The process of interview participant selection was divided into two phases. The first group of 
participants was selected based on the case documentation from each of the case studies. From this 
documentation, I identified actors involved in each of the cases (NGOs, individual lawyers, 
Commissioners/Judges, amicus curiae submissions), and contacted them via email to conduct an 
interview either in-person or via Skype. Second, I collaborated with colleagues (Ana Cristina 
González Veléz; Paola Gomez; Beatriz Ramírez; and Adriana Maroto Vargas) working on human 
rights and women rights issues in the case study countries, and Latin American more generally, to 
determine relevant actors who represent government entities, women’s and human rights 
nongovernmental organizations, and in some cases worked as women’s healthcare advocates and 
providers. I met these colleagues during a Health Rights Litigation course at the Harvard University 
FXB Center for Health and Human Rights in September 2013. 
 
In my first attempts to contact the interview participants I sent out cold emails based on the contact 
information I received from my colleagues. However, in most cases I was unable to establish and 
confirm interview appointments until I was physically in the country. I found that actors were more 
Name, Role/Affiliation Response 
Susana Chávez, Director, PROMSEX, Peru US 
Marisabel Cedano, Director, DEMUS, Peru NR 
Rossy Salazar, Researcher, DEMUS, Peru NR 
Roxana Vásquez, Former Director, CLADEM NR 
Gloria Cano, Director, APRODEH, Peru NR 
Gabriela Filoni, CLADEM US 
Monica Roa, Women’s Link Worldwide US 
Elizabeth Placido, CLADEM NR 
María de la Luz Estrada Mendoza, Catholics for the Right to Decide Mexico NR 
María Isabel Belausteguigoitia Rius, National Autonomous University of Mexico - Programa Universitario 
de Equidad de Género 
NR 
Paola Soto Maldonado / Maria del Carmen Juárez Toledo, INMUJERES NR 
Ana Gloria Robles Osollo, General Director Programs, Issues of Women and Equality between Women and 
Men, National Human Rights Center (CENADEH) 
NR 
Liliana Tojo, Program Director, CEJIL US 
Katya Nallely Vera Morales, Director of International Women’s Affairs, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Mexico NR 
Marta Solano / Cristina Nogués, Agenda Política de Mujeres, Costa Rica NR 
Rose Mary Madden, American Institute of Human Rights, Costa Rica NR 
Alejandra Mora, Former Ombudsman, Director of INAMU, Costa Rica US 
Carolina Molina and Carla Sierra, Cancillería. Dept. of Human Rights, Costa Rica US 
José Carlos Jiménez Alpízar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Costa Rica US 
Boris Molina Acevedo, Attorney/Victims’ Rep in Artavia Murillo NR 
Judge Diego García Sayán, Inter-American Court NR 
Judge Margaret May Macaulay, Inter-American Court / Inter-American Commission US 
Judge Manuel Ventura Robles (*Referred me to Maria Daniela Rivero) US 
Victor Abramovich, Former Special Rapporteur on Women's Rights, Inter-American Commission US 
Tracy Robinson, Current Special Rapporteur on Women's Rights, Inter-American Commission US 
James Cavallaro, Inter-American Commission (declined to participate b/c ongoing cases) D  
Larissa Arroyo Navarrete, Lawyer, member of the Collective for Free Choice  US 
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likely to return an email if they were aware of my in-country location. A significant number of the 
interviews were scheduled as a result of referrals from other participants (“snowballing”), which 
helped to put me in touch with actors who had not responded to my interview requests. 
 
To ensure effective communication during the interview process, I partnered with interpreters in 
each of the case study countries. These interpreters (Viviana Tipiani - Lima, Peru; Carolina Corral - 
Mexico City, Mexico; Muriel Vargas and Tatiana Saprissa - San Jose, Costa Rica) were paid an 
agreed-upon wage, and assisted with in-person interpretation which consisted of translating Spanish-
spoken responses into a recorder and clarifying discussion points. The interpreters also helped 
coordinate interviews via email and phone, and were on-hand to review transcription accuracy. The 
interview format and design was semi-structured, where each interview participant was asked a few 
introductory questions which then opened up the dialogue to areas of particular significance/interest 
to the participant and their membership in one of the four participant groups. Below is a selection of 
sample questions. 
 
Sample Questions 
• All Participants 
1. What is your role in X organization? And, what are the key mission objectives for this  
                  organization?  
            2. Do you want to speak on behalf of X organization, or do you want to speak in an  
     individual capacity? Is it alright to audio-record this conversation? 
            3. In your opinion, or if representing an organization, the organization’s position, what are  
                 the main obstacles to women’s equality in X country, or more broadly? 
            4. What role, if any, do you think the IASHR should play in advancing the reproductive  
                 rights of women in the Latin American region? 
 
• Group One: Participants working in the Inter-American System of Human Rights 
1. What are some of the main obstacles the Inter-American Commission and Court face  
     when it comes to applying a gender-sensitive approach to examining rights violations? 
2. What strategies do you think the IASHR should employ to advance gender-based  
     reparations through women’s rights litigation? 
3. What is your opinion on X case? Discuss. 
4. What tools/instruments do the Inter-American Commission and Court have at their  
     disposal to ensure the effective design of gender reparations? 
 
• Group Two: Participants working with the selected women’s reproductive rights cases and  
                      representatives from women’s rights NGOs more generally 
1. What was your involvement/experience with X case? Or implementation of the  
     reparations in this case? 
2. Does your organization have a legal/monitoring program? If so, how does it operate? 
3. What do you think the role of civil society is/should be in litigating and monitoring  
    reparations issued by supranational human rights bodies such as the Inter-American Court  
    or Commission? 
 
• Group Three: Government representatives in each of the case study countries 
1. What is the role of this office in implementing or litigating supranational human rights  
    cases? 
2. What was/is the State’s position in X case? 
3. What are the challenges in implementing reparation measures?  
!!
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4. How do different state entities coordinate and operate together to comply with  
    supranational judgments? 
5. For Ombuds Offices: Do you think there is a role for civil society to play, in coordination  
    with the Ombud Offices, to assist in the design of reparations? 
 
• Group Four: Medical doctors involved in women’s reproductive health services 
1. What obstacles do women and men face in accessing reproductive health care in X  
    country? 
2. How, and to what extent if any, does the state coordinate with reproductive healthcare  
    providers to develop education and training materials? 
3. How do different women experience their rights differently? 
4. Did you have any involvement in X case? What was your experience?  
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Appendix F: Fieldwork Findings Report (English version) 
 
 
 
! 1 
Women’s Reproductive Rights in the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights  
Conclusions from the Field, June - September 2014 
Researcher: Ciara O’Connell, PhD Candidate, University of Sussex, United Kingdom 
* Working paper, researcher can be contacted at c.o-connell@sussex.ac.uk. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Executive Summary 
The Inter-American System of Human Rights has proven to be a forum for the advancement of 
women’s reproductive rights in the Inter-American region. However, the Inter-American System faces 
significant challenges in promoting structural transformative change that enables women’s enjoyment 
of their reproductive health rights. This report examines three reproductive rights cases from the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: María 
Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru; Paulina Ramirez Jacinto v. Mexico; and Artavia Murillo et al. v. 
Costa Rica. In the summer of 2014, interviews were conducted with representatives in each of the 
case study countries, with the objective of the research being two-fold: (1) to understand how each of 
the cases developed, and the subsequent challenges and advancements; and (2) to learn from these 
cases in order to suggest recommendations for how actors can make better use of the Inter-American 
System as one of several avenues for protecting, promoting and fulfilling women’s reproductive rights. 
The report first discusses challenges in implementing women’s reproductive health rights, and then 
explores how the Inter-American System can strengthen its work on women’s reproductive health 
rights. 
 
Of the numerous challenges to the implementation and enjoyment of women’s reproductive rights 
discussed in interviews, the following emerged as particularly significant: (1) limited understanding 
and institutionalization of ‘gender’; (2) ineffective or nonexistent collaboration between actors; and (3) 
inadequate development, implementation, and compliance-monitoring of reparation measures. 
Interview respondents noted that the Inter-American Commission and Court face great difficulty in 
regards to institutionalizing gender throughout all of the System’s work, where the concept of gender 
is often misunderstood, and the funding allocated to work in this area is minimal. At the state levels, 
national legislation on gender equality and non-discrimination has increased, yet there remains a 
significant gap in how these standards are implemented. Additionally, the concept of gender as it 
relates to reproductive health rights has not been successfully developed in litigation efforts before the 
Inter-American Commission and Court, which may indeed be strategic in certain situations, but can 
also be perceived as a missed opportunity. Collaboration between actors is discussed in the report by 
briefly reviewing four different relationships: (1) NGO collaboration with fellow NGOs; (2) NGO 
collaboration with state departments; (3) collaboration amongst state departments; and (4) 
collaboration between NGOs and the Inter-American System. Interviews revealed common themes 
such as competition amongst groups, limited funding and trust, and duplication of work as central 
impediments to successful collaboration. However, there are several examples of successful 
collaboration efforts, such as the work being done by the CLADEM network, which brings together 
women’s rights NGOs from across the region in order to use the law as a tool for change. Finally, 
reparations remain a largely underutilized tool in litigation efforts before the Inter-American System. 
Interview respondents showed minimal concern for the design of reparations, and very few NGOs had 
effective reparation-monitoring functions. Civil society has a significant role to play in the design of 
effective, transformative and measurable reparations, yet there is a certain reluctance, based on 
funding and expertise, to engage in the work of formulating and monitoring reparations. 
 
As more women’s reproductive health rights cases come before the Inter-American Commission and 
Court, it is of the utmost importance to learn from the experiences of the case studies selected for this 
research, and to ask, what’s next? In this report, suggestions for how to strengthen women’s 
reproductive health rights are divided into two sections: national level, and Inter-American System of 
Human Rights. Several interview respondents agreed that the way forward in terms of advancing 
women’s access to reproductive health rights at the national level is to reform how children and 
university students are educated in gender, sexuality, and reproductive health. One interview 
respondent noted that the goal of education should be to create an “equality culture,” where concepts 
such as gender and autonomy are indivisible from reproductive health. Education also comes in the 
form of training, where medical doctors and members of the judiciary must be trained in gender and 
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substantive equality. The fairly recent Mexican protocol that requires gender training for federal 
judges is a promising advancement in this area. Implementing training and education programs in the 
medical and legal communities is not enough to tackle long-term sociocultural change; these efforts 
must also be coupled with youth education that emphasizes equality and autonomy. 
 
In order to achieve a more effective Inter-American System of Human Rights in terms of dealing with 
women’s reproductive rights, the following suggestions emerged: (1) creating a tradition of gender-
based reparations; (2) using the Convention of Belém do Pará consistently and constantly in litigation 
efforts; and (3) institutionalizing gender training in the Inter-American System. Although the concept of 
gender has increasingly become relevant to the work of the Commission and the Court, there remains 
a resistance to expand upon this work when developing reparations. For example, this was the 
situation in Artavia Murillo et al. (‘Invitro fertilization’) v. Costa Rica, where the case was 
groundbreaking in its development of gender reasoning, but a failure to reflect upon this reasoning in 
the reparations stage of the judgment became a significant missed opportunity for the promotion of 
women’s reproductive rights. The report suggests that future reproductive rights cases should be 
developed with gender-based reparations in mind from the initial stages of the case in order to 
effectively connect reparations to the causes of rights violations. The Convention of Belém do Pará 
has seen minimal use before the Commission and Court, and only one of its provisions is justiciable. 
However, the Convention has great potential in helping to illustrate the structural picture required to 
design effective reparations. Litigation efforts in forthcoming cases need to develop their arguments 
using the Convention of Belém do Pará, and should use all the tools afforded by the Inter-American 
Court’s interpretation of its jurisdiction over the Convention, such as using non-justiciable provisions 
to interpret the sole justiciable provision (Article 7(b)). Lastly, the Inter-American System continues to 
operate a small women’s rights department, where all of the work being done on gender in the 
Commission is relegated to a desk with one employee and two fellows. The work being done by this 
group is exceptional, but the task of incorporating a gendered analysis in women’s rights cases is too 
great. Interview respondents agreed that the Commission and Court should institutionalize gender 
more effectively in their work, starting with a training initiative so that all employees are trained in 
gender and understand the gendered causes of human rights violations. 
 
The above-mentioned challenges and recommendations highlight the thoughts and experiences of 
individuals working in and around the field of women’s reproductive health rights in the Inter-American 
region. Because the Inter-American System of Human Rights will undoubtedly encounter reproductive 
rights cases in the future, it is essential for actors to engage in every opportunity to reflect on 
advancements and missed opportunities in order to develop new ways to protect, promote and fulfill 
women’s reproductive rights in the future. The intention of this report is to play a small role in that 
process of reflection, where hopefully actors ranging from women’s rights NGOs to academics to 
medical doctors, can take a moment to see how far women’s reproductive rights have come, and how 
we can all better work to advance these rights in the future. 
 
This report is a representation of the initial findings and conclusions from fieldwork research. The 
researcher welcomes and appreciates any comments, additional information, advice, and questions.  
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I. Introduction 
 
As universal human rights standards have become increasingly accepted across the Latin American 
region, the focus on how to implement, and subsequently monitor state compliance is the foremost 
challenge in human rights activism and scholarship. Women’s reproductive rights in the Inter-
American region, as well as in many other places around the world, have faced relentless attack, as 
conservative movements coupled with longstanding sociocultural norms challenge women’s rights to 
autonomy, equality and non-discrimination. Cases emerging from human rights monitoring bodies, 
such as the Inter-American System of Human Rights, have noted the relationship that exists between 
gender, discrimination and women’s inadequate enjoyment of their reproductive rights. However, at 
the national level, state practice is in many ways disconnected from the rhetoric and reasoning being 
developed within the international and regional human rights communities. 
 
This research report, which is part of a larger doctoral thesis, is an initial examination of the 
advancements and challenges that exist in protecting, promoting and fulfilling women’s reproductive 
rights in the Inter-American region. In the summer of 2014, over 40 interviews were conducted with 
representatives from NGOs, the medical and legal communities, and state departments in Peru, 
Mexico, and Costa Rica, as well as with representatives from the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The goal of the interviews was to 
determine the causes and consequences of the gap that exists between international/regional human 
rights law and its implementation at the national level, specifically focusing on women’s reproductive 
rights. The research conclusions elucidate the difficulties that arise in developing reproductive rights 
cases, and also in coordinating efforts between different actors, such as governments and women’s 
rights organizations. Additionally, the report suggests initial recommendations for strengthening the 
Inter-American System’s approach to effectively implementing and monitoring women’s reproductive 
rights in the region. 
 
The foundation for this research is built upon three cases from the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights: María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru; Paulina Ramirez Jacinto v. Mexico; and Artavia 
Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica. Each of these cases is a reproductive rights case, and was chosen for this 
project because of its individual topic, as well as its background, challenges/advancements, and 
lessons for the future. The objective of initiating the research through the lens of these cases is to 
determine the success each one has had in terms of its development, reasoning, and implementation. 
A brief summary of each of the cases introduces the context in which reproductive rights litigation 
plays out in the Inter-American System. 
 
María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru (2003)1 
This case was the first reproductive rights case to be admitted to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights. The case involved the forced sterilization and subsequent death, of a rural indigenous 
Peruvian woman. María’s forced sterilization was representative of the situation for thousands of rural, 
indigenous women living in poverty who were the target of a massive state-implemented population 
control policy. The case resulted in a Friendly Settlement Agreement between the petitioner (victim) 
and the State of Peru, and included several reparations, such as: justice measures to hold those 
individuals accountable for the forced sterilizations; amendment of laws and public policies on 
reproductive health and family planning, elimination of discriminatory approaches in healthcare, and 
respect for women’s autonomy; implementation of training for healthcare personnel; and distribution 
of payments to the victim for medical, personal and education expenses. Perhaps the most 
noteworthy element of these reparations is the connection made between women’s reproductive 
health and discrimination against women, and in this case, poor rural indigenous women. This 
Agreement has not been fully complied with by the State, and there remains a strong sense of 
impunity in the country as a result of the State’s failure to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators 
of these crimes. Manuela Ramos, an historical feminist NGO in Peru, noted that this feeling of 
impunity is probably one of the main issues in the country. Although the Agreement highlights the 
indivisible relationship between reproductive rights and discrimination, the public sense of impunity in 
Peru is linked to justice issues surrounding the internal conflict that occurred around the same time as 
the population control effort, and not necessarily women’s reproductive rights. And, despite the fact 
that the sterilizations occurred during the time of conflict, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru, Case 12.191, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 71/03, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2 (2003). 
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created to address the human rights violations during this time failed to mention the sterilizations, 
which has also been a point of contention for organizations working in this area.2  
 
Diana Portal, an attorney with the Ombudsman’s Office Women’s Department, noted that in Peruvian 
society, there is no recognition of this case as being related to discrimination based on gender, race 
or class. She said the following: 
“There is not a social gender perspective, there are sectors, organizations, but as a society 
we do not have a gender perspective.  We do not have that perspective. I think that it is 
because of discrimination. Who were the victims? For example, in the forced sterilization 
cases, who were the victims? The major victims of forced sterilization were Andean women, 
or women who live far from areas in Piura, Cusco, or even in Lima. … So the same situation 
happens as during the internal armed conflict. Who the victim is determines the response 
from the state, and the consciousness of the other. People are not conscious that the 
situation could have been for them. They cannot see themselves in that farmer, or the 
Andean and Quechua-speaking woman.”3  
This argument about linking discrimination to the issue of impunity in Peru is especially important 
because it tackles one of the core issues for protecting, promoting and fulfilling women’s reproductive 
rights in Latin America - the type of woman is directly related to the type of violation, type of 
discrimination, and type of recourse. 
 
This case remains open before the Inter-American Commission, however a number of participants 
view this case as closed in terms of how much potential the case has in continuing to demand justice 
for women. Several participants agreed that a new forced sterilization case that utilizes the more 
recent developments made in reproductive rights in the region, with a different approach towards 
reparations, and more advanced level of reasoning and argumentation would significantly help to not 
only refresh the call for justice in the country, but to also draw stronger links between reproductive 
health rights violations, discrimination, and justice.4 
 
Paulina Ramirez Jacinto v. Mexico (2007)5 
Paulina was a young girl who was raped by a burglar in the State of Baja, Mexico. She subsequently 
became pregnant and sought an abortion, which was legal under the criteria for abortion in her state. 
Paulina and her mother were manipulated by health personnel who gave them biased information, 
with the result being that Paulina’s mother elected for her not to have the abortion. Paulina’s 
representatives claimed that Paulina’s story is indicative of the situation for many other girls and 
women who are forced into motherhood after being raped. Unlike the María Mamerita Mestanza 
Chávez case, this case never reached the admissibility stage at the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights. Instead, Paulina and the State of Mexico reached a Friendly Settlement Agreement 
before the Commission reviewed the case, which included the following reparations: monetary 
compensation for education and school supplies; psychological treatment and health services for the 
victim; a public acknowledgment of responsibility by the government in the local newspapers; 
changes to legislature; an assessment of the enforcement of the National Program for the Prevention 
and Attention of Domestic, Sexual and Violence Against Women; the dissemination of a circular from 
the Health Secretariat to the state health services and other sectors that would serve to ‘strengthen 
the commitment toward ending violations of the right of women to the legal termination of a 
pregnancy’; and a review of literature materials to detect shortcomings in information.  
 
This case is closed according to the Inter-American Commission, yet nearly every NGO and individual 
interviewed did not agree with the Commission’s decision to close the case. Vanessa Coria noted that 
the monetary payments were not made in full to Paulina’s son, and for that reason alone the case !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Final Report from the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, available at 
http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/pagina01.php. This issue was also brought up in an interview with Milena Justo, 
Human Rights Attorney, Manuela Ramos, Lima, Peru, 30 June 2014. 
3 Interview with Diana Portal Farfán, Attorney, Office of the Ombudsman, Rights of Women Department, Lima, 
Peru, 2 July 2014.!
4 Interviews with Jeannette Llaja, Former Director, Study for the Defense of Women’s Rights (DEMUS), Lima, 
Peru, July 3, 2014, and Beatriz Ramirez Huaroto, Advisor, Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations, Lima, 
Peru, 22 June 2014. 
5 Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico, Case 161-02, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 21/07, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.130, doc. 22, rev.1 (2007). 
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cannot be closed.6 Rebeca Ramos mentioned that although Paulina today is conscious of her rights, 
for her and her son, the primary concern “is the issue of monetary compensation, and those specific 
reparations.”7 A formal assessment of the National Program for the Prevention and Attention of 
Domestic, Sexual and Violence Against Women was not conducted, despite the State’s decision to 
include the National Program within the Agreement.8 Additionally, Alejandra Cardenas called attention 
to the fact that the reparation that required the Health Secretariat to distribute a circular to state health 
services was never completed.9 Cardenas asserted that this reparation was particularly important 
because it had potential to directly impact how members of the medical community understand 
women’s abortion rights. Despite these considerable shortcomings in implementation of reparations, 
this case does illustrate an evolution in reproductive rights cases before the Inter-American System – 
even the fact that the State entered into an agreement before the case reached admissibility is an 
achievement.  
 
Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica (2012)10 
Perhaps the most significant of the cases examined in this study is Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, 
which is a case that challenged Costa Rica’s constitutional ban on invitro fertilization (IVF). In its 
judgment, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights determined that the ban on IVF is 
discriminatory, and called for its repeal. The Court then went further by examining the scientific and 
moral arguments around defining the moment of conception, and also by developing a thorough 
definition of the right to reproductive health. While this case was groundbreaking in its reasoning, it 
failed to draw clear parallels between reproductive rights, women’s rights, and gender in its 
reparations. This disconnect can in part be attributed to litigation efforts made on behalf of the 
petitioners, where the focus was not necessarily on linking IVF to women’s rights, but was rather on 
connecting IVF to reproductive disability and the right to form a family. This argument is apparent in 
the reparations, which are particularly general and do not adequately place the ban on IVF in its 
broader context as a women’s reproductive rights violation. The reparations include the following: 
psychological treatment for those victims in the case that request it; publication of the judgment; 
annulment of the prohibition on IVF treatments and access to the service at healthcare facilities with 
infertility treatment centers; education and training programs in human and reproductive rights for all 
members of the judiciary (making mention of the judgment); and monetary compensation for the 
victims.  
 
The implementation of this judgment’s reparations has seen considerable success, however the ban 
on IVF remains. Jorge Oviedo, one of the State representatives in the case, noted that the monetary 
payments were made to the victims within three months of the judgment.11 Dr. Ribas, an IVF doctor 
who originally participated in the case before the Costa Rican government, asserted that all of the 
reparations, except the lifting of the IVF ban, had been completed.12 Finally, Huberth May, one of the 
attorneys who represented the victims, hopes that despite strong resistance from conservative, 
religious groups and the Constitutional Court, legislation to repeal the IVF ban will be passed before 
the end of the year (2014).13  Despite this relative success, Ivania Solano, an attorney at the Office of 
the Ombudsman in Costa Rica, said the IVF case has highlighted the Costa Rican State’s 
shortcomings when dealing with the regional system. She indicated that although the Foreign Affairs 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Interview with Vanessa Coria, Advocacy and Program Manager, WGNRR, Mexico DF, Mexico, 18 July 2014. 
7 Interview with Rebeca Ramos, Legal Researcher, Information Group on Reproductive Choice (GIRE), 17 July 
2014.!
8 Interviews with Patricia Uribe, Former General Director of the National Center for Gender and Reproductive 
Health, 31 July 2014 and José Guevara, Executive Director, Mexican Commission of Defense and Promotion of 
Human Rights, Mexico DF, Mexico, 25 July 2014.  Both participants described how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the National Center for Gender Equity and Reproductive Health, Secretariat of Health, collaborated to have 
the National Program for the Prevention and Attention of Domestic, Sexual and Violence Against Women 
included in the Friendly Settlement Agreement. 
9 Interview with Alejandra Cardenas, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Washington DC, USA, 27 
August 2014.!
10 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 
257 (28 November 2012). 
11 Interview with Jorge Oviedo, Deputy Attorney, San Jose, Costa Rica, 20 August 2014. 
12 Interview with Dr. Delia Maria Ribas Valdés, IVF Doctor, San Jose, Costa Rica, 13 August 2014. 
13 Interview with Huberth May Cantillano, Attorney, Victim Representative, San Jose, Costa Rica, 18 August 
2014. As of January 2015, a law has not been passed to legalize IVF in Costa Rica.!
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Ministry recently began work on fulfilling obligations of treaty organs, there are “no rules related to the 
implementation of the resolutions - none at all.”14 
 
It is important to note that in the reasoning developed by the Court in this case, the right to private life 
was directly linked to reproductive autonomy, reproductive freedom, and “the decision of whether or 
not to become a parent is part of the right to private life and includes, in this case, the decision of 
whether or not to become a mother or father in the genetic or biological sense.”15 This reasoning has 
great potential for future cases that seek to challenge violations of reproductive health rights, where 
the right to private life enshrined in Article 11 of the American Convention, can potentially be used to 
protect women’s “rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their 
children…,” as protected internationally by the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).16  
 
As a whole, these cases highlight the Inter-American Systems advancements and shortcomings in the 
case of women’s reproductive rights in the Inter-American region. Clearly, over time, reproductive 
rights have progressed within the system, with the IVF case representing a huge accomplishment in 
terms of its reasoning and potential for use in following cases. However, initial reflections from the 
information received during the interview stage of this research reveal the following concerns with the 
Inter-American System’s current approach to addressing women’s reproductive rights violations: 
inadequate institutionalizing of gender, limited collaboration between actors, and failure to develop 
and monitor effective reparations. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
II. Challenges 
 
One of the intentions of this report is to develop an understanding of the challenges various actors 
face in developing, implementing, and monitoring women’s reproductive rights. The research adopts a 
bottom-up approach, where the insight and perspectives of individuals and groups working on 
women’s reproductive rights at the local and national levels are seen as a great source of information 
and knowledge for state and regional/international actors. This section reviews the challenges the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights encounters in its work with reproductive rights, and does so 
by combining perspectives from representatives from national and international NGOs, 
representatives from state departments, and representatives from the Inter-American System. While 
the obstacles to achieving full enjoyment of women’s reproductive rights in the Inter-American region 
are innumerable, this report focuses on three specific challenges: (1) institutionalizing gender in all 
levels of work done by NGOs, States and the Inter-American System; (2) insufficient collaboration 
between actors, both horizontally and vertically; and (3) development, implementation of, and 
compliance with, reparation measures in the Inter-American System. These themes overlap and are 
inherently indivisible, but their individual analysis allows for deeper examination. 
 
A. Institutionalizing Gender 
“ We need to eliminate the idea that we look at women as if they are an object of power… the 
idea that women have a natural role, the idea that women are not equal in relation with men, 
institutionally.” – Roger Rodriguez, Executive Secretary of the National Council of Human 
Rights, Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, Peru17 
 
Framing women’s reproductive rights as rights that are violated, in part, as a result of gender 
discrimination, is a significant challenge. In the Inter-American System’s work on women’s 
reproductive rights there has been notable progression in defining and understanding this connection, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Interview with Ivania Solano, Attorney, Ombudsman, Women’s Department, San Jose, Costa Rica, 20 August 
2014. 
15 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica (2012), para. 143. 
16 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW, Article 16 (1)(e).!
17 Interview with Roger Rafael Rodriguez Santander, Director, Executive Secretary of the National Council of 
Human Rights, Lima, Peru, 10 July 2014. 
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especially in reporting mechanisms, thematic hearings and in the IVF case reasoning.18 For example, 
the Inter-American Commission report entitled, “Access to Maternal Health Services from a Human 
Rights Perspective,” noted that “It is very important to bear in mind, in this regard, that women have 
historically been subject to various forms of discrimination and that the obligation to remedy that 
discrimination demands the integration of a gender perspective in the design and implementation of 
laws and public policies affecting women.”19 The Commission has held thematic hearings on topics 
such as sexual and reproductive rights of women in Latin America and the Caribbean, reproductive 
health and emergency contraception, access to information about women’s sexual and reproductive 
health, and reproductive health for women living with HIV and AIDS.20 Expert testimony included in 
the IVF case highlights the role gender discrimination plays in women’s enjoyment of their 
reproductive rights: “Women are raised and socialized to be wives and mothers, to take care of and 
attend to the intimate world of affections. The ideal for women, even nowadays, is embodied in 
sacrifice and dedication, and the culmination of these values is represented by motherhood and the 
ability to give birth.”21   
 
Additionally, the Follow up Mechanism to the Belém do Pará Convention (MESECVI), which was 
established in 2004, has taken significant steps to protect reproductive rights within the Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women 
(Belém do Pará Convention), and also within the American Convention on Human Rights. Recently, 
MESECVI issued a Declaration on Violence Against Women, Children and Adolescents and their 
Sexual and Reproductive Rights, where the declaration included the following:  
“… sexual and reproductive rights are part of the catalog of human rights that protect and 
defend the Universal and Inter-American human rights system; and sexual and reproductive 
rights are based on other fundamental rights including the right to health, the right to freedom 
from discrimination, the right to privacy, the right to personal integrity and freedom from 
torture, cruel inhuman and degrading treatment, the right of all couples and individuals to 
decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of having children and to have 
the information and means to do it, and the right to make decisions about reproduction free of 
discrimination, coercion and violence and thus to be free from sexual violence.”22 
Luz Patricia Mejía, former Commissioner and Rapporteur on Women’s Rights, and current Technical 
Expert and Coordinator of MESECVI, explained that MESECVI’s role is to place pressure on states to 
answer questions about progress made in gender and women’s rights, which can be especially 
powerful because of the public nature of MESECVI’s questionnaire and reporting mechanisms.23 This 
mechanism is also effective as a tool to monitor how states incorporate a gender perspective in their 
legislation and public policies. 
 
The correlation between reproductive health and gender discrimination is also increasingly being 
championed in campaigns by national women’s rights groups, where movements such as “Déjala 
Decidir” promote activism around women’s rights to decision-making and autonomy - “Because I want 
to be the one who decides my life plan.” 24  Hilda Picado, Director of Asociación Demografica 
Costarricense (ADC) [Costa Rican Demographic Association], explained that in her organization’s 
prior work there was no connection between reproductive health and gender. However, she said, 
“since society has been changing, we have changed with society. So we have new handbooks, where 
we include topics like gender identity, sexual identity, gender violence, and sexual and reproductive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Gender discrimination has also been explored in several women’s rights cases in the Inter-American System, 
for example: Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, 16 April 
2001; Gonzalez et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,!(Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs) 16 November 2009; and Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Merits, Reparations 
and Costs) 24 February 2012. 
19 Access to Maternal Health Services from a Human Rights Perspective, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 69, 7 June 2010, 
para. 29. 
20 List of women’s rights thematic hearings, www.oas.org/es/cidh/audiencias/topicslist.aspx?lang=es&topic=15 
21 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica (2012), Expert witness testimony from Neuburger, para 298. 
22 Declaration on Violence Against Women, Children and Adolescents and their Sexual and Reproductive 
Rights, Follow up Mechanism to the Belém do Pará Convention (MESECVI), MESECVI/CEVI/DEC.4/14, 
Eleventh Meeting of the Committee of Experts, 19 September 2014. 
(http://www.oas.org/es/mesecvi/docs/CEVI11-Declaration-ES.pdf) 
23 Interview with Luz Patricia Mejía, Technical Expert and Coordinator, MESECVI, Skype, 26 September 2014. 
24 Interview with Gladys Vía Huerta, Program Coordinator, Catholics for the Right to Decide, Lima, Peru, 31 July 
2014. See https://www.facebook.com/dejaladecidir/info. 
!!
244 
 
! 8 
rights.”25 Movements and efforts such as these, that frame reproductive rights as a gender issue, 
have great potential to not only affect change in the present, but to also generate social and cultural 
change in the long term.  
 
However, a number of interview participants claim that framing reproductive rights within a gender 
discrimination context, while necessary, is not always effective in practice. For example, in many Latin 
American countries abortion is decriminalized under specific criteria, of which all are related to the 
health of women or the fetus, whether the health violation is physical or psychological.26 In this 
situation, litigation efforts can rely on the women’s health argument in order to build a case. Adriana 
Maroto explained, “the discourse of gender in the legal arena is very fragile… so, when we try to 
construct the concept of health, or of vida digna [dignified life], we’re doing it from the point of view of 
gender. We have to do it from the other side… there is a gender discourse that supports these 
arguments, but they have their foundation in the health aspects.”27 
 
While framing reproductive rights as health rights is undeniably advantageous, especially because the 
right to health is inherently linked to the rights to life, privacy, personal integrity, and information, 
which are all rights protected by the American Convention of Human Rights, it is also necessary to 
include gender reasoning in order to provide a structural picture of the context in which the violation 
occurred, and can/will occur again. Developing an understanding of reproductive health as a gender, 
and/or gender discrimination issue, has numerous benefits, of which some are: (1) it forces policy-
makers, state officials, and the Inter-American Commission and Court to examine and address 
sociocultural conditions that are both causes and symptoms of women’s reproductive rights violations; 
(2) it creates a discussion about varying forms of discrimination, and their intersections; and (3) it 
removes the burden on women to prove that their health is being affected, and places the emphasis 
instead on women’s autonomy, and their life project.  
 
Rosa Celorio, the Women’s Rights Attorney at the Inter-American Commission, claimed that one of 
the most significant challenges to incorporating gender into the Commission’s work is an insufficient 
understanding of the concept of gender within the Commission.28 One example of the inconsistency 
within the Commission as it relates to women’s rights and gender-related issues is illustrated by Dr. 
Ribas’ experience with the IVF case in Costa Rica. She said, “I got a lot of resistance from the lawyer 
who was in charge of Costa Rica (at the Commission)… so I talked to local friends, and got advice 
from other people, from the Center for Reproductive Rights and from CEJIL, they said, ‘try to get the 
case moved over to the women’s desk.’”29 Dr. Ribas continued, “They were marvelous, and we got 
the case moved over to the women’s desk, which took about five years. But then things started to 
move… and then the whole process from that point took five years from the time they (the women’s 
desk) got the case. They were very expeditious.”  
 
Both Celorio and Cardenas share the opinion that the institutionalization of gender within the 
Commission requires training, at all levels. However, training alone will not entirely shift the 
Commission’s approach to utilizing a gender perspective, there must also be efforts on behalf of 
petitioners to bring cases before the Commission that effectively incorporate gender in their 
reasoning, and that utilize an intersectional approach. For example, while the IVF case is undoubtedly 
an advancement in the fight for women’s reproductive rights in the Inter-American region, the 
shortcomings in the litigation arguments, as well as in the reparations, elucidate a disconnect between 
women’s reproductive rights and gender. Cardenas mentioned that this disconnect can in part be 
attributed to the fact that, “people who litigate cases are not necessarily the people who actually have 
this as a cause, and understand it.”30 In the IVF case, the victim’s representatives had no background 
in women’s reproductive rights, and were also initially reluctant to collaborate with NGOs or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Interview with Hilda Picado, Executive Director, Asociación Demografica Costarricense (ADC), San Jose, 
Costa, Rica, 14 August 2014. 
26 Worldwide abortion laws: http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/the-worlds-abortion-laws-map 
27 Interview with Adriana Maroto, The Collective for the Right to Decide (La Colectiva), San Jose, Costa Rica, 14 
August 2014. 
28 Interview with Rosa Celorio, Attorney - Women’s Rights Desk, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Washington DC, USA, 29 August 2014. 
29 Interview with Dr. Delia Maria Ribas Valdés, IVF Doctor, San Jose, Costa Rica, 13 August 2014.!
30 Interview with Alejandra Cardenas, Attorney, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Washington DC, 
USA, 27 August 2014. 
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individuals who did have this type of experience. In the final stages of the case they coordinated with 
the Women’s Office of the Ombudsman in Costa Rica and the Center for Reproductive Rights, but 
both La Colectiva and the Center for Reproductive Rights were not included in the development of the 
initial case, and were not invited to participate in the development of reparation measures. Huberth 
May, one of the victim’s attorneys, recognized that the case could have benefitted from further 
collaboration with specialists in women’s reproductive rights, and said, “I think that if we had to begin 
again we would include the reproductive rights and use the trial as an opportunity to help Costa Rican 
society progress… I believe the trial was not planned to go in that direction… issues like abortion, 
contraception, and topics related to women’s autonomy and right to decide about procreation, sex, 
etc…. I believe we could have taken more advantage of this case.”31 Perhaps the foremost missed 
opportunity in this case was the petitioner’s decision to frame the argument on violations of 
reproductive disability discrimination and the right to form a family, and to not also draw connections 
between IVF and women’s rights to decide. The end result of this case, in terms of the direct impact it 
has in Costa Rica, fulfills certain types of women’s and couple’s rights to form a family, yet the poor 
woman, the rural woman, and the woman who is not able to enjoy her right to decide, received no 
further reproductive rights protections.32 
 
In regards to the case study countries explored in this report, there have been significant 
developments in national legislation, policy and structure in incorporating a gender perspective within 
the state’s work; this work is not specifically focused on the relations between gender and 
reproductive health. However, a brief exploration of recent developments sheds light on state 
reactions to the need to incorporate gender into equality and discrimination-based work. It is important 
to keep in mind though, that while a piece of legislation or policy may seem promising on the surface, 
implementation is an ongoing challenge. 
 
In Peru, a restructuring of the State Ministries in 2012 allowed for the creation of the Ministry for 
Women and Vulnerable Populations, which released the National Plan for Gender Equality 2012-
2017. This plan promises to be more effective than past efforts because the Ministry has established 
a special directorate office to deal with gender mainstreaming horizontally among the different 
sectors, and vertically within the different levels of government. Marcela Huaita Alegre, the Vice 
Minister in the Women’s Ministry explained, “we try to make all ministries add the gender approach, to 
then make a reflection about their work, and to add a specific commission, so that this really is part of 
the work of the sector… the gender approach is not only from the Ministry of Women, we have to 
incorporate it in all other ministries.”33 Additionally, Peru is currently in the process of approving a 
National Plan on Education and Human Rights, where an element of that Plan is the National 
Program for Legal Education for Social Inclusion. According to Roger Rodriguez, if passed, this Plan 
has the “objective of training university students in the law faculties in human rights… oriented to the 
following: understanding that the basis of human rights is not necessarily human life, it’s not life, it’s 
not integrity, it’s autonomy. It has a dignity approach that comes together with a gender approach, 
and an education and intercultural approach.”34 
 
In Mexico, the 2013 implementation of a protocol entitled, "Judicial-Decision Making with a Gender 
Perspective," was partly the result of pressure from the Inter-American Court, where it found Mexico 
responsible in several cases involving violence against women.35 The protocol focuses on gender 
training for federal judges, where judges are trained to identify and evaluate the following: (1) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Interview with Huberth May Cantillano, Attorney, Victim Representative, San Jose, Costa Rica, 18 August 
2014. 
32 It is important to note that the case did not address homosexual couples’ rights to form a family, and that this 
issue is contentious in the current drafting of IVF legislation in Costa Rica. 
33 Interview with Marcela Huaita Alegre, Vice Minister of Women, Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations, 
Lima, Peru, 10 July 2014. 
34 Interview with Roger Rafael Rodriguez Santander, Director, Executive Secretary of the National Council of 
Human Rights, Lima, Peru, 10 July 2014. 
35 Judicial-Decision Making with a Gender Perspective: A Protocol - Making equal rights real, Gender Equality 
Unit of the National Supreme Court of Mexico (2013-2014), Available at: 
http://www.sitios.scjn.gob.mx/codhap/ProtocolGenderPerspective. Inter-American Court cases with a gender 
perspective referenced within the Protocol: Gonzalez et al. v Mexico (“Cotton Field” case), see paras. 502, 541, 
521 (16 November 2009); Fernandez Ortega et al. v. Mexico, see paras. 236 and 260 (30 August 2010); and 
Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, see paras. 219, 246 (31 August 2010). 
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disparate impact of laws and norms; (2) when gender stereotypes inform the interpretation or 
application of laws or norms; (3) how binary constructions of sex and gender lead to the legal 
exclusion or disenfranchisement of certain persons; (4) how inequitable distributions of resources lead 
to unequal distributions of power; and (5) the legitimacy of using differentiated treatment in laws and 
judicial decisions.36 The assessment element of this Protocol “tries to find how (judges) introduce 
gender reasoning and analysis into their argumentation… It is not only that they mention 
‘discrimination’ or ‘inequality;’ we are really looking for an understanding of substantive equality.”37 As 
of July 2014, an estimated 400 federal judges had completed long-term gender-based training. The 
focus on substantive equality in the Protocol’s training program has great transformative potential, 
especially because the final stage of the protocol is to monitor and assess the Judge’s work in cases 
following training. While this final monitoring stage seems obvious, in many gender education/training 
programs the challenge has been to evaluate the efficacy of the program – where funding and 
technical expertise to carry out such an activity is limited.  
 
In Costa Rica, the inclusion of gender and women’s rights in national programs is especially 
challenging. For example, over the past four years on International Women’s Day the National 
Institute for Women (INAMU) has concerned itself with makeup tutorials, massages, and shopping 
discounts instead of focusing on issues such as violence against women and access to reproductive 
healthcare. Recently a shift in leadership in INAMU has been cause for optimism, as a well-known 
feminist, and former Director of the Women’s Department in the Ombudsman office, is now leading 
INAMU. Adriana Maroto is hopeful that this new leadership within INAMU will revitalize a sexual and 
reproductive rights agenda. However, the situation in Costa Rica in regards to women’s reproductive 
rights is highly unpredictable. Ivania Solano mentions that although she was able to speak about 
these issues in an interview in August 2014, the situation could change drastically when the new 
Ombudsman is appointed.38 For Solano, regardless of the unstable climate in Costa Rica, one thing is 
certain, “They own our bodies, and they don’t let us have any choices.” 
 
Institutionalizing, or mainstreaming gender, is a challenge at all levels of human rights application. 
Unfortunately the term ‘gender’ is often misunderstood to be synonymous with the word ‘woman,’ 
which limits the transformative potential of incorporating a gender approach in policies, legislation, 
and case law. The federal judge training program in Mexico is especially promising because of its 
expansive understanding of the role of gender. However, it is important to note that gender training at 
such a high level of the judiciary does not have much of an impact for women and men who cannot 
find legal recourse at the local level. In order to undertake the challenge of institutionalizing gender it 
is necessary to first understand what gender means, and then to develop programs and policies that 
work from the bottom-up, where the teacher, police officer, and clinic worker are all educated in 
gender training. To begin this work it is necessary for different actors to collaborate and share 
expertise. The following section explores some of the challenges and advancements in collaboration 
efforts between the following actor groups: (1) NGO collaboration with other NGOs; (2) Civil society 
collaboration with State organs; (3) State department collaboration; and (4) Inter-American System 
collaboration with civil society. 
 
B. Collaboration 
One of the most frequent topics discussed in interviews was the challenge of establishing cooperation 
efforts between and amongst actors. While there are several examples of successful collaboration 
efforts, there remains tension, distrust and a sense of competition that in many ways hinders the work 
being done on women’s reproductive rights. This section briefly introduces some of the collaboration 
opportunities explored in the interviews between civil society, states, and the Inter-American System 
of Human Rights.   
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Judicial-Decision Making with a Gender Perspective: A Protocol - Making equal rights real, Gender Equality 
Unit of the National Supreme Court of Mexico, p. 8. 
http://www.sitios.scjn.gob.mx/codhap/ProtocolGenderPerspective. 
37 Interview with Expert in Gender and Women’s Rights, Anonymous, Mexico City, Mexico, 30 July 2014. 
38 Interview with Ivania Solano, Attorney, Ombudsman, Women’s Department, San Jose, Costa Rica, 20 August 
2014. 
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NGO collaboration with other NGOs 
In Peru, Mexico, and Costa Rica, every national NGO representative interviewed brought up the issue 
of limited funding as an obstacle to their work. Several participants explained that while in the past 
international aid programs were interested in reproductive rights in Latin America, the situation now is 
that funding is scarce, and difficult to secure. With less funding, comes more competition between 
NGOs to secure money for their activities. Also, this lack of resources has created situations where 
some NGOs have had to cease their work as an organization. An example of this is the deterioration 
of La Colectiva in Costa Rica, where individual members continue the work, but there is not enough 
funding to continue daily operations, or to afford an office.  
 
In this time of limited funding it is important for national NGOs to pool their resources, especially in 
regards to activism, local training/education efforts, and compliance monitoring of national legislation 
and international recommendations/judgments. While it is understandable that a fight for funding has 
forced NGOs to differentiate their work from fellow NGOs working in this field, the result has been a 
fragmentation and duplication in work, where NGOs working in the area are not well enough informed 
about other NGO projects and campaigns. However, despite the challenge of funding, there have 
been successful collaboration efforts in the countries represented in this research.  
 
CLADEM (Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women’s Rights), is a great 
example of national NGOs networking across the region to use the law as a tool for change.39 This 
network collaborates with international NGOs, and very importantly, creates a forum for national 
NGOs that do not necessarily work on the legal aspects of women’s rights to be involved in the 
advocacy and monitoring processes of legal decisions. Also, perhaps because of their involvement 
with CLADEM, some women’s rights NGOs that have historically worked on training and education for 
women, have started to shift their strategy to include a legal focus. For example, Manuela Ramos in 
Peru is undergoing an institutional change where they still understand their niche as an organization 
that works on promoting citizenship through education, but that now also sees space to work in the 
future on international and national public policies, and to work on “creating emblematic cases that 
can be used to propose improvements in health and education systems.”40 
 
Collaboration between international and national NGOs has seen significant success in bringing 
reproductive rights cases before international and regional human rights organs. For example, the 
Center for Reproductive Rights has collaborated with CLADEM, DEMUS, La Colectiva, GIRE, etc., to 
lend technical assistance to NGOs that otherwise may not have significant experience before 
international human rights bodies. However, these relationships require trust between the NGOs 
because there are risks associated with joining an international organization. Mónica Arango 
explained, “one thing to understand, and I’m saying this because I’ve been in positions where I go in 
to negotiate implementation of a case with the government and they just tell me bluntly, you’re a 
threat… you’re violating our sovereignty. And it’s a reality because we are a US-based organization 
and why is a US-based organization telling a country how to implement public policy? So there’s a 
question of legitimacy.”41 This point is important because it highlights the context within which 
international reproductive rights NGOs work, one where they have the expertise to assist with 
development of cases, but where their agenda is questioned, and often times, not considered valid.  
 
Civil society collaboration with State departments 
Opinions on NGO and State collaboration efforts differ based on the relationship each NGO has with 
a particular state department. For example, PROMSEX has a good relationship with the human rights 
department of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights in Peru, where the office was instrumental in 
helping to pass the recent therapeutic abortion protocol. However, as Ysabel Marín explained, the 
relationship shared with the Ministry of Health is more complicated, “when we were talking about the 
pill, we were friends, but then about the (therapeutic abortion) protocol, we were fighting!” 42  One !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 CLADEM (Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women’s Rights, Available at: 
http://www.cladem.org/en/about-cladem. 
40 Interview with Rocío Pilar Puente Tolentino, Coordinator of the Sexual and Reproductive Rights Program, 
Manuela Ramos, Lima, Peru, 30 June 2014. 
41 Interview with Mónica Arango Olaya, Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, Center for 
Reproductive Rights, Skype, 11 July 2014. 
42 Interview with Ysabel Marin Sandoval, Human Rights Attorney, PROMSEX, Lima, Peru, 9 July 2014. 
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point raised by several NGO participants was that collaboration with the state depends entirely on the 
department, the topic, timing, and often the individual representatives in the office.  
 
The role of the Women’s Department of the Ombudsman’s Office also varies in each of the countries, 
where in Peru and Costa Rica, the National Ombudsman is seen as having potential for collaboration, 
but in Mexico, NGOs are more wary of forming relationships with the National Commission on Human 
Rights. In Costa Rica, the Ombudsman’s office played a role in convincing NGOs to join the 
discussion surrounding the IVF case, and in Peru, the Women’s department of the Ombudsman’s 
office has worked with NGOs such as Manuela Ramos on training sessions, and with DEMUS on their 
campaign, “Un Hombre No Viola” (A man does not rape).43 However, although the Ombudsman office 
will in certain situations collaborate with NGOs, the role of the Ombudsman is to monitor the state in 
its human rights activities, where its relationship with NGOs is mainly to receive information that can 
then be used in reports. 
 
Lastly, in Peru, both Luis Távara and Daniel Aspicuelta expressed concern with the lack of 
collaboration between state departments and the medical community. Távara noted that there is not 
an institutional practice on behalf of the state to ask for assistance from medical experts who work in 
the area of reproductive rights. He explained that if this does happen, it’s an isolated case and not a 
common practice. 44  This is unfortunate because individuals such as Luis Távara, who have 
participated in international discussions about women’s health and reproductive rights and have 
worked with women in hospitals and clinics, are not seen as valuable sources of information at the 
national level. Daniel Aspicuelta, the director of INPPARES, echoed this opinion by mentioning that 
the public and private sectors do not often collaborate because they don’t share the same thinking 
about women’s reproductive health.45 With education being one of the most important elements in 
strengthening the medical community’s understanding of gender, women’s rights, and reproductive 
health, it is a significant missed opportunity that there is little to no collaboration between experts in 
this field and state-implemented training programs. 
 
State department collaboration  
Collaboration across different government departments is fundamental to the success of any national 
legislation or public policy. This is especially the case for policies that call for shifts in culture and 
society, such as policies that focus on gender equality or non-discrimination. Also, collaboration 
amongst state departments is necessary for the implementation of recommendations and judgments 
from supranational human rights bodies. Information from interviews with representatives of different 
state departments in Peru, Mexico and Costa Rica, as well as with civil society actors, underscored 
various instances where collaboration across departments was effective, and more often, where it 
was not. 
 
In terms of implementation of supranational recommendations and judgments, each state has a 
different process for delegating tasks to the different departments or ministries. In Peru, the Ministry of 
Justice and Human Rights receives communications from the Inter-American System and then 
collaborates with the relevant ministries. In Mexico, the process is similar, however the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is the department charged with implementation of supranational treaties and 
judgments. Finally, in Costa Rica, there is no formal procedure for implementing decisions and 
judgments, as noted above by Ivania Solano.46 During interviews most participants were unable to 
clearly discuss the path taken by international recommendations and judgments once the state 
received the order or signed the Agreement. The overall process lacks transparency, and as a result, 
is very difficult to track – which may be intentional. 
 
One example of effective cross-department state collaboration can be seen in the Paulina Ramirez 
Friendly Settlement Agreement, where the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Interview with Carolina Garcés Peralta, Ombudsman, Women’s Division, Ombudsman Office, Lima, Peru, 2 
July 2014. 
44 Interview with Luis Távara MD, Sexual and Reproductive Health Consultant, Lima, Peru, 8 July 2014. 
45 Interview with Daniel Aspicuelta, Executive Director, Peruvian Institute of Responsible Parenthood 
(INPPARES), Lima, Peru, 9 July 2014. 
46 Ivania Solano does mention that about a year ago (2013), the Foreign Affairs Ministry established an organ to 
deal with treaty obligations. 
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Center for Gender Equity and Reproductive Health within the Secretariat of Health worked together to 
include a program on violence against women in the Agreement. Patricia Uribe, former Director of the 
Center, suggested the inclusion of a plan she had been working on, called the National Program for 
the Prevention and Attention of Domestic, Sexual, and Violence Against Women. Uribe explained that 
there was a “moment where both things came together and they helped each other,” meaning that the 
Program and the Agreement helped each other to achieve momentum at the national level. Uribe 
explained the challenges she faced in implementing the Program, as well as incorporating the 
Program within the Agreement: “At some point, the authorities even tried to discredit the agreement. 
Because I was the one who participated, and I supposedly didn’t have the faculty to take part in those 
agreements. But I had a signed document by the secretary where he authorized me to do it. Initially 
the conservatives didn’t know this and so they tried discrediting the Friendly Settlement Agreement to 
pull back the agreement, but they couldn’t.”47 Despite efforts made to assist implementation of the 
National Program by including it in the Agreement, the actual impact of this Program has been 
minimal. In fact, Rebeca Ramos, a legal researcher with GIRE, said that a more powerful tool for 
protecting women’s rights in Mexico is the General Law of Victims (2013), which is a popular piece of 
legislation with origins based out of the Movement for Peace, and not necessarily the women’s rights 
movement.48 While this collaboration effort was initially promising, and is notable still, the overall 
impact was not as impressive. 
 
Dr. Luis Távara, a medical doctor working on sexual and reproductive health in Peru, provided an 
anecdote to illustrate inefficiency in collaboration between state departments in Peru. He said,  
“I believe those sectors (health, women, justice, etc.) have all been part of isolated efforts to 
improve health, but there is no integration of those bodies. An example on violence - the 
Ministry of Health established a guideline for serving women who have suffered from sexual 
violence. They have identified, at least in Lima, which health services are prepared to provide 
a service. The Ministry of Women tried to do the same, to regulate the same thing. They have 
their own facilities, where apparently they are providing services in sexual violation cases. But 
when the issue is about a victim of sexual violence, their health is an emergency, a medical 
emergency, so if it is a medical emergency, it needs to looked at in the appropriate place, the 
Health Ministry. That’s not a doubt about the good will of the Ministry of Women, but it doesn’t 
make sense that they have a competition against each other.”49  
The example provided by Dr. Távara highlights significant concerns in how state departments 
collaborate: failures to pool resources, limited intersectional approach, and ineffective competition 
between departments. While it is true that a victim of sexual assault needs medical care (both mental 
and physical), it is also true that the sociocultural context in which the violation occurred is necessary 
to understand in order to address it and hopefully take action to amend it. One could argue that the 
Ministry of Health is not the appropriate venue to establish a guideline for serving women who are 
victims of sexual violence as much as the Ministry of Women is not entirely appropriate; however, an 
appropriate solution would be a combination of the two, with input from civil society and the medical 
community. 
 
The relationship between the national Ombudsman office and state departments is one worth 
exploring. The role of the Ombudsman is to monitor state activities, and to issue reports on human 
rights situations in specific contexts, for example women’s rights. In both Peru and Mexico, 
representatives from the Women’s Department of the National Ombudsman offices discussed their 
monitoring roles and also showed an interest in the activities of the state at the supranational level, 
such as before the Inter-American Commission. When asked about the potential to collaborate with 
state departments such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the development of a Friendly Settlement 
Agreement, both offices stated they would be interested in such an activity if they were invited in that 
capacity. However, as Carolina Garcés Peralta explained, there is very limited precedent for the 
Ombudsman’s office to play a role at the international level. She said, “if there was a report or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Interview with Patricia Uribe, Former General Director of the National Center for Gender and Reproductive 
Health, 31 July 2014. See 
http://www.inm.gob.mx/static/Autorizacion_Protocolos/SSA/Violencia_familiar_sexual_y_contra_las_mujeres_crit
erios_par.pdf. 
48 Interview with Rebeca Ramos, Legal Researcher, Information Group on Reproductive Choice (GIRE), 17 July 
2014. Law of Victims January 2013 (Ley General de Victimas, Nueva Ley publicada en el Diario Oficial de la 
Federación el 9 de enero de 2013), Final Reform DOF 03-05-2013.!
49 Interview with Luis Távara MD, Sexual and Reproductive Health Consultant, Lima, Peru, 8 July 2014. 
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statement from the System (asking for Ombudsman participation), that would be excellent… We have 
our hands tied because we cannot do anything beyond the law.”50 Garcés Peralta explained that in 
the past the Ombudsman office attempted to take Peru to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, but that significant backlash questioned how the Ombudsman could take on that role in the 
Inter-American System and also be part of the State.  
 
While there are numerous other examples of state collaboration efforts, the ones highlighted here are 
illustrative of some of the current debates and challenges state organs face in designing effective 
practices and programs to implement women’s human rights. In summary, the following challenges 
emerged from interviews: processes for complying with international recommendations and 
judgments varies by country, but with overall challenges stemming from ineffective guidelines and 
unregulated transparency procedures; collaboration across state departments does not necessarily 
ensure success of a policy or program, although the effort may be noteworthy; duplication of work 
done by different departments is not only inefficient, but also allows for gaps in an intersectional 
approach to implementing rights; and the limited role of the Ombudsman, where there is possible 
potential to expand its role as a critical collaborator before the Inter-American System. 
 
Inter-American System collaboration with civil society  
The relationship between civil society and the Inter-American System has expanded over the last 
decade. NGOs participate in numerous capacities before the Inter-American Commission and Court, 
with three activities being most influential: NGOs serving as victim’s representatives in emblematic 
cases, NGOs participating in thematic public hearings before the Commission, and NGOs submitting 
amicus curiae reports as interested parties in cases. National and international NGOs have 
successfully formed partnerships in order to bring women’s reproductive rights cases to the Inter-
American Commission and Court. In the aftermath of a case, it is also NGOs that monitor compliance 
of state implementation of reparations, and then report back to the Commission and Court on the 
status of compliance. NGO participation in women’s reproductive rights cases has been essential to 
the progress made in this area. In fact, the IVF case is illustrative of the impact NGOs have in 
developing case argumentation and reasoning, where it is often the situation that NGOs understand 
the structural sociocultural problems that cause women’s right violations. 
 
Through the Commission’s thematic hearings mechanism, members of civil society share information 
with the Commission, which can then be used in cases, reports, and precautionary measures. NGOs 
may request these hearings, and the state can also choose to request a hearing. As mentioned 
above, in regards to women’s reproductive rights the Commission has held thematic hearings on 
topics ranging from emergency contraception to reproductive health for women living with HIV and 
AIDS. NGOs also participate by submitting amicus curiae reports to the Commission and Court, 
where they attempt to highlight structural problems that are both cause and symptom of the rights 
violation. While the Inter-American Commission and Court do not directly refer to amicus curiae in 
case decisions and judgments, the reports undeniably assist with setting the stage for understanding 
the context within which a rights violation occurred. However, despite these activities, the relationship 
between the Inter-American System and civil society faces significant challenges.  
 
The Commission and Court rely on civil society to report on human rights situations, bring emblematic 
cases, and to also monitor state compliance with recommendations and judgments. However, there is 
very little support coming from the System in terms of strengthening civil society. For example, in the 
aftermath of friendly settlement agreements and decisions, some interview participants expressed 
dissatisfaction with limited support from the Commission in the monitoring stages of a case. Vanessa 
Coria described a situation in one of the final follow-up hearings in the Paulina Ramirez case, where 
she was enquiring about the status of a payment for the victim’s child. She noted that the overall 
feeling from the Commission was that she should have been satisfied with the State’s compliance 
with the other reparations, and not push too hard for more. She said, “Sometimes we lose the battle 
because we don't have the support of the Commission to do the follow-up.”51 Additionally, because !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Interview with Carolina Garcés Peralta, Ombudsman, Women’s Division, Ombudsman Office, Lima, Peru, 2 
July 2014. In this interview Garcés Peralta also indicates that the Peruvian Constitutional Court no longer allows 
the Ombudsman office to submit amicus curiae, so they have reformatted that mechanism. Limiting the 
Ombudsman powers is indicative of the State’s attitude toward further participation on behalf of the Ombudsman. 
51 Interview with Vanessa Coria, Advocacy and Program Manager, WGNRR, Mexico DF, Mexico, 18 July 2014. 
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the Commission does not operate a formal compliance-monitoring mechanism, there is a significant 
burden on civil society to monitor state compliance efforts. With limited funding this is a gargantuan 
task, that in order to be remotely successful requires not only the support of the Commission, but also 
reparations that are designed to be monitored.  
 
C. Reparations: Development, Implementation, and Compliance-monitoring 
At the conclusion of an agreement, decision or judgment, the Inter-American Commission and Court 
review reparation measures that are suggested by the petitioners (and the Commission) for the state 
to fulfill. In the case of a friendly settlement agreement, the petitioner and the state reach a 
compromise with the goals of developing a remedy for the victim and preventing the violation from 
occurring again. When the Commission issues a merits decision, or the Court orders a judgment, the 
reparations are selected based on the requests from the petitioner/Commission. The reparations 
stage of a case has the objective of compensating the victim for the state’s violation of their rights, 
and also to put measures in place to prevent the violation from recurring; guarantees of non-
repetition. This second element, non-repetition, is especially important because of the potential impact 
it has for society, and ultimately for the advancement of rights protections in the region. However, as 
Alejandra Cardenas stated, the Inter-American System does not ‘have a strong tradition to be thinking 
about remedies… they (the Commission) ask for three or four things that are very general, but there is 
never a lot of thought put into what a reparation would look like… and there’s not a public policy point 
of view when they think about reparations.”52 This observation is evident in each of the cases studied 
for this research, where the reparation elements that have the strongest potential to affect long-term 
change are weak in design, and as a result, are not implemented at the national level. 
 
Oscar Parra, a senior attorney at the Inter-American Court, indicated that part of the problem with 
developing effective reparations can be attributed to a failure to develop a structural approach in 
emblematic cases. While the victim is the central focus of the petitioner efforts, cases before the Inter-
American System of Human Rights deal with structural human rights violations, where the focus of 
reparations should also be on a structural approach to guarantees of non-repetition. Parra explained, 
“every case, no matter what the topic is associated with, every case is a universal case, it’s novel in 
itself. It could be the same country, the same topic, it could be Guatemala, it could be forced 
disappearances… it could be a totally different approach depending on the litigation. And I think that 
for the Inter-American Court, considering that the Court is dealing with specific cases, it could be an 
important reason to develop specific narratives for specific cases. This is one obstacle for a structural 
approach, because sometimes if you don’t have a structural picture about a specific problem, it’s 
difficult to issue orders that are very open.”53 Parra refers to Mexico’s “Cotton Field” case as 
exemplary in this regard, where the concept of femicide was supported through a structural approach 
to argumentation, and where the reparations reflected the petitioner and the Court’s concerns with 
discrimination of and violence against women. 54  With the specific topic of reproductive rights, 
designing a case with a structural approach is essential to setting the stage for effective non-repetition 
reparation measures.  
 
Looking more specifically at the reparations in the IVF case, interviews conducted with 
representatives from the Court and the Commission, as well as with individuals involved in the case, 
highlighted a couple of factors that played a role in the development and effects of weak reparations 
in this case. First, the petitioners in this case could have asked for more specific and in-depth 
reparations that address IVF as it is a practice that enables women’s decision-making and freedom of 
choice, but that was not the focus of the petitioners’ argument, as was discussed previously by 
Huberth May.55 Second, although the judgment itself includes reasoning around the stereotyping of 
women as mothers, and takes into consideration the role gender plays in this stereotype, there is no 
reparation that reflects this as an impediment to women’s enjoyment of their rights. In other cases, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Interview with Alejandra Cardenas, Attorney, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Washington DC, 
USA, 27 August 2014. 
53 Interview with Oscar Parra Vera, Senior Attorney, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 7 August 2014. 
54 Gonzalez et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,!(Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs) 16 November 2009, is an example of reparations which reflect gender discrimination that contribute to 
violence against women: conduct an investigation into the violations using a gender perspective; create or update 
a national database of disappeared women and girls; and implement permanent education and training programs 
and courses for public officials on human rights and gender. 
55 See note 31, Huberth May Cantillano. 
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and also in Commission reports, the Inter-American System has recommended that states implement 
plans or programs to tackle the stereotyping and discrimination of women, but in this case the 
reparations do not effectively look at the causes of the rights violation. Lastly, because the judgment 
issued fairly general reparations, the State of Costa Rica faces significant difficulties when it comes to 
implementation. Jorge Oviedo explained that the Court does not have enough information about the 
context of the health system in Costa Rica to issue sweeping reparation measures such as, “the 
Costa Rica Social Security Institute must make IVF available within its health care infertility treatments 
and programs.”56 He raised concerns about implementation of the IVF legislation, and noted that while 
there may be legislation implemented to repeal the ban, there are no guidelines on how to pay for the 
treatment, and how to decide who gets the treatment. Oviedo argued that the Inter-American 
System’s failure to adopt the margin of appreciation doctrine is detrimental to implementation of the 
judgment because the Court is not in a position to understand the inner-workings and practices of 
each State.  
 
While most of the NGO representatives interviewed mentioned compliance-monitoring of case 
reparations as part of their activities, there was very little conversation around reparation design. This 
observation supports Cardenas’ claim that there is no tradition to be thinking about remedies, not only 
at the Commission level, but also at the level of civil ociety. Because it is the role of civil society to 
monitor state compliance with implementation of reparations, there must also be a push on the part of 
civil society to demand strong, detailed, educated and measurable reparations. In order to counter 
arguments such as those made by Jorge Oviedo about the Court’s lack of information about the inner-
workings of the state, civil society must become better prepared to think about the context within 
which a human rights violation exists, and about how to affect long-term social change within that 
context. While it is indeed smart to consider state sovereignty arguments, and to refer to state 
discretion to design and implement policies that effectively prevent repetition of violations, there is 
also a responsibility for petitioners and civil society to provide the Commission and Court with an 
opportunity to issue effective structural reparations. 
 
In the last year, the Inter-American Court added a formal compliance-monitoring unit to its 
mechanisms, which has led to a restructuring of how case reparations are monitored. As Alexandra 
Sandoval explained, in the previous model, the legal teams that developed and presented the cases 
were responsible for the case in its aftermath. This process allowed for lapses in monitoring, where 
the team wouldn’t have enough time or resources to adequately monitor state implementation of 
reparations. It also created duplication in work, where cases for a particular country may share 
reparation measures, but did not necessarily have the same legal team working on each of the cases. 
In the new model, compliance of reparation measures is monitored by grouping reparations from 
different cases together, which then allows for an analysis that is comprehensive, within the country’s 
context.57 Although this development in the Court’s work is fairly recent, it is indeed promising in how 
it reflects the Court’s agenda for the future. 
 
These challenges - gender institutionalization, collaboration efforts, and reparations - each carry with 
them significant hurdles in terms of their design and application. However, the intention of this report 
is not only to highlight these challenges (as well as advancements made in these areas), but to also 
share perspectives from various actors in regards to efforts to address these challenges. The final 
section of this report attempts to summarize ideas and opinions emerging from interviews which aim 
to develop new approaches for responding to the challenges discussed above. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
III. What Next? 
 
Over the course of the research interviews, participants were asked for their opinions on how to 
strengthen the Inter-American System in its approach to protecting, promoting and fulfilling women’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Interview with Jorge Oviedo, Deputy Attorney, San Jose, Costa Rica, 20 August 2014. Artavia Murillo et al. v. 
Costa Rica (2012), para. 338. 
57 Interview with Alexandra Sandoval, Senior Attorney, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, San Jose, Costa 
Rica, 12 August 2014.!
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reproductive rights. This section is divided into two parts, suggestions for change at the national level, 
and suggestions for change in the Inter-American System of Human Rights. The intention of this 
section is to share ideas, whether they be specific or general, between individuals, organizations, and 
state departments working in different countries, in varying contexts, and with diverse agendas.  
 
A. At the National Level 
Linked directly to the challenges of institutionalizing gender and collaboration, is the need for 
education and training. For many respondents, education was noted as one of the key elements to 
achieving structural change. And, when asked about the types of reparation measures that would be 
most effective in promoting long-term social and cultural change, education and training were noted 
as having the greatest potential.  
 
Diana Portal said, “one of the most important elements is education… how we are educating girls in 
our country, in the secondary level, and at the university. That is a pending issue in our country - to 
have a consciousness to integrate a gender perspective, an equality culture of non-discrimination, an 
education that promotes freedom from violence, which is then reflected in life, and in culture.”58 When 
thinking about how to better promote an “equality culture,” Jeannette Llaja agreed that education is 
instrumental in promoting a shift in how society views women. She thinks it is important to start this 
process at an early age, so that “if a child is three years old and sees the dad talk down to the mom, 
s/he learns that what is happening privately at home is not always right.” Llaja added, “it is very easy 
to say (to the state), ‘implement programs for children in young age groups to start talking about 
equality, and then to measure those programs, and start showing what kinds of programs are being 
made, gather the statistics…’ but with the words gender and equality, it is important to add those 
terms.”59 
 
Ana Cristina González Vélez, a medical doctor and expert consultant in sexual and reproductive 
health and rights, concurs that education and training are fundamental components in fulfilling 
women’s reproductive health rights in the region. She noted that her organization, Global Doctors for 
Choice, is aware of the need to work at the university level, with medical students, in order to 
introduce notions of rights into medical training. She said, “(doctors) haven't had the opportunity to 
see the relations between what they do, and the human rights framework. So, you have to put the 
actions or the activities that a doctor does, or the kinds of things that they deal with, in terms of human 
rights. So, how is the right to information different than giving complete and timely information? Do 
this all in a way that women can understand... these kinds of things doctors don't understand as part 
of a right. They see rights issues as a general, an abstract thing, and their work is the real life...”60  
 
These perspectives illustrate the interconnection between youth education and training of medical 
personnel, where the goal is to create an all-encompassing rights culture. However, there are 
challenges with implementing education and training at the national and local levels. Hilda Picado, 
Director of ADC, highlights some of the challenges she faces with implementing sexual and 
reproductive rights education at public schools in Costa Rica. ADC instructs approximately 5,000 high 
school students a year with their program, but they face funding challenges which in turn impact the 
number of educators that can be trained and the quantity of materials to be developed. Also, 
measuring the success of the program requires funding that ADC does not have, which makes it 
difficult to prove the value of this type of education.61  
 
Challenges also arise in training of medical personnel, where courses on sexual and reproductive 
rights are often electives, or they are taken by practicing doctors who have a particular interest in the 
material. Luis Távara emphasized the need for medical students and practicing doctors to understand 
they need to respect their patient’s beliefs, and to recognize that “in healthcare that are differences 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Interview with Diana Portal Farfán, Attorney, Office of the Ombudsman, Rights of Women Department, Lima, 
Peru, 2 July 2014. 
59 Interview with Jeannette Llaja, Former Director, Study for the Defense of Women’s Rights (DEMUS), Lima, 
Peru, 3 July 2014. 
60 Interview with Ana Cristina González Vélez, MD, Sexual and Reproductive Health Expert, Global Doctors for 
Choice, Skype, 5 August 2014. 
61 Interview with Hilda Picado, Executive Director, Asociación Demografica Costarricense (ADC), San Jose, 
Costa, Rica, 14 August 2014. 
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based on gender, and on cultural ways.”62 But, without an institutional shift to include rights education 
in sexual and reproductive health training, the potential for rights violations in the medical sector is 
huge – as was the situation for Paulina Ramirez in Mexico. 
 
Another component of training is at the judicial level, where members of the judiciary learn to adopt a 
gender perspective in their understanding and interpretation of the law. Mexico’s protocol to train 
federal judges to use a gender perspective is a promising development, but this program targets the 
highest level of judges, and has not evolved to include training for lower level judges, or those judges 
that women first encounter when denouncing the state. 63  Additionally, this program has not 
incorporated social awareness in its approach, so women in Mexico are not aware of the potential 
changes happening in the judiciary. Much like the situation with medical training, the protocol in 
Mexico does not require members of the judiciary to enroll in gender training. However, in anticipating 
possible reluctance to participate on behalf of the judges, the program has partnered with a national 
university to develop a masters program in the area, which has proven to be a great incentive.64 
 
The Inter-American System has the capacity to work in the fields identified above, and in some 
situations it has issued recommendations and reparations requiring the state to invest in training 
programs for medical personnel and members of the judiciary. However, of each of the reproductive 
rights cases examined in this research, not one includes a reparation that focuses on youth education 
as an important tool to eradicate gender discrimination. It is the role of petitioners and the 
Commission to design and request reparation measures, so collaboration efforts made with 
individuals and groups working on education has great potential for not only including these types of 
reparations in the System’s work, but also for ensuring their implementation.  
 
Alongside the necessity for education and training, is the need for both civil society and the state to 
create structures to implement and monitor supranational recommendations and judgments. In the 
aftermath of any case emerging from the Inter-American System, compliance monitoring becomes the 
responsibility of civil society. However, with limited resources, and often general reparations that are 
not easily measured, this is a huge task. Because of these challenges, civil society organizations 
focus on measuring implementation of reparations that are easy to see: such as monetary 
compensation, or legislative reform.65 Reparations which are more focused on structural change, such 
as implementation and assessment of the National Program for the Prevention and Attention of 
Domestic, Sexual and Violence Against Women in the Paulina Ramirez case, are not adequately 
monitored because the reparation itself is too broad. Cardenas explained, “I think this has been a 
learning curve for practitioners and NGOs, is that they realized that this is a contract (a Friendly 
Settlement Agreement)... so you really have to think about very concrete terms for these agreements. 
That you can actually monitor and follow up.”66 While there are significant challenges civil society 
faces in regards to monitoring state implementation, the priority for reproductive rights cases must be 
two-fold: get the case to the Inter-American System, and then monitor all the reparations. But of 
course, in order to do this, petitioners need to work with the Commission and Court to develop 
effective reparations. 
 
Lastly, one of the most surprising challenges revealed at the national level is the extent to which the 
state is unprepared to implement reparation measures. Luis Jardón, Director of Human Rights 
Litigation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mexico, explained that part of the challenge in fulfilling 
the monetary compensation reparation in the Paulina Ramirez case was that at the time there were 
no funds allocated in the budget for payments related to remedies ordered by international organs.67 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Interview with Luis Távara MD, Sexual and Reproductive Health Consultant, Lima, Peru, 8 July 2014. 
63 See note 36. Interview with Expert in Gender and Women’s Rights, Anonymous, Mexico City, 30 July 2014. 
Judicial-Decision Making with a Gender Perspective: A Protocol - Making Equal Rights Real, Gender Equality 
Unit of the National Supreme Court of Mexico, www.sitios.scjn.gob.mx/codhap/ProtocolGenderPerspective.!
64 Interview with Expert in Gender and Women’s Rights, Anonymous, Mexico City, 30 July 2014. 
65 For a further discussion of this argument, see “Litigating Reproductive Health Rights in the Inter-American 
System: What Does a Winning Case Look Like?” Health and Human Rights: An International Journal, FXB 
Center for Health & Human Rights, Harvard University Press, Volume 16 (2) December 2014, available at 
http://www.hhrjournal.org/volume-16-issue-2/.!
66 Interview with Alejandra Cardenas, Attorney, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Washington DC, 
USA, 27 August 2014. 
67 Interview with Luis Jardón, Director of Human Rights Litigation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico DF, Mexico, 
29 July 2014. 
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And, as Ivania Solano mentioned above, the state of Costa Rica does not have a system in place to 
formally implement and track compliance with reparations. One of the institutional priorities that the 
Inter-American System should look for in regards to state intentions of complying with reparations is a 
national mechanism dedicated to implementation.  
 
 
B. In the Inter-American System 
The following suggestions were discussed as possible strategies for strengthening the Inter-American 
System’s approach to protecting, promoting, and fulfilling women’s reproductive rights: (1) stronger 
reparations that focus on gender and discrimination; (2) an expansion of the Commission and Court’s 
use of the Belém do Pará convention; and (3) institutional training using an intersectional approach 
within all levels of the Commission and Court.  
 
Gender-Based Reparations 
As mentioned above, there is a compelling need to incorporate gender and discrimination into 
argumentation and reparations before the Inter-American Commission and Court. As Oscar Parra 
explained, it is imperative that litigation efforts aim to frame cases using a structural approach to 
address a specific problem. In doing so, the Commission and Court are better equipped to understand 
how and why rights violations occurred, and are then able to place the violation in its larger context. 
Of the three cases highlighted in this report, the forced sterilization case, María Mamerita Mestanza 
Chávez v. Peru, goes the furthest in developing the structural picture in terms of women’s rights. The 
agreed upon facts of the case state that María’s experience is one “among a large number of cases of 
women affected by a massive, compulsory, and systematic government policy to stress sterilization 
as a means for rapidly altering the reproductive behavior of the population, especially poor, Indian, 
and rural women.”68 Then, this structural picture is linked to a reparation that seeks to connect this 
specific case to the larger context: “The Peruvian state pledges to change laws and public policies on 
reproductive health and family planning, eliminating any discriminatory approach and respecting 
women’s autonomy.”69 This reparation makes an effort to address forced sterilization as it was a 
discriminatory practice inflicted upon a certain type of woman in Peru. Although the Peruvian state 
rarely recognizes supranational cases and treaties as influential on its legislation and policy,70 it is 
plausible to infer a connection between this reparation and the Ministry of Women’s progress towards 
developing its National Plan for Equal Opportunities of Women and Men 2006-2010, and the National 
Plan for Gender Equality 2012-2017. In terms of measuring state compliance, it is necessary and 
beneficial to develop reparations that draw clear connections between the case and state action. 
Lastly, measuring the efficacy of a reparation designed to address inequality and gender 
discrimination is a challenge, because although the state may reform and pass legislation to that 
effect, putting paper into practice, and then assessing that practice, remains a significant hurdle. 
 
In order to start developing more effective reparations that include a gender perspective, it will be 
necessary for petitioners, and the Commission and Court, to understand, and act upon, the 
interrelated nature of women’s rights violations. For example, the underlying issues of all women’s 
rights violations can be directly linked to discrimination against, and stereotyping of, women. While the 
“Cotton Field” v. Mexico case recognized gender discrimination as an obstacle to women’s rights to 
life,71 the same argument is more difficult to assert in a reproductive rights case, largely because of its 
contentious subject matter. Even within the issue of reproductive health, there are certain ‘safe’ 
subjects, and others that are off-limits. For example, in the IVF case the Court clearly defined the right 
to reproductive health and linked it to the right to integrity, but a year later in its provisional measure 
for “B,”72 the Court did not even mention the word ‘abortion,’ let alone incorporate its own reasoning 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru, Case 12.191, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 71/03, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, (2003), para. 9. 
69 María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru, Case 12.191, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 71/03, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, (2003), 11th reparation. 
70 Interview with Mónica Arango Olaya, Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, Center for 
Reproductive Rights, Skype, 11 July 2014. 
71 Gonzalez et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,!(Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs) 16 November 2009. 
72 “B” Provisional Measure in Respect of El Salvador (29 May 2013), available at 
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/B_se_01.pdf. 
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from the IVF case.73 In order to begin developing gender-based reparations, those actors participating 
in the Inter-American System must start to approach women’s violations with a gender-based 
perspective, where, for example, reproductive health violations and femicide originate from the same 
root cause; discrimination and violence against women.  
 
Using Belém do Pará 
The Convention of Belém do Pará is the only international convention specifically designed to address 
violence against women. Overall use of the Convention of Belém do Pará has been limited, with only 
a small selection of Commission Court cases referring to the Convention of Belém do Pará. However, 
the Commission’s use of the Convention has shown significant progress over time, which is partly 
attributable to work being done by litigators and civil society that use the Convention to develop a 
structural picture of a specific problem in emblematic cases. While the Commission and Court’s 
reluctance to incorporate Belém do Pará in decisions and judgments has lessened over time, there 
remains much work to be done in future cases in order to tap into the Convention’s potential. 
 
While the Convention in its entirety is a powerful instrument, the Inter-American Court has determined 
that only Article 7 falls within the jurisdiction of the Court.74 The Commission has the capacity to find 
violations of the other provisions enshrined within the Convention, but the current practice enforces 
the Court’s interpretation of the Convention. In brief, Article 7 provisions protect women’s rights to due 
diligence, where states have a duty to prevent and punish any act or practice of violence against 
women. Liz Melendez explained that the utility of this Article is potentially quite expansive, where the 
duty to prevent violence covers the structural problems which ultimately cause women’s rights 
violations.75 While the scope of Article 7 is undeniable, the emphasis thus far has been on due 
diligence and domestic justice measures, where perpetrators of crimes are required to face 
accountability. When asked to expand upon its jurisdiction of the Convention of Belém do Pará to 
include Articles 8 and 9, the Court determined that these provisions could indeed be referred to in 
interpreting Article 7 violations, but that they did not have stand-alone enforceability powers. Article 8 
includes provisions such as the progressive realization of measures designed “to modify social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, including the development of formal and informal 
educational programs appropriate to every level of the educational process, to counteract prejudices, 
customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of 
the sexes or on the stereotyped roles for men and women which legitimize or exacerbate violence 
against women.”76  Article 9 encapsulates the overall objective of the Convention of Belém do Pará: 
“States Parties shall take special account of the vulnerability of women to violence by reason of, 
among others, their race or ethnic background or their status as migrants, refugees or displaced 
persons. Similar consideration shall be given to women subjected to violence while pregnant or who 
are disabled, of minor age, elderly, socioeconomically disadvantaged, affected by armed conflict or 
deprived of their freedom.”77 This distinction in enforceability is important to acknowledge because 
Article 7 is in many ways a duplication of rights already protected within the American Convention, 
and taken alone this provision has very little impact in developing a structural picture of women’s 
rights violations. This concern relates back to Oscar Parra’s ideas surrounding the need for petitioners 
to frame violations within their structural background in order to then ask for reparations that have 
transformative potential.78 By limiting application of the Convention of Belém do Pará the Court 
signals to petitioners the need to develop arguments that use Articles 8 and 9 effectively in order to 
interpret Article 7; a challenge that petitioners must keep in mind when bringing future women’s 
reproductive rights cases. 
 
However, it is important to note that feminists working in this area are increasingly aware of the 
limitations and potential advancements that come with using the concept of due diligence in litigation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 The IVF (Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica) case includes an expansive definition of reproductive health, and 
links reproductive autonomy to integrity and privacy, but in the “B” provisional measure the focus is on the right to 
life and humane treatment, with no reference made to the interrelated nature of these rights with integrity.  
74  Gonzalez et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs) 16 November 2009, paras. 35-80. 
75 Interview with Liz Melendez, Executive Director, Flora Tristán, Lima, Peru, 9 July 2014. 
76 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women,  
“Convention of Belem do Para”, Article 8(b). 
77 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women,  
“Convention of Belem do Para”, Article 9. 
78 See O. Parra, note 53. 
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efforts.79 In fact, the ‘appropriation’ of due diligence by feminists has allowed for a challenge of the 
historic public/private divide. This means that where at one time women’s rights violations were 
relegated to self-regulation within the private sphere, the concept of diligence can be used to bring 
those violations into the public arena, where violations are seen publically, and demand a different, 
more accountable, form of regulation. In the Inter-American System there remains much to be seen in 
terms of how litigators and the Commission and Court expand upon Article 7 of the Convention of 
Belém do Pará, because it is partly the duty of the petitioner to develop arguments that allow for 
further interpretation of the Convention.  
 
Gender Training in the IAS  
Ultimately, the development of gender-based reparations and further use of the Convention of Belém 
do Pará are merely wishful thinking without implementation of gender-based training at all levels of 
the Inter-American System of Human Rights. This is because both the Convention and gender-based 
reparations remain an afterthought in case development as a result of the lack of knowledge about 
the role of gender within the Inter-American System. Indicative of this lapse in gender understanding 
is the current structure of the rapporteurships in the Commission. The women’s rights desk is 
operated on a part-time basis, with one permanent member of staff and two temporary fellows.80 And, 
interestingly, including gender-based issues in the Commission’s work is more contentious than one 
might expect. Rosa Celorio explained the political side of women’s rights work within the Commission, 
where the President of the Commission is currently also the rapporteur on women’s rights; she must 
take care not to favor certain themes over others in her capacity as President.81 
 
It is undeniable that there is a significant problem in the Commission in regards to incorporating a 
gendered analysis of human rights violations. Several interview respondents commented that training 
for all employees is essential if an effort is to be made to shift the current practice from reluctant to 
willing in terms of including gender-based perspectives in the Commission’s work. Of course, the 
immediate reply to such a suggestion is the need for more funding to implement such a program. It 
can be argued however, that the current funding is put to little good use if the work done by the 
Commission is inherently flawed in its approach. It is also important to note that gender-based training 
is not the only training that would benefit women victims of human rights violations. Too often right 
violations are dissected and compartmentalized into separate (and not always equal) themes, when in 
fact the themes overlap and intersect. For example, in the first case mentioned in this report, María 
Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru, the victim experienced her rights violations as an indigenous, 
poor and rural woman, where each of these conditions combined to contribute to her discrimination. In 
establishing mandatory training programs at all levels of the Commission and Court which incorporate 
the interrelated nature of human rights violations, there is great reason to believe that cases will be 
better equipped with structural pictures of systemic problems that cause human rights violations. 
 
However, it is essential to recognize that training programs within the Inter-American System are a 
limited solution to a far-reaching problem. The Inter-American Commission and Court are human 
rights bodies that serve as the last resort for recourse, where a gender approach to analyzing cases is 
indeed welcomed, but in reality comes much too late for the individual victim. Gender based training 
must also be implemented at the national and local levels, so that doctors, police officers, members of 
local, state and national judiciaries, educators at the primary, secondary and university levels, and 
members of families are given an opportunity to explore the gendered dynamics of life, and hopefully, 
subsequently challenge them. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 See article, Paulina García-Del Moral & Megan Alexandra Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered 
politics of the public/private divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” Citizenship Studies, Vol. 
18(6-7) 661-675 (2014). 
80 Interview with Rosa Celorio, Attorney - Women’s Rights Desk, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Washington DC, USA, 29 August 2014. 
81 Interview with Rosa Celorio, Attorney - Women’s Rights Desk, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Washington DC, USA, 29 August 2014.!
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IV. Conclusion 
 
The protection, promotion and fulfillment of women’s reproductive health rights in the Inter-American 
region is a task best undertaken using a multifaceted “bottom-up” approach. While international 
human rights law certainly has a symbolic and regulatory function and carries with it a sense of 
legitimacy, on its own it lacks the power to effect structural and transformative change. As feminists 
and/or human rights advocates at the local and national levels become increasingly familiar with the 
human rights tools available to them at the regional and international levels, there is a significant 
opportunity to further include civil society in activities in these arenas. However, as this report has 
shown, the challenges that limit the advancement of women’s reproductive rights through the Inter-
American System are numerous. Certainly further collaboration between actors, more significant 
efforts to understand and institutionalize gender, and effective gender-based reparations are key to 
achieving progress in this area, but these recommendations are useless if not accompanied by local 
and national level activism that calls for social, cultural and political reform. 
 
Perhaps the clearest concern emerging from interviews conducted during this research has been the 
social and cultural climate of gender discrimination in the Inter-American region, which is the root 
cause for women’s reproductive rights violations. Interestingly though, this concern is not at the 
forefront of the work being done on reproductive rights in the Inter-American System. Although 
gender-based discrimination is discussed in reporting mechanisms and in cases if only minimally, 
gender-based discrimination is an afterthought for which argumentation and reparation design are 
extremely weak. While litigation efforts have proven to be relatively successful over time, there 
remains a significant gap in how petitioners use the Inter-American Commission and Court as tools in 
the struggle to achieve transformative social and cultural change. Furthermore, the Commission and 
Court have the Convention of Belém do Pará at their disposal, but have been reluctant to apply the 
Convention in reproductive rights cases.  
 
Over the next decade the Inter-American System of Human Rights will certainly be confronted with 
women’s reproductive rights cases.82 With each opportunity it will be important for civil society, 
victim’s representatives and the Inter-American Commission and Court to learn from the lessons of 
the three cases highlighted in this report. Litigators must focus on developing a structural picture of 
women’s rights violations (reproductive rights as well as violence against women), placing heavy 
emphasis on gender-discrimination. In part, this can be achieved by calling on the Commission and 
Court to review cases with Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention of Belém do Pará in mind. Based on the 
development of a structural argument, it will then be necessary for litigators and the Commission to 
use particular care in designing reparations that address gender-discrimination, and that can be 
defined and measured qualitatively and quantitatively. Ultimately, it will be the responsibility of civil 
society and victim’s representatives to challenge the status quo and subsequently shift the Inter-
American System’s approach to women’s rights violations. Hopefully this report will play a small role 
in the advancement of women’s reproductive health rights within the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Potential upcoming reproductive rights cases: I.V. v. Bolivia, Admissibility, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 
40/08 (July 23, 2008), FS v Chile, Admissibility, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 52/14 (July 21, 2014); AN v. 
Costa Rica (2008), Beatriz v. El Salvador (2013), and Aurora v. Costa Rica (2013). 
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Participants 
* Individual names in bold represent individual perspectives, not necessarily those of the participant’s 
organizations or affiliations. 
 
The findings outlined in this report reflect opinions, perspectives and information obtained through 
interviews conducted June through September of 2014, with representatives from women’s rights 
NGOs, human rights NGOs, state departments, the medical community, the Inter-American 
Commission and the Inter-American Court, as well as human rights lawyers, and experts in gender 
and sexuality. A sincere thank you is most definitely in order to everyone who participated in this 
research - without the generous donation of your time and knowledge this project would not have 
been possible.  
 
 
Peru 
PROMSEX (Center of the Promotion and Defense of Sexual and Reproductive Rights) - Ysabel Marín 
Sandoval (Human Rights Attorney)  
 
INPARRES (Peruvian Institute of Responsible Parenthood) - Daniel Aspicuelta (Director) 
 
Flora Tristán - Cecilia Olea Mauleón (Women’s Rights Researcher) and Liz Meléndez (Executive Director) 
 
Manuela Ramos - Rocío Pilar Puente Tolentino (Coordinator of the Sexual and Reproductive Rights Program) 
and Milena Justo Nieto (Human Rights Attorney)  
 
Catholics for the Right to Decide - Gladys Vía Huerta (Program Coordinator) 
 
Ombudsman, Rights of Women Department - Carolina Garcés Peralta (Women’s Rights Ombudsman), with 
Diana Portal Farfán, Sheilah Jacay, and Carla Villareal López 
 
Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations - Marcela Huaita Alegre (Vice Minister of Women) 
 
Ministry of Health - Gloria Marisela Mallqui Osorio (Executive Deputy, Vice Minister’s office) 
 
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights - Roger Rafael Rodriguez Santander (Director, Executive Secretary of 
the National Council of Human Rights) 
 
Jeannette Llaja - Former Director of DEMUS (Study for the Defense of Women’s Rights)  
 
Beatriz Ramirez Huaroto - Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations (Advisor to the Ministry of Women) 
 
Luis Távara, MD - Sexual and Reproductive Health Consultant 
 
 
Mexico 
GIRE (Information Group on Reproductive Choice) - Rebecca Ramos (Legal Investigator) 
 
MEXFAM (Mexican Foundation for Family Planning, A.C.) - Doroteo Mendoza (Manager of Evaluation, 
Investigation and Information Systems)  
 
Equidad de Género (Gender Equality): Citizenship, Work and Family, A.C. - María Eugenia Romero 
Contreras (Director) 
 
CIMAC (Communication and Information for Women, A.C.) - Lucía Lagunes Huerta (General Director) 
 
National Center for Gender Equality and Reproductive Health Centro (Directorate General for 
Reproductive Health) - Rufino Luna Gordillo (General Director)  
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Cases - Luis Jardón (Director, Human Rights Litigation) 
 
José Guevara - Executive Director of the Mexican Commission of Defense and Promotion of Human Rights  
 
Marisol Aguilar – Impact Coordinator, EQUIS - Justice for Women 
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Patricia Uribe Zúñiga - Former Director of the National Center for Gender Equity and Reproductive Health, 
Under-Secretariat of Health Promotion and Prevention, Secretariat of Health 
 
Vanessa Coria - Advocacy and Program Manager, WGNRR (Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights), 
formerly with CEJIL (Center for Justice and International Law) 
 
Gender Expert - Anonymous 
 
 
Costa Rica 
ADC (Asociación Demográfica Costarricense) - Hilda Picado Granados (Executive Director) 
 
Ombudsman, Women’s Department - Ivania Solano Jiménez (Attorney for the Protection of Women from the 
Office of the Ombudsman) 
 
Adriana Maroto Vargas - Academic, Member of The Collective for the Right to Decide (La Colectiva) 
 
Dr. Delia Maria Ribas Valdés - Medical Doctor Specializing in Invitro Fertilization 
 
Jorge Oviedo (Deputy Attorney) with Amanda Grosser - General Prosecutor of the Republic, Representative 
of the State, Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica 
 
Huberth May Cantillano - Attorney, Victim Representative, Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica 
 
 
International  
Center for Reproductive Rights - Mónica Arango Olaya (Regional Director for Latin America and the 
Caribbean)  
 
Ana Cristina González Vélez, MD - Sexual and Reproductive Health Expert, Global Doctors for Choice 
 
Maria Daniela Rivero - Human Rights Attorney 
 
 
Inter-American System of Human Rights 
Oscar Parra Vera - Senior Attorney, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
 
Alexandra Sandoval - Senior Attorney, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
 
Rosa Celorio - Attorney and Specialist, Women’s Rights Desk, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
 
Alejandra Cardenas - Attorney, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, formerly with CRR (Center for 
Reproductive Rights) 
 
Luz Patricia Mejía - Technical Expert and Coordinator, MESECVI (Follow-up Mechanism to the Belém do Pará 
Convention) and former Commissioner and Rapporteur on Women’s Rights at the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights 
 
 
 
Many thanks to… 
Ana Cristina González Vélez, Par Engstrom, Beatriz Ramirez Huaroto, Paola Gómez Espinosa, 
Adriana Maroto Vargas, Lucia Lapenta, Viviana Tipiani, Carolina Corral, Muriel Vargas, and Tatiana 
Saprissa. 
 
Travel funding provided in part by the UK Society for Latin American Studies. 
 
This report was written at the Centre for International Justice and Governance at the Australian 
National University, with a visiting grant awarded by Hilary Charlesworth’s project, “Strengthening the 
International Human Rights System: Rights, regulation and ritualism” (2014). 
 
* Information about the researcher can be found at: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/profiles/303008. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. These written comments are respectfully submitted to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (“Inter-American Court”) in support of the petition made by “IV” against the State of 
Bolivia before the Inter-Commission on Human Rights (“Inter-American Commission”) on 
March 7th, 2007. 
 
2. Ciara O’Connell is a member of the Inter-American Human Rights Network1 and the Centre 
for Cultures of Reproduction, Technologies and Health.2 She is also a PhD Candidate in the 
School of Law at the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom.3 Her research is on gender-
based reparations and reproductive rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System. Diana 
Guarnizo-Peralta4 is a researcher with Dejusticia and currently leads the organization’s work 
on economic, social and cultural rights. Cesar Rodriguez Garavito5 is the Director and legal 
representer of Dejusticia. Dejusticia6  works to strengthen the rule of law and promote human 
rights in Colombia and across the Global South. It is an NGO think/do tank that produces 
rigorous research that can contribute to action for social change. Dejusticia also carries out 
direct advocacy through campaigns, litigation, education and capacity-building. 
 																																																								
1 Inter-American Human Rights Network, University College London, http://interamericanhumanrights.org/. 
2 Centre for Cultures of Reproduction, Technologies and Health, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/corth/. 
3 Ciara O’Connell, University of Sussex: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/profiles/303008. 
4 Diana Guarnizo-Peralta, Dejusticia, http://www.dejusticia.org/#!/investigador/186 
5 Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito, Dejusticia, http://www.dejusticia.org/#!/investigador/8 
6 Dejusticia, http://www.dejusticia.org/. 
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3. This case concerns the sterilization of the petitioner, “IV,” an immigrant migrant woman who 
was subjected to a tubal ligation procedure without her consent on July 1, 2000, in a public 
hospital in Bolivia. “IV” has not received justice through the Bolivian criminal court system. This 
case focuses on the violation of “IV’s” reproductive health and autonomy, and is indicative of a 
medical environment in Bolivia that is discriminatory towards women. The Inter-American 
Commission has determined that gender stereotyping and discrimination are structural 
obstacles to women’s enjoyment of their reproductive health rights, which is one of the 
foundational premises of this case. 
II. MEDICAL POWER AND WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
4. The responsibility afforded to members of the medical community in relation to women’s 
reproductive health is significant; it is loaded with power, and often leaves women in extremely 
vulnerable positions. Michele Foucault described medical doctors as “priests of the body,” 
meaning that the authority of the doctor in her/his ability to confront suffering and deny death is 
akin to the spiritual power typically afforded to priests.7 This power intensifies with regard to 
female patients because a woman’s relationship with her doctor is ripe with gendered 
assumptions based on her role as a (potential) mother. 
 
5. The power dynamic between medical professional and woman-patient is described by Kathy 
Davis as “paternalistic control.” In the concept of “paternalistic control” the doctor is given the 
power to decide in the woman’s best interest, and the woman is seen as someone in need of 
being controlled.8 When describing what paternalistic control might look like in application, 
Sally Sheldon provides the following examples: “Paternalistic control may involve influencing a 
woman to continue (or equally to terminate) a pregnancy. Equally, it may be failing to tell her 
about some of the alternatives open to her.”9 While exercising “paternalistic control” is most 
obviously done by members of the medical community, it can also be understood as a form of 
state intervention that “actively imposes the control of the woman as the doctor’s 
responsibility.”10  As Sheldon explains, the state cannot be perceived as neutral in matters of 
reproductive health. However, the state can in effect distance itself from any negative 
connotations related to its attempts to regulate women’s reproductive rights by relying on 
medical doctors to appear neutral while also “support(ing) the existing status quo and the 
power imbalance which characterizes it.”11 
 
6. According to Rebecca Cook, “the role of health professionals is to give the individual 
decision-maker medical and other health-related information that contributes to the individual's 
power of choice and does not distort or unbalance that power.”12 In that women seeking health 																																																								
7 Michele Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic (London and New York: Routledge: 1989), 32. 
8 Kathy Davis, ‘Paternalism Under the Microscope,’ in Todd, A.D. and Fisher, S. (eds.) Gender and Discourse: The 
Power of Talk (New Jersey: Ablex Publishing, 1988) 23-4. 
9 Sally Sheldon: Medical Power and Abortion Law (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 66. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 74. 
12 Rebecca Cook, “Women's Health and Human Rights: The Promotion and Protection of Women's Health through 
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services may feel dependent on their health care-giver, they may feel obliged to agree with 
what is proposed to them, “particularly when those with the power of superior knowledge of 
medicine tell them that what is proposed is for their own good.”13 
 
 7. The legal concept of informed consent, or the right to make informed choices for one's own 
future, requires that medical professionals refrain from exercising “paternalistic control,” and 
instead provide women with information that is free from coercion and personal preference. 
The International Federation of Gynecological and Obstetrics’ definition of informed consent 
contains the following: 
“It is important to keep in mind that informed consent is not a signature, but a process 
of communication and interaction. […] If physicians, for reason of their own religious or 
other beliefs, do not wish to fulfil […] the criteria for informed consent because they do 
not want to give information on some alternatives, they have an ethical obligation, as a 
matter of respect for their patients’ human rights, to disclose their objection, and to 
make appropriate referrals so that the patients may obtain the full information 
necessary to make valid choices.”14 
 
8. The asymmetrical power relationship between health care provider and woman-patient 
creates a potentially violent situation for women; her reproductive autonomy and dignity, her 
proyecto de vida, is at risk.  
III. GENDER STEREOTYPING AND THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT 
9. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights substantiated its jurisdiction over Article 7 of the 
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against 
Women (“Convention of Belém do Pará”) in the case of Gonzalez et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. 
Mexico,15 and in doing so determined that “the different Articles of the Convention of Belém do 
Pará may be used to interpret it and other pertinent Inter-American instruments.”16  
 
10. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights have developed the principle of due diligence as it applies to women through the 
Convention of Belém do Pará. The principle of due diligence is understood as including an 
obligation on the part of the state to prevent violations of women’s rights.17 Elizabeth A.H. Abi-
Mershed, current Assistant Executive Secretary of the IACHR, described the concept of due 
diligence as it is enshrined in Article 7(b) of the Convention of Belém do Para, as requiring that   
																																																																																																																																																																																								
International Human Rights Law,” Chapter 4: International Human Rights to Improve Women’s Health, 26. Available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/48440/m1s5cook.pdf. 
13 Ibid., 27.  
14 Ethical Issues in Obstetrics and Gynecology, FIGO Committee for the Study of Ethical Aspects of Human 
Reproduction and Women’s Health, October 2012, p.15. Available at: http://www.figo.org/sites/default/files/uploads/wg-
publications/ethics/English%20Ethical%20Issues%20in%20Obstetrics%20and%20Gynecology.pdf 
15 González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) 
16 November 2009. 
16 Ibid,, ¶79. 
17 “IV” v. Bolivia, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Merits, Case No. 12.655, Report No. 72/14, 15 August 2014, note 169.  
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“(S)tates parties ensure that their agents refrain from acts of violence against women, 
and […] that these states apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish such 
violence when perpetrated by non-state actors in the home, community or wherever it 
may occur. States parties undertake to ensure that these obligations are given practical 
effect and that women at risk for or subjected to violence have access to effective 
judicial protection and guarantees.”18 
 
11. Within the obligation to prevent violence against women, is the duty enshrined within 
Article 8 of the Convention of Belém do Pará: 
“(T)o modify social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, including the 
development of formal and informal educational programs appropriate to every level of 
the educational process, to counteract prejudices, customs and all other practices 
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes or on 
the stereotyped roles for men and women which legitimize or exacerbate violence 
against women.”19 [emphasis added] 
 
12. The impact of stereotyping on women and women’s lives is detrimental. Gender 
stereotypes “devalue (women’s) attributes and characteristics,” and perpetuate and reinforce 
“prejudices about women’s inferiority […] in all sectors of society.”20  Human rights legal 
institutions have a part to play in challenging both the cause and effect of gender-based 
stereotypes. According to Rebecca Cook and Simone J. Cusack, “legal and human rights 
analysis can be instrumental in diagnosing a stereotype, which is a necessary prerequisite to 
its elimination.”21 
 
13. The selection of case law summarized below introduces key developments in the Inter-
American Court’s approach to gender stereotyping. The objective of introducing these cases is 
two-fold:  
(i) To draw attention to the use of stereotypical language in women’s rights cases that 
effectively essentializes women as (potential) mothers,22 rather than challenges those 
gender-based stereotypes as they have been deemed “incompatible with international 
human rights law”23 by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
 
(ii) To highlight the need to frame violations of women’s reproductive rights within the 
larger violence against women framework (Convention of Belém do Pará), and therefore 
establish an argument to suggest that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights develop 																																																								
18 Elizabeth A.H. Abi-Mershed, “Due Diligence and the Fight Against Gender-Based Violence in the Inter-American 
System,” in Due Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence, Carin Benninger-Budel, ed., 
(Netherlands: Brill Nijhoff Law Specials, 2009) 131. 
19 Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence against Women ("Convention of Belem do Para"), 9 June 1994, Article 8(b). 
20 Rebecca Cook and Simone J. Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010) 1. 
21 Ibid., 37. 
22 Linda Alcoff, “Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory,” Signs, Vol. 13(3), 
1988, 405-436. 
23 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) 28 
November 2012, ¶302. 
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reparations specifically designed to address the harm/violation alleged under Article 7(b) 
of the Convention of Belém do Pará in IV v. Bolivia. 
 
14. Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru24 
In this case the Inter-American Court examined how violence against women relates to 
inhumane treatment.25 The Court stated that “the pregnant women who lived through the 
attack (experienced) an additional psychological suffering, since besides having seen their 
own physical integrity injured, they had feelings of anguish, despair, and fear for the lives of 
their children.”26 The Court also noted “severe solitary confinement had specific effects on the 
inmates that were mothers […] The impossibility to communicate with their children caused an 
additional psychological suffering in the inmates that were mothers.”27 
 
15. While this case is groundbreaking in that it was the first instance in which the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights applied the Convention of Belém do Pará, the Court relied 
in-part on a stereotypical view of women as mothers to determine violations of their rights 
under the Convention of Belém do Pará. As Patricia Palacios Zuloaga points out, the Inter-
American Court’s claim that women victims did not have time to become mothers because of 
their search for truth and justice, as well as its reliance on women’s “experience of 
maternity,”28 relies heavily on social stereotypes of women as mothers. According to Zuloaga, 
the Court’s “positive shift to gender justice […] fails to extend gendered logic to reparations 
and (relies) on stereotypes of women in order to find violations.”29 
 
16. González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico30 
In regards to the role of gender stereotyping in this case, the Court indicated that  
“(T)he subordination of women can be associated with practices based on persistent 
socially-dominant gender stereotypes, a situation that is exacerbated when the 
stereotypes are reflected, implicitly or explicitly, in policies and practices and, 
particularly, in the reasoning and language of the judicial police authorities, as in this 
case. The creation and use of stereotypes becomes one of the causes and 
consequences of gender-based violence against women.” 31 
 
17. Alongside a number of other reparations issued in González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. 
Mexico, the Inter-American Court ordered the State of Mexico to  
“(C)ontinue implementing permanent education and training programs and courses for 
public officials on human rights and gender, and on a gender perspective to ensure due 
diligence in conducting preliminary inquiries and judicial proceedings concerning 
																																																								
24 Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Merits, Reparations and Costs) 25 November 2006. 
25 Ibid., ¶292. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., ¶330. 
28 Patricia Palacios Zuloaga, “The Path to Gender Justice in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,” Texas Journal 
of Women and Law, Vol. 17(2), 2008, 243. 
29 Ibid., 229. 
30 González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 15. 
31 Ibid., ¶401. 
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gender-based discrimination, abuse and murder of women, and to overcome 
stereotyping about the role of women in society.” [emphasis added]32 
 
18. Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica33 
The Court examined the impact of gender-based stereotyping in this case and determined that 
the ban on IVF can affect men and women, and that the impact of the ban may have a 
disproportionate impact in women “owing to the existence of stereotypes and prejudices in 
society.”34 The Court then relied on observations from the World Health Organization to 
conclude, “while the role and status of women in society should not be defined solely by their 
reproductive capacity, femininity is often defined by motherhood.”35 
 
19. The Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica judgment included the expert witness testimony of 
Alicia Neuberger, who explained that,  
“(T)he gender identity model is socially defined and molded by the culture; its 
subsequent naturalization responds to socioeconomic, political, cultural and historic 
determinants. According to these determinants, women are raised and socialized to be 
wives and mothers, to take care of and attend to the intimate world of affections. The 
ideal for women, even nowadays, is embodied in sacrifice and dedication, and the 
culmination of these values is represented by motherhood and the ability to give birth… 
A woman’s fertility is still considered by much of society to be something natural that 
admits no doubts. [...] Motherhood has been assigned to women as an essential part of 
their gender identity, transformed into their destiny.”36 
 
20. The Inter-American Court ultimately concluded in Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica that 
“gender stereotypes are incompatible with international human rights law and measures must 
be taken to eliminate them.”37  
 
21. Despite advancements made by the Inter-American Court to draw parallels between 
gender identity, stereotyping and women’s reproductive rights violations, it is important to note 
the Court’s earlier assertion in the Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica judgment: “motherhood is 
an essential part of the free development of a woman’s personality.”38 The Inter-American 
Court relied on the concept of motherhood to find a violation of the right to private life under 
the American Convention on Human Rights.  
 
22. Although the Inter-American Court emphasized the role of gender stereotyping on 
women’s enjoyment of their reproductive rights in Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, it did not 
address the issue of gender stereotyping in the reparations. The Convention of Belém do Pará 
was not included in Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, which limited the ability of the Court to 																																																								
32  González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 15, at ¶602 (22). 
33 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Merits, Reparations, & Costs) 28 
November 2012. 
34 Ibid., ¶294. 
35 Ibid., ¶296. 
36 Ibid., ¶298. 
37 Ibid., ¶302. 
38 Ibid., ¶143. 
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issue reparation that would address the impact of gender-based harm in this case. The gap 
between gender reasoning and reparation in this case indicates the need to develop women’s 
reproductive rights cases within the violence against women legal framework. 
 
23. Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala39 
In regards to gender stereotyping in this case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
determined that 
“(G)ender stereotyping refers to pre-conditioned attributes, behaviors or possessed 
characteristics or roles that are, or should be performed by men and women 
respectively, and it is possible to associate the subordination of women with practices 
based on socially dominant and persistent gender stereotypes. In this sense, their 
creation and use becomes one of the causes and consequences of gender violence 
against women, these conditions are aggravated when reflected, implicitly or explicitly, 
in policy and practice, particularly in the reasoning and as language of state 
authorities.” 40 
 
24. In the reparations issued for this case, the Inter-American Court ordered the State to 
“…incorporate within the National Education System curriculum, at all levels, a 
permanent education program on the need to eradicate gender-based discrimination, 
gender stereotypes and violence against women in Guatemala, in light of the 
international standards on these matters and the jurisprudence of this Court.”41    
 
25. While the Inter-American Court has consistently ordered gender-based reparations in 
women’s rights cases, it elected not to do so in Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, which was 
its first women’s reproductive rights case. IV v. Bolivia presents an opportunity for the Inter-
American Court to articulate and develop the inherent connection between violence against 
women, as it is addressed through the Convention of Belém do Pará, and violations of 
women’s reproductive rights. Furthermore, the Inter-American Court has the opportunity to 
issue gender-based reparations designed to prevent violations of women’s reproductive rights. 
 
 
IV. “IV” V. BOLIVIA: RISK OF REPETITION AND THE NEED FOR GENERAL REPAIR 
(GUARANTEES OF NON-REPETITION)  
26. The Court has generally been open to ordering general forms of redress (guarantees of 
non-repetition) no just in cases of systemic violations of human rights,42 but also in those 
cases where there is a risk of repetition. In cases involving health care personnel, the Court 
has awarded human rights training in order to prevent the repetition of a violation or a 
particular situation. For example, in cases related to medical malpractice the Court ordered the 
state to implement human rights training for justice operators and health care professionals in 
																																																								
39 Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R, (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, & Costs) 19 
November 2015. 
40 Ibid., ¶180.  
41 Ibid., p. 101, ¶13. 
42 González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 15, and Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala, supra note 39.	
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relation to patients’ rights.43 Reparation measures were awarded as a way to disseminate 
information about patients’ rights and to facilitate access to justice for patients whose rights 
had been violated. Also, in Ximénes-Lópes v. Brasil, 44 a case related to inadequate treatment 
and hospitalization of persons with mental disabilities, the Court ordered the state to develop 
training and education programs for medical personal and all people working in mental health 
institutions, which would include the standards and guidelines related to the treatment of 
people with mental disabilities. In this case, training was necessary in order to transform health 
care structures and the behavior of a medical community that did not adequately treat people 
with mental disabilities.  
 
27. In regards to the present case, there is a culture of gender bias and stereotyping among 
medical personnel in Bolivia that makes the possibility of repetition of this violation very likely. 
While the 1998 Bolivian Health Regulations45 establish a duty for doctors to request patients’ 
voluntary and informed consent prior to performing a tubal ligation procedure, in practice, 
medical professionals in Bolivia do not always apply these regulations in a consistent way. In a 
report published by the Center for Reproductive Rights in 2001, it was found that the 
requirements to access such services were not being wholly complied with by medical 
personnel in Bolivia. For example, in a visit carried out to the Hospital Materno Infantil Germán 
Urquidi in Cochabamba, the informed consent forms developed by the Bolivian Health 
Regulation were not found in the hospital.46 Instead, there was a general authorization form 
that allowed medical doctors to practice “all the necessary tests”.47 There is no recent data that 
shows the level of compliance with the obligation to request informed consent in Bolivia. 
However, the fact that the State does not provide information about the real compliance with 
this duty should be understood as an indication that the situation has not improved. Even 
though there is no specific evidence showing that the lack of compliance with the regulation is 
due to the existence of a gender bias, section two of this amicus already indicated how the 
medical community very often exercises “paternalistic control” in relation to women’s health. 
 
28. In fact, other reports have shown how particular practices in the medical community 
actually hinder the application of Bolivian laws. For example, in 2014 the Plurinational 
Constitutional Tribunal of Bolivia deemed unconstitutional the practice of requiring women to 
obtain judicial authorization in order to access legal abortion services in the case of rape.  
However, according to information from Amnesty International, medical professionals and 
prosecutors in Bolivia have not complied with this judgment; they are still requiring judicial 																																																								
43 Albán-Cornejo et al. v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R, (Merits, Reparations and Costs) 22 November 2007, ¶164; and 
Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R, (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations & Costs) 21 May 2013, ¶206. 
44 Ximénes-Lópes v. Brasil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R, (Merits, Reparations and Costs) 4 July 2006, ¶250.  
45 Norma Boliviana de Salud (Bolivian Health Standard) MSPS-98: Anticoncepción Quirúrgica Voluntaria [Voluntary 
Surgical Contraception], Volume 1, Oclusión Tubárica Bilateral en Riesgo Reproductivo [Bilateral Tube Ligation in cases 
of Reproductive Risk], approved by the Ministry of Health through Ministerial Resolution No. 517, November 17, 1998. In 
addition, Article 37 of the Code of Ethics and Medical Deontology of the Medical Association of Bolivia states that: “A 
person may only be sterilized in response to his or her express, voluntary and documented request for sterilization, or in 
the event of therapeutic necessity determined strictly by a medical board." 
46 Center for Reproductive Rights, “Derechos de la Mujer en Bolivia: Un informe Sombra,”  9. Available at 
http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Bolivia%20CESCR%202001%20Spa.pdf  
47 Ibid. 
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authorization to perform abortions in cases of rape. Amnesty International has determined that 
“a decisive work of dissemination and education is going to be necessary since there is 
confusion and lack of information about this topic in the health services, police, prosecutors, 
ombudsman and other personnel in charge of the compliance of this ruling.”48  
 
29. In addition, CEDAW Committee recently expressed its concern “about the persistence of 
discriminatory stereotypes about the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family 
and in the larger society that perpetuate discrimination against women in areas such as […], 
health […],” in relation to Bolivia.49  
 
30. If the Inter-American Court of Human Rights does not provide specific reparation measures 
designed to transform gender bias and stereotyping culture within the Bolivian medical 
profession, and society in general, there is a high likelihood that violations of women’s 
reproductive rights, such as those experience by “IV” in this case, will continue to occur in 
Bolivia. 
V. DEVELOPING GENDER-BASED REPARATIONS IN “IV” V. BOLIVIA 
31. We suggest that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights exercise its motu propio 
capacity in order to issue guarantee of non-repetition reparations designed to address gender 
stereotyping and discrimination within the Bolivian medical sector. We suggest that for each of 
the three reparations below, the Inter-American Court requires the State to submit a follow-up 
report twice yearly. 
     Reparation Suggestion:  
The Court orders the State to, within a reasonable time, adopt education and training 
programs to be delivered to medical students and current medical professionals in the themes 
of informed consent and gender-based discrimination and stereotyping. The training should be 
conducted as part of a permanent aspect of medical education and training, and should be 
developed in conjunction with civil society and the national Ombudsman Office.  
 
32. In addition, because gender-based stereotyping and discrimination intersect with other 
social factors such as race, ethnicity, economic and citizenship status, and sexuality, we urge 
the Inter-American Court to order a reparation designed to address gender stereotyping and 
discrimination on a broader scale in Bolivia, as it did in its 2015 case, Velásquez Paiz et al. v. 
Guatemala.50  
 Reparation Suggestion: 
The Court orders the State, within a reasonable time, to incorporate within the public education 
system, at all levels, a permanent education program on the need to eradicate gender-based 
discrimination, gender stereotypes and violence against women in Bolivia, in light of the 
international standards on these matters and the jurisprudence of this Court. 																																																								
48 Amnesty International, “Bolivia: Informe para el Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación contra la Mujer de las 
Naciones Unidas, 61ª Session, 6-24 de julio de 2015,” 12.  
49 UN, CEDAW (2015) Concluding Observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, UN. Doc. CEDAW/C/BOL/CO/5-6, ¶16.  
50 Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala, supra note 39. 
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33. Finally, with reference to the recommendations made by the Inter-American Commission in 
its Merits Report,51 we suggest that the Court order the State to adopt an informed consent 
framework for medical professionals that reflects the criteria of the International Federation of 
Gynecological and Obstetrics (FIGO).52  
 Reparation Suggestion: 
The Court orders the State, within a reasonable time, to update its standard and domestic 
regulations on informed consent, which will be distributed to and upheld by members of the 
Bolivian Medical Community. The Standard should reflect international standards such the 
ones developed by World Health Organization and the International Federation of 
Gynecological and Obstetrics’ criteria on informed consent. 
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51 “IV” v. Bolivia, supra note 17 at ¶187(4). 
52  Ethical Issues in Obstetrics and Gynecology, supra note 14, at 14. 	
